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Abstract 
 
Despite its benefits, online peer-to-peer lending bears the risks associated with 
traditional forms of institutionalised lending. However, because individuals have 
taken over the role of the institutional lender, and the institutional participant in 
this form of lending takes a step back by acting only as an intermediary between 
the borrowers and lenders, ordinary individuals are left to bear the type of risks 
that institutions have traditionally borne, but without the same means of doing so. 
There has been little academic analysis of the role and form that regulation should 
take in the regulation of peer-to-peer lending and most discussions centre on the 
American regulatory experience.  
This thesis sets out to examine the theoretical classification of online peer-to-peer 
lending and the theoretical and practical justifications for regulating it. The aim is 
to ascertain the most appropriate way to regulate peer-to-peer lending, taking into 
account the underlying conceptual model which underpins it. The study adopts a 
theoretical analysis of P2PL participants and regulation based on the concepts of 
consumer protection and paternalism. It includes a doctrinal analysis of the UK 
peer-to-peer lending legislation and regulation to identify, describe and explain 
the rules pertaining to the industry. It also uses a comparative approach to 
compare P2PL with existing forms of financial lending and similar 
(dis)intermediated forms of transacting between individuals to show that online 
peer-to-peer lending is a unique form of intermediated transaction.  
The thesis argues that it is important that regulation displays an understanding of 
the underlying conceptual framework of the business model it aims to regulate. 
In doing so, it also argues that the peer-to-peer lending users are more than just 
‘consumers’. They demonstrate a shift in the conception of individuals from 
consumers to prosumers because they participate in the production side of the 
services they receive. It goes further than existing discussions of prosumption by 
positing the concept of the ‘lendsumer’ to give a more accurate account of the 
role and experiences of peer-to-peer lenders and the effect this has on their 
transactional relationships and the risks they face because of this role. Based on 
this analysis, the thesis shows that the UK regulatory regime has limited suitability 
because it lacks awareness of the underlying prosumption model of peer-to-peer 
lending, focusing only on the business-to-consumer aspects. Consequently, it 
does not resolve all the issues resulting from the tripartite, participatory nature of 
the peer-to-peer lending transaction.  
In light of these findings, the thesis proposes the regulatory use of two main 
concepts and highlights their implications for peer-to-peer lending regulation. The 
first is the ‘lendsumer’ as a new paradigm of the consumer which has implications 
for the regulatory protections afforded to the P2P lenders. The second is the use 
of gatekeeper liability, adapted to online peer-to-peer lending, as a way to affect 
these protections in light of the particular vulnerabilities and risks experienced by 
the peer-to-peer lender. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
1.1 Context: The Emergence of P2P Form of Financial Intermediation 
 
Peer–to-peer lending (P2PL) is a fast-growing financial service industry, which 
enables individuals to borrow and lend to each other. It has existed within the 
peripheral lending economy for centuries in the form of friendly societies, payday 
loans and microcredit. Like P2PL these institutions were, and still are, forms of 
lending between members of the community, friends and neighbours,1 but unlike 
P2PL they exist predominantly in the physical world. However, lending between 
individuals has ‘re-emerged’ on a larger scale because people are more able to 
connect and interact through organised networks on the internet and due to the 
recent financial crisis which caused banks to tighten their guidelines on lending.2 
It has been acclaimed as a phenomenon which could help fill the space left by 
traditional banks in the lending industry in the wake of the financial crisis because 
of their weariness in relation to lending,3 by providing people with an alternative 
option for borrowing and saving. The combination of these factors has meant that 
consumers and small businesses, who have found it difficult to obtain credit 
following the crisis, now have an alternative means of doing so.4 The significance 
is that P2PL platforms have the potential to become mainstream competitors to 
institutional forms of lending and raising capital. However, as the P2PL industry 
grows and wields a greater share of the consumer lending market,  a growing 
number of individuals will use platforms to lend and borrow credit and, 
consequently, be exposed to the risks. This raises the important questions of 
whether and how regulation steps in to regulate those risks in the interests of the 
people who will be using the platforms’ services and whether such regulation 
adequately considers the risks and business model.   
 
                                                          
1 Alex Brill, ‘Peer-to-Peer Lending: Innovative Access To Credit And The Consequences Of 
Dodd-Frank’ (2010) 25 Wash L Found L Backgrounder 1, 1. 
2 ibid. 
3 Margareta Pagano, ‘Peer-to-peer lending boom could make banks obsolete’ The Independent, 
(London, 17 December 2012) <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/peertopeer-
lending-boom-could-make-banks-obsolete-8421241.html> accessed 20 January 2013. 
4 Jack R Magee, ‘Peer-to-Peer Lending in the United States: Surviving after Dodd-Frank’ (2011) 
15 NC Banking Inst 139, 40; Alan Krueger, ‘In Credit Crisis, Some Turn to Online Peers for 
Cash’ (Economix Blog, 14 October 2008) <http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/10/14/in-
credit-crisis-some-turn-to-online-peers-for-cash/> accessed 8 July 2012. 
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P2PL is a form of financial intermediation because of the platforms’ role of 
facilitating lending between different parties, and the industry performs a similar 
role to more traditional forms of financial intermediation such as bank lending. In 
traditional forms of lending, institutions such as banks and credit unions enable 
borrowers to raise capital by transforming the funds deposited by savers into 
loans. P2PL differs from this because the platforms’ role does not include such 
transformation of capital and they do not contractually participate in the actual 
lending transaction. Although, they are involved in the administration of the loan 
– which is where their level of intermediation or involvement can be said to be 
highest and in which their potential for accountability or liability for wrongs or 
failures carried out on their platforms can be found, as will be argued in Chapter 
Five.  
 
However, because of the platforms’ role of simplifying the lending process by 
removing the need for other intermediaries, such as brokers and banks and their 
role of facilitating direct lending between individuals, P2PL can be framed within 
the context of the movement towards financial disintermediation. Financial 
disintermediation aims to remove intermediaries from a process, supply chain or 
market. in the context of P2PL, the intermediaries are removed from the lending 
process. Other examples of financial disintermediation include the raising of 
capital in the capital markets instead of using banks. Although, the extent to which 
this applies can be questioned because other intermediaries can be found 
operating within the capital markets also, such as fund managers and brokers. 
Indeed, Lin has pointed out that despite the rhetoric of disintermediation, many 
attempts to disrupt and disintermediate financial transactions actually create new 
intermediaries because of the way the financial markets are connected.5 This 
implies that if disintermediation is only partial or non-existent, platforms are able 
to distance themselves from accountability towards individual P2PL transactions. 
This means P2P lenders can find themselves in a situation where although they 
bear the risks faced by traditional lenders, e.g. loan default and the inability to 
recover debts, they do not have the capacity to do so themselves and instead 
rely on a non-contractual party, i.e. the platforms to do so for them. Consequently, 
most of the control within the P2PL process remains with a third party, except 
                                                          
5 Tom CW Lin, ‘Infinite Financial Intermediation’ (2015) 50 Wake Forest Law Review 643, 644. 
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there are little to no contractual rights of enforcement against them for failure to 
perform their role in the P2PL process as platforms do not provide guarantees 
against such lending risks.  
 
A subset of the disintermediation movement, in which P2PL also exists, is the 
collaborative or sharing economy. The sharing economy is the collective name 
for peer-to-peer markets which enable supply-side flexibility and use 
technological innovations like the internet and smartphone applications.6 
Technological innovation enables businesses to simplify market entry for 
suppliers whilst supply-side flexibility means that users can enter and exit the 
available supply of service providers at will.7 For example, Uber, the smartphone 
application links passengers directly with independent contractors who drive 
private cars rather than employees driving company vehicles.8 It also enables 
drivers to easily add or remove themselves from the available pool of drivers 
through the smartphone application.9 Similarly, Airbnb represents 
disintermediation within the hotel industry as it enables individuals to host guests 
in their spare rooms or apartments by listing their availability on the Airbnb 
platform.  
 
Other examples include eBay and Alibaba which are online platforms that enable 
individuals to buy and sell products directly with each other on a consumer-to-
consumer basis. They are disintermediated in the sense that these sale 
transactions transpire directly between sellers and retailers in the absence of 
wholesalers and stores. Facebook is another example, it is a social networking 
platform which enables people to connect with each other online and share 
videos, messages and photographs. It has been used by individuals to raise 
money for other people, such as the case of Katie Cutler setting up a fundraising 
page and raising £300,000 worth of donations for Alan Barnes, a man who was 
                                                          
6 Georgios Zervas, Davide Proserpio and John Byers, ‘The Rise of the Sharing Economy: 
Estimating the Impact of Airbnb on the Hotel Industry’ (Social Science Research Network 2016) 
SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2366898 2 <http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2366898> accessed 18 
July 2016. 
7 ibid. 
8 Alex Rosenblat and Luke Stark, ‘Uber’s Drivers: Information Asymmetries and Control in 
Dynamic Work’ (Social Science Research Network 2015) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2686227 2 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2686227> accessed 18 July 2016. 
9 Zervas, Proserpio and Byers (n 6) 2. 
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assaulted outside of his home in Low Fell, Gateshead;10 and even to livestream 
real-life events directly to millions of other users, as in the case of Diamond 
Reynolds livestream of the aftermath of her boyfriend’s shooting at the hands of 
police in Minnesota, USA.11 In the same vein, P2PL simplifies the process of 
lending by creating an online space for ordinary people to loan their money to 
other people; the online mechanism of the platform streamlines this process by 
cutting transaction and overhead costs typically associated with bricks-and-
mortar institutional lending. 
 
A significant difference between traditional forms of intermediation and 
disintermediated services within the sharing economy is that the intermediaries 
no longer operate on a purely business-to-consumer (B2C) model. Rather, there 
is an emphasis on C2C-type intermediated roles. P2PL exists within the same 
context of C2C intermediation in the financial sector. The movement away from 
focusing on the business towards empowering individuals reflects the same 
philosophical idea underpinning the concept of consumer responsibilisation: 
empowering consumers so they can protect their own interests. However, despite 
this transition giving individuals the opportunity to do more for themselves, their 
exposure to supply-side production roles traditionally performed by businesses 
exposes them to similar risks because of their increased participation in the 
production of their own services or products. This necessitates a consideration of 
how these risks can be mitigated by regulation to protect their interests.  
 
Another key issue of the type of disintermediation exhibited by the sharing 
economy is the extent to which the platforms can be held legally or otherwise 
accountable for the conduct of users of their intermediary services. The 
disintermediation of the services has led some platforms within the sharing 
economy to downplay such responsibility. For example, Uber often claims to be 
“just an app,” which enables drivers to become more entrepreneurial, however, it 
                                                          
10 BBC, ‘Alan Barnes: Fundraiser Katie Cutler Meets Mugging Victim’ BBC News (Tyne & Wear, 
1 February 2015) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-tyne-31080227> accessed 18 July 
2016; Chris Brooke and Hugo Gye, ‘Disabled Mugging Victim to Buy New Home as Donations 
Reach £280,000’ Mail Online (1 February 2015) <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2935072/Disabled-4ft-6in-mugging-victim-buy-new-home-donations-exceed-200-000-
mark.html> accessed 18 July 2016. 
11 Hannah Kuchler, ‘Facebook’s role as live broadcaster questioned’ Financial Times Weekend 
(London, 9/10 July 2016) 6. 
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has considerable control over how the drivers carry out their jobs such as 
monitoring, predictive and real-time scheduling management, implicit and explicit 
rules about driver performance.12 Similarly, the innovative development of 
Facebook’s live broadcasting service, Facebook Live and Twitter’s Periscope, 
which provides a similar service, and their use by individuals to record live footage 
of events such as riots, the aftermath of terrorist attacks and the above police 
shooting case, has led to calls for these platforms to employ senior editors to 
manage the uploaded content or to be regulated in the same way traditional news 
broadcasters and newspapers are for their editorial responsibilities.13 This 
highlights the fact that despite the rhetoric of disintermediation, platforms within 
the sharing economy often do still play a significant role within C2C transactions. 
This suggests they can and should be held responsible for failures within the 
service by their users. This is demonstrated in more detail in relation to P2PL in 
Chapter Five. 
 
The chief form of P2PL is an unsecured consumer loan transaction brokered by 
an online platform. The platform facilitates direct finance between individuals by 
enabling them to lend and borrow money from each other without the 
intermediation of institutional lenders such as banks and credit unions.14 Zopa is 
a leading P2PL platform in the UK. Its operations provide a typical idea of how 
online P2PL platforms operate. However, P2PL is an industry with varying 
business models and more are bound to be formulated as the industry continues 
to grow. What follows is a description of how Zopa works. 
In the UK, and indeed worldwide, Zopa was the first online P2PL website.15 Others 
include Ratesetter and Funding Circle in the UK and Prosper in the U.S.A. Set up 
in March 2005, it stands for ‘zone of possible agreement,’ which is the range 
between the lowest one person is prepared to get for something, and the highest 
                                                          
12 Rosenblat and Stark (n 8) 3. 
13 Kuchler, (n 11) 6. 
14 Brill (n 1) 1; Magee (n 4) 139; Andrew Verstein, ‘The Misregulation of Person-to-Person 
Lending’ (2011) 45 UCDL Rev 445, 452. 
15 Seth Freedman and Ginger Zhe Jin, ‘Do Social Networks Solve Information Problems for 
Peer-to-Peer Lending? Evidence from Prosper.Com’ (2008) NET Institute Working Paper 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1304138> accessed 10 December 2013; Ana Cecilia Briceño 
Ortega and Frances Bell, ‘Online Social Lending: Borrower-Generated Content’ (2008) 4 
<http://aisel.aisnet.org/amcis2008/380> accessed 10 December 2013. 
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another person is prepared to give up for something.16 There are three 
participants in online P2PL: platforms, borrowers and lenders. On Zopa, users 
set up an account and register as either a lender or borrower, usually using 
pseudonyms. Borrowers fill out an application like a bank application form, and 
give Zopa permission to access data on them. A combination of information that 
borrowers provide and information that Zopa purchases from Equifax and Credit 
Bureau enables Zopa to score borrowers with a unique credit scoring. The four 
categories are A*, A, B and C, A* being the borrowers with the highest credit 
score. This enables the platform to manage risk of default for the lenders because 
by investigating the borrowers’ reliability and ability to repay debts, they can 
minimise the probability that lenders will experience losses from delinquent 
payments. It also decreases this chance by filtering out the worst or poorest type 
of borrower from the good ones that have some form of profit potential. 
Borrowers seeking a loan request a quote by stating how much they want to 
borrow and for how long. Zopa matches this information with potential lenders, 
who have previously set out the conditions on which they are prepared to lend. 
For example, their interest rates, the length of time they are prepared to lend for 
and the credit ratings of the borrowers that they wish to lend to.17 The Zopa 
lending FAQs suggest that lenders can decide their own interest rates by looking 
at what other lenders are doing. Thus, in the spirit of providing a truly direct, 
consumer-to-consumer exchange, Zopa takes a background role and provides 
them with the information to make their own choices. The lenders therefore 
choose to lend at their own risk. 
Compared with traditional bank lending which is funded by customers’ bank 
deposits and lent out to other bank customers unknown to the depositors, lenders 
on Zopa are invested with greater decision-making responsibilities.18 As with most 
lending platforms, Zopa is not party to the loan contracts that it matches. Zopa’s 
role is merely to facilitate the making of contracts by managing risk, ensuring that 
the losses suffered by lenders is as low as possible and within the expectations 
it has set, and providing information to the participants. So, whilst lenders have 
                                                          
16 Zopa, ‘Frequently Asked Questions’ <http://uk.zopa.com/help/help-faqs-interested#regulated> 
accessed 11February 2013. 
17 Evan Davis, Interview with Gile Andrews, Chief executive of Zopa, ‘Alternative Finance’ The 
Bottom Line (BBC, February 17, 2013). 
18 Ana Cecilia Briceño Ortega and Frances Bell (n 15). 
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increased involvement in the lending process, they must bear the risk of a 
borrower failing to repay their loan themselves. 
Zopa also spreads risk by diversifying the lenders’ funds. Whilst the average 
lenders on Zopa lend £5,000, this can be spread across numerous borrowers in 
units of £10.19 Zopa assembles the cheapest loan it can out of these £10 units 
and presents them to the borrower as a quote. Each loan is unique to the 
borrower’s request for a quote and assembled in real time, so the loans are not 
pre-packaged products which are sold to the borrower.20 
The main selling point of P2PL is that it saves money by eliminating the 
intermediating bank, consequently borrowers are offered much lower interest 
rates and lenders can expect higher returns.21 Borrowers benefit because P2PL 
provides individuals, small businesses and entrepreneurs with access to credit 
when they may be excluded from traditional loan sources.22 Meanwhile, investors 
can diversify their portfolios, thus reducing risk.23 Unlike traditional securitisation 
markets where loans are packaged into complex bundles and sold to investors, 
online P2PL investors can see all the details related to each loan.24 So P2PL 
platforms promise a simpler, more transparent lending landscape where P2P 
borrowers (P2PBs) know who they are liable to and P2P lenders (P2PLs) know 
which borrowers owe them money.25 
 
1.2 Research Problems 
 
Despite its benefits, P2PL still bears the risks associated with traditional banking 
forms, including: money-laundering; consumer privacy and data protection 
concerns; terrorism financing and identity theft caused because P2PL platforms 
connect borrowers and lenders over matters of shared identity. The risk of 
                                                          
19 Zopa, ‘Frequently Asked Questions’ <http://uk.zopa.com/help/help-faqs-interested#regulated> 
accessed 11February 2013. 
20 ibid. 
21 Verstein, (n 14) 457; Magee (n 4) 143. 
22 Magee (n 4) 145; Verstein (n 21) 460. 
23 Magee (n 4) 139; Verstein (n 21) 460. 
24 Jane J Kim, ‘Peer-to-Peer Lender Relaunched - MarketWatch’ (The Wall Street Journal, 28 
April 2009) D5 <http://www.marketwatch.com/story/peer-to-peer-lender-relaunched> accessed 
5 July 2012. 
25 Verstein (n 14) 463. 
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fraudulent borrowing may be higher online.26  It is also unlikely that individual 
P2PLs will have adequately researched or understood the risks of P2PL, so 
inexperienced lenders may be susceptible to intentional misleading27 particularly 
in models where their decisions to lend are based on personal stories presented 
by borrowers describing the purpose of their borrowing.  
 
Further, in the event of default, lenders are dependent on the platforms and the 
businesses they contract to recuperate losses from defaulting borrowers.28 In the 
worst case scenario where the platform collapses, lenders cannot independently 
pursue debt collection.29 Even if they did, because online users are often 
anonymous, identifying them and their location may prove difficult.30 On one hand, 
this is beneficial as it prevents the spread of personal information and the use of 
intimidation to recuperate unpaid debt. On the other hand, platforms are 
notoriously bad at recuperating debt,31 for example when Quakle, a UK P2PL 
platform, collapsed in 2011 many lenders were left with minimal chance of 
recovering their money.32 This is particularly the case because in the UK, lenders 
of P2PL platforms are not covered by the Financial Services Compensation 
Scheme (FSCS). The FSCS is a compensation fund of last resort for customers 
of financial services firms authorised by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 
and the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), regulatory institutions set up by 
the UK government to regulate financial services and ensure consumer 
protection.33 The FSCS may pay compensation to customers where a business 
has stopped trading or is in default and it protects such things as deposits, 
insurance policies and home finance.34 These are issues that need to be 
considered in any regulatory regime hoping to limit the risks associated with P2PL 
                                                          
26 ibid 470. 
27 Verstein (n 14) 466. 
28 Eric C Chaffee and Geoffrey C Rapp, ‘Regulating Online Peer-to-Peer Lending in the 
Aftermath of Dodd-Frank: In Search of an Evolving Regulatory Regime for an Evolving Industry’ 
(2012) 69 Washington and Lee Law Review 485, 506. 
29 ibid. 
30 Chris Reed, Making Laws for Cyberspace (Oxford University Press 2012) 50. 
31 Chaffee and Rapp (n 28) 506. 
32 Robert Powell, ‘The Truth behind Quakle’s Collapse’ (21 December 2011) 
<http://www.lovemoney.com/news/credit-cards-current-accounts-and-loans/loans/13799/the-
truth-behind-quakles-collapse> accessed 12 February 2013. 
33 Financial Services Compensation Scheme, <http://www.fscs.org.uk/what-we-cover/about-us/> 
accessed 25 November 2013 
34 ibid. 
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online and provide adequate protection for both lending and borrowing 
consumers of the financial service. 
 
However, the current regulatory status of P2PL around the world is not uniform 
as it differs. Some countries have managed to fit it within existing financial 
regulatory structures, for example, in the USA, P2PL has been classified as 
securities and is regulated under that body of law, with the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) requiring that P2PL platforms register as issuers 
under the U.S. Securities Act of 193335. In other countries either P2PL has not 
developed enough for it to be considered a regulatory concern or they have only 
just started considering P2PL as a phenomenon that requires regulation. For 
example, in the UK, under the previous Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
(FSMA) regime, P2PL was not regulated despite its existence in the financial 
market since 2005. As a business model P2PL did not fall within the categories 
of activities that the FSMA regime considered regulated and nothing was done to 
bring it under financial regulations in the UK. However, since April 2014 it has 
been regulated by the FCA, which replaced the FSA in April 201336 and a new 
regulatory activity of “operating an electronic system in relation to lending” has 
been imposed37 to regulate the P2PL platforms with the aim of protecting P2P  
lenders and borrowers. 
Current P2PL regulation in the UK focuses on national operation, i.e. both 
platforms and customers that are based in the UK and not foreign nationals. 
There has been a distinct lack of desire to harmonise national regulation with 
other countries’ existing regulations. The fact the UK regime considers P2PL as 
a form of lending activity, whereas the USA has regulated it as a form of securities 
investment, may preclude a UK-based platform from easily transferring its 
operations to the USA and vice versa. This is because no specific consideration 
has been made for the potential globalisation of P2PL. As P2PL platforms are 
based online, rather than in a particular physical place of operation, and because 
people can access a website from anywhere in the world, it is typically differences 
                                                          
35 Verstein (n 14) 448. 
36 Simon Read, ‘Peer-to-Peer Lenders Get a Boost from Regulation’ (The Independent, 8 
December 2012) <http://www.independent.co.uk/money/spend-save/peertopeer-lenders-get-a-
boost-from-regulation-8393637.html> accessed 21 March 2013. 
37 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) (No2) Order 
2013, SI 2013/1881 3 36(H). 
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in national regulations that inhibit the international operation of online businesses 
like P2PL platforms. However, whether the actual regulations themselves, will 
preclude the use of P2P platforms by foreign nationals, thus inhibiting the growth 
of the platforms into international P2PL sites rather than just national or regional 
ones, will depend on their terms. This does highlight one potential problem with 
the regulation of an online lending business that needs to be considered. 
Contrary to some claims, the online P2PL system has not completely ridden the 
lending market of intermediaries, as the platforms intermediate between lenders 
and borrowers that use their service. Many platforms, use auction mechanisms 
with which lenders can compete with each other to lend to particular borrowers 
and although the lending activities are considered to be direct P2PL, detailed 
examination of the cash flow movements on such sites, indicates that the cash 
does not move directly from the lender to the borrower, and the repayments from 
the borrower to the lender.38 Rather, platforms tend to take on an intermediary 
role and take commission for their operations.39 Their basic intermediary role is 
that of exchange facilitation.40 Online P2PL therefore also necessitates a 
consideration of the regulation of intermediaries and what their liabilities to their 
customers should be. In the interests of lender protection, regulations may need 
to consider in greater detail whether it is worth holding P2PL platforms liable as 
third parties for the conduct of P2PL participants. This is an issue that the FCA 
has not looked at in its new rules. 
 
Online P2P platforms may rely on credit ratings of the borrowers provided either 
by third party credit ratings agencies or by themselves, to inspire the trust of 
lenders in the borrowers’ ability to pay back. Albeit, the final decision lies with the 
lender who chooses the risk level of the borrower he or she decides to lend to. 
One possible question therefore, is whether online P2PL platforms can ever be 
held liable for losses suffered by lenders e.g. because of reliance placed on 
incorrect or misleading credit ratings. Theoretically, there are two ways this could 
happen: holding the platforms liable for the poor advice given about the borrowers 
through the credit ratings. This would require either the establishment of a 
                                                          
38 Arvind Ashta and Djamchid Assadi, ‘An Analysis of European Online Micro-Lending Websites’ 
(2010) 6 Innovative Marketing 7, 8. 
39 ibid. 
40 Ashta and Assadi, (n 38) 16. 
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fiduciary duty of care towards the lenders, or it may require holding platforms 
liable for communicating misleading or incorrect information which was originally 
provided by the borrowers. For example, the information gathered from borrowers 
to produce the credit ratings or through the additional information posted on the 
P2PL discussion boards. 
With regards to the first method, the common law shows that it is possible, but 
unlikely for platforms to be held to have a fiduciary duty to P2PLs. Borrowing from 
traditional banking lender-borrower dichotomy, the general principle is that unless 
a firm clearly undertook to advise a customer, there is no duty to provide advice 
on the suitability or risks of a particular transaction from a consumer’s 
perspective. For example, in Williams & Glyn’s Bank v Barnes41 an experienced 
businessman borrowed £1 million from the bank and his company was heavily 
indebted to the bank. The company became insolvent and the bank called in the 
personal loan. The businessman claimed the bank had breached its duty to him 
in lending the personal loan when it knew the company was experiencing 
difficulties. The court held that the bank had no duty to advise unless there was 
a clear assumption of responsibility. As P2PL platforms make it clear on their 
websites that consumers’ funds are at risk and as they do not provide advice 
about lending suitability, such as which borrower(s) a particular lender should 
lend to, it is unlikely they can be shown to have clearly assumed responsibility 
towards the P2PLs. 
However, in Verity and Spindler v Lloyds Bank plc,42 Judge Robert Taylor found 
that the claimants had specifically sought the advice of a bank manager on the 
prudence of a transaction and that the bank manager had assumed the role of 
financial advisor, and been negligent in the advice provided. One factor which 
established that financial advice had been requested, was that the claimants were 
financially unsophisticated. Another factor was that the bank’s advertising 
brochure advertised free financial advice.  
However, the platforms rarely, if ever, undertake to provide financial advice to 
lenders for each transaction. Rather, they make it clear to participants that they 
are not party to the lending transactions. Although they connect lenders with 
                                                          
41 Williams and Glyn’s Bank Ltd v Barnes [1981] Com LR 205. 
42 Verity and Spindler v Lloyds Bank plc [1995] CLC 1557. 
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borrowers, their service does not include providing advice to lenders about the 
suitability or risks involved in a particular borrower or vice versa. However, the 
above case implies that even though a platform might outwardly state it does not 
provide advice, does not preclude it from being found to have done so based on 
their actions towards the P2PL users. Therefore, platform accountability can be 
justified by the platform’s actual conduct towards its users and not just based on 
what it says it does.  
One reason for regulating online platforms in their capacity as intermediaries is 
because they have access to information and communicate this information in a 
way that neither the borrower nor lender does. A platform is in a better position 
to moderate information provided by borrowers and ensure it is correct because 
they have access to the borrowers’ personal data and identification. In contrast, 
the lenders are limited to reliance on borrower information provided by the 
borrowers themselves or the platforms, which in a pseudonymous environment 
means the information can be difficult for them to verify. Without the platform’s 
involvement, misleading or inaccurate information provided by borrowers would 
not be distributed to lenders, because platforms use the information provided by 
borrowers to categorise them into the different risk categories which lenders rely 
on when making their investment choices. However, whether credit ratings 
devised by external agencies can be treated as advice that can be misleading is 
unlikely because platforms either facilitate communication between borrowers 
and lenders through a forum service or merely communicate information that the 
borrowers provide themselves during their application process to the lenders.  
By analogy, online P2PL platforms could be compared to internet search engines 
like Google. An internet user who would like to find a web page but does not know 
its specific internet address or who would like to find a selection of web pages 
concerning a chosen topic, can use a search engine to do so.43 Google enables 
users to do this by entering terms in a search field and clicking the search button, 
meanwhile Google constantly updates an index of billions of web pages which 
allows it to respond to the users’ search requests.44 However, Google has no 
control over the users’ search terms or the material available on the various 
websites it indexes. At one point, Google search results would display two types 
                                                          
43 Google Inc. v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2013] HCA 1, para 19. 
44 Google Inc. v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2013] HCA 1, para 20. 
21 
 
of results, ‘organic search results,’ ranked in order of relevance to the user’s 
search terms, and ‘sponsored links’, which is a form of advertisement created by 
or at the direction of an advertiser who pays Google to display the links. 
In the Australian case of Google Inc. v Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) 
sought to establish that Google had contravened s.52 of the Australian Trade 
Practices Act 1974 directly by producing (in the sense of creating) misleading 
sponsored links. The section provides that “[a] corporation shall not, in trade or 
commerce, engage in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or is likely to 
mislead or deceive”. Google sought to rely on the s.85(3) defence which is that it 
is a defence if the defendant establishes that he or she is a person whose 
business it is to publish or arrange for the publication of advertisements and that 
he or she received the advertisement for publication in the ordinary course of 
business and did not know and had no reason to suspect that its publication 
would amount to a contravention of s.52. 
The court rejected the ACCC’s submission. Each relevant aspect of a sponsored 
link is determined by the advertiser and the automated response of the Google 
search engine is determined by the users’ search requests. So Google did not 
author the sponsored links it displayed or published.45 It was stated that the nature 
of the internet and internet technology behind the display of a sponsored link 
following a consumer’s search request, required Google to ‘respond’ to the 
request, but this merely amounted to the assembly of information provided by 
others to display advertisements directed to Google’s users. Consequently, 
Google was seen as merely a means of communication between the advertisers 
and the consumers.46  
The High Court allowed the appeal, even though Google staff had assisted 
advertisers in the selection of keywords that would match their website to the 
internet users’ search terms because it did not demonstrate that Google 
personnel, rather than the advertisers, had chosen the relevant keywords, 
created, endorsed or adopted them. 
                                                          
45 Google Inc. v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2013] HCA 1, para 68. 
46 Google Inc. v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2013] HCA 1, para 69. 
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The similarity with online P2PL, is that just as internet search engines match an 
internet user’s search terms to related websites, the lending platform matches a 
lender’s search for a particular grade of borrower, borrowing purpose or other 
search criteria, to borrowers who correspond with those searches.47 As a 
facilitator, a lending platform has no control over the risk choices of the lenders, 
and consequently the list of borrowers which are drawn up by the search. The 
listings that are drawn up cannot be said to be misleading on this basis, 
particularly because platforms merely communicate the information about 
borrowers that they provide themselves.  
The implication of this case is that online intermediaries will not be held liable for 
third party information. In the context of P2PL, other than the imposition of a basic 
duty to verify borrowers’ information, if a similar approach were to be adopted as 
in the Google Inc. case, platforms would not be held liable to lenders for any 
misleading, deceptive or inaccurate statements provided by borrowers, which 
cause a loss to the lenders. Additionally, the FCA’s objective of ensuring 
proportionate regulation, combined with the relatively embryonic condition of the 
P2PL market, means it is unlikely that regulators will consider imposing additional 
burdens on platforms in the near future. The relationship between regulation and 
technology is often expressed in terms of a conflict, with technology embodying 
notions of enterprise and progression whilst regulation is usually associated with 
bureaucracy which stifles growth and innovation.48 This highlights the problem of 
the need for law and regulation to adapt to changes in technology without creating 
unnecessary barriers to growth. This is usually accomplished by balancing the 
regulatory principle of ensuring rules are proportional to the risks associated with 
the regulated activities, whilst also ensuring there are adequate protections for 
the consumers. 
 
 
 
                                                          
47 Alternatively, the platform also matches borrowers to lenders who have expressed a 
willingness to lend at their desired interest rates 
48 Jonathan B Wiener, ‘The regulation of technology, and the technology of regulation’ (2004) 26 
Technology in Society 483, 483. 
23 
 
1.3 Research Questions and Methodology 
 
As a result of the problems discussed above, this thesis has investigated two 
main research questions. The first main research question is: What are the 
theoretical and practical justifications for P2PL regulation? 
The subsidiary questions that have been examined under this question are: 
a. Does P2PL fit within the existing conceptions of consumer and 
consumer protection? 
 
b. Does P2PL differ from other existing kinds of financial 
intermediation?  
 
These questions are necessary because they lay the foundation for future 
arguments about how P2PL should be regulated. There are many reasons why 
a phenomenon should be regulated for example, preventing anti-competitive 
actions between businesses, protecting wider society from the risks associated 
with business conduct, to ensure the quality of a product and/or to prevent 
deceptive or unscrupulous practices by both businesses and individuals. Such 
justifications can impact the form of the regulation, the objects of regulation and 
its emphasis or direction.  
 
As an example, one reason for the imposition of competition or antitrust laws is 
to prevent companies from forming monopolies or cartels which give them close 
to total control of the market sector, because doing so might prevent start-up 
companies from entering the sector due to the high costs of doing business. 
Ultimately, the purpose of competition is to create competitive markets that 
support economic growth and provide consumers with more choice. 
Consequently, the object of competition law tends to be anti-competitive actions 
of the business actors being regulated, as opposed to the customers being 
protected, e.g. Chapter I of the Competition Act 1998 penalises individuals for 
forming cartels by making them liable to imprisonment for up to five years or 
imposing fines on them. The competition rules tend to focus on preventing anti-
competitive behaviour rather than improving the circumstances of the customers 
affected by it, which falls under consumer protection rules. 
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Similarly, if the problem to be resolved are the risks associated with institutional 
lending on the wider financial market, then regulation is most likely to focus on 
the bank or depository institution as the object of regulation rather than the 
customer, for example, capital requirements are imposed on the banks to ensure 
they are able to sustain operating losses whilst maintaining their ability to honour 
their customers’ deposit withdrawals. 
 
Therefore, it is necessary to understand why a phenomenon needs to be 
regulated e.g. whether because of the risks it involves or its benefit to society. 
The sub-questions are also significant because they necessitate a better 
understanding of the way P2PL works. This contributes to the overarching 
question of why it needs to be regulated because by understanding how a 
phenomenon works it is possible to determine the appropriateness of the 
regulatory approach adopted and the appropriateness of which participant is 
regulated within the sector. Doing so enables one to determine whether 
regulation is proportionate and efficient. 
 
The thesis adopts a theoretical analysis of P2PL regulation from the consumer 
protection and paternalism perspectives. The theories are used as a framework 
for analysing the justifications for and the appropriateness of existing regulation. 
They also provide the foundation for analysiing the underlying conceptual 
structure of the P2PL model, for example, using consumer protection to analyse  
consumer-to-consumer, business-to-consumer and lendsumer-to-prosumer 
models and what they entail for regulation. Consumer protection law and 
paternalism are used to justify regulation and to assess whether existing 
regulation conforms to their principles. 
 
The thesis answers this first question by arguing that paternalism in the form of 
consumer protection law provides a basic justification for state intervention into 
the private actions of the P2PL participants because of the risks faced by P2PLs 
and borrowers in relation to each other, the platforms and the effects of their 
activities, particularly in relation to the underlying person-to-person structure of 
the sector. In doing so, the first research question involves the identification and 
explanation of theoretical and practical justifications for P2PL regulation and the 
form it should take.  
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However, the theories of paternalism and consumer protection only provide a 
partial justification, because in answering the sub-questions, the thesis shows 
that P2PL is a new and unique form of lending based on a prosumption model of 
operation rather than on a consumption model of intermediation. The P2PL users 
do not fit within existing conceptions of what it means to be a consumer and 
following from this, consumer protection. This is because the person-to-person 
structure of P2PL has affected a change in the roles, conduct and nature making 
them more akin to ‘prosumers’, i.e. consumers who engage not only in the 
consumption of services but also in the production of the services they wish to 
consume.49 Due to this uniqueness, regulation cannot simply be transposed from 
similar phenomenon and applied to P2PL as this will create inefficient or 
inappropriate regulatory measures unsuited to it.  Therefore, the justifications for 
regulatory intervention do not lie in just the protection of the weaker party as 
suggested by consumer protection theory, or the ‘average’ consumer as 
suggested by consumer law, but also on the characteristics and effects of the 
prosumption model on which P2PL is based. 
 
In answering this first research question, the thesis also incorporates a 
comparative element in the analysis of P2PL, although it differs in purpose and 
focus from usual comparative legal analysis. Comparative law is a sub-branch of 
legal research and, for some comparative lawyers, the aim is to harmonise or 
unify laws.50 Comparative law helps answer the normative question of what the 
law should be.51 One of its benefits is  highlighting the possibility of achieving the 
goals of regulation or law through different rules and structures.52 By 
understanding and analysing the similarities and differences between different 
                                                          
49 Alvin Toffler, ‘The Rise of the Prosumer’, Third Wave (1984); Marian Salzman, ‘Rise of the 
Prosumer’ (2000) 54 Print 141; George Ritzer and Nathan Jurgenson, ‘Production, 
Consumption, Prosumption The Nature of Capitalism in the Age of the Digital “prosumer”’ 
(2010) 10 Journal of Consumer Culture 13; ibid; David Beer and Roger Burrows, ‘Consumption, 
Prosumption and Participatory Web Cultures An Introduction’ (2010) 10 Journal of Consumer 
Culture 3. 
50 John Bell, ‘Legal Research and the Distinctiveness of Comparative Law’ in Mark Van Hoecke, 
Methodologies of Legal Research: Which Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline? (Hart 
Publishing Limited 2013) 157.. 
51 John Bell, ‘Legal Research and the Distinctiveness of Comparative Law’ in ibid 158.. 
52 John Bell, ‘Legal Research and the Distinctiveness of Comparative Law’ in ibid.. 
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rules and institutional structures, it is possible to determine how justified a 
particular rule, policy or strategy is over another.53  
In contrast, the thesis does not adopt a comparative approach to the rules and 
regulations pertaining to P2PL, because other than the American system, there 
are few established national P2PL regulatory regimes with which to compare the 
UK approach. The thesis focuses on a comparison of the subjects of regulation 
rather than on the regulation itself. It uses a comparative approach to compare 
P2PL with existing forms of financial lending and (dis)intermediated transactions. 
This is because analysing the similarities and differences between these different 
forms of business model enables a better level of understanding of the conceptual 
frameworks on which they are based and the effects of these conceptual 
frameworks on the industry participants for whom the regulation is ultimately 
designed to benefit e.g. through consumer protection provisions. This 
comparison is beneficial for highlighting the differences between industries, which 
enables the design of regulation to be tailored to the specific industry being 
regulated, rather than  copied and pasting regulatory provisions from similar but 
conceptually different business models. Overall, the comparative element of the 
thesis therefore enables an analysis of the appropriateness of existing regulation 
specifically in relation to online P2PL.  
The second main research question for the thesis is: Are current UK regulatory 
instruments fit to resolve the regulatory difficulties posed by P2PL? 
The subsidiary questions that have been examined under this second question 
are: 
a.  What are the assumptions of financial services regulation? 
b.  What are the implications of consumer protection for P2PL 
regulation? 
 
This research question has been chosen because it follows on from the first 
discussion about why regulation is justified and appropriate for the P2PL industry 
on a theoretical level to move on to a discussion about the appropriateness of 
existing regulation on a practical level. This is because by taking into account the 
reasons behind the need for regulations and the theoretical underpinnings of how 
                                                          
53 John Bell, ‘Legal Research and the Distinctiveness of Comparative Law’ in ibid.. 
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the sector operates it illuminates the analysis framed by the first research 
question, by placing it in a practical context so that the implications of the theories 
can be demonstrated. It focuses the thesis on the issue of how the industry should 
be regulated which is an important question to ask because P2PL is a relatively 
new form of lending practice and it is unique in comparison to other forms of 
lending and intermediation. Therefore, to determine whether the theoretical 
underpinnings of the industry are properly considered, it is necessary to analyse 
the form and implications of current regulatory rules pertaining to it and whether 
the regulation adequately takes these into account. 
 
The research question is also significant because it focuses on the UK regulatory 
regime. Academic discussions about how P2PL has been regulated are mostly 
based on its regulation in the USA; very few articles have been written about its 
regulation in the UK particularly ones which focus on the regulatory implications 
of the person-to-person model on which it is based.  
The study includes a doctrinal analysis of legislation and case law, particularly in 
relation to the UK P2PL regulatory regime. Doctrinal research is a study of the 
law and legal concepts and it is the most dominant form of legal research design.54 
It has been described as a process of analysis55 and provides a systematic 
exposition of the rules governing a particular legal area, it analyses the 
relationship between  rules and it can be used to explain areas of difficulty within 
them.56 The approach is used in this thesis to identify, describe and explain what 
the current legal and regulatory rules are in relation to online P2PL and the 
ideologies upon which they are based. Consequently, the second research 
question involves the contextual analysis of current rules and regulations to 
determine whether they are fit to resolve the regulatory difficulties posed by P2PL. 
The thesis argues that the current UK regulatory regime is partially effective 
because it focuses on one aspect of the intermediated consumer-to-consumer 
model on which P2PL is based, i.e. the relationship between the platforms and 
their users. It is demonstrated that because the regulatory focus is placed only 
                                                          
54 Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan, ‘Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal 
Research’ (2012) 17 Deakin Law Review 83, 85. 
55 Paul Chynoweth, ‘Legal Research’ in Andrew Knight and Les Ruddock (eds), Advanced 
Research Methods in the Built Environment (1 edition, Wiley-Blackwell 2008) 37. 
56 Hutchinson and Duncan (n 54) 101. 
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on the regulation of the platforms’ practices or conduct, the regime is based on 
the business-to-consumer model of transactions and therefore does not reflect 
the consumer-to-consumer horizontal relationships which exist in P2PL. Due to 
this assumption the regime does not fully take into account the risks and problems 
faced by P2PLs and borrowers in relation to each other. Significantly, this shows 
a lack of awareness or understanding of the disintermediation movement in which 
P2PL exists. 
Overall, the research method used to address the research questions and 
objectives is the critical analysis of primary and secondary material. In doing so, 
the thesis adopts the doctrinal and limited comparative methodologies to answer 
the research questions. 
A critical theoretical analysis is more appropriate for a study that focuses on the 
regulatory issues and the concepts underlying P2PL. As P2PL is a new area for 
academic legal research, it is difficult to find a body of work that deals specifically 
with P2PL in the areas set out in the research questions and objectives sections. 
To overcome this problem, this study draws comparisons with established fields 
such as banking law, financial services research and other forms of 
disintermediated alternative finance structures. It also makes use of previous 
academic and industry studies of P2PL where these are available.  
The research is largely library-based and the following materials have been used: 
books, journal articles, reports, websites, online news articles, case law and 
legislation. 
 
1.4 Research Objectives 
 
The purpose of this thesis is not to make a judgement on the efficacy or worth of 
P2PL, nor suggest ways in which P2PL platform operations can be improved to 
benefit the borrowers and lenders participating in its service. P2PL is an 
established method of finance which shows no signs of disappearing due to the 
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year-on-year growth of the industry.57 Rather, the scope of this thesis has been 
to assess how and why P2PL can be regulated now that it is here.  
This thesis has three aims. The first is to ascertain the most appropriate way to 
regulate online P2PL, taking into account its varying models, the rights and 
responsibilities of its three participants and its online nature. The second aim is 
to support and enrich regulatory and legal knowledge of P2PL regulation by 
analysing its regulation in the United Kingdom through the lens of consumer 
protection and through a comparison with other financial institutions such as 
banking, consumer credit, and comparable forms of social lending. Finally, the 
thesis aims to suggest a conceptual framework for the analysis of appropriate 
online P2PL regulation which is based on the underlying person-to-person model 
of P2PL.  
This thesis is the first known attempt to comprehensively study the theoretical 
and conceptual underpinnings of the regulation of online P2PL. It will benefit 
regulators and policymakers seeking to regulate online P2PL by providing them 
with a greater awareness and understanding of the C2C underpinnings of P2PL 
and the implications this has on regulation. Governments and regulatory bodies 
from countries which do not currently regulate P2PL will find this thesis useful 
because it provides a theoretical and practical foundation for them to base their 
regulatory policy considerations on. By considering the theoretical justifications 
for regulation and the conceptual underpinnings of P2PL, the thesis provides a 
basis for future laws and regulations to be built. 
Online P2PL has given rise to regulatory confusion about the most appropriate 
way to regulate it. However, it has not been subjected to much critical legal 
analysis outside of the USA, particularly in the UK. Much legal scholarship has 
centred on U.S. securities law58 or on the use of micro finance or P2PL for 
development.59  
 
                                                          
57 Bryan Zhang and others, ‘Pushing Boundaries: The 2015 UK Alternative Finance Industry 
Report’ (Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance 2016) 41 <https://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/faculty-
research/centres/alternative-finance/publications/pushing-boundaries/> accessed 26 February 
2016. 
58 Brill (n 1); Verstein (n 14). 
59 Kevin E Davis and Anna Gelpern, ‘Peer-to-Peer Financing for Development: Regulating the 
Intermediaries’ (2010) 42 Journal of International Law and Politics 1209. 
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A lot of regulatory confusion is caused by the multitude of P2PL models. In 
addition to this is the problem of how it should be regulated, considering that 
much of the current financial and banking regulatory systems around the world 
were not  formulated with online P2PL in mind. 
 
There is still a lot of research that needs to be done in the field of regulating P2PL. 
Most analyses that deal with the regulation of P2PL start from the assumption 
that regulation is necessary but do not engage with the justifications for or against 
regulation nor investigate how regulation should treat the individual rights, 
responsibilities and interests of the lenders/investors, borrowers and platforms 
that make up the participants of P2PL. There is also little analysis of how the 
consumer-to-consumer relationships of P2PL may affect the content and nature 
of regulations. Similarly, although there has been some treatment on the 
regulation of intermediaries in general,60 specific treatment on the regulation of 
P2PL platforms themselves is scarce, if not non-existent. 
 
Most studies of P2PL are qualitative investigations of its various features and 
workings involving some sort of empirical analysis. For example, Berger and 
Gleisner’s study empirically examines the intermediation of electronic P2PL 
platforms and provides insight into the workings of individuals on the platforms, 
including how individuals operating within the platforms might assume 
responsibilities over each other.61 Klafft has investigated whether often 
inexperienced lenders operating in a pseudonymous online environment are able 
to obtain an attractive return on their investment.62 A number of studies have also 
focused on the theme of credit risk and trust in the operation of P2PL.63  
                                                          
60 Gavin Sutter, ‘Rethinking Online Intermediary Liability: In Search of the Baby Bear Approach’ 
(2011) 7 Indian JL & Tech. 33. 
61 Sven Berger and Fabian Gleisner, Emergence of Financial Intermediaries in Electronic 
Markets: The Case of Online P2P Lending (March, 11 2010). BuR Business Research Journal, 
Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1568679 
62 Conference on E-Learning, E-Business, Enterprise Information Systems, and E-Government, 
EEE 2008, H. R. Arabnia and A. Bahrami, eds., pp. 371-375, CSREA Press, Las Vegas 2008. 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1352352 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1352352. 
63 Rajkamal Iyer and others, ‘Screening in New Credit Markets: Can Individual Lenders Infer 
Borrower Creditworthiness in Peer-to-Peer Lending?’ (Social Science Research Network 2010) 
SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 1570115 <http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1570115> accessed 2 
February 2013; Enrichetta Ravina, ‘Love & Loans: The Effect of Beauty and Personal 
Characteristics in Credit Markets’ [2012] Available at SSRN 1107307 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1107307> accessed 10 December 2013; 
Mingfeng Lin, Nagpurnanand R Prabhala and Siva Viswanathan, ‘Judging Borrowers by the 
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These empirical investigations and the many others like them that focus on how 
P2PL works and how it can be improved are useful for the development and 
critique of the business model. Such details also provide better insight into how 
P2PL operates and would be insightful to any consideration on how P2PL should 
be regulated, because to regulate a phenomenon it is essential to know in detail 
how it works. However, the fact P2PL studies largely approach it from a practical 
and often business operational perspective also demonstrates there is a need for 
theoretical analysis of its regulation from the perspective of all three of its 
participants: the lenders, borrowers and the platforms. 
 
Current academic literature also demonstrates there is a lack of consensus on 
who should do the regulating; this is demonstrated by the American-focused 
literature, debating whether it should be the SEC or a new body, the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).64 This highlights a central classification 
problem that needs to be resolved before any meaningful talk of regulating P2PL 
can go ahead. That is, what classification do P2P loans fall under? In the U.S. 
P2P loans have been classified as securities, whilst the American trade group, 
Coalition for New Credit Models have rejected this classification and proffered 
that P2PL should be regulated as a ‘consumer banking service’.65 
 
This study is undertaken to fill these knowledge gaps in the P2PL literature by 
focusing on a theoretical and legal analysis of its regulation in the UK. Seeking to 
provide a conceptual framework for regulating P2PL, it is imperative to fully 
understand its historical development; its key participants and how it compares 
with similar non-bank lending schemes such as payday lending and micro-
lending to establish why regulation is necessary and learn from the experience of 
other forms of fringe lending the pitfalls to avoid and the successes to emulate. It 
is also necessary to justify the regulation of P2PL and identify which theory of 
regulation best suits it and from there, what the best regulatory policy to adopt is. 
This will help to avoid piecemeal regulation which fails to demonstrate an 
understanding of the subject of its regulation. 
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This thesis considers it important to realise that the P2PL market involves two 
different types of consumers who transact with each other through the 
intermediation of an independent platform. As this is the case, it is necessary to 
explore the different risks, interests and other vulnerabilities faced by these very 
different participants. On one hand, there are the borrowers, who are commonly 
treated as consumers, and on the other there are the lenders, who face different 
problems but are arguably on an equally vulnerable position. Compared to 
traditional lending institutions, this thesis will demonstrate that P2PL transactions 
are performed horizontally, i.e. consumer-to-consumer, rather than vertically, i.e. 
institution-to-consumer. The consumer protection literature examined however, 
does not consider consumer protection issues on this horizontal level.  
In addition, the literature does not consider how the different consumers of P2PL 
services should be treated by regulation. This is important because it is necessary 
for regulation to afford the appropriate protections or facilitations and do so 
proportionately. This thesis aims to fill this gap through an exploration of the 
regulation of online intermediaries, from the perspective of P2PL.  
Studies indicate that there is a connection between trustworthiness and the 
perception of credit risk.66 The implication for regulation is that to support the 
growth of this new market, it would need to facilitate an environment of trust so 
that lenders will continue to fund loan requests. After all, if lenders do not view 
borrowers as trustworthy, they will be unwilling to risk parting with their savings 
on P2PL platforms. Rather, they may find other means of investing their savings 
which does not involve P2PL platforms. These studies do not speak directly about 
the implications for regulation, and how this relates to the underlying consumer-
to-consumer model of financial intermediation that P2PL undertakes, so this 
thesis will examine the need for regulation to encompass an understanding of the 
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way P2PL works on a conceptual level between lenders and borrowers and the 
need to reduce credit risk.  
P2PL platforms have been treated by the literature as a method of connecting 
individual borrowers and lenders so that they can conduct their own private 
transactions. For example, Brill only comments that before widespread internet 
access, connecting individual borrowers and lenders in a loan marketplace was 
impractical, however P2PL platforms now achieve this feat.67  
Although David and Gelpern investigate the international aspects of regulating 
P2PL platforms, their analysis concerns charitable and non-profit platform 
intermediaries like Kiva rather than for-profit platforms like Zopa. Consequently, 
the regulations they investigate are based on charity and banking law, because 
micro-financing institutions operate with a charitable and developmental aim, but 
in some ways behave like banks and investment funds for example, taking funds 
from investors and assuming a conditional obligation to repay them, although 
without interest.68 They argue that the rise of P2P intermediaries operating within 
the international finance market requires a change in the regulation of 
developmental finance. They state this could either be through the refinement of 
charities regulation in the funders’ home state or to include the “new aid 
intermediaries” within the changing regime for regulating international finance.69 
This paper is useful for the insights it provides into the international regulation of 
intermediaries similar to P2PL, however, although they use the same name, their 
investigation is actually about micro-finance institutions, which operate with 
different goals in mind to for-profit P2PL.  
The literature does not consider the regulation of for-profit P2PL platforms as 
intermediaries either on a national level or an international level. It also does not 
consider the regulation of P2PL platforms from the perspective of their users for 
example, whether regulation should hold them liable to borrowers and lenders 
that use their services and on what grounds. So far the literature does not 
consider the platforms’ liability to their users e.g. for the borrower information they 
present on their websites for lenders or how much responsibility they should take 
for the defaults of borrowers that use their services. However, considering issues 
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of liability for P2PL intermediaries is essential because their accountability would 
create greater confidence in the P2PL market.  
 
1.5 Structural Outline of Thesis 
 
The thesis is divided into six chapters. Following this Introduction, Chapter Two 
begins with an examination of three theories of regulation, rational choice theory, 
behavioural economics theory and paternalism, and relates them to P2PL. It 
focuses on the concepts of paternalism and consumer protection as the principle 
justifications for state intervention in the regulation of the P2PL industry. It 
analyses the conceptualisations of consumer protection and consumer law in 
relation to P2PL and demonstrates that P2PL does not fit within the existing 
conceptions of ‘consumer’ and consumer protection because of the underlying 
P2PL model and the nature of P2PLs who exhibit traits of prosumerism rather 
than consumerism. 
Chapter Three distinguishes P2PL from other types of traditional and alternative 
forms of intermediation such as payday lending and credit union lending. The 
chapter compares the similarities and differences between the regulatory 
concerns of the informal lending schemes discussed, as compared to P2PL. Each 
comparison demonstrates that P2PL differs from existing forms of financial 
intermediation. 
Chapter Four analyses the current UK P2PL regulatory regime in light of the 
characteristics of P2PL discussed in Chapters Two and Three. It argues that the 
regulatory regime is heavily based on the B2C model of business operation which 
does not accurately reflect how firms within the C2C, ‘sharing economy’ and 
P2PL in particular, differ substantially because they are based on separate 
concepts. However, the UK P2PL regulation only reflects the B2C relationships 
existing within a P2PL transaction and not the tripartite relationship between the 
lender and platform, platform and the borrower and the lenders’ and borrowers’ 
respectively.  
In light of the analysis of the UK’s P2PL regulatory regime, Chapter Five suggests 
two main points. It argues for the of use of gatekeeper liability to regulate P2PL 
platforms, and suggests a new concept of the ‘lendsumer’ to reflect the 
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transitional nature of P2PLs and the fact that they are not merely consumers but 
can also be considered to be prosumers. 
Finally, Chapter Six presents the findings and conclusions of the thesis and 
provides a summary of the answers to the research questions. 
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2. P2PL and Consumer Law and Consumer Protection Concepts and 
Paradigms 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In order for the legal rules and regulations relating to P2PL to effectively govern 
its market and participants, the definition and notion of consumer which underpins 
them must match the economic and technological reality exhibited within the 
regulated markets in addition to the actual behaviour of consumers.70 This is 
important for online P2PL as it consists of three interacting parties, two of which 
may be individuals who behave similarly to ordinary consumers. Consequently, it 
is necessary to identify the nature of the parties, the relationships within P2PL 
and to see how existing concepts of consumer regulation apply to them. This 
analysis is carried out across Chapters Three and Four.  
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the conceptualisations of consumer 
protection and consumer law as they relate to P2PL and show that P2PL does 
not fit within existing concepts and methodologies. It goes on to set the stage for 
the arguments in favour of the need for a new conception of the consumer 
considering their increasingly active role in off-and online markets. 
Section 2.3 analyses three regulatory philosophies which are the rational choice 
theory, behavioural economics and paternalism. These theories are discussed in 
this chapter because they have different effects on the type and direction of 
protection that regulation based on them would afford individuals, particularly 
regarding whether regulation should intrude in private transactions by following 
an interventionist approach. Therefore, to justify a particular regulatory approach 
for P2PL it is necessary to assess which approach is suitable. For example, RCT 
assumes that people are rational beings who can choose an outcome that will 
maximise their welfare. As will be shown, this implies that providing individuals 
with the required information for them to base their choices on, is sufficient 
protection. On the other hand, behavioural economics has shown that individuals 
are not always rational beings and can be misled by their own emotional or 
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psychological biases and information asymmetries that exist within a non-perfect 
market. As discussed in this section, the implication is that a purely non-
interventionist regulatory strategy is inadequate. These discussions lead to an 
analysis of paternalism as a means of justifying the suggestion that regulators 
should intervene in the private transactions of online P2PL users for their own 
benefit. Section 2.3.4 charts the seeming recognition of the efficacy of 
paternalistic intervention within EU and UK retail investment regulation post 
financial crisis and highlights that despite this change in other areas of retail 
investment regulation, P2PL regulation does not reflect a similar change. 
Having concluded the necessity of interventionist regulation to even the playing 
field between the three P2PL participants, Sections 2.4 to 2.7 analyse the notion 
of consumer protection and the established concept of ‘consumer’ based on EU 
and UK legal definitions and argues that P2PL users do not fit within this concept. 
This leads to the discussion in Section 2.8 of how individuals have evolved from 
being passive consumers to the less established classification of active 
‘prosumers’. Once again, it is argued that P2PLs do not fit within this classification 
either and therefore need their own concept to aptly describe their characteristics 
and behaviours, in light of their increasingly active role in both off- and online 
markets. 
 
2.2. Risks of P2PL faced by lenders 
 
Namvar has discussed the rise of P2PL as a new and alternative form of 
investment and describes how P2P loans are being incorporated into investment 
portfolios for diversification purposes.71 His analysis considers the risks and 
benefits involved in investing in unsecured consumer loans such as P2P loans. 
Examples include the credit and default risks involved in investing in P2P loans. 
Lenders face credit risks because P2P platforms are not obligated to verify the 
information they provide them about a potential borrower's creditworthiness and, 
even though the information may be derived from consumer reporting agencies 
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like Experian or Equifax, it might be outdated or fraudulent.72 As neither the 
platforms nor government authorities like the FSCS guarantee the loans, lenders 
face a high degree of risk because the loans are unsecured.73 Likewise, they also 
bear the burden of default risks. As P2P loans are unsecured they are very 
speculative investments; in cases of borrower default, there is no guarantee that 
platforms will be able to enforce the borrower’s payment obligations or recuperate 
missed repayments. Even if they could, the costs of collection are passed on to 
the lenders reducing their return on investment further.74 Namvar’s study also 
provides an overview of the consumer lending market and an overview of the P2P 
loan market.  
Namvar’s discussion on the strategy drivers, risks and barriers to investing in P2P 
loans provides a useful indication of the issues P2PLs face. Like Hulme and 
Wright, he also touches on the history of P2PL. He traces it back to the 
Babylonian civilisation although he does not cite any evidence to support this. 
Namvar presents P2P loans as a new alternative asset class which offers 
investors a new way to access a profitable consumer lending market in a way 
that avoids traditional intermediaries – banks. This analysis does not analyse the 
implications of P2PL for regulation in detail, except to state that regulation should 
be avoided in order to maintain high growth and yield within the P2PL market. 
This is similar to arguments put forward by Verstein, Chaffee and Rapp, that 
regulation should be proportionate and not stifle business innovation. However, 
by discussing P2PL from an investment perspective, Namvar broadens 
knowledge on the risks and benefits involved in P2PL in a new way and it provides 
further insight into the lender experience of P2PL. Greater knowledge of the P2PL 
lenders’ experiences within the industry enables regulation to be appropriate for 
and reflect the protection or pursuit of the lenders’ interests. This is important to 
ensure regulation does not undermine the participants’ interests or encourage 
activities which unnecessarily blocks access to the P2PL for some lenders.   
Several studies of P2PL have centred on the theme of credit risk and trust. Iyer 
et al found that the lenders used both hard and soft information from a borrower’s 
loan application to deduce a borrower’s creditworthiness.75 Hard information 
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being information such as the platform’s credit risk assessment of borrowers, 
whilst soft information is the type of information garnered from the platform’s 
discussion boards. Similarly, Lin et al investigated the significance of social 
networks and how friendship becomes a guide for judging credit worthiness. The 
authors found that loans which result from those friendships have lower interest 
and default rates.76 This supports the findings of Iyer et al that lenders also rely 
on soft information when making lending decisions. It is also supported by 
Ravina’s study in 2012 which finds that factors such as age, physical 
attractiveness and race are also considered during lending decisions. In light of 
the financial crisis and the trend towards responsible lending in its wake, these 
findings indicate that regulation may need to encourage more responsible or 
effective decision-making amongst P2PLs. Duarte, Siegel and Young also 
conducted an empirical study and found that the loan requests of borrowers who 
are considered untrustworthy are less likely to be funded and the reverse being 
true for borrowers seen to be more trustworthy.77 However, due to information 
asymmetries existing between the P2PLs and borrowers because borrowers 
have information the lenders do not, adverse selection bias may still arise.78  
 
2.3. Consumer Protection Rationale 
 
Consumer protection regulations are defined as a body of law designed to 
prevent individuals from taking on excessive risk,79 and protect consumers’ 
interests at the individual transaction level.80  The underlying idea is that 
consumers are in an inherently weaker position compared to businesses, and 
therefore require protection. At this transactional level, protecting a consumer 
means ensuring that within each agreement or transaction, there are no failures 
which can undermine consumers’ ability to maximise their own welfare.81 By way 
of contrast, although competition law also aims to protect consumer interests, the 
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approach in which it does so occurs on a macro level, i.e. nation- or worldwide 
level.82 Additionally, it targets firms’ practices without necessarily providing rights 
to consumers. For example, Chapter I of the Competition Act 1998 regulates anti-
competitive arrangements such as when businesses within an industry agree to 
fix selling prices or other trading conditions. This means that whilst competition 
law targets unfairness or inequality of competition in the free market which 
ultimately maximises consumer welfare by giving consumers a variety of choices; 
consumer law is more individualistic because it protects the consumer more 
directly by giving them exercisable rights against a business or other parties, or 
enabling them to make free, rational selections from those choices.83 From this 
perspective, the requirements of competition law and consumer protection law 
complement their similar goals. 
In the field of consumer protection, ‘harm’ is considered a failure within the 
individual consumer transaction, and it usually occurs in the origination stage, i.e. 
the period before and during the entering of the agreement; or within the 
substance of a transaction.84 This explains why most consumer protection 
regulations like information disclosure, focus on the pre-contractual stage of a 
transaction. For example, disclosure-based regulation requires information to be 
accurate and of sound quality to resolve the harm caused by gaps in the 
consumer’s knowledge about the transaction they are about to enter and early 
cancellation rights to mitigate transactions entered by individuals in the spur of 
the moment. Such regulations aim to prevent failures which inhibit consumers’ 
ability to enhance their welfare.85  
There are two main philosophical approaches to consumer protection regulation, 
RCT and the behavioural approach. Both propose different ways to regulate 
consumer welfare. The former suggests a non-interventionist approach, whilst 
the latter suggests the opposite. 
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2.3.1 Rational Choice Theory 
 
Rational Choice Theory (RCT) is the idea that people are rational economic 
beings who, when faced with several choices, will choose the one they believe 
will maximise their welfare.86 Consequently, according to this viewpoint, as 
individuals are able to make rational choices, the market will reflect the choices 
of all market participants thus guaranteeing market efficiency.87  
It has been treated as a mixture between a normative theory and an empirical 
one. It is normative in the sense that it attempts to define what is rational and 
empirical in the sense that it makes predictions about the behaviour of rational 
agents88 based on this. Underlying the basic theory are the concepts of rationality 
and utility. From the rational choice perspective, rationality is understood in terms 
of the attempt to achieve a goal which one has good reasons to believe are in 
one’s interests as understood by the decision-maker.89 This means when an 
individual makes decisions, they are able to rank various goals based on their 
respective value or preferences and give reasons for them. This in turn is based 
on the view that economic rationality or self-interest is the main motivator behind 
human behaviour,90 as opposed to altruistic concerns or actions based on passion 
or emotion.  
The implication of RCT is that information is essential for consumers to make 
efficient and rational choices. Consequently, proponents of the theory favour a 
non-interventionist approach to consumer protection regulation. Examples 
include: information disclosure91 and the promotion of competition between 
different businesses,92 to provide consumers with an optimum number of choices. 
For example, information disclosure rules are designed to give individuals the 
required amount and quality of information they need to make good decisions. 
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This is because, to make a reasoned decision or choice, one needs to have all 
the facts relating to that decision available. Without this information, the reasons 
behind a choice may be at best inaccurate or at worst false. Therefore, without 
information individuals may make decisions that do not lead to the achievement 
of their goals.  
The theory assumes that consumers will have enough information to base their 
preferences on and their choices will be clear and rational.93 As the theory is 
based on the concept of rationality and therefore on reasoned choices, and 
because reasoned choices necessitate access to information relating to a choice, 
the theory also assumes that when making decisions, consumers will collect and 
evaluate the information available and base their decisions on this information 
alone.94 This does not account for decisions based on emotional, cultural, or 
situational biases.   
In the context of online P2PL, the RCT would imply that regulation should only 
ensure platforms provide its users with as much accurate information as is 
necessary for them to enter the right transactions. In fact, this non-interventionist 
approach is imbibed by many P2PL business models structured like Zopa, where 
the platforms are not party to the contract, but merely match consumers to each 
other and facilitate communication of both private information (credit scoring) and 
public information (through the discussion boards). The platforms provide lenders 
with credit reports and in some cases, teach them how to use them. It is then left 
to the lender to make a choice based on these credit reports and investing 
heuristics.  
However, if the point of consumer protection regulation is to prevent or mitigate 
harm to consumers, then such protections are limited in scope because they can 
only help to resolve harms faced by lenders and borrowers at the decision-making 
stage when they are entering an agreement. It does not help resolve all the 
market failures faced during the life-cycle of the lending agreement from its start 
to the point it is repaid. Once the agreement is underway, information-based 
protections are of little use in resolving the harms faced by P2P users where they 
do not need to make any decisions as such, but need to be able to enforce their 
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rights under the agreement, e.g. the potential for market failure created by their 
reliance on the platforms to run smoothly and administer loan agreements 
efficiently or which arise from the expectations that the loans will be repaid. 
An example of this limitation is demonstrated by a recent problem faced by users 
of some Chinese P2PL platforms. In Guangzhou, China, several cases were 
reported of female students who having borrowed money through the legitimate 
P2PL platform, Jiedaibao, were then coerced into sending naked photographs of 
themselves as collateral for a loan. Lenders had been using P2PL platforms to 
target university students, many of whom could not obtain credit from traditional 
lending sources such as banks. The lenders demanded that students provide 
photocopies of their identity cards, student cards and family data in addition to 
the nude photographs. Jiedaibao told a local newspaper, Global Times, that such 
demands were private deals between users which the platform could not interfere 
with, rather their response to the issue was to provide warnings to users about 
the need to protect their privacy and contact the police if necessary. Other 
platforms issued warnings to their members to stop obtaining this type of 
collateral.95  
One market failure demonstrated by this example is the failure of the platform to 
ensure trust between P2PLs and borrowers. For the type of business which 
facilitates transactions between anonymous strangers, part of the platform’s role 
is to reassure lenders that they can trust the borrowers to repay their debt. This 
role is carried out through the provision of information such as credit ratings and 
sometimes access to a forum where users can communicate with each other. 
However, in this case, the information provided was insufficient to inspire such 
trust and led to further market failures such as breaches of privacy and personal 
abuse after the loan agreement had begun. This example, though extreme in its 
nature, shows that not all market failures are caused by lack of sufficient 
information or the inability to make sound decisions, neither can they all be 
resolved by regulation which helps to encourage rational decision-making. 
Therefore, it cannot help to stop at providing consumers with more choices and 
information. A more effective approach would be to create incentives for platforms 
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to monitor and prevent the type of behaviours that occur when its users interact 
on the platform. An example of this would be to hold the platform responsible for 
the illegal actions of its users or for its negligent handling of such cases. However, 
such protections require a more interventionist approach than the RCT would 
permit.  
The emphasis of the RCT approach on disclosure is limited to pre-contractual 
events and cannot adequately deal with the outcomes of consumer decisions, 
such as a platform’s inability to recuperate debt from the borrowers. The very 
term, ‘rational choice’ implies there are choices to be made, but as demonstrated 
by the above example, this does not help in situations where the time for making 
choices has past and the need to implement or enforce those choices arises. 
Consequently, RCT alone inadequately explains or resolves the variety of market 
failures that can be experienced by P2PL participants. 
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2.3.2 Behavioural Economics 
 
One problem with the RCT approach is that in any one transaction, there may be 
information asymmetries between the contractors, creating opportunities for 
fraud.96 Information asymmetries occur when one party has more or better 
information than the other. This can lead to the party with superior information 
taking advantage of the other’s lack of knowledge and to adverse selection which 
occurs when the immoral behaviour taking advantage of the asymmetric 
information occurs before the transaction. For example, a borrower who knows 
they cannot afford a P2PL loan but provides false or misleading information to 
secure a better rating. A second problem caused is moral hazard, where the 
immoral behaviour takes advantage of the asymmetric information after the 
agreement has started. For example, the fact a borrower has used a 
guarantor/collateral to signal his viability as a lending option, could lead to poorer 
loan performance because the borrower relies on the existence of the 
guarantor/collateral to fall back on rather than making all the repayments.97 
Similarly, one party may attempt to deceive the other through false information. 
E.g. a borrower can commit credit score fraud or document falsification to obtain 
a loan. It also does not consider the fact that the third party sources of information, 
in this case the P2PL platforms, may not always be what they seem. In the 
absence of adequate regulation, it is feasible to conceive of P2PL platforms being 
used as vehicles for long firm fraud, i.e. when a business is created, and 
developed a good reputation to win the trust of its customers or suppliers so its 
owners can defraud them. Such fraud is caused by the lack of knowledge of the 
customer that the platform is not genuine.  
Furthermore, in online P2PL, the lenders’ main source of risk information is the 
credit ratings provided by the platforms or their subcontracted credit ratings 
agencies. This is because lenders cannot source information about the borrower 
which they can use to judge their creditworthiness independently of the platform 
due to the anonymised nature of the transactions on P2PL platforms. The 
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collapse of Enron and the recent financial crisis has indicated that in some cases 
the information provided by ratings agencies lack credibility due to the conflict of 
interests between the issuer who pays for their services and the need to remain 
objective.98 Arguably, this conflict of interests does not apply in the context of 
online P2PL because borrowers in such markets are not in a position to develop 
relationships with credit ratings agencies in a way that will affect the transactions. 
Still, it provides an example of the fact that participants in P2PL transactions must 
often base their decisions on the risk assessments of other providers of 
information, which they may not have the abitlity to verify. Therefore regulation 
should ensure adequate verification measures are in place, so that consumers 
get accurate information. The problems created by information asymmetries are 
particularly important for online P2PL because if taken advantage of they can 
compromise the trust each party has in the other, which is a critical issue for 
business models aiming to encourage transactions between strangers99 who 
because they do not know each other, must be facilitated in trusting each other 
by the platform.  
Regulators have attempted to correct information asymmetries either through the 
provision of increased amounts of information to individuals, or by ensuring the 
information available is clear and simple to understand. However, this may not 
always work for P2PL as the participants, being retail investors or ordinary 
consumers who have decided to try their hand at a new form of investing their 
savings, may not have much investment or lending knowledge or the expertise 
necessary to assess the outcome of financial transactions using the economic 
data provided to them.100 Large amounts of information then becomes an internal 
transaction cost which individuals, participating in P2PL for personal rather than 
business gain, may disregard as too complex or copious.101.  
The recent mis-sold payment protection insurance (PPI) issue demonstrates this 
behaviour amongst consumers as does the Financial Ombudsman Service’s 
approach to resolving these complaints. In cases where the consumer was sold 
PPI on a non-advised basis, i.e. where the financial business only had a duty to 
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provide the information a consumer needed to make an informed choice about 
whether to have PPI and present it in a clear, fair and non-misleading manner, 
many consumers either did not read all the terms and conditions of the agreement 
or they did not take steps to ensure they understood what they were signing, 
which explains why the policy was mis-sold to them in such cases. It is telling that 
the Financial Ombudsman Service’s approach to these cases is to determine 
whether a consumer was given adequate information about the product. In 
deciding this, it looks at whether the financial business had drawn the consumer’s 
attention to the significant features of the PPI policy, rather than just giving them 
the information. This is in line with their general complaints handling approach 
which is to look at everything that happened to give rise to the complaint and treat 
both parties fairly in coming to a decision about how to resolve the issue. This 
approach is adopted with all complainants regardless of their level of financial 
acumen judging by their background e.g. whether they are a banker working in 
the financial industry or a school teacher. Their rationale is that by highlighting 
the important policy terms, the financial business would have allowed the 
consumer to make an informed choice.102 
For example, in the final decision reference number DRN6430714, the case 
concerned the sale of a regular premium PPI policy sold alongside a credit card 
in 1998 on a non-advised basis. The Service had to determine whether NatWest 
had given ‘Mr J’, information that was clear, fair and non-misleading to put him in 
the position to make an informed choice. In deciding that the business had not 
provided sufficient information, the ombudsman had considered the fact that, 
“…the leaflet does not contain important information concerning eligibility, any 
limitations or exclusions which may apply and most importantly the cost of the 
policy. A footnote indicates that further details will be sent on acceptance…This 
information is not drawn to the reader’s attention but is contained…towards the 
very end of the leaflet in the section entitled offer terms and conditions. This 
information is written in small, closely worded text, spread over a number of 
pages and is very difficult to read. I am not persuaded that this was sufficient to 
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draw Mr J’s attention to information which he needed in order to make an 
informed decision about the insurance he was buying.”103 
The implication of this approach, which focused on the way information was 
presented and whether key issues were pointed out to the consumer, is that there 
is an underlying assumption that the average person does not read through 
numerous pages of information, regardless of how important it is to the 
transaction at hand. This case highlights that although in theory, providing 
individuals with information might be a good way to enable them to make rational 
decisions, in practice, the way individuals behave may be responsible for 
impeding their ability to make rational decisions. 
This example also relates to a second critique of the RCT provided by behavioural 
economics theorists. Behavioural economic theorists study how social and 
emotional factors impact the economic decisions of people and institutions. The 
critique is that people do not always make rational choices or act in ways that 
maximise their personal welfare. Rather, the simplification of complicated 
information by using heuristics combined with the natural tendency of people to 
copy each other’s choices,104 can lead to poor decisions. For example, herding is 
typical of distorted rational behaviour experienced by all individuals.105 Therefore, 
RCT also assumes that individuals are willing to read all the information provided. 
A consequence of RCT as it relates to regulation is the proposition that non-
intervention is the most appropriate form of regulating the private transactions 
that people/businesses choose to enter because they are better able to judge for 
themselves what is good for them than anyone else. Non-interventionist 
regulations follow from this because they are based on the theory that there is no 
moral justification for intervening in others’ affairs, e.g. because it violates their 
rights to freedom or respect due to their individual autonomy.106 Examples include 
self-regulation or relaxed regulation like ‘light-touch’ regulation.  
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However, in practice non-interventionist models of regulation do not always 
support the idea that because people are rational they should be left to their own 
devices, including to regulate their own behaviour. For example, prior to the 
financial crisis, one of the key regulatory approaches adopted in UK was the idea 
of ‘light-touch’ regulation. This consisted of a regime based on the idea that 
governments and regulatory agencies should not intervene in markets rather, 
they should leave the markets to regulate themselves with the government 
playing a small role which did not place unnecessary burdens on business.107 
Light-touch regulation usually takes the form of minimal regulation which is 
business-friendly, and reluctant to interfere with how businesses operate,108 in this 
sense, it is non-interventionist. Prior to the financial crisis, the FSA’s supervisors 
assumed that the judgement of a firm’s senior management in combination with 
market discipline should not be questioned by regulators as they could be relied 
on to deliver efficient outcomes.109 Consequently, the regulators did not make 
judgements about what could happen in the future and instead adopted a reactive 
approach to regulation where they only intervened if there was clear evidence of 
failings. However, this light-touch regulatory approach failed to control the 
systemic risks associated with consumer defaults during the financial crisis 
because it focused on the more observable factors of whether firms’ systems and 
controls were in order rather than on their ongoing safety and soundness.110 This 
demonstrates that non-interventionist regulation can be ineffective and 
governments need to have a greater understanding of the regulated industries 
and firms as well as comprehensive involvement how the sector in question is 
regulated.  
Interventionist consumer protection regulations, which comprise active 
involvement of the state to ensure the interests of individuals are protected, can 
help prevent similar risks within the P2PL business model, albeit on a transaction-
by-transaction scale, by reducing the incidence of consumer default or at least 
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making it more predictable to lenders,111 for example, by creating an onus on 
borrowers to provide more detailed information about their financial situation, 
including whether they are or have been involved in any IVAs or bankruptcies, 
the amount of their existing debt and their borrowing history etc. A more 
interventionist approach might be to limit the number of loans a medium to high 
risk borrower can take out at any one time on any P2PL platform. This latter 
suggestion would require communication between platforms and possibly the 
formulation of a borrower database of open P2PL loans. This could be managed 
through the P2P Association and governed by data protection laws, accessible 
only to platform moderators and credit risk agencies, except where borrowers 
request copies of their personal information.  
Operating on the basis of caveat emptor, i.e. on the basis that people assume 
the responsibility to examine and decide for themselves whether to purchase a 
particular product/service, as is currently the case with many models of online 
P2PL,  places a great deal of responsibility in the hands of inexperienced lenders, 
and can amount to abandoning them to the risks of the market they operate in.112 
In the long run, this may not be good for the market as if P2PL lenders or 
borrowers build up too much negative experience, they may lose confidence in 
the P2PL market causing the business model to fail. 
Conversely, a purely interventionist approach is unsatisfactory due to its 
impracticality. It would be expensive to apply, and because of the consumer-to-
consumer nature of P2PL business models, with the platform acting as a 
bystander to the transactions, it would not be practical to implement and monitor. 
Business models like Zopa’s, suggest that a combined approach to consumer 
protection would be needed to fit most P2PL models. This would involve 
combining elements of non-interventionist regulation such as information 
disclosure to enable P2PL users to make informed choices. However in 
recognition that in a non-perfect world information alone is insufficient to protect 
individuals from the effects of market failures, it needs to be combined with a 
more interventionist approach where the regulators supervise the actions of the 
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platforms and ensure that the rights and interests of P2P users are enforceable. 
At the start of the transaction, the lenders make their decisions based only on 
information collated by the platforms from the consumers. Therefore, regulation 
at this end of the transaction can only intervene in terms of the information that is 
provided. Where interventionist regulation would be more useful is in providing 
the lenders with remedies for post-transaction events e.g. borrower default. 
 
2.3.3 Paternalism  
 
In light of the fact some, such as Verstein, have viewed regulation as an 
unnecessary hindrance to the growth of P2PL because of the costs involved and 
the risk it might create barriers to entry into the market for new, smaller 
platforms;113 and also in light of research such as Hulme and Wright’s survey 
report suggesting that P2PL users tend to be independent and responsible 
people,114 it is necessary to justify intervening in their private transactions through 
the regulation of individuals and the P2PL market. 
The concepts of paternalism and consumer protection are linked because 
consumer protection is a regulatory approach resulting from the theory of 
paternalism. When academics or regulators talk about imposing rules designed 
to protect consumers, they are assume that consumers are incapable of 
achieving this goal themselves and that the state is in a position to know, 
understand and implement an individual’s interests better than the individual can. 
This is the case even though the state is a third party, external to the choice to 
be made by the consumer or the action to be taken. In doing so, the state acts as 
though it has the right or authority to impose its understanding of individuals’ 
interests over their own conception of their interests. Consequently, when the 
state intervenes in individuals’ private transactions to protect them from the 
consequences of their actions, e.g. rash decisions leading to poorly made 
choices, or from market failures such as information asymmetries, the state is 
adopting a paternalistic stance. It is assuming a parental role towards the 
consumers, i.e. the state behaves as though it has the right and authority to 
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govern the individual’s actions. It is also because the state is an external party 
that paternalistic actions need to be justified.  
 
Definition of Paternalism 
 
There is no set definition of paternalism or what amounts to a paternalistic act.115 
Although many writers on the subject speak about the same general concept, 
they are divided about its meaning and therefore about what needs moral 
justification.116 Reviewing these different definitions highlights the different 
conceptions about what makes interventionist regulation at first glance 
problematic. 
Dworkin originally defined paternalism as roughly, the interference with a 
person’s liberty of action and such interference is to be justified based on the 
good, happiness, welfare, interests, needs or values of the person being 
coerced.117 Liberty of action is the power to determine one’s actions without any 
interference or restraint, i.e. it is based on the notion of an individual’s freedom. 
Underlying the notion of liberty of action is the belief that individuals are endowed 
with reason and natural rights and these factors give them the capacity to decide 
for themselves their own life-plans,118 be it choices, goals or actions. This 
definition assumes that all forms of paternalism are forced on the individual, 
however this does not consider paternalistic acts which do not involve coercion. 
A classic example is Homer’s Odyssey story in which Ulysses instructs the sailors 
on his ship to tie him to the mast so he could listen to the song of the sirens 
without falling to the same fate of other sailors who had been driven to shipwreck 
and destruction in their desire to follow the sound, and ignore any demands he 
might make to untie him. By preventing Ulysses from acting on his desires to 
leave the boat, the sailors were acting paternalistically. However, they were doing 
so in accordance with his freely made request. This demonstrates that 
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paternalism does not need to be linked to coercion or force. What can be 
gathered from this definition therefore, is that the contentiousness of 
interventionist regulation is the idea that it involves compelling an individual to do 
something they would not ordinarily do or want to do. 
Gert and Culver challenged Dworkin’s definition for two main reasons. Firstly, by 
using the term ‘liberty of action’ Dworkin had limited the definition of paternalism 
to acts which interfered with a person’s actions or behaviour. Secondly, Dworkin 
had assumed all forms of paternalism involved coercion. In contrast, Gert and 
Culver argued that paternalism can occur in the absence of interference with a 
person’s liberty of action and coercion.119 So by limiting the definition of 
paternalism to acts which involve coercion or liberty of action, Dworkin did not 
consider the full spectrum of acts which can be characterised as paternalistic.  
Dworkin later amended his definition stating that paternalism should be 
understood more broadly as an interference with a person’s autonomy and this 
interference could range from rational argument to physical force.120 This change 
expanded the definition of paternalism by shifting the focus from ‘liberty of action’ 
to ‘autonomy.’  These concepts differ in meaning. ‘Liberty of action’ focuses on 
the idea of freedom in relation to one’s actions and behaviours. Consequently, a 
definition containing this concept perceives paternalism as the deprivation of the 
freedom to act or behave in a certain way. However, not all acts viewed as 
paternalistic involve the deprivation of freedom, e.g. providing state benefits to 
members of society who can no longer work for themselves, or job seekers 
allowance to members of society currently unemployed but who are looking for a 
job and need financial assistance in the meantime. In these examples, the state 
takes over the responsibility of an individual to provide for themselves, but there 
has neither been any coercion nor has the state deprived them of their freedom 
to work or provide for themselves.  
However, autonomy is the actual or potential ability to exert control over oneself, 
unlike liberty of action which is simply the freedom to act. To be autonomous an 
individual’s actions must be truly their own, e.g. if A studies medicine because A 
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believes doing so offers good opportunities, then A can be said to be acting 
autonomously. But if A studies medicine because of parental pressure, the 
decision to choose that course of action was not truly A’s due to the outside 
influence, and therefore cannot be described as autonomous.  
Therefore, by changing his definition to use the word ‘autonomy’ instead of ‘liberty 
of action,’ Dworkin incorporated the idea that paternalism did not just impact 
actions, but it could also affect a person’s will. Hence Dworkin’s use of the 
example of rational argument, which does not interfere with a person’s ability to 
carry out a particular action, nor does it necessarily coerce a person to act in a 
particular way, but it does interfere with their current way of thinking and 
reasoning. Although the use of the word ‘autonomy’ means that the definition is 
broad enough to accommodate scenarios that are usually considered to be 
paternalistic but which his original definition did not accommodate, the concept 
of autonomy has the potential to be too broad. This is because it could be argued 
that an individual’s desires and choices etc. can all be said to be partly influenced 
by factors outside of the agent’s control e.g. drug and gambling addictions compel 
an individual to take drugs and gamble against their better judgement, and an 
individual’s opinions can be moulded by the way the media presents news stories. 
However, neither case would be viewed as an act of paternalism. However, the 
shift in focus to autonomy and the removal of the need for coercion, reveals that 
the main problem with paternalism that this definition highlights is the very fact 
that it contravenes an individual’s will. This takes for granted that individuals’ 
autonomy is the greatest value to be promoted and anything else is of less 
importance, e.g. the good of society. 
In the context of this thesis, in which paternalism is used as a justification of more 
interventionist P2PL regulation, the implication of this expanded definition is that 
it indicates that paternalistic regulation not only has the potential to affect a P2PL 
user’s behaviour on a platform in terms of what they can or cannot do, but can 
also affect their desires, intentions or choices regarding the platform. Although 
this might seem heinous because of the deprivation of the users’ abilities to act 
and choose outcomes for themselves, in practice, this does not have to be 
considered a negative prospect. For example, as part of the FCA’s aim to protect 
the users of P2PL platforms, its regulatory regime requires that all platforms must 
have a certain amount of capital set aside to ensure their liquidity and, 
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arrangements in place for a third party to take over their role administering loans 
if the platform itself collapses. This has the potential to influence current or 
prospective users to have more confidence in the P2PL industry and therefore 
cause them to adopt P2PL as a way to invest their savings in the case of 
prospective lenders, or to feel safe enough to lend more of their money on the 
platforms in the case of current users.  
Shapiro has suggested that the underlying element of every definition of 
paternalism, and a key part of the concept, is that a paternalistic act is one which 
is carried out to benefit the action’s target, whether an individual or a group.121 
Shapiro does not give examples of the different academics’ definitions which 
agree on this point, but it does seem to be an aspect of paternalism most 
commentators seem to agree on, because what differs in their definitions are 
other factors such as how that benefit is brought about e.g. whether or not through 
coercion or whether or not the target gave consent.122 For example, Dworkin 
provides that the reasons for a paternalistic act are the good, happiness, welfare, 
interests, needs or values of the target. All these things can be said to be things 
that benefit the target. Similarly, Gert and Culver’s definition includes the 
requirement that the actor believes they are acting for the target’s good.123 
Likewise, Thaler and Sunstein state that the goal of paternalistic acts is to make 
the affected parties “better off.”124 
However, he criticises definitions which have as their only requirement the benefit 
provided by the act as being too broad and to demonstrate this, gives the example 
of a government operated lighthouse in dangerous waters which benefits the 
sailors navigating those waters. To consider such a law as paternalistic because 
of benefit alone would cause the concept to have little value,125 no doubt because 
to define it this way would mean the term could be too broadly applied to any 
piece of legislation that benefits its targets. Shapiro therefore considers 
paternalism to include a combination of benefit to its targets and a propensity to 
continue acting thus, regardless of the target’s consent. Coercion may or may not 
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be a factor.126 So according to Shapiro, an action is paternalistic if the actor knows 
that the target does not consent and may withhold consent if it is asked for.127   
Similarly, Paul Burrows’ definition focuses on the degree of consent expressed 
by the target. Like Shapiro, he states that an act is paternalistic if the actor 
pursues it for the target’s benefit and would do so knowing the target did not 
consent. The intention being to persuade, induce, or compel an individual to do 
something he would not otherwise choose to do, to benefit that individual.128 To 
do something to or for an individual without the individual’s consent would 
normally be viewed with distaste. The discomfort caused by the notion relates to 
the person’s individual autonomy and the ingrained notion that every individual 
has a right to order their own lives and make their own choices, so that to strip 
that capacity from someone would take something away from that individual, be 
it an inherent value or substance or just to infantilize that individual by treating 
them as though they were children.129  
In light of this, for an actor to proceed regardless of whether the target provides 
consent suggests four underlying implications of paternalism where the definition 
focuses on the concept of consent. Firstly, the actor has the authority to override 
the target’s will, because if not, the action may not be legitimate and therefore 
impermissible. Secondly, in the actor’s mind, there is a good reason for 
intervening or overriding that will. Although, this second implication depends on 
the value one places on individual autonomy. For example, in contemporary 
liberal society, great importance has been placed on the individual,130 so there 
needs to be a good reason for intervention. In comparison, the social order of 
medieval societies placed more importance on the communal and social needs 
above the individual’s,131 so undermining a person’s autonomy could be justified 
in relation to the society’s good. Thirdly, the reason posited by the actor is more 
crucial or beneficial than respecting the target’s freedom or right to choose for 
oneself and fourthly, the actor believes they are in the best position to achieve 
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this outcome. From the perspective of regulators, all these factors are present 
when they issue rules over a business’ activities or intervene on behalf of a 
consumer in the absence of consent. 
However, the more common definition is that a paternalistic act is an action 
undertaken by a person with the goal of furthering another’s good.132 The focus 
placed on the aim of producing some sort of benefit or good, implies that the 
motivation behind the act is a key factor of the definition, rather than just the end 
results. Therefore, an action would still be viewed as paternalistic even if the 
result did not produce the benefit intended. E.g. according to Kronman, generally 
any legal rule that prohibits an action on the basis that it would be contrary to the 
welfare of the target is paternalistic; therefore a law requiring individuals to wear 
seatbelts and helmets is paternalistic.133 This is because one of the central 
purposes of the law is not just to protect third parties from the target, but to protect 
the target from themselves by curtailing their power to act in a way that the law 
deems contrary to individuals’ own interests.134 Kronman therefore argues that 
although paternalistic laws are sometimes necessary, when one is adopted, there 
is an obligation on the lawmaker to explain why the interference is justified in 
some cases but not in others – this is in order to legitimise the paternalistic action 
or law and define its limits.135 By referring to an obligation on the lawmaker to 
justify interference, this perspective of paternalism assumes that it is 
automatically problematic and requires express justification because it is also 
influenced by the theory that individuals are rational and when making decisions 
for themselves they will generally choose the best option available to them. These 
issues of justification are discussed in the next section on the debates 
surrounding paternalism. 
Unlike Burrows and Shapiro, Van De Veer has posited that an act does not 
require the absence of consent to be paternalistic, because it can still be 
paternalistic if the target provides the actor with consent. Van De Veer provides 
the example of a person who thinks he will drink too much at a party and gives 
his car keys to a friend asking him to hide the keys or somehow prevent him from 
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driving home.136 Van DeVeer’s definition of paternalism is therefore an action 
which is at odds with the target’s preferences at the time of action. Consequently, 
if the person, now drunk, demands his keys back from his friend and the friend 
refuses, this denial is a paternalistic act.137 This means that consent is not a 
necessary requirement of a definition of paternalism, what matters is what the 
target’s preferences were at the time of the act and whether at that time, the act 
contravened them. Rather, this means that the usefulness of the concept of 
consent in relation to paternalism lies with its ability to add support for why the 
actor intervened, i.e. as a justification for the paternalism.  
However, Van De Veer states that a paternalistic action may be justified by prior 
consent.138 This serves to broaden the definition of paternalism firstly because an 
action can be paternalistic with or without the target’s consent and secondly 
because for an action to be considered paternalistic, it merely needs to be 
contrary to the target’s preferences when the action is being carried out. This 
implies that in cases where the target previously provided his or her consent to 
the action (Time1), the action automatically becomes paternalistic as soon as that 
consent is revoked, i.e. the recipient changes his mind (Time2). Therefore, within 
this construction of the concept of paternalism, consent becomes a factor in the 
legitimisation of the action, since prior consent can justify a paternalistic action, 
rather than a determinant of what makes an action paternalistic.  
This approach to paternalism creates a conflict between an individual’s 
preferences as expressed at different times, i.e. whether the preference 
expressed at Time1 should be honoured or the changed preference expressed 
at Time2. This is the issue of the ‘multiple selves,’139 which is the idea that an 
individual’s personality changes over time and that the way a person thought or 
behaved in the past is different from the way the person thinks or behaves in the 
present; problems arise when one has to consider which phase of the evolving 
personality takes priority over the other, i.e. the preferences of the former self or 
the preferences of the current self.140 This potentially gives rise to further issues 
for the justification of a particular paternalistic regulation. Yet, if this definition 
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were applied, any governmental action could be deemed paternalistic in a 
broader sense at least, because in democratic countries, governments are voted 
in by the public on the basis that they will act on their behalf regarding various 
matters. However, as Blumenthal points out, although affecting the target’s 
behaviour or choices is a necessary condition for an act to be paternalistic, it 
cannot be a sufficient condition because this would mean any governmental 
action should be considered paternalistic, which is too broad a claim.141  
Blumenthal’s definition of paternalism involves third party intervention into an 
individual’s behaviour or decision-making processes, with the aim of protecting 
individuals from the consequences of actual or potential biases in their decision-
making process.142 He goes further by defining a form of paternalism called, 
‘emotional paternalism,’ which is typically governmental conduct which 
intervenes in an actor’s decision-making at Time1 (with previously obtained 
consent) or Time2 (at a time where consent has been withdrawn), either when 
that decision-making involves judgements about emotions or emotionally-laden 
topics, or when it was, or has the potential to be, biased by emotions evoked by 
the objective of a judgement or incidental, transient moods.143 The idea underlying 
the concept of emotional paternalism is that people’s emotions render them 
vulnerable to poor decision-making. This concept therefore embraces the idea 
that paternalism does and should protect individuals from themselves regardless 
of their consent.  
However, this definition does not account for the type of regulation which 
interferes with the target’s actions to benefit a target whose autonomy or freedom 
is not affected by the action. For example, the FCA regulatory regime in the UK 
provides that businesses of financial services should have a complaints 
procedure in place to resolve disputes between them and their customers. 
Compelling a business to have a complaints procedure interferes with its ability 
to operate in the way it sees fit. Additionally, having such a complaints procedure 
may detrimentally effect the business, in the sense that it will inflict extra costs on 
the business e.g. the need to employ and train staff to resolve the complaints; if 
the complaint is found to be valid the cost of compensating the customer for the 
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wrongdoing; and the potential damage to the firm’s reputation. On the other hand, 
the regulatory requirement benefits the customers by giving them the capacity to 
ensure their complaints are addressed, but the paternalism does not deprive the 
customer of a freedom nor reduce the customer’s autonomy in some way. 
Seana Shiffrin’s account of paternalism goes some way to addressing this point. 
She views paternalistic actions as by definition an interference with personal 
sovereignty.144 Shiffrin has characterised paternalism as behaviour towards 
another which meets the following conditions: 
a) It aims to have or avoid an effect on B or his/her sphere of legitimate 
agency, i.e. the areas or issues that B has the right to control or make 
decisions about. 
b) It involves the substitution of A’s judgement or agency for B’s 
c) It targets B’s interests or matters that legitimately lie within B’s control 
d) It is undertaken because A regards his/her judgement or agency to be (or 
is as likely to be) superior to B’s judgement or agency.145 
One implication of Shiffrin’s definition is that there must be a motive behind the 
action – it must aim to either create a positive impact on the target, or limit a 
negative one. In this sense, an action cannot be classified as paternalistic simply 
because it provides a benefit to the target or because it coerces the target to 
behave in a certain way, rather, it must be designed to do this. There are two key 
features of Shiffrin’s account of paternalism which differentiate her definition from 
others. Firstly, paternalism does not necessarily involve active interference and 
secondly, it does not have to involve a specific concern for the target’s welfare. 
In relation to the first point, unlike the academics discussed above, Shiffrin 
considers that even an omission can be considered paternalistic because 
depending on its motive, an omission can also affect an individual’s autonomy 
just like an action can. She provides the example of an individual who asks a 
friend for help building a set of shelves. The friend refuses because the individual 
often asks for help to his own detriment, i.e. he is failing to learn the skills needed 
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to do things by himself. If the friend voices these concerns and persuades the 
individual to build the shelves himself, this cannot be paternalistic, but if the friend 
refuses to help without explaining these reasons to the individual, Shiffrin 
considers this omission to be paternalistic. The crux of this argument is that in the 
former scenario, the friend respects his autonomy because by providing the 
individual with reasons why he should change his mind and act differently, the 
friend has respected his capacity or right to make decisions about his own 
actions. Whereas, in the second scenario, the friend has supplanted the 
individual’s judgement about what is good for him with her own.  
Regarding the second point, the fact that a paternalistic action/omission does not 
have to be concerned with the target’s wellbeing means that an action can be 
paternalistic even if the actor’s consideration is for a different party. For example, 
if the actor intervenes with the target’s business operations, not out of concern 
for how well the business is run, but because of concerns with how the business’ 
operations impact its stakeholders, this intervention can be defined as paternalist. 
Examples of this therefore include environmental regulations which prohibit the 
flushing of industrial waste into nearby rivers because it could cause disease to 
society members and be detrimental to the environment. Here, the regulator 
takes control over a decision that is within the business’ domain, how the 
business should be run, by supplanting the business operators’ judgement that 
flushing waste into rivers is cheaper and therefore more efficient for the business, 
with the regulator’s judgement that it is better to protect the health and safety of 
members of the society. Therefore, within Shiffrin’s definition, the key contention 
of paternalism is not that the intervening act is done on behalf of the target or for 
the benefit of the target, rather paternalism occurs because an aspect of the 
target’s autonomy has been taken over.  
This review of the definitions of paternalism highlights that there are as many 
conceptions of paternalism as there are authors of the topic.146 The aim has not 
been to posit a new definition to add to the already large pantheon of definitions 
of paternalism. Rather, by reviewing the different ways that academics have 
defined and redefined the concept, it highlights the contentions contained within 
the concept and which demonstrate why paternalistic regulation is in need of 
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justifying. This has led Garren to conclude that, “while there is little to no 
agreement among contemporary authors as to paternalism’s intension or 
extension, and therefore little to no agreement as to what, precisely, stands in 
need of moral justification, there is widespread agreement that paternalism 
however defined – intent or effect, attempted or successful, coercive or non-
coercive, consensual or non-consensual,…state or personal, public or private, 
hard or soft…does give rise to a question of moral justification”147 because in all 
definitions as has been seen, paternalism involves the intrusion of an external 
party, e.g. a regulator, into the private affairs of an individual and this intrusion 
needs to be justified in order to be considered appropriate. In cases like P2PL 
which involve multiple parties, each party has interests and goals which might 
differ or conflict with the other parties’ interests or goals. This means that 
consumer protection regulation has the potential to harm one party’s interests or 
supplant their autonomy to benefit the other. Consequently, to expect the 
regulators to intervene more actively to protect P2P participants even though they 
have voluntarily agreed to take part in the private loan contracts, requires 
justification about why such intrusion is appropriate or necessary. 
The concepts of rational choice and behavioural economics both elicit debate 
about the way an individual behaves within the context of their economic or other 
actions. These discussions are only useful to regulators because by explaining 
how individuals behave or make decisions or choices, they contribute to answer 
the question of why a consumer may need regulation and how much. For 
example, RCT answers this question by saying that either no regulation is needed 
because the market regulates itself, or little regulation is needed, e.g. the 
proponents of the provision of information only and the need to make consumers 
take more responsibility for their actions. In contrast, behavioural economics 
theory answers the question by implying that more regulation is needed because 
consumers need extra help in their transactions. In relation to the regulation of 
P2PL, and consumer protection regulation in general, both theories link to the 
debate about paternalism because they are often used as a justification for or 
against it, or more or less of it. The debate about paternalism furthers this 
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question because depending on whether it is justified, one can argue for the 
regulation of a particular behaviour or industry. 
 
Key debates surrounding paternalism  
 
Paternalism is a concept that gives rise to debates concerning several 
philosophical and political issues including the nature and importance of freedom 
and autonomy, and the relationship between the state and the individual148 
because of the importance of the individual within modern society and the 
practical effect of paternalism on autonomy and freedom. It has important 
practical implications for regulatory policy, because regulation that is considered 
paternalistic causes a lot of controversy,149 due to the historic association of 
paternalism with the limitation of individuals’ liberty, freedom and autonomy. 
The central debate about paternalism concerns whether it can ever be justified 
and under which circumstances.150 Perhaps to soften its blow to the ideals of 
liberty and autonomy and to curtail negative criticism, paternalism has been 
divided into different types, mainly hard and soft paternalism. ‘Hard’ paternalism 
involves policies and regulations which target knowledgeable and competent 
agents, whereas ‘soft’ paternalistic policies are limited to targeting agents who do 
not act knowledgably or voluntarily,151 e.g. mental patients. 
 
The presumptively problematic nature of paternalism  
 
One of the key issues in the philosophical debate about paternalism is why it is 
automatically considered always wrong or at the very least always to be avoided. 
J.S. Mill the key proponent of act utilitarianism, argued against paternalism of any 
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form except where it is to prevent harm to others.152 However, the theory of act 
utilitarianism does not provide much help explaining why paternalism is 
intrinsically problematic because regardless of how it is defined, paternalism can 
maximise utility.153 
However, as Mill argued, individuals can be considered to be in a better position 
to know where his/her happiness lies and the best way to achieve it. This is a 
powerful argument against state paternalism, because politicians and regulators 
are not able to know an individual well enough to understand what is best for that 
person or tailor a policy specifically for that individual’s needs. Additionally, state 
paternalism in the form of policies and laws apply to the citizenry, so they are too 
general to be sensitive to the varying interests of their targets.154 A utilitarian anti-
paternalist may therefore argue that the paternalist rarely promotes the good and 
is never in a position to know when it will.155  
Still, this argument merely demonstrates that paternalism can be ineffective, it 
does not answer the question of why it cannot be justified or why it is thought to 
be always wrong. After all, the fact something is ineffective does not mean it 
should be banned in all situations, it simply points to the need for improvement. 
This is also the case with arguments that criticise paternalism on the basis that it 
limits freedom and autonomy, because paternalistic policies may promote the 
greater good in the long run, e.g., preventing someone from contracting into 
slavery increases his/her overall freedom.156 Coon and Weber provide an 
example of paternalistic policies which act in an anti-paternalistic manner: where 
the least paternalistic state prohibits its citizens from travelling to various 
countries to prevent them from being subject to greater paternalism later on.157 
This demonstrates that paternalism can be used to promote non-paternalism, 
therefore throwing into confusion the argument that paternalism is always bad 
and should be completely prohibited. 
In trying to answer this question, Coon and Weber examine ordinary articulations 
of anti-paternalism and find that what makes paternalism presumptively wrong 
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eludes us.158 For example, when ordinary people state that “you/the government 
cannot tell me what’s good for me,” they are stating that paternalism fails to 
respect the freedom and autonomy of individuals when they impose values on 
them, e.g. laws which require motorcyclists to wear helmets assume that the risk 
of injury outweighs the thrill of riding without a helmet whereas some 
motorcyclists might place more value on the latter.159  If this mentality was applied 
to the P2PL landscape, coupled with Hulme and Wright’s analysis of P2PL users 
as inherently independent and autonomous,160 some could argue that 
paternalistic regulation inhibits their ability to exercise that independence and 
personal autonomy. Consequently, the implication is that regulation of the lenders 
and borrowers should reflect this e.g. through methods focusing more on 
information disclosure and financial education. 
Shiffrin’s characterisation of paternalism might suggest that it is presumptively 
wrong because it treats its targets like children. The fourth part of her 
characterisation is that A undertakes a paternalistic act because A regards his/her 
judgement/agency to be or more likely to be, superior to B’s judgement/agency.161 
Therefore, A like a parent, supposes an authority to make decisions on behalf of 
B.162 Whilst assuming authority is not intrinsically wrong, it is the underlying 
expression of A’s superiority over B through a paternalistic act or decision that 
most would consider distasteful, because it suggests that B is less intelligent or 
less able to make decisions for him/herself.163  
Coons and Weber argue that this point is also dissatisfying because in acting 
paternalistically, A may not necessarily be expressing an intrinsic superiority over 
B, but may act paternalistically because they recognise that B is in a particular 
state or situation where people happen to make frequent mistakes in their 
reasoning, so the paternalistic act may simply be local, temporary or 
circumstantial.164 In this light, a paternalistic act can be construed as a responsive 
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action to a recognised need, which is not necessarily a bad thing so long as the 
action chosen is appropriate and the need is properly identified. This highlights 
that paternalistic conduct is not fundamentally wrong, rather it is method and 
reasoning underpinning each act that is deserving of criticism and the same can 
be said of any form of conduct or regulation. 
They also highlight that what anti-paternalists might consider to be objectionable 
about paternalism is not the expression of superiority over an individual, or that 
the paternalist may not fully understand the target’s interests, rather, for 
paternalism to be effective it requires the paternalist to use private information to 
make a public decision. What B considers to make their life worth living or their 
choice the best one for them, is private information and even if A is in a position 
to know exactly what these interests are, using them involves a degree of 
invasion of privacy.165 Even if it is shown that paternalism does not need an 
understanding of an individual’s personal values to be effective, acting in a 
paternalistic way without considering a target’s own evaluative perspective, 
demonstrates a willingness to impose values on that target. The implication is 
that paternalism either amounts to an invasion of privacy or the disregarding of a 
target’s personal values.166 
 
Justification of Paternalism  
 
Behavioural economics research has identified many decision-making errors that 
individuals make which has expanded the debate about paternalism. To the 
extent the errors identified by this body of research leads people to not behave in 
their best interests, paternalism can be argued to be justified. There are two 
historic justifications for paternalism. Firstly, scepticism about the ability of certain 
categories of people to make decisions in their best interests, e.g. the mentally 
disabled and minors.167  Secondly, there are situations where even sound-minded 
individuals may make decisions which are not in their long–term interests.168  
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Behavioural economics has added to the paternalism debate by describing ways 
in which people sometimes fail to behave in their best interests. For example a 
substantial body of literature investigates the ways people fail to process 
information; Tversky and Kahneman attribute such failures to people evaluating 
probabilities based on stereotypes,169 and Rabin  and Schrag find that actors 
sometimes interpret ambiguous evidence to confirm their current understanding 
about the world.170 Another body of literature documents how people 
systematically make judgement errors about the costs and benefits of their 
choices, e.g. the extent of loss aversion shown in people’s decisions appears not 
to match their actual experiences of gains and losses.171 Such errors of rationality, 
demonstrate a need for paternalistic policies which aim to help people make 
better decisions or behave in their own best interests.172 This is because the 
existence of the errors of rationality means if the consumers cannot pursue their 
own interests something else should step in to do so for them, at least where 
there is a public interest in doing so. 
Commentators have discussed the practical implications of behavioural 
economics for the law. For example, it suggests an increased role for third parties 
to help protect people from their own prejudices, particularly with respect to the 
suitability of paternalistic policies.173 It would be worth applying such questions 
specifically to the regulation of P2PL to analyse on a cost-benefit basis whether 
paternalistic policies are appropriate for this market. It might be that due to the 
varied models of P2PL operations and the different levels of risk involved in each 
type, paternalistic policies may not always be proportionate.  
Blumenthal has argued that whilst many scholars agree that individuals’ decision-
making processes are subject to biases and various failings, discussions have 
focussed on cognitive biases. He argues that people are probably more 
susceptible to emotional biases which may also be harder to correct.174 This is a 
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key issue because a paternalistic policy is largely justified because of either a 
cognitive or emotional bias preventing proper rational reasoning in an individual, 
and if it is harder to correct an emotional bias, then a paternalistic regulation that 
is adequate for a cognitive bias, may not be suitable or capable of correcting the 
emotional one. Therefore, the distinction between cognitive and emotional biases 
has important consequences for the cost-benefit analysis which should evaluate 
how appropriate paternalistic intervention is.175  
Thaler and Sunstein have suggested a form of paternalism which is 
simultaneously libertarian, called ‘libertarian paternalism’. This advocates policies 
which ‘nudge’ people to make better choices without precluding an option or 
increasing the costs of choosing it. It is based on a psychological research 
showing that people’s choices are influenced by small aspects of the choice 
environment. For example, people tend to have a bias towards the status quo 
rather than to change, so where there is a default option, individuals’ choices tend 
to be heavily influenced by it. Again, people tend to be risk-averse in the face of 
potential losses, but risk-seeking in light of potential gains, so choice can be 
influenced by how it is framed – as a loss or a gain.176 Thaler and Sunstein 
therefore argue that policy-makers should take such psychological tendencies 
into consideration and create choice environments where individuals will choose 
what is in their best interests.177 This has implications for regulation based on 
information disclosure because the way the information is framed may have an 
adverse effect on borrowers and lenders but a positive effect for the industry 
players who encourage them to lend or borrow on their platform, or vice versa. 
Policies which are libertarian paternalistic are paternalistic because they nudge 
people, and libertarian because they preserve freedom of choice.178 Thaler and 
Sunstein give the example of a school cafeteria where food is arranged in a way 
that common cognitive biases lead people to make healthier choices, although 
unhealthy food is still served at no extra cost. Such a strategy is paternalistic 
because it nudges people to make better health choices but does not cause any 
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detriment. Libertarian paternalism may therefore fall under Joel Feinberg’s 
definition of ‘soft paternalism’ where an actor has the right to prevent self-
regarding harmful conduct only when that conduct is substantially non-voluntary 
or when temporary intervention is necessary to establish whether it is voluntary.179 
Soft paternalism so defined, amounts to Mill’s first justification of paternalism 
which concerns the nature of an individual: if the individual’s judgement is 
impaired e.g. because of such things as immaturity or ignorance, to the extent 
that the individual does not know or appreciate or is incapable of knowing or 
appreciating the actual or potential harm to himself, then paternalism is justified. 
Conversely, anti-paternalists might argue against paternalism even in its soft, 
‘nudge’ form because it is better to leave people to choose freely, without any 
influences. However, Thaler and Sunstein argue that in many choice situations 
some organisation or agent must make a choice that will affect the behaviour of 
others, whether intended or not. So it is not possible to avoid a choice situation 
where people’s choices are influenced in one direction or another. Therefore, 
arguing against nudging on this basis is a ‘literal nonstarter’.180 Consequently, 
Thaler and Sunstein justify nudging on the basis that influences on choice are 
inevitable whether or not they are in favour of the target. 
Hausman and Welch have criticised Thaler and Sunstein’s libertarian paternalism 
on the basis that the nudges they propose are either not paternalistic at all or they 
should not be acceptable to libertarians.181 They argue that some nudges are not 
paternalistic at all because they merely give advice, information or engage in 
rational persuasion thus treating their targets as fully competent, unlike 
paternalism.182 The rest are paternalistic but do not answer libertarian concerns 
about the preservation of ‘a wider sense of liberty called autonomy’, even if they 
do preserve freedom of choice.183 Hausman and Welch argue that to the extent 
that nudges exploit the individuals’ decision-making flaws, they also diminish the 
control people have over their evaluations and choices because their decisions 
would ultimately reflect the machinations of the policymaker, not their own 
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analysis of alternatives.184 Consequently, libertarian paternalism might still be at 
odds with libertarian concerns with liberty. 
Blumenthal-Barby argues that making the use of nudges transparent will quash 
these libertarian concerns.185 Similarly, Thaler and Sunstein suggest that the use 
of nudges should be accompanied by a publicity condition, although they do not 
say how explicit this transparency needs to be.186 However, as Coons and Weber 
state, it is not clear how transparency will make a difference because nudges 
tend to rely on entrenched psychological tendencies that influence peoples’ 
choices subconsciously. So it would probably make it worse if the targets were 
informed about such nudges. Coons and Weber give the example of a love 
potion: if A has a love potion that makes B fall in love with him despite her current 
loathing, the fact that A tells B of the love potion does not mean he is morally 
justified in using it against B.187 This is arguably worse than using the love potion 
without consent, because it forces the recipient to ‘watch [themselves] fall victim 
to such influence.’188 Transparency will therefore not mitigate nudge the 
problematic nature of nudge policies. 
Coons and Weber go on to argue that transparent choice architecture is more 
like providing information or giving advice than paternalism.189 This is because if 
an individual was made aware that nudge policies would be used to influence 
their decision-making, then they would be alerted to the existence of their 
entrenched psychological tendencies and choose to either resist them or not. If 
this is the case, what leads individuals to make the better choice is that they have 
been reminded of the importance or value of that choice, and not because of the 
psychological tendencies in their reasoning that nudge targets.190 
Coons and Weber also state that whereas traditional paternalism takes steps to 
artificially ensure that it is irrational, from the target’s perspective, to make 
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suboptimal choices, it does not change the target’s fundamental evaluations.191 
Examples of traditional paternalistic acts are raising the cost of choosing what is 
viewed as the bad option or creating incentives for the target to pick the better 
one. Rather, traditional paternalism changes the external environment of the 
target in a way that makes their reasoning favour the better option.192 This is 
disrespectful in the sense that it disregards the target’s ability to make prudent 
decisions, however it treats individuals as rational by appealing to what they value 
and what people think they have reason to do.  E.g. people see themselves as 
having reason to seek financial incentives and avoid fines, traditional paternalism 
appeals to this reasoning. But people do not tend to think they have reason to 
choose a default or a status quo, rather these are unconscious choices.  
Contrarily, libertarian paternalism makes individuals act on things they do not 
consider to be reasons for doing things. Nudges change individuals’ assessment 
of various choices without appealing to their current values or views on a 
particular choice. Consequently, libertarian paternalism involves a deeper level 
of disrespect for the target because rather than just ignoring a target’s point of 
view or turning the viewpoint against the target like traditional paternalism, it 
views the target’s preferences as something to be replaced, removed or 
changed.193 Coons and Weber therefore state that libertarian paternalism does 
not merely violate rights of autonomy or self-sovereignty, but treats targets as 
though they are not owed such rights.  
This line of argument is supportive of anti-paternalist arguments that paternalistic 
policies are incompatible with autonomy. But such an argument is so broad that 
it could even cover the act of persuasion itself, the aim of which is to change, alter 
or extinguish the target’s point of view on a subject.  
Camerer, et al propose an approach to evaluating paternalistic regulations and 
doctrines called ‘asymmetric paternalism’ or ‘cautious paternalism’. These are 
regulations which create large benefits for those who make errors, whilst 
imposing little or no harm on those who are fully rational.194 The goal of 
asymmetric paternalism is to enable boundedly rational consumers make better 
                                                          
191 ibid 22. 
192 ibid 22. 
193 Christian Coons and Michael Weber (n 143) 23. 
194 Camerer and others (n 180) 1212. 
72 
 
decisions and align demand more closely with the true benefits they obtain from 
consumption.195 However, the authors are not proposing a new method of 
regulation but a new framework for evaluating the costs and benefits of regulatory 
options. In this way, they add more precision to the debate about whether market 
transactions should be presumed to be rational or whether a predictable set of 
heuristic failings support the case for paternalisms.196 They argue that a better 
idea of the costs and benefits of regulation on individual market actors is 
necessary for the proper design of adequate regulatory mechanisms.197 
Camerer et al raise an important issue about the behavioural choices of 
individuals. I.e. when assessing asymmetric paternalism policies, we should 
consider whether patterns of seemingly irrational behaviour are mistakes or 
expressions of stable preference. The correct policy to adopt is one that 
encourages disclosure, rather than banning the regulated product outright 
because if an individual continues to choose that seemingly defective option, then 
it is possible that they have a decent reason to do so, even if it is not clear to the 
policymaker.198 They give the example of extended warranties which an 
economist knows protect only very rare events, but a consumer continues to 
choose to purchase them despite being educated about this fact through policy 
initiatives. The authors suggest the debate about paternalism should shift from 
justifying its use, to analysing whether the benefits of mistake prevention are 
more than the harms imposed on rational people. This shows regard for the 
libertarian concern for the preservation of autonomy. Because the regulation of 
P2PL is still a relatively new area of academic interest, it is still necessary to 
consider whether this approach is justified. 
Contrary to the approaches of Thaler and Sunstein and Camerer et al, Garren 
posits that attempts by contemporary writers to reconcile liberalism and 
paternalism have either led to the weakening of the liberal commitments to 
autonomy and neutrality, or to the weakening of paternalistic commitments to the 
exercise of power over competent adult individuals without their consent for their 
own good. He argues that the fact either theory has to be weakened highlights 
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their incompatibility and “one must choose: liberalism or paternalism. One cannot 
have both.”199  
In relation to online P2PL regulation, the debate surrounding the justification of 
paternalism is significant because the design of its regulation must adopt a 
particular stance and justify it. If the regulations involve a degree of 
consumer/investor protection, the level of protection and its use needs to be 
justified in light of the fact that P2PL involves private lending contracts between 
lenders and consumers which they have freely chosen to enter. Arguably, from a 
libertarian perspective, the law should allow such individuals to exercise their 
freedom of contract without any influence on their choices or autonomy, 
regardless of the potential consequences. 
Considering the varied models of P2PL online and the varied interests of the 
consumers, this thesis prefers the libertarian-paternalistic approach to 
paternalism, as it represents a compromise between paternalism i.e. intervention 
and libertarian considerations for freedom of action. This is because it is important 
to prevent unnecessary risks or problems which can be caused by individuals’ 
choices, and affect themselves or the public at large.  
This recognises that although people have an interest in exercising their freedom 
of choice and liberty, they also have an interest in avoiding bad situations, 
negative consequences or living out the consequences of their mistakes or errors 
of judgement. Arguably, this is the basis of the current payment protection 
insurance mis-selling scandal – consumers who relied on poor, unclear or 
misleading information provided by businesses and based on their own 
judgement, are now able to claim redress to put them back into the position they 
would have been in had the policies not been added to their financial product 
accounts. Paternalistic policies can help consumers avoid the burden of financial 
regret. 
For practical purposes, a compromise will mean that regulations benefit from both 
perspectives. On one hand, consumers and the industry are provided with the 
help they need to thrive by avoiding or mitigating avoidable negative factors and 
consequences, recognising the idea that industries/markets also benefit from 
paternalistic or facilitative measures, like antimonopoly competition and entry into 
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market rules. On other, consumers and the industry are left with sufficient room 
to make choices once the playing field has been levelled. 
Consequently, this thesis considers paternalism justified where facilitative and 
preventative measures serve to level the playing field and make the market fairer 
for all market participants. E.g. by removing information asymmetries, ensuring 
equal bargaining power, ensuring accountability for misconduct, breach of 
contract or criminal activity, encouragement or facilitation of vulnerable 
consumers and small businesses. Once market participants can interact on an 
equal basis, libertarian principles of freedom, personal autonomy, choice and 
responsibility apply. 
 
 
2.3.4 Existing ‘Hard’ Paternalism Regulatory Shift 
 
The preceding section has shown that although paternalism has a reputation for 
being presumptively wrong for restricting the beneficiaries’ autonomy, in this 
context by limiting their freedom of contract, it can be justified where it serves to 
level the playing field between market players, making the market a fairer place. 
In spite of the paternalism versus autonomy debate, post-financial regulation 
within the retail investment and consumer credit markets has shown an 
increasing tendency towards stronger paternalistic measures. This suggests that 
regulators and market participants are becoming more open to hard paternalism 
which infringes on the contracting parties’ freedom to contract or behave 
autonomously. This general trend in current regulation supports the argument 
that P2PL regulation should also reflect this movement towards more intrusive 
protections for the lenders and borrowers for the same reasons it has been 
exhibited in the retail investment and consumer credit markets. 
The shift towards interventionist paternalism can be demonstrated by EU and UK 
regulations before and after the 2008 financial crisis in consumer credit regulation 
and retail investment regulation and general treatment of retail/household 
investors.  
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Information paradigm dominated Pre-crisis regulation  
Before the financial crisis, the UK and EU contract law regimes largely followed 
the principle that the autonomy of private parties in their contractual relationships 
was paramount and it should be respected.200 This remained the case unless 
there was a good reason for law and regulation to intervene, for example because 
the terms of the contract were unfair or for public policy interests such as illegality 
of the contract.201 In both jurisdictions, this freedom of contract approach resulted 
in reliance on mandatory information rules to protect investors, rather than 
substantive rules that sought to alter the actions of contractual parties.202 
The approach taken to protect the investor pre-crisis took the form of ‘soft’ 
paternalism because through  reliance on mandatory information rules, investors 
are supposed to make better decisions for themselves rather than having their 
behaviour governed by intrusive content-based mandatory rules.203 This is 
exemplified by the 1971 Crowther Committee Report on Consumer Credit which 
emphasised that there should be as little state intervention as possible, so that 
the consumer has the freedom to use his/her own knowledge of the consumer 
credit market to the best of his/her ability and according to what he/she thinks is 
in his/her best interests.204 The fact that the report influenced the adoption of the 
Consumer Credit Act 1974 is telling about the general approach to paternalism 
during this period. 
In the area of consumer credit following the crisis the UK’s reliance on 
transparency and information as a way to protect the consumer has gradually 
given way to a focus on irresponsible lending practices of credit providers. This 
is exemplified by the UK’s borrower-focused affordability assessment. In 2010 
the Office of Fair Trading issued guidance to creditors on irresponsible lending. 
The guidance dealt with the issue of affordability assessments which it called ‘a 
borrower-focused test’ in which the creditor assesses the borrower’s ability to 
undertake specific credit commitments in a sustainable manner, without the 
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borrower incurring financial difficulties and/or experiencing adverse 
consequences because of the borrowing.205 The reason why this measure is 
intrusive is because in sections 4.8 and 4.26 of the guidance, the OFT 
recommended that where the affordability test shows that borrowers would be 
unlikely to meet repayments under a credit agreement in a sustainable way, credit 
should not be provided. Therefore, the measure dictates to both creditors and 
borrowers what type of credit agreement they should enter into and under what 
circumstances. Similarly, the FCA expects mortgage lenders to base their 
decision to lend on a thorough assessment of the consumer’s income and 
expenditure, and base their decision to lend on the amount of income left after 
the consumer’s expenditure has been deducted, and if the consumer does not 
have sufficient borrowing capacity, the FCA requires that the lender does not 
grant the mortgage loan.206  
The approach to protection demonstrated by the affordability test is no longer 
about ‘nudging’ the consumer by giving them the opportunity to make better 
decisions through the provision of information, but of taking positive steps to 
control outcomes. The focus of sustainability by the affordability test is also far-
reaching because it requires businesses to consider future events in the life of 
the consumer such as whether the credit agreement at hand will put them in a 
worse position in the future, rather than the business considering its own aims in 
the business deal at hand. This also takes  decisions out of the hands of the 
consumer to businesses by assuming that once the business has taken various 
factors into consideration, it will be in a better position than the consumer to 
decide whether or not a credit agreement is suitable for the consumer.  
The emphasis on tackling irresponsible lending is a regulatory shift because it 
demonstrates how regulators no longer expect consumers to bear the sole 
burden of responsibility as they did before. It is no longer the case that consumers 
are expected to weigh up the information they are provided by, for example, 
mortgage providers, and determine whether they are able to fulfil their 
commitments under the lending agreement. Rather, much of the responsibility 
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has been shifted to the lenders due to the requirement that they perform suitability 
assessments.  
However, the application of the responsible lending approach to protection comes 
across some difficulty within the P2PL structure. Whereas the firm usually 
responsible for carrying out these suitability checks would be the lender or credit 
broker, in P2PL there is no broker and the lenders are individuals who are not in 
a position to assess the suitability of the lending from the borrower’s perspective. 
On top of this, the P2P platforms are not a party to the contract and so can 
distance themselves from the responsibility to carry out suitability checks. The 
credit checks that they do arrange, often through third party credit reference 
agencies, are for the sole purpose of ensuring that the borrowers are able to meet 
credit repayments to assure P2PLs of the safety of investimet on the platform. 
The creditworthiness check, however, is an altogether different test from ensuring 
that the credit that the borrowers take out is suitable and sustainable for the 
borrower. For this reason, in order to protect P2PL borrowers from the risks 
associated with irresponsible lending, P2PL regulation would require even more 
interventionist measures which involve vesting the ‘passive’ P2P platforms with 
the responsibility usually associated with institutional lenders, therefore making 
them liable for poor lending practices even though they are not the lenders.207 
A similar trend towards strong paternalism after the crisis can be seen in the EU 
regulation of consumer credit, as exemplified by a comparison between the 2008 
Consumer Credit Directive208 (CCD) and the 2014 Mortgage Credit Directive 
(MCD).209 The CCD contains lots of information requirements which the creditor 
or credit intermediary is expected to comply with at different stages of the credit 
relationship.210 For example, article four details information that firms should 
mention in  advertisements; art. 5 and 6 contain information firms should provide 
consumers before concluding credit agreements and articles 11, 12 and 18 detail 
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information that should be provided during the credit contractual relationship.211 
The reliance of these provisions on information provision as a form of protection 
demonstrates how the CCD is part of the information paradigm of consumer 
protection. 
Indeed, the furthest the CCD goes in intruding on the contractual autonomy of 
the firms and consumers for the sake of protecting investors is to require the 
creditor to, “provide adequate explanations to the consumer, in order to place the 
consumer in a position enabling him to assess whether the proposed credit 
agreement is adapted to his needs and to his financial situation, where 
appropriate by explaining the pre-contractual information…, the essential 
characteristics of the products proposed and the specific effects they may have 
on the consumer…” (Emphasis added).212 The provision explains that the purpose 
of the creditor’s explanation is to enable the consumer to assess the merits of the 
credit being provided. Therefore, like RCT, the underlying rationale is the 
consumer in need of protecting is a rational one and is well-equipped to 
understand and mitigate the risks they face if given sufficient information. 
The protective measures of the CCD are also limited by the fact that its scope did 
not include some key forms of consumer credit including credit cards and loans 
involving credit of less than EUR 200 or more than EUR 75,000.213 This therefore 
excluded from protection risky forms of consumer credit such as payday lending 
which feature frequently revolving credit of relatively small amounts that can trap 
consumers in a cycle of debt.  
In direct contrast to the CCD, following the crisis there has been an awareness 
that irresponsible lending practices has worsened the problem of consumer over-
indebtedness, because it can have a detrimental effect on the individual’s well-
being and, on a macro-level, can cause a housing bubble and undermine 
consumer confidence in the market.214 No doubt as a response to this, the MCD 
created a clear duty of responsible lending for mortgage providers,215 which can 
be seen in art.18(1) that explicitly requires providers to thoroughly assess the 
                                                          
211 Consumer Credit Directive, arts 5, 6, 11, 12 and 18. 
212 Consumer Credit Directive, art 5(6). 
213 Cherednychenko (n 213) 409. 
214 ibid 410–411. 
215 ibid 411. 
79 
 
creditworthiness of r consumers before concluding credit agreements.216 The 
factors that providers should take into account include any future payments under 
the mortgage credit and other regular expenditure, the consumer’s debts, other 
financial commitments, income, savings and assets, and future events such as 
possible reduced consumer income or increased borrowing rate.217 Further more, 
unlike the CCD, art.18(5(a) of the MCD states that the consequence of un-
creditworthiness should be a refusal by the creditor to advance credit to the 
consumer.218 
Another example of the increased post-crisis regulatory ‘hard’ paternalism is the 
use of product intervention techniques across the EU. The underlying rationale 
of product intervention is that targeting dangerous products once they have been 
designed, marketed or sold to some consumers will prevent problems from 
growing and affecting larger numbers of consumers.219 This rationale reflects an 
understanding that prevention is better than cure and that sometimes the service 
users or contractual parties are not always in the best position to ensure the best 
outcomes for themselves. The implication for P2PL regulation is that regulatory 
measures that are designed to prevent bad outcomes before they happen are not 
a bad thing in and of themselves. This could mean that, although the P2PL market 
has not yet shown itself to be detrimental to society, it does not mean that it should 
be left to grow organically without regulators’ consideration of  harmful risks to 
borrowers and lenders. 
A UK example of the use of product intervention occurs within the retail 
investment market. According to s.137D of the Financial Services and Markets 
Act 2000, as amended by the Financial Services Act 2012, the FCA can create 
temporary product intervention rules where it has identified risk to consumers 
resulting from a particular product, type of product or practices associated with a 
particular product or type.220 Such interventions are only meant to be temporary 
as they are limited to a maximum duration of 12 months. The product intervention 
rules can occur through requirements for certain product features to be added, 
excluded or changed; by imposing restrictions on sales or the marketing of a 
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product in relation to some or all types of consumer and, at the most extreme, the 
FCA can choose to ban the sale or marketing of a product.221 In fact, the FCA has 
already made use of these powers by banning the promotion of unregulated 
collective investment schemes (UCIS) in 2013.222 
As another example, in January 2015, the FCA introduced a price cap on the total 
amount that high-cost, short-term credit lenders, like payday lenders, could 
charge.223 There are three main elements of the price cap. Firstly, when loans are 
taken out or rolled over, the interest and fees charged must not exceed 0.8% of 
the amount borrowed. Secondly, in the event of a borrower defaulting, any fees 
incurred should not exceed £15. Businesses can charge fees after default, but 
they should not exceed the amount of the initial loan. Finally, lenders should 
never charge borrowers fees and charges which amount to 100% of what they 
borrowed.224 
The cap ensures that consumers do not have to pay back more than twice what 
they have borrowed. It also ensures that a consumer who takes out a typical loan 
over a thirty-day period and makes his/her repayments on time, will not have to 
pay more than £24 per £100.225 The aim of this measure was to secure an 
appropriate degree of protection for borrowers against excessive charges in this 
market.226 During the consultation period for the price cap, the FCA made clear 
its intentions that, “we expect the cap to lead to a reduction in lending and some 
customers who have previously taken out high-cost short-term loans will no 
longer get them. …we believe that, apart from for a short initial period, they will 
be better off without loans.”227 This reflects the ‘hard’ paternalism approach 
because through the price caps the FCA has intervened in the normal business 
practices of a particular market purely for what it believes is in the consumer’s 
best interests. It also reflects an underlying assumption that the FCA, rather than 
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the consumer, is in a better position to know what is best for the consumer in the 
long run. 
The shift towards a more interventionist approach to regulation in the post-crisis 
retail and consumer credit markets can also be framed as a change in how 
regulators in the EU and UK treat retail investors. Indeed, Moloney has argued 
that following the financial crisis the retail investor is no longer treated by 
regulators as an empowered, autonomous individual but is now afforded 
protections usually associated with vulnerable consumers of financial services 
and investment products.228  
According to Moloney, prior to the crisis, there were two main targets of EU 
investor protection regulation, the ‘consumer of financial services’ and the 
‘small/average/retail investor’.229 EU regulation tended to treat the targets 
differently depending on which category they fell into, so a ‘consumer of financial 
services’ benefited from more interventionist measures compared to a ‘retail 
investor’.230 Pre-crisis regulation also tended to focus on products and services 
related to retail investors e.g. household investment, rather than on mortgage 
products or consumer credit products that are more typically associated with 
consumers of financial services.231 Consequently, pre-crisis measures aimed to 
protect retail investors through the promotion of empowerment, autonomy and 
choice.232  
One of the examples Moloney gives is of the changed approach between the 
MiFID I and II regimes. The former was largely based on disclosure, process-
based suitability rules and a principles-based regime and it did not intrude on the 
retail investors’ choices or the products sold to them.233 However, the MiFID II 
differs from MiFID I in that the controls it espouses relate to how the service is 
delivered to investors, rather than simply empowering investors through 
disclosure rules.234 For example, it provides that investment advice must be 
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labelled according to whether or not it is provided on an independent basis and 
whether it is based on a broad or restricted analysis of the market.235 Additionally, 
art.7 provides that if the investment advice is provided on an independent basis, 
the investment firm should assess “a sufficient range of financial instruments 
available on the market which must be sufficiently diverse with regard to their type 
and issuers or product providers to ensure that the client’s investment objectives 
can be suitably met”.236 This means that  investment firms cannot limit advice to 
financial instruments provided by them or firms having close links with them.237 
This requirement of diversification is interventionist by seeking to improve 
diversity through intrusive measures than merely providing information and 
expecting investors to be able to know that they should diversify portfolio 
themselves.  
These post-crisis measures in the EU and UK indicate that there is an increased 
reluctance to require retail investors’ responsibility for their own choices and 
protection. Moloney’s argument about the increased “consumerisation” of the 
retail investor therefore centres on the fact that regulatory measures now place 
responsibility with investment firms and consumer credit providers,238 either by 
regulating the product to be sold through product intervention measures or bans 
or by ensuring the investor receives advice and not just information for the 
investor to put to use themselves. According to her analysis, retail investors are 
“consumerised” not because of what they do, but because the regulatory 
approach towards them has become more interventionist and precautionary.  
If the movement of the regulatory treatment of the retail investor to the consumer 
domain is associated with a push towards ensuring that financial service 
providers give them advice, this consumerisation of the retail investor has limited 
application or use in P2PL. P2PL model operates on the basis that no 
lending/investment is given. If regulators were to force platforms to provide 
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lenders or borrowers with advice, they would be forcing a change within the 
fundamental structure of P2PL, i.e. the element which supposedly ‘cuts out the 
middleman’ by making the platform a more involved intermediary. As such, using 
regulation to encourage greater advice to lenders and borrowers is not a useful 
regulatory tool within P2PL. Chapter 5.6 therefore proposes using gatekeeper 
liability, a form of civil liability, as one possible method of regulating P2PL 
platforms for the benefit of lenders and borrowers in a way that truly reflects their 
role and activities in P2PL. 
As previously mentioned, Moloney’s argument that retail investors have become 
consumers is based not on what they do, but rather, on how they are treated and 
viewed by regulation. They are no longer treated as responsible and capable of 
self-governance. Instead, a more paternalistic approach is being taken and they 
are now being treated the way that ordinary consumers have generally been 
treated by regulation, i.e. with more intrusive regulation that restricts freedom of 
contract and autonomy. She mentions that retail investors should not “be seen 
simply as risk-takers and asset accumulators, but should be regarded as 
purchasers of products which are increasingly essential for welfare.”239 
Consequently,  her view of the consumer as someone who purchases a product 
based on need is different from this thesis’ conceptualisation of consumer and 
“lendsumer”.240 The thesis defines consumer and “lendsumer” on the basis of 
individuals’ actions and behaviours in P2PL transactions rather than regulatory 
treatment. The analysis of the consumer and prosumer which are examples of 
this thesis’ perspective grounds the argument that regulation should  consider 
what lenders do and their activities, and, following from this, be more reflective of 
the fact that P2PLs exhibit traits of both consumers and prosumers. 
Consequently, protections should be designed to reflect the transitional nature of 
P2PLs which is unique to business models similar to direct P2PL. 
Given the general movement towards the consumerisation of the retail investor 
in the EU and UK, and the general shift away from a focus on the stability of the 
retail financial markets towards protection of the investor, it is interesting that the 
regulation of P2PL focuses largely on ensuring the stability of the platform. This 
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is to ensure continued consumer confidence in the burgeoning P2PL market. 
Policy on regulation of P2PL has tried to shy away from highly intrusive measures 
to ensure adherence to the principle of proportionality – possibly the most 
intrusive protective measure has been the requirement of firms to have in place 
arrangements for the loan contracts to be administered by an alternative third 
party should the platform itself cease to exist. However, it does not go far enough 
to say what type of arrangements should be made and their quality and degree.241 
Possibly, these tentative investor protection measures in P2PL are because that 
as a new market regulators are concerned with not stifling its growth and its 
business model of operation is exclusive of advice. Therefore, regulators cannot 
provide the usual interventionist measures exemplified by the post-crisis 
regulation of the more traditional models in the retail investment and consumer 
credit markets, which is to bring investment activity under the requirement of 
providing advice to consumers.242 
 
2.4 Approaches to Consumer Protection 
 
Norbert Reich distinguishes between three broad approaches to consumer 
protection as seen over time within developed countries.243 He calls them ‘pre-
interventionist’, ‘interventionist’ and ‘post-interventionist’ philosophies of 
consumer protection.244 ‘Pre-interventionist’ approaches to consumer protection 
relate to the model used in developed market economies in the 1950s and 
1960s.245 Reich states that pre-interventionist approaches developed from 
commercial and competition law. It analysed basic assumptions of civil law like 
caveat emptor and freedom of contract and suggested mild solutions which did 
not impose specific standards on the content of contractual relations.246 
Information was viewed as a key component of consumer autonomy and 
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consumer autonomy could be improved by self-help information systems and 
government-monitored information systems like labelling.247 
‘Interventionist’ or ‘regulatory’ policies relate to those implemented in the 
1970s.248 The approach is based on a more active role for the state in social 
relations, i.e. the ‘welfare state’.249 The welfare state controlled and changed the 
traditional principles of freedom of contract, competition and fault liability which 
were seen to discriminate against the consumer.250 Welfare economic theories 
dealt with the power aspects of market transactions and tried to re-establish 
bargaining power through tools like warranties or banning exemption clauses.251 
Other justifications for the interventionist approach included market failures and 
the contract law principle of caveat emptor,252 which is the idea that consumers 
assume the responsibility to examine and decide for themselves whether to 
purchase a particular product or use a particular service. 
The interventionist approach was criticised by the economic analysis of law. The 
Coase theorem posits that so long as there are no transaction costs, the parties 
involved in a transaction will find the best allocation of property rights through 
voluntary exchange regardless of the original distribution.253 This implied that the 
interventionist approach prevented the efficient allocation of resources and law 
should only influence the distribution of property rights, but the allocation of 
resources should be left to the parties themselves.254 This state of affairs could 
lead to harmful effects for P2PLs who might misinterpret the information they are 
provided e.g. about the borrowers they choose to invest their money on and 
therefore choose unsuitable lending opportunities on the P2PL platform.  
‘Post-interventionist’ policies relate to those used in the 1980s which involved a 
“mixed rationality” of consumer law.255 On the one hand they do not support the 
deregulation of the markets, however on the other hand such approaches are 
more reserved in their support of consumers than the interventionist approach.256 
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For example, post-interventionist approaches to consumer protection like 
labelling, instructions and warnings serve to avoid stricter standards being 
imposed on businesses and give the appearance that something is being done 
to protect the consumer; on the other hand, such information regulations might 
also be used to make the producer liable in areas where the traditional rules of 
liability or warranty might not apply.257 Another example of post-interventionist 
consumer protection regulation includes product liability. 
 
2.5 Meaning of ‘Consumer’ 
 
This thesis focuses on the EU definition of the consumer which has become 
influential. Defining “consumer” is important because it establishes who can rely 
on consumer protection rules and thus the underlying regulatory model.258 The 
difficulty in forming a definition is exacerbated by the fact that consumers are not 
a homogenous group and can vary widely depending on their differing tastes, 
social positions or cultural backgrounds.259 However, the concept can be better 
identified by looking at the common elements which have been seen to make up 
the notion of the consumer.260 Therefore, each subsection looks at a different 
aspect of the consumer. EU law is used to analyse the concept of consumer 
because many member states’ regulations on the subject bear a close similarity 
to its rules. 
One way EU law distinguishes consumers from other members of society is by 
distinguishing the consumer from a company or an employee. This was the case 
in Francesco Benincasa v Dentalkit Srl.261 In that case, the claimant wished to set 
aside a franchise agreement he had signed with Dentalkit. One point he made 
was that at the time he concluded the agreement, he was a consumer within the 
meaning of the first paragraph of article 13 of the Brussels Convention because 
he was not carrying on a business. The first paragraph of the article defines a 
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consumer contract as one which is concluded by a person “for a purpose which 
can be regarded as being outside his trade or profession.” 
The claimant was therefore trying to take advantage of the wording of the article 
which does not specifically refer to the point in time the consumer’s trade or 
profession should relate to, by focusing on his professional status at the time he 
concluded the agreement. So, as he was not running the franchise as his 
business at the time he signed the agreement, he sought to evoke the article to 
protect his pre-contractual status as a non-business owner, i.e. a consumer. 
The national court found that the franchise agreement was not a consumer 
agreement and so could not rely on article 13. Consequently, the question put to 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ)was whether a claimant could be regarded 
as a consumer under the article if the relevant contract was concluded not for the 
purpose of a trade the consumer was already pursuing, but for a trade he or she 
intended to carry out at a future date.  
The ECJ, interpreted article 13 more narrowly by equating the purpose of the 
contract with the consumer’s status. Seemingly, as the goal or intention of the 
contract was to start a franchise business, the claimant’s purpose of the contract 
was seen to relate to the claimant’s trade or profession. Therefore, Advocate-
General Ruiz-Jurobo Colomer opined that the determining factor was not the 
subjective situation of the consumer, but his position under the contract, taking 
into account its scope and purpose.262 The reason being that the same person 
could be a consumer for certain purposes but an entrepreneur for others.263 
This highlights that one feature of a consumer is that it is a natural person who 
acts for a purpose which is unrelated to their profession, trade or business. 
According to the Directive on Consumer Rights, the definition of a consumer 
should include the following points: 
a) Natural persons; and 
b) Acting outside of their trade, business or profession. (Except for dual 
purpose contracts which is concluded partly within and partly outside the 
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person’s trade and the trade purpose is not the predominant purpose of 
the contract). 
Regarding the first requirement, EU law tends to adopt the limited notion that a 
consumer must be a natural person. This is typically the case in EU Directives.264  
However, the approach that the consumer is always a natural person reflects the 
underlying rationale of EU consumer protection law to level the playing field 
between the person as an individual and a business. This can be seen in the case 
of Cape Snc v Idealservice Srl, where Advocate-General Mischo states that the 
term “consumer” referred to “an individual, which necessarily implies that a 
natural person is concerned.”265 This demonstrates EU law’s insistence that a 
consumer can only be a natural person and not a legal person e.g. a business. 
One reason why the EU law definition focuses on the individual might be that the 
term “consumer” is an economic construct which evolved over time from referring 
to a buyer, to a customer and finally to a consumer.266 
Within the EU a consumer is typically defined as a natural person acting for 
purposes outside of his/her normal business, trade or profession.267 In Océano v 
Grupo Editorial SA v Rocio Murciano Quinero the ECJ stated that the EU 
approach to consumer protection is based on the idea that the consumer is in a 
weaker position compared to the seller particularly regarding bargaining power 
and knowledge.268 The fact bargaining power and knowledge are highlighted 
demonstrates that the consumer protection approach leans heavily towards the 
pre-contractual stage of transactions. Additionally, the seller versus consumer 
terminology, similar to the business versus consumer/customer terminology 
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found in most consumer protection regulation, does not fit the P2PL business 
model of individual-to-individual transactions. 
It also reflects the notion that consumers are in a weaker position compared to 
sellers, in terms of bargaining power and knowledge because they are natural 
persons. There are two underlying assumptions. Firstly, companies are 
economically stronger and more experienced in legal matters, better organised 
and more powerful than individuals and therefore need no protection.269 Secondly 
individuals are rational beings who would be able to make better decisions if the 
playing field between them and the business was levelled. This indicates that EU 
consumer protection law is built on a vertical form of consumer interaction 
between a business and a consumer, as opposed to business transactions which 
occur between individuals. 
This perspective is reflected in the development of the meaning of “consumer” in 
English law. Unlike EU law, the definition in the Sale of Goods Act (SGA) 1979 
and Unfair Contract Terms Act (UCTA) 1977 originally allowed businesses to be 
considered consumers. E.g. two requirements needed to be fulfilled for a person 
to “deal as a consumer” under s.12(1)(a)-(c) of UCTA 1977. Firstly, the party does 
not enter the contract in the course of a business nor hold themselves as doing 
so. Second, the other party makes the contract in the course of a business.270 
The definitions made in these Acts did not require a consumer to be a natural 
person.  
Consequently, it was possible for the Court of Appeal to hold that a claimant 
company was dealing as a consumer in R & B Customers Brokers Co Ltd.271 In 
this case, the claimant was a private company that bought a car from the 
defendant finance company for the personal and business use of one of its 
directors. The claimant rejected the car after discovering that the roof leaked and 
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the defendant failed to resolve it. The terms of the contract claimed to exclude 
implied conditions about the condition/quality of the car or its fitness for purpose. 
However, the claimant argued that the exclusion was invalidated by s.6(2) UCTA 
1977 because it was dealing as a consumer. The section disallows sellers from 
excluding/restricting liability for the quality/fitness of a product when dealing with 
a consumer. The Court of Appeal construed the meaning of “in the course of 
business” narrowly so that a transaction must either be integral or entered into as 
part of the business’ regular course of dealing.272  
However, the definition of “consumer” changed under the Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts Regulations (UTCR) 1999, which in s.3 required that 
consumers be “natural persons.” Similarly, s.2(3) Consumer Rights Act 2015 
defines “consumer” as an individual acting for purposes wholly or mainly outside 
that individual’s trade, business, craft or profession. The term “individual” was 
clarified in paragraph 36 of the Explanatory Notes to mean, ”natural person.” Thus 
reflecting article 2(1) of the Consumer Rights Directive. Consequently, following 
in the footsteps of EU law, the current UK regime excludes businesses from 
consumer protection. 
Possibly, the exclusion of businesses from the UK definition of “consumer” 
reflects the EU view that they are not the weaker party. This adds to the argument 
that paternalism plays a large role in consumer protection. The simple reason for 
the removal of businesses is that they are not seen as needing protection and, 
for the moment, regulators do not want to distinguish between different types of 
business e.g. sole traders compared to large corporations.273 Overall, the 
development of the definition in English law demonstrates that the notion of 
“consumer” is not a static term and further change is not precluded.274 
Shüller criticised the EU definition of the consumer arguing that the term should 
not be defined in terms of whether they are a natural person or not, but by their 
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acts and behaviours.275 This suggests that consumers are not the weaker party 
and thus deserving of attention because they are natural persons, but because 
of how they act/behave in specific circumstances.276 More specifically, he states 
that it is the act of buying consumer goods that defines the consumer, not their 
nature.277 Although Shüller therefore broadens the criteria for what constitutes a 
consumer by associating it with behaviours, this last point ties the concept of the 
consumer to the field of contractual sale of goods, assuming that one can only be 
a consumer when the contract relates to goods sold. However, Shüller’s 
approach is useful because it offers more insight into the consumer by bringing 
into the discourse what a consumer actually does and how, which opens up the 
possibility for a more accurate dialogue of why they should be protected. 
So, unlike the economic construction of the EU definition of the consumer, which 
sees them as capable of making rational decisions in their own interests, a 
definition focusing on the acts and behaviours of consumers recognises, that 
consumers are not always predictable and may not be able to decide in a rational 
manner.278 An important factor of consumer behaviour is the situation, e.g. the 
type of services/goods and the consumer’s environment and experience. So, 
consumer protection law should differentiate different consumer situations to find 
a balance between protecting the consumer and avoiding business costs.279  
This point about the need for a situational conception of consumers, raises 
several questions about the participants of P2P platforms. An example is what 
type of relationship exists between P2PLs and P2PBs, i.e. which would be the 
consumer in this relationship? Both know about the same as the other and suffer 
from a similar level of information asymmetries, if not the same.  Or does 
consumer protection law not govern this type of relationship although one party, 
the borrower, is receiving a service from the other i.e. the loan?  
It will be argued in a later section that consumer protection law as it stands does 
not cover this type of relationship, and so needs to adapt to this relatively new 
form of economic relationship. For now, one response is that because on many 
platforms, P2PLs and borrowers deal with each other through the services of the 
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platform intermediary and not actually directly with each other, consumer law 
would only be relevant in relation to the P2P borrower/lenders’ relationships with 
the platform. Meanwhile, normal contractual rules would govern the relationship 
between P2PLs and P2PBs, e.g. through the principles of breach of contract, 
misrepresentation, etc.  Nonetheless, these questions do show the gap between 
the traditional conception of the consumer as an ‘economic man’ consuming 
goods/services from a business, and the reality of new forms of online 
transactions as exemplified by online P2PL. 
In relation to the second factor concerning an act outside of the individual’s 
profession, EU law does not specify what it means to be acting outside of one’s 
trade or profession. For example, the issue of whether a businessman who is 
also a natural person, acting outside of his profession or trade could be a 
consumer was not covered in Dietzinger, where a credit agreement entered by 
Mr Dietzinger’s parents and guaranteed by him, was not considered outside a 
trade or profession.280 
 
2.6 Concept of ‘Average Consumer’ 
 
Another way EU law identifies the consumer is by specifying the type of consumer 
in question. The classification used ultimately depends on the aim of the 
legislative instrument in question.281 For example, EU law generally uses the more 
restrictive, normative concept of the “average consumer” in its acts and case law. 
However, in situations where a group of consumers require a higher level of 
protection, it uses the concept of the “vulnerable consumer.”282 
The idea of the ‘average consumer’ is a useful one because it acts as a 
benchmark for regulators and courts to refer to when determining who the 
consumer is and how they are likely to behave. However, it is also a simplistic 
concept which is not always practical or inclusive. 
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The origin of the concept in ECJ case law was in the case of Gut Springenheide 
where the court described the features of an ‘average consumer’ in relation to 
whether a statement or description designed to promote the sale of eggs was 
likely to mislead the average consumer.283 It stated that the average consumer is 
someone who is “reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and 
circumspect.”284 So the notion is used like a reasonable person’s test as the court 
is expected to take into account the presumed expectations of the average 
consumer. The concept was refined in subsequent case law, such that we can 
build a picture of the ‘average consumer’ as conceived within the EU. 
In Miles Handelsgesellschaft International mbH the Court of First Instance (CFI) 
stated that the average consumer’s response is that of all average consumers 
who are reasonably informed and observant and not just the niche target 
consumer within the industry in question.285 The case was about the sale of 
clothing for motorcyclists. The judge stated that even if the relevant group of 
consumers only consisted of motorcyclists, they would be no more observant 
than members of the general public when they buy their gear. The broader 
implication of this statement is to highlight that although different industries might 
attract people from different sectors of society, with different interests or skills, 
they are still subject to the same factors which necessitate regulatory protection. 
For example, although P2PL might attract a type of consumer more risk averse, 
independent or financially aware than most, they are still subject to the same 
behavioural and economic challenges as the rest, e.g. information asymmetries 
and a lack of absolute rationality when making decisions. 
However, in relation to how the court measures what the average consumer is, 
the case of CeWe Colour AG stipulated that the average consumer’s features 
depend on the member state the product or service was advertised in and 
designed for.286 E.g. if a transaction occurs in the UK, the court should have in 
mind the characteristics, behaviours or cultural practices of UK consumers in 
                                                          
283 Case C-210/96 ECR Gut Springenheide GmbH, Rudolf Tusky v Oberkreisdirektor des 
Kreises Steinfurt – Amt für Lebensmittelüberwachung, [1998] ECR I-4657, para 37. 
284 ibid para 31. 
285 Case T-385/03 Miles Handelsgesellscharft International mbH v Office for Harmonization in 
the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM), judgement of the Court of First Instance 
(Fourth Chamber) of 7 July 2005, para 15. 
286 CeWe Colour AG & Co OHG v Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (Trade Marks 
and Designs) (OHIM), judgement of the Court of First Instance (Fifth Chamber) of 8 September 
2005, joined cases T-178/03 and T-179/03, para 28. 
94 
 
general, not the traits of consumers in Greece or Italy. These two cases show 
that to determine what the average consumer is, one should look at society in 
general and not the micro-societies within different industries. This approach can 
potentially lead to inconsistencies between member states in terms of how they 
define the ‘average consumer’. This is because if national courts take into 
account their respective social, cultural and linguistic behaviours, the result may 
be different interpretations of the meaning of ‘average consumer’ between 
member states and thus different levels of protection afforded to consumers 
depending on the member state a case arises in.287 This might not appear to be 
pertinent to the current state of P2PL which operates largely on a national-level, 
however the impact would be more clearly felt should the industry start to operate 
on a multinational/international level. 
The characteristics of an average consumer portrayed by Advocate-General 
Geelhoed in Douwe Egberts are: 
“…before acquiring a given product (for the first time), a consumer will always 
take note of the information on the label and that he is also able to assess the 
value of that information. It seems to me that a consumer is sufficiently protected 
if he is safeguarded from misleading information on products and that he does 
not need to be shielded from information whose usefulness with regard to the 
acquisition and use of a product he can himself appraise.”288 
And in August Storck KG, the average consumer is viewed as well-informed or at 
least “averagely informed”,289 i.e. he/she has some idea, if not detailed knowledge 
about the produ/service.290 As noted by Mak, the EU law conception of the 
‘average consumer’ is used as a benchmark for normative evaluation of how a 
consumer can generally be expected to behave in the circumstances of a given 
case. The normative nature of the concept is emphasised by the fact that the 
behavioural traits of the “average consumer” can be determined by the presumed 
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behaviour of the “average consumer” rather than based on a factual expert’s 
report or research poll.291 
Whilst these cases refer to a rational consumer in line with the general conception 
of EU law, there are cases which recognise that the consumer is not always 
attentive to the product/transaction in question, but is still perceived to belong to 
the class of the “average consumer”. In Procter & Gamble v OHIM, the applicants 
wished to register a community trademark for white tablets relating to washing 
machine and dishwasher cleaning products, but the Office for Harmonization in 
the Internal Market (OHIM) refused because the tablets were not distinctive in 
character. This decision was upheld by the Third Board of Appeal of OHIM and 
the CFI which stated that the average consumer would not give a high level of 
attention to the shape and colour of washing machines and dishwater tablets 
since they were everyday consumer goods.292 
These cases demonstrate a dual persona for the average consumer: he/she is 
both well-informed and observant, yet may have an imperfect understanding of 
the product or may not pay attention to some features of the product. This creates 
a situation of impracticality because it is difficult to both conceptualise what 
exactly the average consumer is and unpredictable as to which one is being 
referred to, whether the observant consumer or the non-observant one. 
Commercial practices do not have a uniform impact on consumers because 
consumers do not form a uniform group.293 Consequently, the concept of 
‘consumer’ in general does not reflect that consumers do not fall into one clear 
and unvarying category. This creates problems for a regulatory regime because 
it is unable to choose an accurate benchmark for the identity of the consumers it 
regulates within a particular industry. It can also lead to either an overhanded 
protection regime or an under-regulated one, depending on which way the regime 
has portrayed the average consumer. E.g. a regime that portrays the average 
consumer as too reasonable, well-informed and observant might provide too little 
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protection; whilst a regime that portrays them as too vulnerable might lead to too 
much protection. This suggests that a more finely tuned conception of a 
consumer in the market/industry is necessary to balance the principles of 
proportionality and protection in the regulatory regime. 
Furthermore, the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive enshrines the 
ambiguous conception of the average consumer in law by giving it statutory 
authority.294 The Directive therefore protects the average consumer who is 
reasonably observant and circumspect, rather than the consumer who is 
distracted or uninformed about goods or services, or the naïve consumer who is 
easily persuaded by deceptive advertising or practices.295 In one sense, this 
means it does not protect the consumers most in need of protection, rather there 
is an expectation that consumers themselves should meet a certain standard be 
it of intelligence or rationality before they can expect the benefit of protection. I.e. 
consumers are expected to always act rationally and responsibly. 
The average consumer test often results in forms of weak paternalistic measures 
e.g. disclosure obligations and ‘cooling-off’ periods.296 However, such measures 
hint at the awareness that consumers are not always reasonably well-informed, 
observant and careful, because although disclosure obligations pander to the 
rationality and intelligence of the average consumer, they also indicate they are 
not always well-informed. The need for measures like cooling-off periods 
recognises that individuals can make bad decisions in the heat of the moment, 
rendering them careless and unobservant. However, these weaknesses do not 
appear to be accounted for in the conception of the EU average consumer.   
The Directive does include protection for “vulnerable consumers”. These 
individuals are protected by the Directive on the basis of age, mental or physical 
infirmity or credulity.297  However, as stated by Incardona and Poncibo, the 
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inclusion is impractical and unnecessary.298 This is because if, for example, a 
product/service targets the elderly, then the average consumer will be determined 
by the average within this group.299 But if it targets all members of society, it would 
be impractical to expect businesses to tailor their marketing in a way that would 
not mislead all the possible vulnerable consumers,300 not least because of the 
broad range of what constitutes a vulnerable consumer.301 Consequently, the 
inclusion of an exception for vulnerable consumers serves to highlight the 
problematic idea of the average consumer, because it does not in reality reflect 
the average consumer. 
The case of Buet provides a different notion of the “vulnerable consumer” which 
perceives them as vulnerable in particular circumstances.  In  that case, the ECJ 
said that a customer of door-to-door educational enrolment salesmen are more 
vulnerable than most canvassing consumers, because they are more likely to be 
behind on their education and wishing to catch up, so they are vulnerable to the 
sales tactics promoting the educational enrolment which might persuade them 
with the likelihood of better job prospects.302 Another justification for the ban on 
canvassing, which is a protective measure, was that because teaching is not a 
consumer product in daily use, a poorly considered purchase could cause the 
buyer harm other than mere financial loss that could be more long-lasting. E.g. 
low quality or unsuitable training could harm their chances of getting a better job 
or enrolling on further training.303 This case therefore depicts a consumer who is 
not vulnerable because of a characteristic of the individual, but because of a 
certain circumstance. In this sense, it indicates that vulnerability, and by 
extension the concept of ‘consumer,’ is situational – i.e. a consumer may be 
vulnerable in cases of the canvassing of educational enrolment courses, but not 
in situations where they are trying to buy a car.  
One question raised by the average consumer concept is, if the typical user of an 
industry qualifies as an ‘average consumer’, does this mean the law or regulation 
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in question should be designed to suit them and ignore the possibility of the 
vulnerable consumer? Which benchmark should be used, the average consumer 
or the vulnerable consumer? Or should there be a two-strand test? For example, 
the law is x, but if the consumer falls within the category of a vulnerable consumer, 
then the exception to be applied is y.  
Micklitz argues that the EU’s involvement in consumer legislation gradually 
changed the outlook from consumer protection law into consumer law. This 
meant that the focus shifted from the weak consumer to the average consumer304 
– as shown in the above discussion of the EU definition and conceptualisation of 
‘consumer’. Consequently, the weakest market participant was no longer 
considered to be “the small man” on the street, but increasingly the private or 
small business owner.305 The impact is that EU consumer law protects the 
‘average consumer’ rather than the vulnerable one unless it is designed to protect 
against a particular vulnerability, e.g. door step selling victims who are vulnerable 
because of a lack of opportunity to inspect goods.  
This has been most obvious in the information paradigm that dominated 
consumer law, for example, by comparing the original Doorstep Selling Directive 
85/577/ECC to the Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83/EU and the original 
Consumer Credit Directive 87/102/EEC with the revised version 2008/48/EC, one 
can see a development in the obligation to inform.306 The underlying rationale is 
that the circumspect, informed consumer would be able to make a rational 
decision based on information received.307 However, whilst such protections 
might protect the ‘savvy’ individual, it is different for individuals who cannot 
process the available information and require information for different reasons.308 
Arguably, such individuals might be covered by the EU’s concept of the 
‘vulnerable consumer’ however the implication of this “backup category” is that 
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under consumer law such as the consumer protection law regimes of the 1970s 
and 1980s consumers are not considered to be intrinsically vulnerable, , rather 
only some groups of consumers require protection.309  
The consumer law approach to conceptualising ‘consumer’ is problematic for 
extending the concept so broadly as to include many different types of market 
participant. As stated by Micklitz, one cannot compare the owner of a yacht to an 
electricity customer who cannot pay his bill and whose provider turns off the 
power. Consequently, the concept of 'consumer encompasses the small business 
person to the vulnerable consumer.310 In other words, they all can be classified 
as consumers even though their respective relationships within the markets they 
operate in are different and so their levels of vulnerability (if at all) can vary 
greatly. This points to the need for a consumer (protection) law that is more 
flexible in how it defines the ‘consumer’. It would be impractical to create a 
different body of rules and regulations for each type of consumer, particularly 
because each type of consumer can usually be found within a given market. 
Micklitz therefore proposes a “mobile system of rules” and “conceptual 
descriptions”.311 The moveable redress system is based on the idea that different 
rights and obligations can be assigned to different types of consumer.312 
Consequently, Micklitz highlights four main groups of the consumer: the informed 
consumer; the responsible consumer who can make use of the information 
provided to exercise his/her rights; the circumspect consumer, who benefits from 
market-rectifying mechanisms that grant a minimum level of fairness through 
mandatory rules; and the vulnerable consumer who, at least in EU law, is usually 
afforded status-based antidiscrimination rules.313 
The idea is that the different types of consumer experience different types of 
weakness and different levels of values, so a responsible consumer, which 
according to Micklitz includes the client/small business person requires a legal 
framework that guarantees “access justice” rather than focusing only on the 
guarantee of social justice through redistribution. Legal or regulatory provisions 
which provide “access justice” ensure access to the market so that the 
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responsible consumer can benefit from the advantages of the variety of products 
and services.314 In contrast, the vulnerable consumer intrinsically requires legal 
provisions that provide social justice because according to Micklitz, “as an 
individual, and indeed the weaker party on the market, he needs the protection 
of the legal system”.315 
It therefore appears that Micklitz’ differentiated consumer is based on the 
difference between professional and oftentimes business ‘consumers’ and 
‘individual’ consumers, where he associates the vulnerable consumer with 
individuals. However, these categories and corresponding resolutions to 
problems do not fit the lenders of P2PL because, like traditional 
conceptualisations of consumer, Micklitz does not take into account the 
vulnerabilities arising from the actions of consumers in the market. Rather than 
regarding them as active participants in the market, the differentiated consumer 
framework views them as passive recipients of goods and services, 
Consequently, the vulnerabilities conceived and the corresponding solutions are 
based on the risks faced by individuals (and small businesses) who are simply 
on the receiving end, e.g. information risks and inability to access a particular 
market. Whilst such vulnerabilities affect all forms of consumers – including 
P2PLs and borrowers – it is not broad enough to contemplate the peculiar risks 
and vulnerabilities the latter face.  
Furthermore, the movability aspect of Micklitz’s solution is that the extent of the 
personal responsibility of the consumer depends on the extent of autonomy 
he/she has, and the extent state intervention in contractual relationships to 
guarantee social or access justice depends on this. Therefore, the burden is on 
the consumer to use the information provided and to inform the business 
participant if there are any shortcomings. As such, the responsible consumer 
would have a higher burden of self-reliance and responsibility than the vulnerable 
consumer.316 
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Micklitz does not make it clear whether the use of information by the consumer is 
the sole criterion for determining the consumer’s level of responsibility or 
increased need for protection, although it is the only one mentioned on 
corresponding obligations on consumers for their protection. As such, even e 
flexible movability is tied to the information paradigm of consumer law, as the 
starting point for protection is that help is provided to the consumer in accordance 
with his/her ability to use the information provided. However, information should 
not be seen as the starting point, because in some consumer activities it is of no 
use or bears no relevance to the risks or vulnerabilities faced. For example,  once 
the lending contract is underway, information is no longer of use to the P2PLs, 
who are henceforth dependent on the platform to perform its task adequately and 
lack the power to do so themselves. 
Based on the concept of the prosumer, which highlights that individuals are not 
just passive receptacles of services provided to them, but are active participants 
in the services, this thesis argues for a legal framework that takes into account 
what the consumers actually do and what arises from their activities specifically.317 
Therefore, adequate protection needs to be afforded to different types of market 
participant within their own market of operation. Consequently, this thesis argues 
for a flexible protection law paradigm that looks at the particular vulnerabilities of 
the P2PLs and borrowers.  
Nonetheless, Micklitz’s idea of differentiated remedies is significant. 
Differentiated remedies means that there should be different remedies depending 
on the different types of consumer in the particular context. For the responsible 
consumer, a reasonably prepared package of information which provides 
pertinent and accurate information would be a suitable remedy., Whereas the 
right to withdraw or change contractual partners may be of no benefit, the right to 
access and a minimum standard of services applicable to all would be more 
appropriate for the vulnerable consumer.318Therefore, Micklitz’s differentiated 
consumer approach is a suitable starting point for this thesis’ analysis, by 
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highlighting the fact that the body of consumers is not as homogenous as the 
concept of ‘average’ consumer implies.  
In response to the  question of whether the benchmark for consumer law’s 
conceptualisation of consumer should be the average or vulnerable consumer, it 
would more practical for there to be a single test – to assume that the average 
consumer is a vulnerable one, in light of research of behavioural and cognitive 
psychology studies which show that consumers are not all, and not always, 
rational. 
Arguably, rather than having a strict test for the ‘average consumer’ based on a 
fallible conception of the average consumer, it would be better to shift the goal 
posts slightly by acknowledging that the average consumer is not always rational 
and observant. Rather, the definition should include the behavioural flaws 
exhibited by people when carrying out transactions or making purchases. One 
might go further to argue that the concept should be more flexible and take into 
consideration both economic and social vulnerabilities faced by the individuals in 
question, e.g. the inclusion of how much control one has in the specific 
marketplace activity at the pertinent time as something that should warrant the 
classification of vulnerability and thus the need for protective measures. This 
section has shown that the general notion of ‘consumer’ cannot accurately 
convey the varying complexities of the individuals who are the end-users of 
goods/services, whether it is their features or the ways they behave in different 
circumstances. At best, it only serves as an umbrella description of all those who 
purchase goods/services. 
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2.7 Concept of ‘Vulnerable Consumer’ 
 
The regulation of financial services is usually justified by the need to protect 
consumers, but consumers are a diverse group and protecting them all is a 
challenge faced by regulators.319 There are two main views of consumer 
protection, the first is that consumers need to be protected from firms’ 
unscrupulous activities e.g. misleading information or aggressive sales tactics; 
whilst the other view is that consumers must be protected from themselves.320 
 
Cartwright’s paper on vulnerable consumers focuses on the challenge to design 
policies which appropriately consider the interests of disadvantaged consumers. 
For the purposes of his research, he calls them “vulnerable” consumers. A key 
development of his article is his consideration of the different ways vulnerable 
consumers should be understood. Cartwright develops a way to classify them 
which he terms a ‘taxonomy of vulnerability’. The aim of Cartwright’s taxonomy is 
to help identify where vulnerability is most likely to arise. The factors of 
vulnerability which he classifies are: information, pressure, supply, redress and 
impact vulnerability.321  
Cartwright uses “vulnerable” in the relative sense of the word, i.e. consumers as 
a group may be vulnerable in comparison to other market players like traders, or 
in comparison to each other. However, he focuses on consumers who are 
vulnerable in comparison to each other.322 Additionally, the article focuses on 
consumers who have the capacity to look after their own interests, but are 
relatively regarded as vulnerable323 or disadvantaged.324  
Cartwright also suggests ways that this taxonomy can be used by regulators and 
legislators to ensure that the interests of vulnerable consumers are correctly 
taken into consideration. One example he gives is in the context of redress 
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vulnerability. In some cases, consumers may only be appropriately protected 
where they can hold businesses to account by obtaining redress. However, this 
may require knowledge, confidence and resources all of which a vulnerable 
consumer may not have.  
He points out that the law addresses the needs of such consumers largely 
through the prevention of unfair practices.325 An example is the Consumer Credit 
Act 1974 which is the main legislation designed to govern the relationship 
between lenders and consumer borrowers. Sections 140A to 140D deal with 
unfair relationships. A court can make an order regarding credit agreements in 
three situations listed under s.140A, for example, the way the creditor has 
exercised or enforced any of his rights under the agreement or any related 
agreement.326 The provisions provided in this section of the Act allow for 
maximum flexibility because they do not specify any meaningful way of identifying 
an unfair credit relationship.327 
Cartwright has stated that the fact consumers of financial services need legal 
protection is a certainty.328 They are vulnerable in many ways and the question 
that should be asked is how they should be protected.329 There are many legal 
mechanisms which can be used to protect consumers, and there are very many 
different types of consumers that need protecting, e.g. sophisticated investors 
and unsophisticated current account holders, because of this, it needs to be 
determined “which mechanism should be used to protect which type of consumer 
in which field of financial services.”330 
Cartwright’s taxonomy provides a useful framework for addressing questions 
about appropriate regulatory measures in favour of various vulnerable 
consumers. It also recognises that consumers are not a homogenous group but 
come in very many forms and experience varying types of vulnerability. This is 
an important factor for regulators to bear in mind because not all regulatory 
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methods are suitable for each consumer, even within a particular market like 
P2PL. 
 
106 
 
2.8 Concept of ‘Prosumer’ 
 
Previous conceptions of the consumer treated them like “passive receptacles” 
who could be swayed by appealing messages.331 However, the characteristics of 
consumers are changing because rather than passively consuming the 
goods/services they use, they are more involved in the production process. 
 
2.8.1. Origin of the term ‘prosumer’ 
 
The term ‘prosumer’ is attributable to Alvin Toffler who dealt with the concept in 
his book, “The Third Wave”, where he recognised the active participation of 
consumers.332 It is an amalgamation of the concepts of producer and consumer 
and has been defined as an individual consumer who gets involved in the design 
or production process of a good which the individual will eventually purchase or 
can envision themselves purchasing.333 In this way, the prosumer engages in 
activities which are traditionally perceived as separate activities carried out by 
separate parties, i.e. they are simultaneously a producer and a consumer of 
goods/services. Because of this combination of activities, the prosumer is said to 
engage in ‘prosumption’. A term itself an amalgamation of the concepts of 
production and consumption and which Ritzer has defined as the interconnected 
process of production and consumption.334  
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According to Ritzer and Jurgenson, prosumption is made up of an equal focus on 
production and consumption.335 This suggests that prosumption is different from 
customer-centred services where companies allow customers to modify elements 
of the final product,336 e.g. the colour of a car the customer wishes to purchase, 
because in such cases the company retains control over the production 
process.337 Rather, in prosumption, the customer co-innovates and co-produces 
the product he/she will eventually consume.338 
 
2.8.2. Consumption to Prosumption: a brief history of the prosumer 
 
The economies of the developed world have been governed by capitalism for the 
last few centuries.339 In its earlier stages during the industrial revolution, and for 
approximately two centuries after, capitalism focused largely on the production of 
goods, particularly within factories.340 This was particularly the case during World 
War Two with the focus on manufacturing war materials with very little for 
individuals to consume.341 The resulting scarcity of consumer goods created a 
desire for them.342 
During this period, the central principle in contract for sale of goods was caveat 
emptor, i.e. buyer beware. This placed a good deal of contractual risk on the part 
of the consumer because it was the buyer’s responsibility to check the goods 
before contracting and the buyer who bore the risk of defected goods, except 
where the defects were unforeseeable.343 However, the underlying assumptions 
of the caveat emptor principle were that in the eyes of the law, both contractual 
parties were on an equal footing; each party had a distinct role in the transaction, 
i.e. one was the seller and the other the buyer; and both parties were seen to 
have opposing interests, i.e. both wanted the best bargain for themselves.344 
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The first assumption was based on classical theory of contract which viewed 
freedom of contract as an expression of the will of contracting parties to choose 
whether to contract.345 Consequently, the parties to the contract were seen as 
being in the best position to determine their wills and therefore viewed as self-
reliant, self-sufficient and self-determinant.346 
From the early 1960s, the production industries started to decline. This period 
also saw the focus shift from production to consumption with the emergence of 
large indoor shopping malls as the sites of consumption and the outsourcing of 
production to other countries like China.347 The consumer society was also aided 
by the growth of available credit,348 which enabled people to spend and thus 
consume more. The consumer society did not replace production, but it was no 
longer the priority.349  
The classical contractual principle of caveat emptor also became tempered by 
consumer protection legislation because the rise of mass-production and mass-
consumption made the view that producers and consumers had equal bargaining 
power unsustainable.350 Examples of the early consumer protection legislation 
were President John F. Kennedy’s Consumer Bill of Consumer Rights, based on 
an address to congress on 15 March 1962, which conferred such rights as the 
right of consumers to safety, to be informed, to choose and to be heard.351 
Similarly, in the EU, the European Commission 1975 Programme for Consumer 
Protection and Information Policy recognised five basic consumer rights which 
included the rights to  protection of economic interests, redress, representation 
and to information and education. 
Whilst the consumer protection regime recognised that producers and consumers 
did not have equal bargaining power, as with classical contract theory, the regime 
was structured around the idea that producers and consumers had distinct roles 
within the transaction and opposing interests. It was therefore largely tailored to 
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suit the traditionally passive consumer who did not actively engage in the 
production process and simply consumed. 
However, from late 2007 to 2008, during the global recession, consumption and 
production began to decline and there were signs that the prosumer society was 
challenging the separate consumer and producer societies.352 Yet for Toffler and 
Ritzer, prosumption has always existed.  
According to Toffler, over time there have been three types of societies which 
have existed in waves, each wave taking over the previous one. The First Wave 
was dominated by the settled agricultural society. Prosumption was the 
predominant form of economy in this pre-industrial society. The Second Wave of 
the industrial age society followed, featuring mass production, mass education, 
mass media, mass distribution and consumption; and it began with the Industrial 
Revolution in western Europe. According to Toffler, it was during this period that 
marketization drove a wedge into society separating the two functions into the 
separate entities of ‘producer’ and consumer’.353 However, society is moving 
towards the Third Wave which consists of the rise of the prosumer and 
prosumption354 once again.  
Similarly, Ritzer has argued that it was the Industrial Revolution that separated 
production and consumption. However, rather than the forms of society existing 
one after the other, they have never been fully distinct.355 For example, during the 
height of the age of production, producers consumed raw materials like coal and 
timber to manufacture the final products and consumers produced their meals.356 
And consumers have often contributed to the production of the goods and 
services they consume by being put to work, e.g. with the onset of fast-food 
restaurants, consumers carried their own trays of food to their tables and filled 
their own drinking cups before sitting down to eat them, likewise in supermarkets, 
consumers have been encouraged to use self-service checking machines to buy 
the products they eventually consume. So, prosuming activity always existed, but 
was slight during the production-focused period. 
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2.8.3. Factors of the change from consumer to prosumer 
 
There is both a cultural and economic cause for transition from consumer to 
prosumer. In relation to the cultural cause, society has latched on to the idea that 
there is a need for self-empowerment and the emphasis is on personal rights.357 
Linked to this is the increasing desire of people to be in control of their own affairs, 
whether in the workplace, school or the doctor-patient relationship.358 
Consequently, the structural relationships between consumers and 
businesses/professionals is changing from a hierarchy of leadership which sees 
the business/professional exercising all the control within the relationship and the 
consumer being passive, to a partnership-based structure, which sees the 
business or professional having to justify their decisions and solicit input from the 
‘consumer’.359 An example of this is the doctor-patient relationship where doctors 
no longer dictate treatment to patients, but provide them with options and explain 
the options to them. 
In the context of the P2PL industry, the industry thrives off and is rooted in this 
zeitgeist. It is built around the type of people who want to take control of their 
finances and savings by taking control away from banks and traditional financial 
institutions. Some people prized the concept or encouraged it as a way of 
punishing the banking industry for their reckless behaviour leading to the 2008 
financial crisis. In this way, the P2PL users exhibited their empowerment and 
exercise of non-passive control within their transactions. 
Therefore, if as Shüller argued, one cannot define ‘consumers’ by their nature but 
by their acts and behaviour, the fact that the way the consumer acts and behaves 
is different from before, means the concept of ‘consumer’ needs to change. 
The second factor of this transition is economic. Firstly, the development of 
technology and cheap labour has caused a shift in the focus of global capitalism 
from concerns about the need to make lots of products quickly, i.e. production, to 
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the need to get consumers to purchase goods to prevent the failure of the 
company i.e. consumption.360  
Secondly, it is cheaper to get consumers to do the work of consumption 
themselves in the form of self-service ticket machines in train stations or self-
service check-out machines in supermarkets.361 P2PL for example, is akin to self-
service lending and borrowing; the intermediary takes a step back in comparison 
to traditional lending institutions, to give people more control. Both factors have 
resulted in the empowerment of the consumer transforming them from being the 
passive consumer to the more active ‘prosumer’. 
Salzman described a prosumer as cash-rich, time-poor, demanding, socially 
aware and demanding of full and transparent access to information.362 However, 
it is questionable whether these features are any different from the traditional 
conception of the consumer enshrined in law. The EU law definition can 
accommodate this concept of ‘prosumer’ because of its underlying assumption of 
the ‘average consumer’. 
The prosumer represents the blurring of lines between production and 
consumption, because they participate in the production of the goods and 
services they consume.363  
A distinguishing feature of prosumers is that unlike consumers, they are made to 
work for the things they consume. According to Dujarier, there are three main 
types of work that a prosumer does which helps categorise them, directed self-
production, collaborative co-production and organisational work.364 
Directed self-production entails situations where consumers produce for 
themselves using tools and support provided by the supplier, e.g. vending 
machines, ATM machines and eating from a tray in fast food restaurant.365 These 
situations are usually imposed on the consumer, so the consumer is made to 
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work to consume and bears the burden of time, money and travel. Therefore, the 
consumer is forced to become a prosumer. 
Collaborative co-production involves unpaid profit-making work.366 E.g. 
crowdsourcing, where tasks are outsourced to crowds of people across the world 
who can act as a remote, unpaid workforce.367 This category also includes the 
use and market exploitation of information captured about individuals online 
either passively using traces left on websites, mobile phones and GPS, or 
deliberately through surveys 368. Additionally, user-generated content also falls 
under this category of work carried out by the prosumer. E.g. when bloggers write 
articles (blog) or post videos of themselves (vlog) reviewing different 
goods/services, or providing instructions for their audience on how to use them, 
they generate advertising revenue for companies which they may or may not 
benefit from financially. 
The final category of work is organisational work. This type of work indirectly 
collaborates with the production side of transactions because it aims to produce 
a practical response in the main producer which is subjectively and socially 
acceptable.369 For example, when the consumer, deliberately avoids buying their 
car fuel from companies with dubious moral practices e.g. the failure to clean up 
oil spillages. For this type of work to succeed, consumers must work, in the sense 
of testing, comparing, researching, writing and negotiating with the business, all 
the while facing obstacles put in place by marketers like exit barriers, confusing 
rates and loyalty programs designed to persuade them into adopting the 
behaviours the marketers and businesses expect.370 
 
2.8.4. The identity of prosumers 
 
The question remains, who or what is the prosumer? The notion of consumer was 
defined according to its nature as a person and the purpose of the transaction, 
i.e. the fact the transaction was carried out for personal rather than for business, 
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trade or professional purposes determined whether a contract was a consumer 
contract or whether an individual was a consumer. Contrarily, the 
conceptualisation of the prosumer tends to be centred on the prosuming work 
that they carry out. So a prosumer is someone that puts in work towards 
(produces) what they wish to or will eventually consume. Likewise, a prosuming 
transaction is one which either requires or encourages the actor to produce and 
consume. 
Early examples of prosumption include fast food restaurants requiring their 
customers to be their own waiter by carrying their food to their table or car, or 
sandwich bars like Subway requiring consumers to choose the content of their 
meals371 by adding extras like different sauces and toppings. Other examples of 
prosumption include consumers becoming their own bank cashier using ATM 
machines and their own check-out assistants in supermarkets using self-service 
check-out machines.372  
Examples of prosumption can also be found online in a less material form 
because of the web 2.0 version of the internet. In terms of the development of the 
internet, web 2.0 is second generation internet and it contrasts with web 1.0 
because it facilitates user-generated content, whereas previously, content was 
created by internet providers like AOL and Yahoo.373 In contrast, web 2.0 has 
been crucial to the development of the means of prosumption because it lets 
users produce content collaboratively.374 For example, Wikipedia, a website 
where users create, edit and update the encyclopaedic entries; social network 
websites like Facebook, blogs and micro-blogging sites like Twitter; eBay a 
website where consumers and retailers create the marketplace; YouTube, a 
website where users create and upload videos for consumption, and Amazon, an 
online shopping centre where internet users do the work of ordering products and 
writing reviews.375 
Online business transactions can be identified by the parties to a transaction. The 
typical categories are business-to-business, business-to-consumer and 
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consumer-to-consumer transactions.376 In most electronic commerce, the 
prosumer is often perceived as falling under the category of participant which 
follows the ‘-to-‘377 i.e. the role traditionally played by the consumer of being the 
recipient of goods/services. However, they can often display the characteristics 
associated with the participant before the ‘-to-‘378 through their capacity as 
producers. Consequently, the prosumer blurs the roles of consumer and producer 
within transactions. 
However, as under the consumer society, the corporations still control the major 
resources online.379 Although participants take on the role of the producer, the 
profit and potential for profit e.g. through branding, remains with the corporations, 
even though they have taken a step back and allow the participant to do a lot, if 
not all the work,380 they would normally do, for free.  
Consequently, even in scenarios where the prosumer takes on the role of the 
entity before the ‘-to-’ in a transaction, the move from consumer to prosumer has 
not placed them on an equal footing with the business. This is particularly the 
case in consumer-to-consumer transactions online, where the business takes a 
step back and seemingly no longer belongs to that transactional structure, only 
facilitating the consumers in the production and consumption of their own 
goods/services; yet retains hold of the major resources required to fully carry out 
the transaction. 
 
2.9. P2P lenders and borrowers 
 
2.9.1. Users of P2PL 
 
Hulme and Wright381 provide a comprehensive analysis of P2PL which surveys 
its historical background and the reasons for its re-emergence in the financial 
scene. They analyse the concepts of community and individualism and find that 
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P2PL offers a new type of financial relationship which attracts the type of 
individual that desires on the one hand, financial services which are based on 
community ideals such as ‘good faith’, ethicality and a varying desire to 
participate in communities, where financial exchanges are based on principles of 
altruism, transparency and personal social responsibility. For example, in their 
survey of Zopa users, they found that 54% of lenders and 85% of Zopa borrowers 
thought of Zopa as “exceptionally transparent”, whilst 73% of the people that 
completed their survey on the general banking industry felt that mainstream 
financial services should be more transparent about the organisations they invest 
in.382 Hulme and Wright have stated that they believe this transparency leads 
members to view “social lending” schemes to be acting in ‘good faith’ with care 
for the individual and with a philosophy that looks beyond the transactional nature 
of the financial relationship. 
On the other hand, these individuals also have a higher level of individualism 
facilitated by the self-educative effect of the internet, in that they are looking for 
innovative financial solutions that give them a greater sense of control and 
empowerment. Overall, the authors argue that concepts of the individual within 
community, transparency and ethicality are all pivotal to P2PL schemes and 
provide the ideological underpinnings of this form of financial exchange. 
Hulme and Wright argue that although there are many financial motivations for 
using social lending schemes, the ethical and social principles they reflect are the 
main attractions for users.383 For example, they state that if a borrower defaults, 
it negatively affects the lenders’ expected return which according to their 
research, results in a feeling of obligation and duty to repay.384 However, 
experience has shown that this is not always the case. For example, Quakle, the 
now defunct P2PL platform based its operations around a similar, social 
philosophy stating, “Quakle believes that social bonds strengthen confidence and 
make borrowers more likely to repay”.385 This was not the case due to practical 
realities inlcuding the fact that many of its borrowers were already in a poor 
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financial state before they started using the service. Many were borrowing from 
the P2PL site to repay existing payday loans.386 
This shows that operating P2PL on the principles of trust, transparency, altruism, 
and consumer responsibility alone, is insufficient to ensure P2PL schemes work 
smoothly in the interests of the participants. Research on the limits of human 
rationality, literacy and learning has shown that there are limits to consumer 
learning.387 There are challenges involved in trying to instil new habits and skills 
in consumers, for example, behavioural research has shown that consumers 
select differently from the same options depending on the context and how their 
choices are framed.388 Additionally, educating them is often compromised by the 
conflicting interests of firms’ to exploit irrational consumer behaviours.389 
Therefore, there is a tension between consumer responsibility and firms’ 
competitive pursuit of profit. It also suggests there is a need for regulation to 
ensure that the principles which form the basis of P2PL are enforced and 
complied with – it is not adequate to rely on individuals or platforms to enforce 
them. 
Hulme and Wright’s findings on the type of people that use P2PL are that the 
users of P2PL are individuals who are inherently responsible or autonomous. As 
to the form regulation should take, the implication is that the regulation of P2PL 
users should reflect this characteristic by delegating some sort of responsibility 
or placing on them an onus to protect their own wellbeing within the market, e.g. 
through the responsibilisation of the consumers through education, transparency 
and information disclosure. However, this too has its limits. Responsibilisation of 
the consumer is discussed further below. 
 
2.9.2. Ideals/Goals of P2PL 
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Davis and Gelpern’s study of P2PL focuses on its use for development; it is useful 
because the regulatory concerns are not just domestic in nature but treat the 
international aspects of P2PL regulation.390 E.g. they discuss the interests of key 
players on the international lending platform such as the home state, host state, 
recipients of the funds and donors and present the regulation of P2PL within the 
structures of two different bodies of law, charity and banking. This provides a 
different perspective on the nature of P2PL.  
An analysis of the charitable, not-for-profit use of P2PL as found in micro-
financing can be used to compare the communal and altruistic motives of lenders 
within the for-profit P2PL structure. These ideals were also highlighted by Hulme 
and Wright in their discussion of the type of people who engage in social lending 
which represents them as sophisticated and independent people who appreciate 
community values and altruism/philanthropy.391  
However, financial services regulation does not reflect consumer interests of 
investing or purchasing from an ethical, altruistic or trust-based institution. 
Financial services regulation tends to emphasise principles of consumer 
protection and competition moderated by the principle of proportionality. E.g. the 
FCA’s regulation of P2PL in the UK, is primarily disclosure-based. In the FCA’s 
consultation paper on its approach to crowdfunding, it stated that for loan-based 
crowdfunding, e.g. the approach followed by Zopa, “[their] approach will require 
firms to ensure that investors have the information they need to be able to make 
informed investment decisions and that all communications are fair, clear and not 
misleading.”392 They also state that, “[Their] proposals seek to provide adequate 
consumer protections that do not create too many barriers to entry or significant 
regulatory burdens for firms.”393 The underlying implication is that consumer 
interests are secondary regulatory concerns and the interests for business are 
primary. 
This highlights that where consumers are concerned, the emphasis of regulation 
is to enable them to act independently, but free of various perceived dangers, i.e. 
regulation for consumers tends to be protective. However, where businesses are 
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concerned, regulation can be both protective and facilitative of their interests. For 
example, laws and regulations have been designed to protect small businesses 
by ensuring that competition and entry into markets is fair; whilst also facilitating 
business through principles of proportionality, and the legal principles behind 
limited liability companies which make it easier and less risky to do business. 
 
2.10. Comparison between P2P lenders and consumers 
 
The previous sections provided an in depth look at the main components making 
up a consumer. To summarise, consumers are generally understood to be natural 
persons, who act for non-business/professional/trade purposes, to obtain goods 
or services for consumption or use. They are reasonably well-informed and 
reasonably observant, prudent and they are passive recipients of the activities of 
producers.  
 
2.10.1. P2P lenders’ role during the formation of the loan 
 
P2PLs tend to be natural persons who act for a purpose which does not relate to 
their profession, trade or business. However, there are some platforms which do 
allow institutions to lend, such as Zopa. The underlying rationale of the principal 
that consumers are natural persons is to reflect the idea that consumers need 
protection to level the playing field between the individual intending to consume 
and the business providing the product of consumption. P2PLs also face uneven 
playing fields. Although they are the suppliers of the money in relation to the 
borrowers, they are reliant on the borrowers to provide accurate details about 
themselves and this, through the intermediation of the platform. This reliance 
creates an uneven playing field because they have no control or involvement over 
parts of the service provision e.g. limited knowledge and bargaining power. 
Shüller argues that it is what the consumer does and how they behave that makes 
them a consumer – e.g. the act of buying consumer goods.394 For example, 
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P2PLs are targeted by businesses to an extent – they are made aware of and 
attracted to P2PL platforms through online advertising mediums: 27% of lenders 
through online advertising and 33% through online intermediaries like 
MoneySupermarket. It’s assumed they react to such advertising in the same way 
as ordinary consumers of goods or financial services and so are subject to the 
same behavioural tendencies when receiving, understanding and acting on them. 
They are primarily motivated by the interest rates that they can obtain on a 
platform – 78% of P2P consumer lenders saw this as a very important factor 
whilst 22% saw this as an important factor.395 Although platforms can use these 
rates to attract lenders, such rates can be misleading depending on a platform’s 
accuracy in reporting them, or level of scrupulousness. When making their 
choices of which platform to use and basing their decision on such interest rates, 
P2PLs as natural persons can be subject to behavioural biases which might lead 
them to make irrational decisions. 
The use of auto-bidding/lending tools by lenders on P2PL platforms such as 
Unbolted and Bondora,396 suggests a passive characteristic, showing reliance on 
the platform’s machinations and not on the lender’s own productive skills. This is 
similar to the ordinary bank depositor who places money into his bank account in 
reliance that the bank will pay the interest each month/year. In this respect, the 
behaviour of lenders who select this option are similar to ordinary consumers.  
If consumption is one of the key aspects of what makes a consumer, P2PLs are 
consumers in respect of their relationship with the platform. In this context, they 
make consumer-like decisions when choosing a platform to lend on, they are 
dependent on the platform to fulfil their role i.e. connect them with worthy 
borrowers, administer the loan smoothly and pursue debtors etc. They can also 
exercise consumer powers if they are dissatisfied with the services of the 
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platform, e.g. they can remove their funds from the platform and invest it 
elsewhere. However, their consumer tendencies are linked to their relationship 
with the platform. 
The extent to which P2PLs can be said to be consumers regarding their 
relationship with the borrower is questionable. On the one hand, they enter the 
transaction with the borrower directly because the platform is not part of the 
contract. The good they receive from the borrower is the repayment of the loan 
with interest and they receive this good largely in a personal capacity. However, 
their engagement with the borrowers are limited on P2PL platforms as their 
money is divided amongst numerous borrowers and their engagement with 
borrowers is not always directly with the borrower, particularly on platforms where 
the users are hidden behind a veil of anonymity. In most cases, the platform acts 
as some kind of conduit between the lenders and borrowers. In this sense, P2PL 
cannot always be described as purely P2P. 
However, the similarities between P2PLs and consumers are largely surface 
ones and there are several differences which serve to distinguish them. For 
example, unlike consumers, P2PLs are not mere targets of marketing for 
consumption, nor does their role only include providing key information to 
businesses which they can use to develop their services/products. Although both 
parties are integral to their respective transactions, they are important in different 
ways. E.g. the importance of consumers lies in the information that businesses 
can gather from them, which will be used by the business to develop their product 
or service. Consequently, many businesses invest in market research such as 
surveys to find out direct from consumers the type of products they would like to 
use and why. Another example, is the use of online cookies which track internet 
users and are used to help businesses tailor their website, services and 
advertising to suit a particular customer. In contrast, a P2PLs role is more integral 
to the service, such that without them, the service would not exist. As platforms 
do not lend money and are not party to the lending agreement, the lenders role 
is elevated in importance because without them there would be no money to 
finance the platform’s loans. P2PLs therefore have the additional capacity of 
monetary support because the fact they lend has become a key characteristic of 
P2PLs. 
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Similarly, another way in which the role of P2PLs is different from consumers is 
that their level of participation in the transaction is significantly higher. In ordinary 
customer transactions, there is always a degree of customer participation.397 In 
the context of the service marketing literature Bitner et al have said that in many 
services, customers play vital roles in creating service outcomes and ultimately 
in either improving or reducing their own satisfaction and the value received.398 
They produced a framework depicting the different levels of participation required 
of customers across varying services, which is useful here to compare the levels 
of participation of consumers compared to P2PLs. 
According to their framework, the low level of participation benchmark is 
exemplified by services where all that is required of the consumer is their physical 
presence during the service delivery stage of the transaction.399 At this level, the 
products consumed tend to be standardised, the service might be provided 
regardless of any individual purchase and the consumer’s only contribution might 
be to make payment. Examples of this level of consumer participation are 
consumers who purchase airline tickets or attend theatre productions. In both 
cases, a consumer only has to buy their ticket to receive the service, but the plane 
will still fly and the actors will still perform, even if the consumer does not attend. 
This is not so with P2PL. Firstly, each P2P loan is tailored to the individual 
lender’s specifications and are therefore not standardised products which are 
created and packaged before being sold to them by the platform. Secondly, more 
input is required from the lenders for the transaction to go ahead. Even in 
examples where lenders choose the autolend form of lending, where the platform 
automatically lent on their behalf, the lender still has to first join the platform’s 
community, transfer the funds, select their criteria and after the start of the 
transaction, monitor the loans themselves to ensure the autolending still matches 
their personal lending criteria, and if not, they alone must take action to update 
and change this. Consequently, P2PLs do not fit the low category of participation 
because their involvement is significantly higher. 
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The moderate level of participation is where a consumer’s input is needed for the 
creation of the service.400 Customisation of standard products and services occur 
at this level, and whilst the consumer’s inputs are necessary for a good quality 
outcome, it is the business that delivers the service, not the consumer. Services 
at this level also require the consumer to make the purchase to proceed.401 For 
example, a consumer getting a haircut at a salon must give the hairstylist 
information (the input) about what style he/she desires. Depending on the 
quantity and quality of information provided by the consumer, the hairstylist may 
or may not produce the desired style, or a style that meets the consumers’ 
expectations in terms of quality.  
On the face of it, this degree of participation appears to suit P2PLs, particularly 
those who chose the autolend options of their platforms, because if one considers 
the input as the lenders’ selection of their lending criteria, then the quality of the 
loans the platforms find for them depends on the information they provide to the 
platform. So if the lender does not adequately gauge his/her risk appetite, or 
erroneously decides to put all their savings into the platform at once, the quality 
of the loans sourced by the platform may later turn out to be of poor quality in 
relation to the lender’s expectations and in terms of the latter scenario, the 
platform will use all of the lender’s available funds.  
However, looking at it this way only focuses on the service provided by the 
platform to the lender, rather than on the service the platform is ultimately 
designed to enable, i.e. the creation of a loan contract between individuals. 
Therefore, a key difference between this level of consumer participation and the 
participation of a P2P lender is that at this level within consumer transactions, 
after the service has been designed, it is the business that delivers it to the 
consumer. Whereas within P2PL, the main service that is provided is the loan 
service and this is delivered by the lender through the provision of the loan funds. 
Thus, the lender plays a part in designing the loan and delivering it to the 
borrower, albeit through the administration of the platform. 
The last level of Bitner et al’s framework of participation is the high level of 
participation, where the customer co-creates the service/product. At this level, the 
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consumer’s inputs are compulsory and co-create the outcome, because without 
their active participation, the service cannot be created. 402 Consequently, if the 
consumer does not fulfil their role, the service itself is affected.403 Examples of this 
level of participation include personal training sessions where if the consumer 
refuses to take part in the exercises or carry out the tasks set out for him/her, the 
goals of the service will not be achieved, i.e. the consumer will not lose weight. 
Within these categories of participation, consumers can play a number of roles, 
e.g. they could provide inputs such as information, effort, physical possessions 
or co-creation of the service/product etc.,404 which impact the productivity of the 
organisation through the quantity and quality of their inputs.405 They could also be 
a contributor to the quality of the service and their own satisfaction e.g. in services 
like education where the extent of their co-operation can impact the quality of the 
education they receive.406 Lastly, consumers could also play the role of competitor 
to an organisation, which is where the customer can chose between purchasing 
the product/service from the seller/service provider or, if they have the skills, 
producing the products/services themselves.407 Where they choose the latter, 
they become a competitor to the company. An example is the current trend of 
individuals who desiring natural products, create their own skincare and haircare 
products from ingredients they have in their own homes, rather than using store-
bought varieties. 
The first role is a common role carried out by P2PLs. To an extent, they also take 
part in the second role of contributing to the quality and their own satisfaction with 
the service, because without their input and without them making the right choices 
or decisions, they cannot expect to get the full value of the service from the 
platform. However, P2PL introduces another dimension which impacts this role, 
i.e. an element of chance involved in P2PL. This is because P2PLs are also 
dependent on the actions of P2PBs and their ability to carry out their side of the 
bargain efficiently, as well as the platform. Therefore, a tripartite dependency in 
the provision of the P2PL service provided exists. 
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What all levels of participation in this framework have in common is that the 
service/product that the consumer participates in the delivery of, will eventually 
be consumed by that particular consumer. Even in cases where the product is 
intended to be a gift, it is still consumed by the purchaser because it is used by 
the purchaser as a gift to someone else.  
However, in P2PL, lenders contribute to the production of each loan by designing 
the loan through their lending criteria selections. They are also involved in the 
service delivery stage and provide the loan funds. The lenders therefore play a 
significant role in P2PL because without them the platforms would not be able to 
realise revenues from the business model, and the borrowers would not be able 
to raise finance on the platform to realise their goals.408 This shows that although 
P2PLs do engage in consumer-like activities, their level of participation is higher. 
It is also different, because they take on a more expanded role – that of the 
investor.409 
Whereas a consumer participating in online surveys or being tracked can be said 
to be participating or co-producing, the role of P2PLs has transformed into 
something more than mere participation. Consumers participate by exercising 
their purchasing power, contrarily P2PLs’ participation is central to the business 
model and diversification on the platform. 
P2PLs are also different from ordinary consumers because they blur the lines 
between production and consumption. Their role involves a mixture of 
entrepreneurship, i.e. productive action and social network participation, which is 
an activity typically associated with consumers e.g. on social media websites like 
Facebook and twitter.410  They engage in production activity through the selection 
of loan initiatives to fund and their lending criteria, the provision of the funds 
required to effectuate the loan and in the monitoring of the lending transaction 
during the loan term. They decide to produce and fund a loan rather than taking 
out a loan themselves or putting their money in a bank account as an ordinary 
consumer would do. In doing so, they also decide to bear the risks associated 
with lending activity as opposed to the risks typically borne by a consumer. 
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At the same time, they engage in social network participation through the fact that 
on most platforms, each loan is funded by a large network of lenders who have 
selected similar lending criteria within the platform’s community. This network is 
not put together by the lenders themselves, rather they are matched by the 
platform without their direct involvement or choice. In this sense, their 
participation level is low and matches that of the ordinary consumer. Hence, 
based on what P2PLs do, their capacity is a hybrid of consumer and lender, i.e. 
a “lendsumer” The same individual could be a consumer for certain purposes but 
an entrepreneur for others. This concept of “lendsumer” is discussed in more 
detail in sections 2.10.3. and 5.7. 
Although consumers can participate in the design and delivery of a service, they 
typically do so for their own benefit. On the other hand, although P2PLs take part 
in providing the lending service they are not the individuals who are going to 
consume the service,411 the borrowers are. Despite this, the lenders’ provision of 
the lending service is integral to them receiving a benefit from it. They are 
therefore simultaneously producers and consumers, but what they are producing 
is not what they are going to consume. This makes them different from ordinary 
consumers who may participate actively, and from prosumers who produce what 
they are going to consume. P2PLs produce a product/service to consume the 
profits made from it. In other words, they fund a loan which will be consumed by 
a different individual, the borrower, to consume the interest made on the loan. 
Therefore, in P2PL the production and consumption outcomes of the lender are 
separate elements of the transaction. The loan is separate from the interest rate 
as one element goes to the borrower, and the other to the lender. By way of 
comparison, unlike bank consumers who inadvertently fund loans produced by a 
bank and reap a small proportion of the interest gathered from them, P2PLs are 
not separated from the production side of a lending transaction because they fund 
the loan knowingly and with their own funds, which in itself involves various levels 
of decision-making and positive action.  
The fact that P2PLs make different evaluative decisions also makes them 
different from ordinary consumers.412 The risks a consumer has to consider are 
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related to purchase and product-choice decisions.413 For example, the risk that a 
product may be faulty or inappropriate for their needs, such as the risk that a 
builder hired to carry out some home improvements will carry out the work he has 
been contracted to do in a timely fashion and to a quality degree. Such risks are 
different from the risks relating to investment decisions made in support of the 
generation of an offering as happens in P2PL.414 In P2PL, when lenders make a 
decision to lend, they have to take into consideration the level of risk they are 
capable of exposing themselves to, they also have to evaluate the likelihood of a 
particular loan offering or selection of lending criteria is likely to yield their desired 
economic outcome based on the amount they are willing to put into the 
transaction. This is more complex than a consumer having to decide whether a 
product is worth the price already advertised for it, because in this scenario, a 
consumer typically only takes into consideration the amount they have to spend, 
whether they want to spend it now or later, and if they can get a similar product 
elsewhere for a cheaper price. These evaluations are based on the products 
shown or described to them and which are easily verifiable as soon as they are 
delivered to the consumer, and the price of the product is predetermined. It might 
also be argued that consumers face a degree of price uncertainty also, because 
ordinary consumers might be incapable of efficiently determining the true cost of 
the product. However, this problem is heightened in the P2PL context because 
the product they buy into, is not standardised and therefore difficult to compare 
to other products. Also, there is no guarantee it will produce their desired outcome 
because the borrower may not repay the loan. Consequently, whether the cost of 
the lending transaction was worth the price they paid for it, is not as easily verified 
and cannot be truly known until the loan has run its full term. Therefore, P2PLs 
must bear and evaluate different types of risks than consumers. 
Two other differences are worth mentioning in brief. Under current models of 
P2PL, group participation is integral to the activity, particularly as there is typically 
little other way to diversify within this mode of investment. Secondly, P2PLs’ 
purposes are different from consumers. Whereas consumers consume, P2PLs 
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produce in order to patronise others, be part of a communal social initiative and 
to invest.415 
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2.10.2. P2P lenders’ role during the administration of the loan 
 
The previous section has shown that during the formation of the loan when the 
lender designs and creates the loan, the lender is very different from an ordinary 
consumer, in terms of their role, capacity and decision-making. However, once 
the loan is underway, the lenders experience a high level of dependency on the 
platform, not least because it is the platform not the lender, who administers the 
loan. For example, lenders on eMoney Union,416 a P2PL platform operating in the 
UK, depend on the platform for administration of the loan in many ways. The 
borrowers’ repayments are secured on property or by eMoney Union’s eProvision 
fund. They are reliant on the platform to chase late payments and in cases of 
non-payment, the platform puts in a claim to the eProvisionFund on the lenders’ 
behalf to ensure that they do not suffer a loan repayment default. However, there 
is no guarantee that the claim will succeed as it is subject to sufficiency of money 
in the fund. In addition, P2PLs are dependent on the platform to keep their money 
safe in the case that it ceases to trade.  
Similarly, Unbolted,417 a UK P2PL platform, which allows borrowers to borrow 
against collateral of value, it is the platform, rather than the lenders, that 
determines the value of the asset lent against by partnering with selected firms 
that are internationally recognised for creating or managing auctions for a 
particular category of assets. The platform uses its partners’ mid-range value 
estimate to determine the value of the asset. So lenders depend on the platform 
and its associates to accurately value the asset lent against. In addition, the asset 
is under the control of Unbolted during the term of the loan and lenders do not 
have private access to it. If the borrower defaults, the platform puts the asset up 
for auction and the funds received, less charges for selling it through a third-party 
auctioneer, are used to pay off the outstanding loan principal and interest. 
Therefore, the lender is also dependent on the platform’s ability to sell the asset 
at the best value for money on their behalf. 
These examples demonstrate how once the loan offering is underway, the 
capacity of P2PLs falls back to that of a consumer because they are dependent 
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on the platform for most of the main aspects of lending: payment collection, 
payment chasing following default and ultimately, the sustainability of the 
platform. These are all aspects of lending which the P2P lender does not have 
control over. 
In this context, whilst at the start of the process lenders make a choice about what 
loan offering to create, when it comes to using a particular platform, they act in 
the form of a consumer. This is because they are purchasing a product (the 
service of the platform) and they are subject to similar risks that consumers are, 
i.e. the reception of inadequate services. In addition, their participation level at 
this point is similar to ordinary consumers because they are passive recipients of 
the platform’s service, whose only recourse is to withdraw their funds and transfer 
them to another platform or form of savings/investment (bearing the financial loss 
that withdrawal costs). 
 
2.10.3. Comparison between P2P lenders and retail investors 
The discussion in section 2.3.4 about retail investors demonstrated that they are 
increasingly being treated as consumers by regulators. This is significant for the 
classification of P2PLs because it is arguable that there is little difference 
between P2PLs and retail investors and so P2PLs should also be regulated like 
consumers. However, the preceding sections have shown that P2PLs, being 
different, cannot be categorised as consumers. This section goes furthers and 
explains why P2PLs are fundamentally different from ordinary retail investors. 
The main point is that P2PLs should be viewed as a specific subset within the 
general category known as ‘retail investor’. 
Ordinarily, ‘retail investor’ is a difficult concept to pin down.418 David Lawton, the 
previous FCA Director of Markets, Policy and International, described retail 
investors as having longer term horizons, investing regular savings, pension 
contributions, wind-falls like inheritance and desirous of broad exposure to some 
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investment risk to get a greater return.419 More specifically, Huertas defines ‘retail 
investor’ as a non-regulatory/legal and generic term for individuals, who whilst 
acting outside of the course of their ordinary business, can be categorised under 
MiFID II as either retail clients or professional clients.420 He distinguishes the term 
from ‘retail client’ as used in MiFID II, which means any natural or legal person to 
whom an investment firm provides investment or ancillary services421 and who is 
not a professional client.422 Generally, the term is used similarly to Huertas’ 
description to describe individuals who buy and sell securities for their personal 
account. Similarly, Warren Buffett, a well-known investor has defined investing 
as “…laying out money now to get more money back in the future."423 
Retail investor can also be defined by contrasting it with institutional investor. In 
Monitor Audio Limited, the tribunal judge stated that, “...the usual sense of an 
institutional investor connoting an institution whose function is to invest on behalf 
of others in a wide range of ways, as opposed to a private or retail investor.” 
Therefore, retail investors do the opposite - they invest on their own behalf.  
As P2PL concerns individuals who lend their own money to other individuals to 
receive a return on their investment, P2PLs can broadly be described as ‘retail 
investors’. However, whereas P2PLs’ investment lies in the loans they make to 
P2PBs, ordinary investors usually invest in a broader range of assets such as 
bonds, where the investor loans his/her money to a company or a government in 
exchange for a return; stocks and shares in companies, where the investor buys 
a stake in a company in the hope that the value of the shares, which can fluctuate, 
will increase and in return  receive an income called a dividend. Investors can 
invest by buying shares directly, but the more common approach is for them to 
invest indirectly through an investment fund such as a workplace pension. Other 
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assets include commodities, collectibles and structured products. Therefore, 
different are both the assets invested in and, the entities receiving the 
investment–typically businesses rather than other people. 
Investments can be sold to retail investors through either a non-advised or 
advised sale. A non-advised sale occurs when the investor does not receive any 
advice but buys the investment directly from the product provider. The FCA424 
defines a ‘non-advised’ sale as one where the firm gives objective information to 
potential customers and leaves them to make the decision about whether to 
proceed on their own. In contrast, the FCA states that an ‘advised’ sale is where 
the investor receives an explanation about why a product or provider suits the 
potential customer’s demands and needs.425 Such advice can be obtained from 
an independent financial advisor who recommends products from a whole range 
of financial product providers, or an appointed representative who is only able to 
recommend a product from a limited range of product providers. 
During an advised sale, the advisor is expected to find out the customer’s 
circumstances and assess the customer’s attitude to risk before making a suitable 
recommendation. An advisor can consider how long the customer wishes to 
invest for, the amount of capital available for investment and ensure that the 
customer’s capital is spread across different investments. Consequently, 
whereas P2PL is at present, invariably undertaken on a non-advised basis, retail 
investors tend to have a choice about whether to invest with or without advice. 
The way P2PLs and ordinary investors usually invest also differs in terms of the 
channels used and actions taken as exemplified by investing through buying of 
stocks, mutual funds and using online investment portfolio manager. 
Individual investors can buy stocks through many channels. They can purchase 
them online. The investor usually pays either a flat fee or a percentage of the 
purchase price for each transaction and the method is largely non-advised. 
Stocks can  be purchased through a stockbroker, whose role it is to buy and sell 
stocks and other securities on behalf of retail investors in return for a service fee. 
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In the UK stockbrokers are regulated by the FCA and must first obtain a 
recognised qualification from the FCA’s Appropriate Qualifications Table, such as 
a Level 6 Diploma in Wealth Management from the Chartered Institute for 
Securities and Investment.426 
Retail investors also invest through mutual funds that buy groups of stock for 
investors. Rather than owning the stock the investor owns a share in the fund and 
pays an annual fee. Therefore, a mutual fund is a pool of money provided by 
individual investors, companies and other organisations.427 To this extent, mutual 
funds seem similar to P2PL because in the latter, the lenders money is similarly 
pooled to fund a single loan. Mutual funds have a particular investing style, 
strategy or purpose, for example a fund can invest purely in emerging markets. 
They are actively managed by fund manager who monitors the stocks and bonds 
within its portfolio. This means that the investor’s only role is to choose a fund 
that suits their investment criteria and style, they do not need to analyse financial 
statements or information or monitor their investments. 
In the UK, there are two main types of retail fund, open-ended funds and closed-
ended funds. Most open-ended retail funds are established as an undertaking for 
collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) governed by Directive 
2009/65/EC on undertakings for collective investment in transferrable securities 
(UCITS Directive). These can be sold by fund managers or through third party 
distributors such as independent financial advisors whether on advised or non-
advised basis. The FCA subjects the funds and their managers to regulation 
under its Collective Investment Schemes Sourcebook (COLL).428 Regulations 
relate to insider dealing, money laundering, short selling, market abuse and 
derivatives. UCITS can be sold to all types of investors including retail investors. 
Investors can also invest through an Exchange Traded Fund (ETF) which is an 
inexpensive way to profit from stocks.429 ETFs usually track the performance of 
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an index of stocks like the FTSE 100 or the MSCI emerging market index, and try 
to replicate them by investing in the same assets at the same or similar 
proportions. The price of the ETF rises and falls with the index it tracks. As the 
ETF tracks the index, retail investors are saved the time and expense of having 
to do so themselves. Buying ETFs also enables them to invest in a range of 
markets that they may not be able to access individually. 
‘Nutmeg’ is an example of an online wealth manager which creates an investment 
portfolio based on ETFs for investors. It targets investors of all levels of financial 
acumen. However, their sales pitch makes it clear that their main target are retail 
investors: “You don’t have to be a stock market expert to have an investment 
portfolio. You just have to know your financial situation, risk tolerance and how 
much you want to invest. We do the rest.”430 For a similar reason, investors can 
start with an investment as little as £500 for each portfolio, or “pot” created. 
However, investments below £5,000 require a minimum monthly contribution of 
£100. Investors can invest in as many pots as they want for different purposes 
such as buying a home or saving up for a car. If investors choose to invest with 
Nutmeg, they do not have to do anything. Nutmeg helps them determine what 
type of portfolio is suitable for them, based on the investors’ objectives and risk 
tolerance. All decision-making in relation to the investment is made by Nutmeg’s 
investment team. This includes the decision about which underlying securities to 
invest in and to buy and sell shares. The investor does not have to consent to 
every single transaction. Instead, when investors sign the terms and conditions, 
they agree for Nutmeg to take full responsibility of their investment. Essentially, 
the only thing the investor does is to tell Nutmeg about themselves and select a 
risk level. 
These investment examples show that one way in which P2PLs differ from retail 
investors is in the asset that they invest in. P2PLs’ investment is in the form of a 
loan. They lend their money to another individual with the expectation that it will 
be repaid with interest. This is very different from the stocks, bonds and mutual 
funds that individual investors tend to invest in because their expectations and 
level of reliance on other parties regarding their respective investments are 
different. For example, retail investors have little control over the final value of 
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their investment, which essentially boils down to chance. However, although 
P2PLs themselves have no control over their investments because this lies with 
the platform, the likelihood of them receiving their money back and the interest is 
dependent on the borrowers meeting their repayment requirements on time and 
in full. To an extent this in turn depends on the management skills of the 
platforms, e.g. whether they are skilled at judging the creditworthiness of potential 
borrowers, whether they adequately collect funds and keep them in a safe, 
separate account, and whether they pursue borrowers who are in arrears or 
default. These are much more preventable and/or controllable factors than the 
value of stocks, bonds, indexes and commodities. Essentially, for P2PL the risk 
lies in whether all  parties carry out their end of the bargain– an issue which can 
arguably be more easily governed by adequate regulation than the value of 
traditional stocks, 
Another difference between traditional retail investors and P2PLs is that unless 
they are purchasing and monitoring their stocks directly, most retail investors 
depend on a firm to do this for them, i.e. they have very little input in investment 
decisions. Nutmeg investors provide a clear example of this. Based on what they 
do, Nutmeg investors can be categorised as consumers in the classical sense. 
They have a very low level of participation: the underlying business model is 
business-to-consumer and they are reliant on Nutmeg’s actions at all stages of 
the investment process. The same can be said of other forms of retail investment 
which occur through the intermediation of an institutional investor or wealth 
management fund such as workplace pensions, pension funds, mutual funds, 
which are all typical investment routes for retail investors. The only role of retail 
investors is to purchase the investment service and at no point during the 
investment process do they prosume, which distinguishes them from P2PLs. 
As mentioned in Section 2.10.3. P2PLs can satisfy the general classification of 
‘retail investor’. However, as Lin argued, investors are not a homogenous 
group.431 Aside from the classical archetype of ‘reasonable investor’, investors 
can fall within a number of different profiles in the real world of finance. In his 
original typology of investor paradigms which Lin calls ‘cross-cutting’ a single 
investor might fall within more than one classification at a time.432 These include: 
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the reasonable investor who is understood to be the perfectly rational actor of 
neo-classical economics and until relatively recently, was the architype of 
investor protection regulation. The irrational investor, according to behavioural 
economics literature, is capable of rational decisions, but also influenced by 
emotions, biases and heuristics.  The active investor categorisation relates to 
ownership style and investor timeline. Rather than passively investing in a 
company like the reasonable investor who is expected to be a long-term investor 
that uses a buy-and-hold strategy, active investors either attempt to influence the 
business underlying their investment or invest for short periods of time e.g. 
amateur day traders and high-frequency investors. The sophisticated investor 
refers to investors of above-average wealth and financial acumen, particularly 
professional investors like investment banks, hedge funds and pension funds and 
their respective asset managers. By definition, retail investors do not fall within 
this bracket and likewise the entity investor which is not a private or natural 
person acoording to the reasonable investor paradigm, but a legal creation.  
Finally, in this typology is what Lin calls the cyborg investor.433 This is because 
due to advances in financial technology, the modern financial marketplace is 
increasingly becoming less dependent on human input for trading stocks and 
increasingly relies on machines or tools which use complex algorithmic programs 
to execute investment decisions much faster than any human can.434 The impact 
of the technological advancements is such that even ordinary investors can use 
websites or software that make investment decisions for them, and enable 
ordinary investors to invest in riskier private offerings which have historically only 
been available to wealthy investors.435 Lin therefore argues that as the investor 
marketplace has changed drastically due to the increased use of technology to 
invest, there is need for a new investor typology of “algorithmic/cyborg 
investor”.436 The rationale is a dissonance between the singular paradigm of the 
homogenous reasonable investor and the reality of a much more diverse profile 
of the investor which necessitates a re-examination of investors and investor 
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protection.437 In other words, the classical, dominant typology of the reasonable 
investor becomes outdated in the face of new participants to the changing 
financial marketplace.438 The significance is that it highlights the need for investor 
regulatory paradigms to adapt to the changes in the marketplace for regulation to 
remain relevant and up-to-date.  
This equally applies to the P2PL market. Although Lin’s typologies largely refer 
to investors’ behaviours, the analysis of consumers in this chapter has shown 
that participants can and should also be analysed in relation to their roles and 
activities in their respective transactions, particularly the responsibilities, conduct, 
vulnerabilities and risks they may face. Therefore, although P2PLs fit within the 
general definition of  ‘retail investor’, a paradigm which is more specific to P2PL 
is consumer-to-consumer (C2C) marketplaces and differentiates them from the 
marketplaces of retail investors of stocks and pension funds. Arguably, the 
protections required should specifically relate not just to the general behaviours 
of most retail investors, but also to their specific activities and vulnerabilities whilst 
engaged in P2P loan transactions.  
This is important because the post-financial crisis regulatory treatment of retail 
investors in the EU and UK increasingly considers them as consumers. Although 
this provides them with greater protections than they were previously getting 
under the pre-crisis rational investor paradigm, the protections do not see the full 
picture because they are limited to scenarios typical of B2C 
transactions/business models. P2PLs are a specific subset within the general 
classification of ‘retail investor’ requiring a new, specific and accurate typology 
which Chapter Five discusses in more detail. 
 
2.10.4. Comparison between P2P lenders and prosumers 
 
As P2PLs cannot be categorised as consumers, an alternative is to classify them 
as prosumers. Section 2.8 demonstrated that the essential characteristics of 
prosumers are that they are self-sufficient; they take on part of the job the 
producer would normally do; they produce goods/services for personal 
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consumption; they carry out various types of work and they are active 
participants. 
In highlighting the differences between consumers and P2PLs, the previous 
section already demonstrates some of the main similarities between P2PLs and 
prosumers. Namely, during the loan formation stage of the P2PL transaction, 
P2PLs’ level of participation is substantially higher than the ordinary consumer’s 
and they take on the part of the transaction that the producer would normally do. 
E.g. in the formation side of the transaction, the lenders display their self-
sufficiency through their reliance on their own resources e.g. decision-making 
and evaluations. This section therefore highlights some further similarities and 
differences between P2PLs and prosumers. 
One way P2PLs are similar to prosumers is in the work they do during the 
formation of the loan agreement. At this stage of the transaction, they appear to 
engage in directed self-production and collaborative co-production. Directed self-
production is where the business provides individuals with the tools and support 
needed for them to produce the good/service for themselves. A similar situation 
can be found on P2PL platforms, where the platforms provide the lenders with 
the tools they need to select their lending criteria and thus design their own 
lending investment.  
However, unlike in most cases of directed self-production, P2PLs are not forced 
to carry out this work, rather they engage in P2PL because of the independence 
it offers them. For example, in most instances of directed self-production e.g. 
eating from a tray in a fast food restaurant, the production activity is built into the 
service, so even if the prosumer did not want to eat from a tray and instead 
decided to sit at the table and wait for a waiter to attend them, because there are 
no waiters to attend them, the individual would be compelled to follow the usual 
fast food process and serve themselves. Consequently, prosumers carrying out 
directed self-production have no choice but to do so because prosumption is built 
into the service. In contrast, although prosumptive activity is built into P2PL, the 
lenders engage in it willingly. This is demonstrated by the UK Alternative Finance 
Benchmarking Report 2014 which found that some of the factors which the 
lenders surveyed thought were important or very important were the ability to 
choose how much to lend and for how long (94% of those surveyed) and the ease 
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of use of the lending model (98% of those surveyed).439 In other words, the most 
important factors were the ones which gave them independence and made them 
self-sufficient on the platform. 
Similarly, it could be argued that P2PLs are prosumers because they carry out 
collaborative co-productive work. This type of work occurs when businesses 
outsource tasks to crowds of individuals possibly across the world, who take on 
the role of a voluntary workforce. This can be seen within the type of P2PL model 
where a single loan is funded by a large crowd of lenders as these models are 
reliant on group participation to work effectively and the task of credit lending is 
outsourced to the crowd of P2PLs. The lenders do not necessarily choose to 
collaborate with other lenders, this is often an intrinsic part of the lending model. 
Neither do they choose who to work with as the platform automatically decides 
this by matching lenders with similar lending criteria. The platforms do not put 
money into the loans themselves, rather they outsource this task to P2PLs. 
Therefore they are prosumers in this sense. Technically, one could say the 
platform makes them work, but the lenders do not receive payment from the 
platform for being its crowdsourced ‘workforce’ – their job being to provide money 
which ultimately benefits the platform owners. However, the reward they receive 
is the interest they earn from lending their own money out to borrowers. 
This relates to the economic cause of the transition of individuals from consumers 
to prosumers highlighted by Salzman.440 P2PL reflects the economic factor of 
change towards prosumerism which is that it is cheaper to get consumers to do 
the work of production, because rather than offering loans themselves, platforms 
shift a large portion of the lending role and risk onto consumers therefore making 
them lenders. This makes running a financial institution cheaper to run and it is 
reflected in the higher interest rates that platforms can use to entice lenders to 
their website. On their websites, platforms often state that the cause of these 
favourable interest rates for both lenders and borrowers is the fact that they have 
cut out the middleman, by whom they are referring to the banks. However, in 
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reality they are referring to themselves. This is because, if they had set up as 
simply an online alternative to the banks, they would have to bear the costs of 
operating as a lending institution which lends money to consumers, including a 
lending license. These costs would then be passed on to their borrowers. But by 
making individuals work as lenders, the platforms have eliminated these costs. 
Therefore, P2PL reflects prosumerism because the business forces or 
encourages consumers to do their work for them. Essentially, P2PL is akin to self-
service lending and borrowing with the intermediary appearing to take a step back 
in comparison to traditional lending institutions to give participants more control. 
These two elements of work and ostensibly extra control within the transaction 
makes P2PLs similar to prosumers. 
However, despite carrying out similar types of work as prosumers, the position 
occupied by P2PLs during the design of a service and within the transaction is 
different from a prosumer’s. According to Bandulet and Morasch’s interpretation 
of Alvin Toffler’s prosumer, the purpose of prosumers was for consumers to 
become more involved in the design and manufacture of products in a way that 
could be made to individual specification based on implicit or explicit information 
about the customer’s preferences.441 But this falls short of what P2PLs do. During 
prosumption of services, the individual might participate by providing the 
producer with information which they can use to tailor the design of the service to 
suit their general customer base and in so doing become co-producers. For 
example, prosumers providing information inputs might contribute to a business 
improving the service they later give to their general customer base or to that 
customer specifically.  
Contrarily, the information P2PLs provide during loan creation is not used by 
platforms to create improved and/or more customised loans in the future which 
still remain standardised packaged loans, rather it is used by the P2PLs 
themselves to create an investment that he or she wants and is comfortable with. 
Therefore, whilst with prosumption, there can still be a distinct producer who uses 
the information provided by the prosumer, with the consumer only taking part in 
the design and manufacturing process, in P2PL the individual actually takes over 
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the design process. They design and create the loan product they want to invest 
in and it is the platform’s job to realise that creation by matching it with the loan 
design created by borrower. If the lender’s design matches that of a single or 
multiple borrowers’ design, a loan agreement is created. In some pure P2PL 
contexts, the P2P lender does this match making themselves by picking a 
borrower to lend to, e.g. on Folk2Folk where P2PLs can choose to lend to a 
particular borrower rather than choosing the autolend option which would match 
them to multiple borrowers based on their chosen criteria. In P2PL, the lender is 
more than just a prosumer, because he/she takes over the position in the 
service/product design process typically occupied by the business. The P2P 
lender designs and produces the loan by setting the lending criteria and providing 
the funds for it, the platform then matches this design to other similar loan designs 
created by numerous other lenders and borrowers.  
Section 2.8.1. of this thesis has highlighted that a prosumer is generally 
considered to be an actor who is simultaneously a producer and consumer of 
goods or services. The term is designed to recognise that the activities of the 
production process and consumption process of a good or service are not always 
separate activities carried out by separate parties. This has led to prosumers 
being defined as an individual consumer who is involved in the design or 
production process of a good which the individual will eventually purchase or can 
see themselves purchasing.442 However, this definition does not apply to P2PLs 
for a number of reasons. Firstly, P2PLs produce a service which as lenders, it is 
not possible for them to consume – unless they are lending to themselves on the 
platform, which is unlikely. Rather a separate party consumes their service. 
Consequently, the individual who becomes his own check-out assistant at a self-
service check-out machine, or the Wikipedia user who creates, edits and updates 
the encyclopaedic entries of Wikipedia both have something in common which 
the P2P lender does not, which is that they both produce for their own benefit. 
Secondly, although the P2PLs’ role involves production, because they are not 
consuming the product they are producing, they are not simultaneously 
producers and consumers of a single product or service, as prosumers are. From 
the P2PLs’ perspective, the transaction does involve them producing and 
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consuming, however, they produce a loan that a different individual is eventually 
going to consume and the lenders consume the ultimate benefit of this which is 
the interest rates that the other party will pay them in return for their lending 
services. Their role therefore involves replacing traditional lenders such as a bank 
or building society during the formation of the loan. This replacement involves 
taking on similar risks and having to make similar decisions when producing the 
loan. Traditionally an institutional lender would produce the loan and reap the 
rewards, but in this context, the P2P lender does.  
However, once the loan has been formed, the P2PLs then revert to the position 
of a consumer due to their relationship of dependence on the platform to 
administer the loan effectively. Therefore, it could be said that the lenders 
consume two separate things, firstly the borrowers’ interest payments and 
secondly the platform’s services. Neither of which are simultaneous to the initial 
lending service being produced by the lenders, but rather are sequential to it.  
P2PLs are similar to consumers in terms of their dependency on an intermediary. 
As they rely on the efficiency and quality of the job performed by the platform, 
they are consumers of those goods. On a different level, they are also consumers 
because at certain points in the P2PL process, they act like consumers. For 
example, they choose which platform to lend on and they rely on the platform’s 
reputation as a marker of whether or not to lend on it, e.g. if a platform has a poor 
reputation of handling defaults, then lenders may choose to invest with a different 
platform. If no lender wants to lend on a particular platform, eventually there will 
be no money to fund the loans on that platform and the borrowers will go to a 
different platform or lending institution to borrow, and ultimately this might lead to 
the failure of the platform. In this sense, P2PLs still wild the same powers over 
businesses/intermediaries that consumers do. It is yet to be seen how likely a run 
on the platform would be, if that is even possible. 
Therefore, whilst P2PLs also combine both producer and consumer capacities, 
they do so in a different way to prosumers. A more accurate way of describing 
their role and capacity is to call them ‘lendsumers’. This is a combination of the 
words ‘lender’ and ‘consumer’ and reflects the fact that they take over the 
production role of traditional lenders, but are also consumers. It is more specific 
than the term ‘prosumer’ because by referring to their lending capacity 
specifically, it highlights that the only difference between P2PLs and consumers 
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is their lending capacity. Once this role has been accomplished in a given 
transaction, they revert back to consumers. This in turn recognises the fact that 
P2PL is a long-term activity which involves different stages, during which the 
users’ roles and capacities experience a change. In a sense, P2PLs could be 
described as transitional prosumers. 
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2.11 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has demonstrated that the assumptions of RCT fail to explain how 
individuals behave and make decisions in practice. Behavioural theory provides 
a more accurate depiction of human behaviour because rather than being based 
on one factor, i.e. the idea that consumers are rational beings who make rational 
decisions based on what is in their self-interest to do, it takes into account the 
fact that there are other factors that might influence a person’s behaviours or 
actions when making decisions. Behavioural theory is not without its critics, but 
the point here is to emphasise that people are not perfectly rational, 
knowledgeable and they do not exist in a perfectly ordered market. Behavioural 
theory reflects this better than rational theory and the implication is that regulatory 
measures should also reflect this through adoption of mechanisms tailored 
towards consumer actions and behaviours. 
It has also shown that the concept of ‘consumer’ is unclear. To make regulation 
workable, EU law has used the average consumer test. But this is not accurate 
in light of behavioural economic research. Consequently, a suggestion is for 
regulation to adopt a more situational approach. For example, this is by 
considering what the average consumer is within the P2P industry, what the 
problems they face are and how regulators are to protect consumers from them 
or limit their effects. 
However, the idea of the consumer is a changing one. Writers like Maloney and 
Micklitz demonstrate that the way consumers are conceived by regulation is 
increasingly changing following the 2008 financial crisis: the former in relation to 
consumer treatment by regulation and the latter in the way that regulation no 
longer sees the consumer as vulnerable per se, but provides protection for the 
‘average’ consumer. Furthermore, out of the idea of the consumer, the concept 
of the prosumer developed to recognise the fact that the party to a transaction 
that has traditionally been perceived as passively receiving the goods and 
services from a separate organisation, can and often does engage more within 
the transaction.  
There is no specific conception of the prosumer beyond the fact that they are a 
combination of producer and consumer. However, the combination is a dynamic 
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and fluid one depending on their role and actions in the transactions. It is by their 
role that they can be identified and on the basis of their role and behaviours that 
regulation of the relevant industry should focus. 
P2PLs display a hybrid of the characteristics of both consumers and 
producers/entrepreneurs. This is more evident when comparing the different 
stages of the loan transaction. During the formation of the loan contract the P2P 
lender displays the trait of a producer or entrepreneur because the degree in 
which they participate in the transaction is greater than an ordinary consumer in 
a comparable scenario, e.g. as compared to a consumer bank depositor. They 
also display a number of other differences to ordinary consumers e.g. the fact 
that they are not mere targets of businesses, and the type of roles, activities and 
evaluative decisions they make are different. However, when deciding which 
platform to lend on, they make the type of decisions and bear the type of risks an 
ordinary consumer makes. In addition, once the loan is underway, their capacity 
and role is more like a consumer than that of a prosumer because of their 
increased dependency on the platform. Whilst this section therefore shows that 
P2PLs are not mere consumers and are therefore different from them, it also 
highlights the fluidity of the role and capacity of P2PLs within any one online P2PL 
transaction. These factors should be taken into account by any regulation that 
seeks to protect, facilitate and/or advance their interests. 
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3. P2PL and Financial Intermediation, Concepts and Practice 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Modern finance operates within a vast ecosystem of interconnectedness. That is, 
there are few, if any, financial institutions or participants that can exist or operate 
without the intermediation of another. In other words, no financial institution is an 
island.443 E.g. company employee pensions are often managed and invested by 
fund managers; insurance companies underwrite loans for banks; stock 
exchanges are intermediaries which provide investors with liquidity by acting as 
a market where they can buy and sell shares, similarly, stock brokers facilitate 
trades between investors on the stock market. Therefore, there are many 
dimensions of intermediation within the financial markets, with some financial 
intermediaries operating within others as in the above stock exchange example 
and others operating in networks of different intermediated actions e.g. J.P. 
Morgan Chase, a large American banking institution acts as a meeting point for 
varieties of counterparties through the wide range of services and products it 
provides including commercial and investment banking, trading, clearing, lending 
and prime brokering.444 Some have even described money as a form of financial 
intermediation because money makes financial transactions easier445 than for 
example, bartering on trade. Therefore, financial industries and transactions exist 
within the complex context of intermediation.  
In one form or another, the key role of financial intermediaries is to act as 
middlemen who collect capital from savers and reallocate it in an investment or 
asset.446According to McCoy, they can be categorised in two groups, namely 
‘retail’/‘primary’ intermediaries who serve individual households or nonfinancial 
businesses or ‘wholesale’/‘secondary’ intermediaries who serve financial 
institutions.447 P2PL platforms fall within the retail category because they largely 
serve individual consumers rather than institutions like banks.  
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P2PL exists within this world of intermediation not just because it is a form of 
intermediation itself, because it acts as a market for individuals to lend and borrow 
from each other; but also because the industry players are connected with the 
wider financial market. For example, the more scrupulous platforms use external 
credit rating companies to assess the worthiness of prospective borrowers and 
they translate this information sourced from the borrowers and credit rating 
agencies to the lenders. Similarly, platforms use bank accounts to store P2PLs’ 
funds prior to investment and the profit they make from operating the platform, 
and the borrowers use bank accounts to store the funds received from lenders. 
Consequently, it is not possible to say that the P2PL industry is completely cut off 
from traditional forms of finance and bank lending, rather, they are a new link in 
the wider financial intermediation chain. A similar point is made by Lin who 
highlighted that despite the many attempts of innovators to disrupt or 
disintermediate financial transactions, they usually end up adding more 
intermediaries to the existing pantheon, because of the interconnected nature of 
finance.448 
As most forms of financial activity comprises intermediation, it is possible to argue 
that P2PL is nothing new and the platforms should be regulated in the same way 
as any other online intermediated exchange. However, online private finance 
between individuals is still in its early days. Although it has existed in many offline 
forms around the world for a long time, e.g. friendly societies, credit unions, 
microcredit institutions and esusu, regulatory bodies at least within the UK are 
still only getting used to the idea of them. An example of this is the fact that the 
regulation of P2PL platforms only started in April 2014.449 As a result of the 
relatively recent introduction of both the subject matter of the regulation and the 
regulation itself, it is still too early to determine whether the regulation effected by 
the FCA in relation to P2PL is or will be effective in dealing with the issues arising 
from the concept and practice of P2PL, at least until they arise; by which time of 
course, it may be too little too late. 
In the previous chapter, the thesis examined the place of P2PL within current 
conceptions of consumer protection law and consumer law particularly the 
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various notions of the consumer and prosumer. Just as it distinguished P2PL 
users from these notions, the purpose of this chapter is to distinguish P2P 
platforms from traditional and alternative financial intermediation models. It does 
this by detailing the historical origins of P2PL and explaining why P2PL should 
be considered as financial intermediation. The chapter then compares P2PL 
platforms and intermediation models that act similarly to or perform similar roles 
to P2PL platforms, specifically traditional bank lending, credit unions, payday 
lending, crowdfunding, esusu/isusu lending and eBay marketplace transactions. 
In doing so, it answers sub-question b) of the first research question, i.e. whether 
P2PL differs from existing types of financial intermediation, by arguing that it 
does. Therefore, the significance of this chapter is providing further justifications 
for regulating P2PL differently. 
 
3.2. Historical origins of P2PL 
 
There is a consensus within the literature that P2PL is not a new phenomenon, 
but has existed in various forms throughout history. Brill states that P2PL 
emanated from microcredit principles which have been used for centuries in 
countries like Ghana and India.450 Microcredit institutions involve the provision of 
small, short-term loans to provide access to credit to poor and often ignored 
entrepreneurs who are often ignored or refused credit by traditional lending 
institutions.451 Brill traces formal microfinance to the Irish Loan Fund of the 1700s 
which was created to help impoverished Irish citizens like modern microfinance 
institutions.452 He states that although most microfinance institutions are non-
profit organisations, their successes have drawn for-profit companies into the 
sector, such as Prosper, a P2PL platform based in North America.453 However, 
he posits that P2PL relates to financial transactions that bypass traditional 
intermediaries by directly connecting borrowers and lenders.454 
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On the other hand, Hulme and Wright trace the development of modern P2PL 
back to friendly societies which originated in Britain in the 1600s,455 because the 
two main roles of friendly societies were mutual support and financial 
assistance.456 They highlight the welfare oriented approach to these goals and the 
collectivism that underpinned the operations of friendly societies.457 They state 
that social lending displays similar concepts of community and collective 
advantage that underpinned friendly societies.  
Overall, there is no real consensus about the historical origins of P2PL, various 
countries around the world have had their own versions of social lending as 
mentioned by Brill and evidenced by Hulme and Wright’s discussion of friendly 
societies. However, comparisons can be drawn between the participants and 
operations of each form of social lending and other disintermediated services 
such as esusu and eBay. 
 
3.3 P2PL as Financial Intermediation  
 
P2PL platforms exist within the context of financial intermediation. This is 
because their role is to act as an intermediary between individuals using their 
platform services as lenders and borrowers. The platforms do this by enabling 
these two parties to create a financial relationship. In the absence of P2PL 
platforms, individuals could lend and borrow from each other directly. However, 
this requires a relationship built on the trust that the money borrowed will be paid 
back in full and on time. Linked to this need for trust, is a need for transparency. 
Before the individual lender lends the money, they need to have information about 
the borrower readily available which will enable them to predict the likelihood of 
them getting their money back. For example, when friends/family lend or borrow 
from each other, they already have a relationship of trust built over time and 
based on their knowledge of their friend/relative, which they can rely on to base 
their lending decision. However, it is possible that because of the time it takes, 
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and the depth of a relationship, necessary to build a relationship of trust between 
families and friends, such lending is not done on a large or commercial scale. 
Online P2PL is done on a vaster scale than family and friendship-based direct 
lending and it involves numerous strangers who do not have the time or 
transparency to build relationships of trust. This is where the platforms 
themselves come in. They provide platform users with economies of scale 
because they help spread the costs of financial research and make asset 
monitoring easier458 than if the lenders and borrowers were to try and interact 
directly. By deduction, their role is essentially to speed up the building of a 
relationship between strangers, albeit simply financial, by securing the trust 
between the two parties which will enable the individual lenders to willingly part 
with their money to people they do not know. They do this by ensuring the credit 
worthiness of the borrowers, to make them more trustworthy; facilitating the 
transfer of the lenders’ money to borrowers; facilitating the borrowers’ 
repayments; and if necessary, pursuing the borrowers for unpaid debts to the 
lenders.  
Platforms also perform typical intermediary functions. E.g. they offer lenders risk-
reduction through the diversification enabled by their pooling of investments.459 
They also leverage their financial expertise and unique knowledge of the 
borrowers’ circumstances to create platform credit ratings which the lenders rely 
on. This in turn helps lenders put a more accurate price on each transaction than 
if they were to try to judge the borrowers’ credit worthiness by themselves. They 
are also like more established types of financial intermediaries because they act 
as conduits for liquidity and exchange460 in the marketplace that they create. In 
this function, they are similar to stock exchanges which create markets for buyers 
and sellers of securities and help to make trades efficient.461 This highlights further 
the fact that P2PL platforms are intermediaries. 
Emphasising this point is important to any argument that P2PL platforms should 
be regulated in the context of their intermediary role. This is particularly the case 
because the P2PL industry is often couched in terms of the disintermediation of 
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financial institutions or traditional bank lending, i.e. cutting out the middleman. 
For example, a March 2014 article by The Economist spoke of “Banking without 
banks”462 and in February 2014, Simon Cunningham of Lendingmemo, an online 
magazine relating to P2PL explained that Wells Fargo, one of the largest banks 
in the world, was afraid of P2PL because of the threat of disintermediation, 
following its ban on staff investment on platforms as reported463 in the Financial 
Times.464 The type of disintermediation usually associated with P2PL is therefore 
one of removing the bank from the lending picture.  
However, such discussions neglect two things, firstly, although the banks are 
visibly removed from the lending scene, they are still involved in the P2PL 
industry through their role as a depositary for the platforms’ accounts and the 
P2PL users. On a normal basis this role might seem insignificant to the way the 
industry works, however, this is one of the means through which the P2PL 
industry is connected with the rest of the financial industry. This might affect the 
P2PL industry, e.g. in the worst-case scenario of if the lenders’ funds are stored 
in a bank which experiences a run on the bank, or which fails in the event of 
another systemic crisis. This is by no means meant to suggest that this is a 
regular occurrence, rather it is meant to point out that the P2PL industry remains 
an intermediation-based industry that also remains connected with the rest of the 
financial market through a network of intermediation. Therefore it might still be 
vulnerable to systemic crisis within the market depending on how widespread and 
terrible they are. This idea is supported by Lin, who argues that financial 
intermediation is infinite because disintermediation has proven to be elusive 
despite the many financial innovations attempting to accomplish it.465 This is 
largely because what really happens tends to be an exercise in “substitutive 
disintermediation” and layering, where financial innovations merely replace older 
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forms of intermediation. The second point missed by focusing on the ‘removal’ of 
banks from the lending process, is that P2PL merely replaces direct bank 
intermediation with platform intermediation, so it does not eliminate 
intermediation from its process.  
Therefore, although P2PL platforms are not party to the lending contracts 
eventually formed it is vital they are properly regulated in a way that considers 
their role as intermediaries. This is because they play such a large role in the 
formation and management of the P2PL relationship between lenders and 
borrowers, as well as the P2PL agreement. Consequently, both the formation and 
management stages of the relationship should fall under appropriate and 
effective regulation for the protection of the borrowers and lenders. 
 
3.4 Traditional Banking Intermediation 
 
P2PLs can be distinguished from other actors that perform similar lending roles 
to them. This section highlights the differences between P2PLs and traditional 
bank lenders, whose role they have overtaken in the P2PL context.  
P2PLs have different roles from traditional lenders such as banks given that they 
are much more simplified. Whereas the P2P lender simply has to produce the 
money to be lent, choose their lending parameters and monitor the automatic 
lending process, a traditional lending institution first has to engage in asset 
transformation. This means collecting money from their depositors and then 
converting these short-term borrowings into long-term loans.  
Due to the bank’s asset transformation role, traditional bank lenders also face 
different risks to P2PLs. E.g. bank lenders face the inherent risk that if numerous 
depositors demand their deposits back at the same time in a run on the bank, the 
bank will not be able to repay them because their money is tied up in long term 
loans and it only has a fraction of the depositor’s money in liquid cash. An 
example of a bank run occurred in 1931 following the failure of Creditanstalt Bank 
in Austria which led to a run on the German mark, UK sterling and then the US 
dollar. This triggered further bank runs in America and was partly responsible for 
the Great Depression. A more recent example of a run on the bank occurred on 
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14 September 2007 when Northern Rock, a British bank, arranged an emergency 
loan facility from the Bank of England and claimed this was the result of short-
term liquidity problems. The resulting bank run occurred after news reports of a 
liquidity crisis. The financial crisis that ensued ended with Northern Rock being 
nationalised. 
Due to the risk of bank runs, the first fundamental role of bank lenders’ is to be 
skilled at identifying the borrowers least likely to repay a loan and more 
importantly, to lend wisely and monitor borrowers to prevent the moral hazard of 
borrowers choosing not to repay the loan. A bank’s ability to gather information 
about investments and choose between good and bad loans efficiently effects its 
ability to offer a return to its depositors. 
Although P2PLs also face the risk that a borrower might not repay the loan, they 
do not face the risk of a run on a bank because the money they lend out on a 
platform is their own. Therefore, lending ethically is not a priority concern for 
P2PLs because at first glance, their lending decisions only affect their own 
finances and not an entire nation’s. 
Another difference is that banks act as depositories of other people’s savings.466 
If there was nowhere to safely deposit funds, individuals would not be able to 
effectively save.467 Whereas banks act as depositories where people can store 
their savings, P2PLs are the savers who have the money which needs to be 
saved or invested. So they do not perform the function of holding money. Rather, 
by engaging in P2PL they have chosen to place their money in another institution 
that is not a bank. This highlights that institutional lenders and P2PLs play 
fundamentally different roles in their lending capacity. 
In this sense, P2PL could not feasibly replace the need for banks as has 
previously been claimed by some platforms, because if there were no more 
banks, there would be nowhere for the P2PLs to deposit the income they make 
on the P2PL platforms. Of course, they could choose to perpetually recycle the 
interest they earn into further investments, but because of the relative illiquidity 
of the money lent on platforms, it is unlikely they will be able to put all the money 
they own into P2PL investments. Neither would it be sensible, since to protect 
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themselves from risk they would need to diversify where they store their money. 
Consequently, there is still a place for traditional banks in the P2PL process even 
if it is indirect and P2PLs do not play the exact same type of role. 
Another role carried out by banks which P2PLs do not do is to pool the money of 
many depositors and make them available for credit.468 P2PL is more 
individualised than this. P2PLs do not perform this function. As with normal 
banking, the P2PLs make their savings available for the platform intermediary to 
do the pooling. In relation to this, part of the bank lender’s decision-making 
process is to decide which borrowers are creditworthy and to distinguish between 
good borrowers and bad ones. This does not form part of the P2P lender’s 
decision-making process because the platform has already distinguished 
between the good and bad borrowers. As shown in Annexe One, the P2PLs of 
all the platforms reviewed, are dependent on the platform to perform credit checks 
and background searches on the borrowers. In contrast, the P2P lender’s 
decision only involves a consideration of his/her own personal appetite for risk 
and the type of borrowers, as already categorised by the platform, which they 
think are most likely to give them good returns based on this. 
Another role carried out by bank lenders is to connect borrowers and lenders, 
therefore acting as an intermediary between the two. This process is meant to 
make it easier, cheaper and faster than if individuals were to try to pool their 
resources by themselves.469 However, the P2PLs do not perform this function, 
rather the P2PL platform does. For example, the P2P lender does not have to 
solicit borrowers like banks do by advertising the availability of their savings to be 
lent out, the platform does this for them. Similarly, the P2P lender does not worry 
about reputation management to ensure that borrowers find them a reliable 
lender, e.g. one who will not harass them for early repayment, change the terms 
of the agreement or make borrowing money unnecessarily difficult – in other 
words, a lender who will provide them with certainty. Instead, the P2PLs rely on 
the platform’s reputation to obtain borrowers to lend to. 
Banks also provide more expert management than P2PLs because they have 
better evaluation and monitoring abilities because of training and their experience 
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in dealing with numerous borrowers and economies of scale.470 In contrast, P2PLs 
typically lack the financial and screening expertise of traditional banks to judge 
financial risk and information. Their ability to do so is key to the viability of the 
industry.471 However, in their study on the ability of P2PLs to infer borrower 
creditworthiness, Iyer et al found that within a given credit category, P2PLs were 
able to deduce one-third of the differences in creditworthiness that are captured 
by a borrower’s exact credit score – although in their study, they were assuming 
that the borrowers’ actual credit scores are a largely accurate depiction of their 
creditworthiness.472 This also highlights that unlike traditional lenders, P2PLs are 
dependent on the platforms and credit ratings agencies to gather the important 
information about the borrowers’ likelihood and ability to repay. 
Iyer et al’s results suggest that despite not being financial experts, P2PLs can 
partly infer underlying borrower creditworthiness, although this inference is 
incomplete. The lenders learn more form standard banking variables which are 
financial and ‘hard’ information compared to the information voluntarily supplied 
by borrowers which could just be false and not easily verified.473 The standard 
banking variables are verified information and more reliable for example, the 
borrower’s number of current delinquencies, debt-to-income ratio and the number 
of credit inquiries in the last six months.474 But they are also able to learn from the 
softer voluntary information provided by borrowers, e.g. the maximum interest 
rate a borrower posts that they are willing to pay on a loan.475 Therefore, to an 
extent, P2PLs are able to evaluate borrower creditworthiness and act on these 
decisions, but unlike traditional lenders, they do not gather this information 
themselves. Rather, P2PLs tend to rely on the platform for most of the traditional 
lenders’ roles. 
Although over time a P2P lender could build up some experience and expertise 
about P2PL in general, they still will not have access to the same level of 
information that a bank has relating to borrowers, because the platform performs 
the role of gathering, analysing and administering the borrowers’ repayments. 
Consequently, whilst P2PLs might gain more skills at predicting outcomes within 
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the confines of the roles and positions they play in P2PL, there will always be the 
same information asymmetries that they would suffer from regardless of how long 
they have been involved in P2PL.  
In addition to the different roles that P2PLs have in comparison with traditional 
lenders, both entities face lending risks. Some are similar but they can be 
differentiated. For example, banks do not hold the money deposited with them on 
trust for the depositors, i.e. the money deposited is not immune from the private 
creditors of the bank.476 Rather, the banks use the money for on-lending and so 
are debtors to their depositors. A bank’s ability to repay depends on their ability 
to collect the loans from its borrowers.477 Similarly, money placed by P2PLs for 
use on a platform is a risk because it is not held on trust for the lender as there is 
no guarantee the borrower will repay. The difference between these risks 
however, is that the P2PLs are not accountable to a third party if the loan 
transaction fails. 
As previously referred to, banks have a higher systemic importance than P2PLs. 
They are at the centre of risk whereas P2PLs are not. Banks take deposits from 
the public and hold people’s money, they provide credit liquidity for the economy 
by providing commercial loans and they are inter-connected with each other e.g. 
through inter-bank deposits and payment systems.478 It will therefore be easier to 
let a P2PL platform fail than a bank because the extent of the credit liquidity 
provided by P2PLs to society at large is relatively small. For example, in 2015 
P2PL consumer lending platforms facilitated £909 million worth of loans to over 
213,000 individual borrowers,479 whereas according to the Bank of England, the 
monthly net consumer credit flow excluding student loans was £0.7 billion in the 
three months leading up to February 2015 alone.480 
On the other hand, they are like banks in the sense that they do provide some 
sort of credit liquidity to members of the public. For example, a borrower seeks a 
loan because they need liquidity. P2PL enables that borrower to achieve liquidity 
for a period of up to three to five years depending on the platform. Similarly, 
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although P2PL platforms are not linked to each other, P2PLs are linked to each 
other because their money is pooled to create a loan. However, within the context 
of P2PL, this is a positive thing because it aids with diversification. 
Finally, P2PLs experience different relationships with the other P2PL participants 
in comparison to mainstream lenders. The relationship between the bank and 
depositor is a contractual one which can be expressed as a ‘debtor-creditor’ 
relationship, because once the bank accepts deposits from their customers they 
become their debtor.481 The relationship between the P2P lender and the 
borrower is a contractual debtor-creditor one also however, their position in the 
intermediated lending chain is different. In mainstream lending, the 
saver/depositor is at the beginning of the chain and is the ultimate lender. They 
are followed by their debtor, the bank, who is also the lender. In turn, the bank is 
followed by the borrower who is a debtor to the bank. In contrast, the P2P lender 
is at the beginning of the P2PL intermediated lending chain as the lender, they 
are followed by the platform who acts as the distributor of the funds and finally 
the borrower who is their debtor. So the relationship between the P2P lender and 
borrower is debtor-creditor, but the relationship between the P2P lender and the 
platform is something altogether different. It could be described as service 
provider-consumer. 
Consequently, although the borrower’s role stays slightly the same, the P2P 
lender’s role and responsibilities increases because it takes on some of the 
traditional lender’s responsibilities/roles but remains in the same position as a 
normal consumer in the lending chain. Consequently, it also retains some of the 
vulnerabilities of ordinary consumers whilst taking on some of the responsibilities 
of traditional lenders, and therefore some of the risks. All this occurs without the 
buffer that ordinary consumer depositors have of FSCS backing for their deposits, 
or even mainstream banks who have often been bailed out by central banks 
across the world during financial crises. 
The extent to which the role of P2PLs is different from normal consumers of bank 
lending in a similar point in the lending chain is that they have different roles. 
Under common law, the bank customer only has two duties: to use reasonable 
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care in drawing cheques so as not to mislead the bank or facilitate forgery482 and 
to notify the bank of known forgeries or misuse of the account.483  
In conclusion, the comparison between P2PLs and traditional lenders such as 
banks has shown that although they carry out similar lending activity, and P2PLs 
find themselves facing similar lending risks, they are ultimately quite different 
because despite their prosuming activity which leads to greater participation in 
the lending activity, P2PLs still retain aspects of the consumer at different stages 
of the lending process. This is highlighted by their dependency on the platform 
during the administration stage of the loan agreement and initially at the start of 
the lending process where the P2PLs rely on the platforms ability to collate 
accurate information about the borrower. This dual capacity is reflective of the 
P2PLs’ characteristic as a transitional prosumer, i.e. “lendsumer” which is 
discussed in detail in Section 5.7.  
 
3.5 Credit Unions 
 
This section looks at credit unions in the UK and explains their background and 
form. The aim of this is twofold. Firstly, it will identify the similarities and 
differences in the nature of credit unions and P2PL. Secondly, based on this 
analysis, it will identify whether credit unions are based on a consumption or 
prosumption model and whether it is similar to the P2PL model.  
This section therefore contributes to the overarching argument of Chapter Three 
that P2PL is similar to some alternative lending models in various ways, but as 
they are completely different business models, the regulatory focus should be 
different. It does this by distinguishing credit unions from P2PL. Consequently, 
the comparison between them centres on the main characteristics of the credit 
union lending model and their members 
Credit unions have been chosen as a comparison with P2PL for several reasons: 
both are alternative forms of lending to traditional bank-based lending; both have 
consumers at their focus – or in the case of credit unions, their members; and 
                                                          
482 See London Joint Stock Bank Ltd v Macmillan and Arthur [1918] AC 777. 
483 See Greenwood v Martin’s Bank Ltd [1933] AC 51. 
158 
 
both can be said to be loosely based on similar social and economic ideals, such 
as self-reliance and empowerment of the user. 
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3.5.1 Definition of a credit union 
 
Credit unions (CU) have been defined as a non-profit and democratic484 ‘financial 
intermediation cooperative’ where its members are both the owners of the 
institution and the consumers and suppliers of its loanable funds.485 Membership 
of a CU is therefore formed, in the words of Smith et al, of both ‘member-
borrowers’ and ‘member-savers’486 and the CU acts as an intermediary between 
the two.  
In this regard, a slight comparison can be drawn between CUs and P2PL 
platforms. Although P2PL platforms are for-profit organisations and therefore not 
owned by their members, the key participants are both borrowers and 
savers/lenders. P2PL participants do not have the same level of stakeholder 
control as credit union members; because of the lack of ownership of the 
organisation they do not have a direct say in the way the business is run. 
Similarly, the relationship between P2PL participants and the platform is not as 
close as the relationship between credit union members’ relationship with their 
credit union, where the main aim is to benefit its members. However, both 
organisations’ participants are drawn from the same broad pool of consumers, 
those who wish to lend, save and invest; and those who wish to borrow.  
As CUs are member-owned businesses, they form part of a type of business 
organisation which is owned by those who directly benefit from its operations, as 
opposed to being owned by its shareholders.487  Therefore these types of 
businesses are typically owned and controlled by members who are from one of 
three stakeholders: producers, employees and consumers.488  
The main role of CUs is to offer its members the means to save and obtain loans 
at a reasonable rate of interest in the local community.489 In the UK, the movement 
is quite small in comparison to other jurisdictions like North America and Ireland 
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and traditionally it has been administered by unpaid volunteers, although this is 
not always the case as exemplified by the City of Plymouth Credit Union which 
first employed paid staff in 2002.490 
 
3.5.2. The form/structure of credit unions and how they operate 
 
Credit unions operate by collecting savings from their members through their 
deposit savings accounts and from this pool of funds it makes available loans to 
its member-borrowers.491 They are therefore formed of persons who combine as 
customers and deal among themselves.492 However, although they tend to be 
single-stakeholder in nature, e.g. a union of employees of a particular company 
or a union of residents of a certain community, a credit unions’ membership often 
contains people who have more than one identity within the credit union i.e. being 
both a customer (saver) and a small business or sole trader (borrower).493 
Credit unions’ main sources of income are the loans they make to their 
members.494 They have as their basis a self-help philosophy which can be seen 
in their provision of education and advice to their members495 and the legal 
obligation for members to share a common bond.496 The common bond is the 
aspect of CUs that creates the community relationship and identity within a credit 
union which binds its members together in a non-financial relationship. A common 
bond can be based on geography, association and occupation.497 A member must 
first prove that they fulfil the common bond requirement before they can join the 
credit union.498 The requirement of the common bond is designed to be a 
protection against default or dishonesty499 on the assumption that if members 
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know each other, they are going to experience some sort of social pressure not 
to disappoint the other members of their community by failing to repay a loan. 
Once a person has been approved as a member, they receive a shareholding in 
the credit union. Within CU, shares are the same thing as savings, so the more a 
person saves the more shares they hold within the union. However, each member 
has equal voting rights regardless of the amount of shares they hold.500 Shares 
are affordable because each one is valued at £1.  CUs pay a dividend on the 
shares each member holds. However the dividend is only paid when a credit 
union has a sufficient surplus in a given year.501  
Savers also receive life insurance in proportion to their shareholding and 
borrower members receive the appropriate amount of loan protection insurance 
to their borrowing.502 Before a loan is lent out, borrowers are scrutinised based on 
how much they have managed to save.503 Consequently, unlike on P2PL 
platforms, members do not sign up as either borrowers or savers, rather, once 
they sign up, they are entitled to also borrow. 
The advantages of CUs are that loans can be made for small amounts and for a 
variety of period lengths which is an option not available in mainstream finance.504 
Additionally, because loans are made at competitive rates, it helps people with 
poor credit profiles.505 
 
3.5.3. Historical development of credit unions 
 
The origin of CUs can be traced to the development of co-operatives in Germany 
in the mid-1800s, particularly the models developed by Herman Schulze and 
Friedrich Raiffeisen. Cooperative banking arose from underlying social economic 
ideals. This can be seen by its aims to promote thriftiness and self-reliance 
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amongst low to middle-income people through savings and credit banking and 
through these means, develop local economies by increasing productivity.506  
One of the main business models for cooperatives was set up in 1850 by Shulze 
in the form of a credit association. This institution consisted of a two-tier system 
of management and supervisory boards and the model insisted that borrowers 
would also become members of the institution.507 Loans were short term loans of 
three months, which made Shulze’s system suitable for urban businesses which 
had no need for long-term loans, unlike farmers who required a longer period of 
investment.508 
On the other hand, Raiffeisen’s business model was more suitable for farmers 
because loans were more long-term and could run for up to ten years.509 He set 
up his first loan bank at Flammersfeld in 1849 to deal with what he saw as the 
problem of usury.510 However, it was his third association at Anhausen, set up in 
1862, where the borrowing members were also members of the association.511  
Like Shulze’s system, Raiffeisen’s was a two-tier management system. However, 
unlike Shulze, there were no joining fees or dividends on share capital. Restricting 
each institution to one parish meant that growth was limited, and yet Shulze’s 
system by comparison has been criticised for encouraging greed and risky 
management through high dividends, salaries and commissions which ultimately 
led to the decline of the system.512 
The idea of cooperative banks spread to European countries such as Austria, 
Switzerland and France. In Italy, Luigi Luzzatti made the societies more 
democratic with large supervisory boards and a specialised risks committee.513 
Catholic activists introduced a Raiffeisen-based model of cooperative banking in 
several Asian and African countries and in Latin America. These institutions were 
volunteer-led, small and based on a place of employment or a specific 
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community.514 The idea also spread to Ireland in the twentieth century however, 
during the civil war all the cooperative banks failed.515  
It also spread to North America where in 1909 Edward Filene and Pierre Jay, 
achieved the Credit Union Act, with rules largely adopted from Raiffeisen’s 
business model.516 Credit unions developed in America in the early twentieth 
century to cater to the needs of the working class who were excluded by 
mainstream banks.517  
The credit union movement in America grew despite the Great Depression where 
they only lost 6.7% of their investments518 because as banks continued to close 
and faith in the mainstream banking sector decreased, people were compelled to 
seek alternative forms of finance.519 Its success during this period can partially be 
attributed to a widespread desire to move away from traditional practices and to 
try new forms of credit.520 A similar phenomenon was experienced by the P2PL 
industry during and after the financial crisis of 2008, where disillusionment with 
mainstream banking led to increased attention on the alternative finance sector, 
as demonstrated by a large number of news article reports portraying P2PL in a 
largely positive light. 
By comparison, Britain had been largely unreceptive to the idea of cooperative 
banks at the time and there has been poor growth of CUs since then. In fact, CUs 
have only existed in the UK financial scene for about twenty-five years.521 Birchall 
has attributed this to the industrial revolution which was more complete in Britain, 
meaning that most people belonged to a wage-earning class less in need of 
credit. In addition, the working class had a wide choice of where to deposit their 
money be it savings accounts, building societies or consumer cooperative share 
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accounts.522 It is for similar reasons that CUs still exhibit poor growth in the UK in 
comparison to other jurisdictions like America, Ireland and Northern Ireland.523  
CUs in the UK eventually took root as a solution to the problem of poverty in low 
income areas particularly in the 1980s and 1990s.524 This is demonstrated by the 
fact that by 1999, 83% of community CUs had formed as community development 
projects to resolve poverty and provide services for disadvantaged people.525 
 
3.5.4. Consumption model of credit unions 
 
Although the nature and principles underlying CUs hint at some traits of 
prosumption, overall, it can be argued that they operate under a business-to-
consumer model of consumption as opposed to a prosumption model like P2PL. 
For example, the credit union model suggests the empowerment of individuals 
within the usual lending dichotomy. They are owned by the savers and borrowers 
that use their services through ownership of a shareholding in the credit union in 
proportion to how much they save in it. Additionally, the credit union industry aims 
to encourage independence in people and adopts a self-help philosophy by 
providing financial education and access to finance to enable individuals to help 
themselves. This self-help philosophy finds expression in the way that borrowers 
are only allowed to borrow from a credit union if they have also saved within it.  
This differs from normal bank lending because the depositors do not have any 
inherent control over how the bank is run and borrowers are usually encouraged 
to take out more debt e.g. through the extension of credit card limits or offers of 
loans and overdrafts for any purpose. However, the empowerment found within 
CUs does not equate to the empowerment of prosumers because although they 
take control of the business and have voting rights, their position in the supply 
chain does not change. This is because, their role within the lending and 
borrowing aspect of the credit union does not differ from the role of ordinary 
consumers. Although the money lent out on CUs derives from the savings of 
member-savers, it is the credit union that makes and carries out the lending 
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decisions. For example, which member-borrows can borrow, how much to lend 
to them and the interest rates applicable. Consequently, as with bank depositors, 
member-savers still play the role of the ultimate lender from whom the funds are 
sourced.  
Following from this is the fact that the relationships between the three users of 
CUs remain largely the same as far as the lending aspect of the industry goes. 
Within the context of their role as saver or borrower, the only relationship an 
individual has is with the credit union because they are not directly reliant on the 
member-borrowers to carry out this role. On the other hand, it could be argued 
that the fact of the requirement of a common bond between all members indicates 
that they do have a relationship with the member-borrowers. In addition, it could 
also be argued that because the credit unions’ main source of lending funds are 
the monies saved by the member-savers, the savers do rely on the member-
borrowers because unless they repay their loans the member-savers would either 
lose their funds or get a poor rate of interest on their savings. However, this is no 
different from the relationship between bank depositors and bank borrowers. 
Although there is a common bond between both member-savers and member-
borrowers, the relationship it is intended to create is one of a community who can 
trust each other to keep the credit union viable by ensuring repayment of debts. 
It is therefore a pre-requisite for joining the credit union and not a relationship 
created by their capacity as savers or borrowers respectively. In this sense, CU 
members also differ from P2PL users because instead of their being a tripartite 
relationship in each lending transaction, the saving and borrowing activities are 
connected by a linear relationship between the members which flows from the 
member-saver to the credit union intermediary and from the credit union to the 
member-borrower. 
Another reason why CUs cannot be said to operate under a prosumption model 
is because their users do not carry out prosuming activity. That is, they do not 
produce what they will eventually consume. For example, apart from being the 
ultimate lenders, member-savers do not play an active role in the lending 
transaction. In fact, they do not participate in each lending transaction because it 
is a separate activity to the one they perform. Their role within the credit union is 
to save money, which they do by opening an account with a CU and depositing 
their funds on a regular basis. Consequently, they consume the service provided 
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by the credit union in relation to saving. However, before consuming this service 
they do not contribute to its development or creation. Their role is therefore non-
participatory and passive in relation to the lending that occurs within a CU as well 
as the savings service they provide because the CU is in control of the major 
resources related to lending and borrowing. The same can be said of the 
member-borrowers because although their access to the borrowing facility 
depends on them being a member of the CU and having saved with it, this 
requirement is merely a prerequisite to the lending transaction at hand and does 
not contribute to its development or creation. As the actions of CU members do 
not involve any producing they cannot be said to be prosumers. 
Therefore, CUs reflect a consumption model of business activity rather than a 
prosumption one and in this way differ substantially from online P2PL. 
 
3.6 Payday Lending 
 
3.6.1. Payday lending and how it works 
 
This section compares payday lending with P2PL because both forms of lending 
operate in the online alternate finance sector and offer borrowers, quick, 
affordable credit.526 Consequently, there were early concerns that the P2PL 
industry could be as harmful to borrowers as payday lenders.527 Two implications 
follow; the comparison between P2PL and payday lending displays a lack of 
understanding of the way P2PL operates. Secondly, if P2PL is perceived as 
equally harmful, regulators may attempt to regulate it in the same way as payday 
lenders which might prove restrictive given recent moves to by the FCA to tighten 
up payday lending regulation.528 It is therefore necessary to demonstrate how 
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fundamentally different they are and why their regulatory requirements are 
different. 
Payday loans are small, short-term cash advances which usually last until the 
borrower’s next pay day.529 They can be sold online or in the high street. When 
sold online, the borrower receives the money electronically into his/her bank 
account once the loan application has been approved and the repayments are 
also made electronically at the agreed date.530 Where the loan is sold in the high 
street, once the loan has been approved, the borrower receives the money 
physically and repayment is made using a post-dated cheque which is left at the 
payday lender’s premises.531 Therefore it is necessary for borrowers to have a 
bank account, be employed532 and have regular income to receive a payday loan. 
Borrowers are usually required to show proof of their identity, address, 
employment status, income and bank account.533 Both online and high street 
lenders use credit reference and fraud prevention agencies and generally limit 
the value of the initial loan to less than £300 so they can reduce the risk 
associated with new customers with an unknown repayment history.534 The 
estimated average payday loan in 2009 was £294535 and Collins has found that 
payday loans are usually between £50 and £1000.536 
If a borrower fails to repay the payday loan by the agreed repayment date, the 
loan may be rolled over to the next payday or alternative extension so long as the 
borrower and lender are willing to agree to an extension.537 Approximately 10% 
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of payday loans last longer than 90 days and more than 10% of all payday users 
experience payment problems.538  
Payday lending originated in the US and is viewed as a form of sub-prime lending 
because its typical customers usually experience cash constraints and have few 
substitute borrowing options.539 The method of lending money against a post-
dated cheque dates back to the Great Depression and possibly further, when 
bank credit was generally reserved for small businesses and the wealthy.540 To 
obtain personal finance in 1920s America, individuals had to rely on pawnbrokers, 
commercial small loan lenders, loan sharks or friends and family, which would 
have been relatively easy in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 
due to the localised nature of trade and exchange at the time.541 In the early 
1990s, many payday lenders functioned or operated out of the offices of cheque 
cashing shops.542 However, there is very little firm data to document the 
development of payday lending in the US between 1990 and 1995.543  
However it was brought to the UK in the 1990s largely by US based companies 
such as The Money Shop.544 US based companies have also established a large 
market presence in online payday lending within the UK. For example, Quick 
Quid, the second largest online lender is owned by a Delaware company called 
CashEuroNet UK LLC and Lending Stream Ltd is owned by Global Analytics 
Holdings, also a Delaware company.545 And they have targeted areas of London 
which have traditionally been low-paid areas.546  
The short duration of payday loans means they have high annualised percentage 
rates (APRs).547 However in 2009, The Office of Fair Trading (OFT) found that for 
high street lenders, the total charge for credit in June 2009 was £12 per £100 
whilst for online lenders, this was £34.14 per £100.548 This indicates that using 
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APR as a measure of cost for short-term payday loans can be quite confusing549 
as it can misrepresent the true cost of credit. 
Payday lending is a form of credit which is used by a small proportion of the 
general public and a small proportion of all credit users.550 The typical payday 
lending borrower is an unmarried, young man with no children who lives in rented 
accommodation and earns over £1,000 a month.551 A payday lending customer 
must be in paid employment at the time they take out the loan.552 According to 
OFT, payday lending borrowers experience a very short period of time when their 
spending surpasses their income, indicating that the role of payday loans is to 
ease unexpected but temporary cash-flow constraints.553 Consequently, the 
borrowers tend to be people within the median income bracket of society and 
above the lowest income brackets.554 This is demonstrated by OFT research into 
the demographics of payday lending customers which shows that the majority of 
its users earn above £25,000 per year, whilst the typical income ranges between 
£11,500 and £25,000 per year.  
The research of Policis and the Friends Provident Foundation displays similar 
results in that the majority of borrowers earn over £24,300 per year and the 
income of most borrowers ranges between £15,000 and £24,300 per year.555 
Policis also found that for 20% of payday borrowers, payday loans were their only 
means of obtaining credit, whilst for 80% there were other alternatives.556 
However, the debt advice charity StepChange has found that of the 36,413 
people with payday loan debts it helped in 2012, whilst the average income was 
£1,298 per day the average payday loan debt was £1,665.557 Additionally, 
following the recession, there has been a rise of indebtedness along with an 
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elongated period of declining incomes.558 In this vein, the Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation has found that in 2014, half of the people living in poverty are from 
working families and about two-fifths of working-age adults living in poverty are 
also working.559 Consequently, the fact that most payday lending borrowers are 
in paid employment earning a median income and that they have alternative 
financial suppliers does not preclude their potential to also be vulnerable 
consumers. 
There are a variety of reasons why a borrower might choose a payday loan 
including certainty of the charges that will be applied to the payday loan, because 
their main lender will not know of the borrowing and because of the simplicity of 
the transaction.560 In addition to this, repeat customers are often offered more 
favourable borrowing terms, others may be deterred from seeking mainstream 
lending options because of the lengthy application process or out of a fear that 
their loan application will be rejected.561 Other common reasons for using payday 
loans include cash constraints, the need to pay an urgent bill or other emergency 
or to keep up with rent or utility bills.562 
 
3.6.2. Differences between P2P consumer lending and payday lending 
 
One of the main ways in which payday lending differs from P2PL is in the overall 
structure of the mode of lending. Regardless of whether payday lenders are 
based on the high-street or online, payday lending uses the business-to-
consumer lending model, whereas P2PL has a consumer-to-consumer structure. 
Therefore, unlike payday lending which depends on the establishment of a single 
payday lender to provide loans, the supply-side of the P2PL industry depends on 
the participation of multiple individual lenders.563  
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This difference can be exemplified by the different ways the lenders in each 
industry screens potential borrowers. Noting that within the P2PL industry, the 
term ‘lender’ does not apply to the platforms’ role or actions. Within the payday 
lending industry lenders use a simple screening process to ensure cost-
effectiveness.564 In addition to the requirements for obtaining a loan, i.e. a bank 
account, evidence of employment and an adequate credit history, successful 
borrowers are those who have a credit score above a certain threshold.565 
However, the level of these checks varies between payday lenders, e.g. Burton’s 
interviewees reported that some lenders contacted their place of work to confirm 
employment but most did not.566 
In contrast, P2PL involves two stages of borrower evaluation, in the first instance, 
the platforms screen potential loan applicants and in the second stage, the 
individual lenders must determine for themselves the borrowers’ riskiness using 
the information provided by the platforms, or on some platforms, simply the level 
of risk they are willing to take from a borrower. As to the first stage, the platforms 
generally classify borrowers according to different risk groups based on credit 
checks,567 and other information gathered by the borrower during the application 
process. They also carry out identity and fraud checks on loan applicants.  
However, in relation to the second stage, the lenders are only told the borrowers’ 
risk assignment and they are not shown the credit score.568 On some platforms 
they may have access to various forms of soft information provided by borrowers 
like pictures, loan purpose descriptions and friend endorsements.569 From the 
lenders’ perspective, higher and lower quality borrowers within a risk group are 
presented the same way,570 creating information asymmetries and making it 
possible for lenders to inadvertently select a poor quality borrower. In addition, 
because P2PLs do not necessarily have professional or any lending experience, 
the lenders may not screen the loans effectively.571 In fact, Loureiro and Gonzalez 
have found that even when P2PLs use prudent heuristics to help them make their 
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lending decisions, information asymmetries lead to subjective decision-making 
behaviour, such as lenders judging potential borrowers on the basis of their age 
or when this is not decipherable on their attractiveness.572  
However, within the P2PL industry, platforms attempt to mitigate these risks by 
applying loan caps to borrowers and providing lenders with simple and ample 
information.573 Livingston has also argued that although the provision of copious 
information may not necessarily lead to better borrower screening if the lender is 
already a poor screener, P2PLs are not poor screeners.574 This is because P2PLs 
make better loan selection decisions overtime, which new lenders benefit from; 
they have the incentive of not risking their own money; and, in the absence of 
collateral to rely on like traditional lenders, they are skilled at interpreting soft 
information provided in borrower listings.575 
On the other hand, it could be argued that with a lot of P2P platforms now offering 
an auto-lend facility which enables automatic lending based on the lenders 
lending specifications, lenders can opt to rely on this and take less responsibility 
or action in the lending process. 
Arguably, both industries have the potential to be bad screeners of potentially 
poor quality borrowers; the payday lenders because of their minimal credit checks 
and the P2PLs because of the potential for unsophisticated or ineffective methods 
of borrower validation. However, both inefficiencies can be improved through 
credit checks.  
Another difference between payday lending and P2PL is in the loans that are lent. 
These differences are exhibited in six main ways: how the loans are lent, the size 
and duration of the loans, their purpose, funding speed, cost and what happens 
when a borrower defaults on the loan. 
In the payday lending industry loans can be lent in a high-street store, online or 
by telephone.576 The lender either keeps a post-dated cheque signed by the 
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borrower for a specific time before depositing it, or authorisation is granted by the 
borrower for the lender to debit their bank account on a future date.577 There are 
a various business models but the finance is mainly derived from the payday 
lenders’ internal resources and where bank finance is used, at least 20% must 
come from internal resources.578  
Unlike in payday lending, P2PLs sign up to a platform and decide how much they 
are willing to lend and for how long. Their money is transferred to a secure 
segregated account held in trust for the lenders and lent out by the platforms to 
borrowers who fit the lenders’ specifications. On some auction-based platform 
models, the lenders can bid directly on borrower listings and a loan contract is 
initiated when there are enough lenders to fund a listing or when the lender’s loan 
offer is matched with a loan request.  
P2PBs also face a longer procedure than payday borrowers. On many sites, they 
first get a personalised loan quote and apply for a loan. The application is 
reviewed by the platform and if the loan request is approved by the platform 
following credit and other checks, the funds are transferred to the borrower. 
Therefore, payday lending is a faster way of obtaining finance for borrowers 
because whilst payday borrowers, particularly users of high-street lenders, leave 
the store with the money, P2P loans are not so immediately obtained.579 There is 
also greater uncertainty within the P2P market about whether a borrower will 
obtain a loan because of the greater degree of validation that they experience. In 
contrast, some payday borrowers believe that their lender will lend to almost 
anyone because of the less rigorous checks. 
Unlike P2PLs, payday lenders are faced with high fixed costs because the cost 
of underwriting a loan is independent of the loan value and other costs are 
independent of the number of loans made, for example, fixed costs include rents, 
overheads, staffing costs and for online lenders investment in online application 
systems.580 Additionally, costs incurred at the application stage are made 
regardless of whether a loan is approved or the loan size.581 As a result of these 
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high fixed costs, it is the number of loans granted that determines the profitability 
of the lender and not how many borrowers the lender services, since a lender 
may earn a similar amount from having one hundred loans taken out by one 
hundred borrowers as they would from one hundred loans taken out by ten 
borrowers.582 This is no doubt due to the additional fees and charges that 
borrowers incur when they rollover their loan.  
In contrast, the loans financed on P2P platforms are sourced from multiple 
lenders, for example in the UK, Zopa, Lending Works and Madiston 
LendLoanInvest, all direct consumer-to-consumer P2P platforms, enable lenders 
to contribute as little as £10 per loan contract and there is no maximum amount 
that they can invest. This spreads the risk and cost of providing the loan across 
all the P2PLs. In addition, the cost to P2PLs to provide the loans are in 
comparison very minimal. On some platforms lenders pay a lender fee; on Zopa 
this is a 1% annual fee that depends on the amount of outstanding loans where 
the payments are up-to-date and Lending Works does not have a lending fee. 
Consequently, fixed costs faced by P2PLs vary depending on the platform they 
use. However, overall the monetary cost of P2PL is can be quite cheap for the 
lenders. 
The size and duration of the loans are also different. Borrowers on P2P platforms 
tend to borrow higher amounts for longer periods, and the loans are repaid in 
equal monthly instalments.583 Zopa, Lending Works and Madiston 
LendLoanInvest all enable a minimum borrowing of £1000. The maximum 
amount that can be borrowed on Zopa and Lending Works is £25,000 whilst on 
Madiston LendLoanInvest it is £7500 although the website states that this will 
change in the future. In addition, each of these platforms enables loan terms of 
between one and five years. In contrast, payday loans can be £300 or less and 
the agreed term is usually until the borrower’s next pay date or 30 days. 
The differences in size and volume also lead to differences in the uses of and 
reasons for using each industry’s loans, which in turn leads to differences in the 
demographics of their users. Payday loans are small in size and short in duration 
because of, or leading to borrowers using them to finance short-term or 
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unexpected financial disruptions584 and the use of the loans are determined by 
the unplanned event rather than by the borrower or their financial situation.585 
Payday loans have been used to fund school supplies, childcare expenses and 
emergency travel among other things.586 And they tend to be used because of the 
loan application procedure’s speed, simplicity and minimal scrutiny.587 Based on 
the borrowing options presented to P2PBs, P2P loans on the other hand could 
be used to for debt consolidation, vehicle purchase, home improvements, special 
events like weddings, and for sole traders to help business growth. In 2014, 46% 
of P2P consumer loans in the UK were obtained to fund a car/vehicle purchase, 
26% for home improvements and 25% for debt consolidation; only 2% was 
borrowed for business purposes.588 
Another difference between the two types of lending is what happens when a 
borrower defaults. In the payday lending industry, when borrowers cannot repay 
the loan on time, they have the option to extend or ‘rollover’ the loan by paying 
the original interest and then writing another cheque for the loan amount plus the 
new interest.589 Borrowers can extend their original loan numerous times which 
can transform a loan intended to be short-term into a significantly longer and more 
expensive commitment. As referred to above,  
On the other hand, the default rates on P2P platforms at present are minimal. On 
Lending Works and Madiston LendLoanInvest default rates are currently 0% and 
expected default rates on both platforms are equally low being 1.54% and 1.5% 
respectively. However, while P2PLs are not protected by the FSCS, platforms 
often have their own security provisions in place which often form part of their 
sales pitch. For example, Lending Works markets itself as the only P2P lender 
with insurance against borrower default.590 Its insurance also insures against 
fraud, cybercrime, accident, sickness or death of the borrower and loss of 
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employment, but it does not cover its P2PLs’ rate of return. In addition to this, it 
has a reserve fund of £146,662 to date which is used to cover arrears.  
Zopa loans have no contractual security provisions but the borrowers’ are 
charged a fee which contributes to the platform’s ‘Zopa Safeguard Trust’ which 
is held in trust for lenders by P2PS Limited. So if a borrower defaults or dies, the 
Zopa lender can assign their loan contract to P2PS Limited and make a claim on 
the Safeguard Trust for the principal loan and interest due. But if the claim is 
denied, then P2PS will start the debt recovery process under the relevant loan 
contract, deducting any enforcement costs that could not be recovered. These 
examples highlight that whilst the P2PLs benefit from some form of reserve fund, 
how these are administered and any additional provisions vary depending on the 
platform. 
Following on from this, the demographics of the users of payday and P2PL differs. 
As highlighted above, payday borrowers tend to be low- and moderate-income 
working people with bank accounts591 but little to no savings. Although payday 
lending borrowers tend to be middle category consumers in terms of age, income 
and education which by itself implies that they are not all necessarily living in 
poverty or financially excluded, the fact that a lot of loans are rolled over means 
that they are chronic borrowers – in fact, this is one of the qualities that payday 
lenders seek because this way they make more profit through additional interest 
and charges.592 Regulation, at least in the US, has sought to limit the number of 
loans that borrowers can take to remedy this issue of chronic borrowing. 
Finally, the relatively recent introduction of P2PL in comparison to payday lending 
has meant that there has been little research carried out in relation to the impact 
of the loans on both lenders and borrowers. As the business model is still new 
and developing the longer term implications are yet to be seen. 593 Regulation has 
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focused on not stifling the development of P2PL, and in some corners such as 
the industry leaders/association, this has been justified by pointing out the 
relatively low default rate and their thus far good practice, in addition to the fact 
that P2PL managed to ride the wave of the financial crisis rather than being 
overwhelmed by it. However, no one can predict the future and, there has been 
no interest rate cap on P2PL loans, so one cannot dismiss the possibility of a 
platform which charges borrowers extortionate rates for borrowing with them, 
simply because this is not currently the case. However, this does show that when 
discussing a new industry, it is important to consider the value and efficiency of 
regulating for the future. 
 
3.6.3. Consumption model of payday lending 
 
As with credit union lending, payday lending reflects a consumption model of 
lending. One reason for this is that only the payday lender controls the resources 
for producing the lending transaction. For example, they determine who the funds 
will be lent to and they hold the funds to be lent. In addition, the demographic of 
individuals that use payday lending often have little to no savings of their own, so 
they are in a position of dependency towards the payday lender. This ties them 
to the conception of a consumer which holds that they are the party that is in the 
weaker position in a given transaction. This uneven playing field is emphasized 
by the fact that payday lenders have often been accused of usury due to the 
exorbitant interest rates they charge borrowers, even though the borrowers that 
typically use payday loans are often already in debt or suffering from financial 
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mainstream lending over time. It is possible that the popularity of disintermediated finance and 
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constraints. This is demonstrated by the wider debate surrounding payday 
lending which seeks to determine whether payday loans trap people in a cycle of 
repeated borrowing by allowing borrowers to continuously extend loans they 
cannot afford to repay each month594 with additional interest and charges added 
on top of the amount originally borrowed. 
Another reason why payday lending follows the consumer model is based on the 
position of payday lending borrowers within the supply or production chain. The 
borrowers do not contribute to the development or production of the loan 
transaction. Rather they merely initiate the loan service by applying for a loan and 
then receive the loan product from the payday lender. Therefore, rather than 
producing to consume for their own benefit, the borrowers do not put in any work 
for the service they receive. 
This links to the third reason why payday lenders cannot be said to operate under 
a prosumption model, which is that within the lending transaction a borrower’s 
role is merely to apply for and borrow money. This means that they are merely 
‘passive receptacles’ of the lending service. Based on Bitner et al’s framework for 
analysing the levels of participation of a business’ customers, payday borrowers 
exhibit a moderate level of participation in the delivery of the service, but they 
only just fit within this level. This is because they cannot be said to show a low 
level of participation according to the framework because the payday lending 
service cannot go ahead regardless of whether the borrower decides to take out 
a loan or not; and the borrower does not simply make a payment for the service, 
they also have to take steps to apply for the loan. However, these roles are aimed 
at consumption they do not contribute to the production of the service itself. 
Payday borrowers operate within the moderate level of participation because 
their input is required for the creation of the loan service. If they do not apply for 
a loan, it will not be generated. However, this is as far as their participation goes. 
As the underlying model of payday lending is consumptive, it fundamentally 
differs from the P2PL mode of financing individuals. Therefore, it cannot be 
treated exactly the same for the purposes of regulation. 
                                                          
594 Gibbons, Malhotra and Bulmore (n 545) 3; Richard M Hynes, ‘Does Payday Lending Catch 
Vulnerable Communities in a Debt Trap?’ (Social Science Research Network 2010) SSRN 
Scholarly Paper ID 1585805 3 <http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1585805> accessed 9 July 
2016. 
179 
 
 
180 
 
3.7 Crowdfunding 
 
The basic structure of P2PL at the conceptual level is of a person-to-person 
transaction. To be more specific, the transactions occur lendsumer-to-prosumer. 
There are many types of individuals who engage in similar activities to P2PLs 
and which also requires group participation for the transaction to come into effect. 
However, this section analyses the differences between P2PLs and these actors 
and shows that on a conceptual level, these models of transacting are not the 
same as on P2PL platforms. For example, some are truly consumer-to-consumer 
models, whereas others are prosumer-to-prosumer. It therefore further 
distinguishes the concept of ‘lendsumer’ and highlights further characteristics that 
make up the ‘lendsumer’. 
The name ‘crowdfunding’ is often used as an umbrella term encompassing 
various types of online platforms which enables people and businesses to raise 
money from the wider public for a specific project.595 E.g. the FCA uses it in this 
way to include both peer-to-peer and peer-to-business varieties. Some 
academics conflate the term with either variety depending on which one they are 
referring to at the time. For example, in their discussion of the occurrence of home 
bias in the crowdfunding context, i.e. the phenomenon that investors or 
businesses are more likely to transact with parties who are geographically closer 
to them, Lin and Viswanathan conflate P2PL with crowdfunding. They describe 
crowdfunding as: 
“where contributors or investors provide funds to an individual or business either 
as donations or in return for a debt repayable over time, an equity share, or a 
reward”596 
As with the FCA conception of the term, they use the term crowdfunding as an 
umbrella term to encompass a variety of different models e.g. donation-based 
forms of financing and debt-based models. By using the term ‘contributors’ 
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alongside ‘investors’, Lin and Viswanathan allow the possibility for crowdfunding 
to include models in which individuals can contribute to a charitable cause 
through donations or where they contribute money to finance an idea which they 
support. By using the term ‘investors’ they also include the possibility for 
‘crowdfunding’ to encompass models where individuals contribute funds with the 
expectation that they are going to earn something in return e.g. loan-based and 
equity-based forms of finance. 
In contrast, Mollick defines crowdfunding as: 
“the efforts by entrepreneurial individuals and groups – cultural, social, and for-
profit – to fund their ventures by drawing on relatively small contributions from a 
relatively large number of individuals using the internet, without standard financial 
intermediaries.”597 
Mollick’s definition is more specific because it focuses only on the type of 
crowdfunding that involves the financing of entrepreneurial ventures. This 
excludes fundraising for personal reasons such as buying a car, home 
improvements or a holiday, which are some of the reasons that people give for 
raising money on P2PL platforms. His definition also includes the essential 
method of crowdfunding which is that money is raised from a large crowd of 
individuals in small amounts. This is sufficiently broad enough to encompass all 
types of crowdfunding as well as P2PL because the idea behind both types of 
fund raising is that money is sourced from multiple people and it also shows how 
both tend to work. But as explained above, P2PL lending is excluded from this 
definition because it does not always involve raising money to fund ventures. By 
referring to the internet as the place which crowdfunding takes place, the 
definition renders itself specific to online variants of raising finance from a crowd. 
It therefore also excludes offline variants of crowdfunding like esusu/isusu, which 
is discussed later in this chapter. Finally, by excluding the use of “standard” 
intermediaries this definition reflects an understanding that online forms of 
crowdfunding are not free of intermediary involvement, rather, the ones involved 
are not traditional forms like banks or investment brokers. Although the definition 
of crowdfunding and the way it is used is still a contentious issue, in part because 
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crowdfunding is still an emergent field of study, this definition is significant 
because it demonstrates that it is possible to define and conceive of crowdfunding 
as a separate business model from P2PL despite how similar they are. 
Following on from this idea, although the umbrella usage of ‘crowdfunding’ 
encompasses different models of sourcing funding from a crowd, it does not 
consider the ways that the different models differ conceptually. For example, this 
thesis has focused on person-to-person or “peer-to-peer” lending, where 
individuals are on either side of the platform-intermediated lending transaction. 
Within these types of platforms, the participants are usually associated with 
consumers or prosumers. Hence, this model is also usually associated with 
consumer-to-consumer business models like eBay. But with equity-based 
crowdfunding, the participants on either side of the transaction are not always 
both individuals. Other forms of crowdfunding such as donation and rewards-
based crowdfunding have more in relation to charitable contributions than they 
do with retail finance as they do not involve a financial investment return, 
consequently they fall outside the remit of the UK regime.598  E.g. even with 
rewards-based crowdfunding, the rewards may be a product or service which the 
lender may hope to receive if the borrower achieves the set fundraising target, 
e.g. tickets to a concert that the borrower was raising money to organise.599  Unlike 
P2PL, these types of crowdfunding can take the form of individual-to-business 
models, and increasingly also institution-to-business, because some 
crowdfunded loans are partially supplied by institutions such as hedge or pension 
funds.600  
Therefore, on a conceptual level, these types of crowdfunding models differ from 
P2PL because they do not involve two consumer parties meeting over the 
platform and transacting, rather it is individual-to-business, whether a small 
business or a large one. This is because the persons raising finance are doing 
so in the course of their trade, or business and therefore cannot be classified as 
consumers, even in cases where they are raising finance in order to start a 
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business.601 Additionally, on platforms which allow institutions to lend, the lending 
process may even be said to have gone full circle and returned to a business-to-
consumer or business-to-business structure. 
Due to the similarities with P2PL, the individuals who provide the finance on 
crowdfunding platforms can be conceptualised as prosumers due to them 
carrying out similar roles with similar levels of participation in the production side 
of the transaction. However, the concept of the lendsumer only applies where the 
lender is an individual, not a business. This is because a business cannot be said 
to transition between being a prosumer and a consumer at the different stages of 
the platform-reliant lending transaction. This is particularly the case when one 
considers the common EU law conception of a consumer which requires that they 
be natural persons. Therefore, on crowdfunding platforms where the funding 
crowd could be made of either/both institutions and individuals, it might be too 
complicated to determine who should be treated as a lendsumer and who should 
be treated as a business for the purposes of regulatory protection.  
These are significant differences because it changes the dynamics of the 
relationships between the participants and may even negate in some cases the 
relevance of regulations such as consumer protection regulations, which will no 
longer be appropriate protection for the lender if it is a business such as a hedge 
fund. The regulations would therefore have to differ. 
 
3.8 Esusu/Isusu 
 
Isusu is a type of rotating credit association (RCA) formed of credit groups/clubs 
found in many countries around the world, particularly Africa and Asia.602 Shirley 
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Ardener, an anthropologist defines an RCA as, “an association formed upon a 
core of participants who agree to make regular contributions to a fund which is 
given, in whole or in part, to each contributor in rotation.”603 This definition 
therefore excludes similar co-operative forms of saving and borrowing like CUs 
because they do not involve the key components of rotation and regularity.604 
The name ‘isusu’ is what it is called amongst the Igbo of south-eastern Nigeria 
and means ‘a gathering’.605 In Nigeria alone it is known by many names 
depending on the ethnic group, e.g. ‘esusu’ amongst the Yoruba,  ‘adashi’ by the 
Hausa and ‘oku’ by the Kalahari.606  
The form varies depending on the place and culture, and ranges from the simplest 
form comprising regular contributions and withdrawals with no interest, reserve 
fund or other complications involved, to modulated cycles involving interest or a 
negotiated auction system for determining the distribution of the fund. 607 
However, it generally operates in the same way with individuals joining together 
and contributing money to a joint pot on a particular day of the week for a period 
of time.608 
It played a prevalent role in most African societies of mobilising savings and 
allocating them for investment before the modern banking system started.609 E.g. 
Nwabughougu traces the origin of the institution in Ngwaland, a village in south-
eastern Nigeria, to pre-colonial times when young men used it to raise money to 
pay the dowry for marriage. In his account, he describes how it generally worked 
in the past.610 Any member of a village who wished to take part would meet at an 
elder’s house once every Igbo week of eight days and contribute a fixed amount 
of about four to eight manillas to the joint fund.611 Each member was entitled to 
the total amount of these contributions in turn and after receiving his share, he 
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would continue to pay his weekly contribution until he had paid the full amount 
received.612 The group was disbanded as soon as everyone had contributed 
received their share of the communal pot.613 In pre-colonial times, membership 
was only open to members of the same village as this made it easier to deal with 
dishonesty and keep defaults to a minimum.614  
There are two different types of defaulters within isusu which impact the stability 
of the organisation in slightly different ways. The first category are those who 
default before receiving their share of the contributions.615 These types were 
treated with more sympathy by the collective because the lack of payment could 
have been caused by illness or poverty. In this situation, the defaulter would be 
expected to find a substitute to continue their payments. If the defaulter could not 
find a substitute an enquiry would be instigated to find out whether this was due 
to negligence. If not, the members would find a substitute for him.616 But if the 
defaulter was found not to be able to contribute because of his own negligence 
the members would seize one of his fowls for each week he had defaulted and 
order him to continue the contribution.617 
The second type of defaulter is one who defaults after receiving his share of the 
pot.618 This posed a greater threat to the collective’s stability because it inspired 
a lack of trust within the group. Consequently, this type of defaulter was treated 
with greater severity by being brought before the village council, ordered to pay 
a fine and continue his contributions.619 Failure to do so would lead to his 
outstanding balance being treated as a debt and his property seized.620  
In more modern times, a key characteristic of isusu is that a group of around 
twenty to thirty members must reach a solid agreement before the isusu starts.621 
In the past this agreement formed part of an unwritten legal code, which meant 
members depended on mutual trust and oaths of allegiance.622 In modern times 
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some isusu groups operate with written constitutions.623 Also in modern times, the 
members tend to come from similar economic backgrounds, e.g. market women, 
members of trading guilds, artisans and childhood friends.624 The money is often 
used by individuals to start a business or expand an existing one in for example, 
pottery or sculpture making, soap making, farming,625 repayment of debt or the 
education of children,.626 The aim is to create financial stability for members in 
times of need.627 
Each member of the group contributes a fixed amount of money at regular periods 
as agreed upon by the group, which could be daily, weekly or monthly depending 
on what was agreed and the total amount contributed is kept by the group leader 
who is unanimously selected by the group and acts as a treasurer.628 When the 
time comes for sharing the savings out amongst members, non-participants are 
not allowed to receive any of the returns and anyone that has defaulted on an 
earlier round is not allowed to continue to the next.629 As isusu is founded on 
mutual trust between the members, it is typically peer pressure that causes 
members to make each periodic payment on time, this is accompanied by other 
pressures caused by social norms within the local culture.630  
The amount each member receives when the money is shared depends on the 
number of people within the group,631 and the number of shares the individual 
holds within the group and this in turn depends on how much they can afford to 
contribute on the periodic payment date.632 For example, if there are nine people 
within an isusu collective, the first person may contribute both first and last to 
receive payments twice (first and last respectively). In this way, they act as both 
the first and tenth person within the group and hold more shares. The number of 
shares held also determines the person’s position within the group; consequently, 
the shareholder with the highest number of shares is usually the president.633 
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The total amount saved by all members of the group is allocated to individual 
members in turn by rotating the payment in a pre-defined order.634 However, this 
schedule is flexible because if a member requires emergency funds, the order 
can be changed to help the person in need.635 Once the isusu group has been 
formed, joining as a new member is not easy as one needs to be guaranteed by 
at least two existing members to be accepted.636  
Some isusu members consider themselves to be their own bankers and prefer it 
to institutional forms of lending such as banks637 because it generally does not 
force them to make interest payments.638 Isusu provides members with easy 
access to loans which do not attract interest, do not incur joining or exit fees, the 
amount paid is dependent on what the individual can afford and default generally 
does not result in the appropriation of the debtor’s personal belongings.639 
Consequently, saving and borrowing money with isusu does not carry the same 
degree of risks that normal borrowing does. 
Oluwole distinguishes between isusu/esusu and a similar type of traditional 
banking system amongst the Yorubas called ‘Ajo’. He states that in ajo, members 
of a group contributed a certain about of money periodically and all or part of the 
accumulated funds are given to one or more members in rotation until all 
members have benefited from the joint pot.640 Whereas, in isusu/esusu, members 
receive the accumulated funds saved by the group at the same time, rather than 
in turn.641 However, the terms seem to be used interchangeably, particularly within 
the literature as some writers have described the operation of isusu/esusu as 
rotating in the same way that Oluwole describes ajo.642 
Either way, there are several risks inherent in esusu and ajo alike, e.g. both 
systems of finance are heavily dependent on trust between members for the set 
up, and continuation of the group.643 Members of the club are typically only 
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accepted on the basis of mutual trust, however loss of trust within the group could 
cause it to collapse, and this could be caused by such things as default or 
untimely contributions by some members.644  
The fact that the esusu group leader also acts as the treasurer of the club creates 
an unhealthy dependence on them. If the group leader dies, this could create 
problems for the other members because the leader’s family may deny 
knowledge of the leader’s status and withhold the groups’ funds.645 This is 
exacerbated by the lack of court mediation in these situations. This could create 
such a large degree of mistrust within the group that the esusu collective 
collapses. Similarly, a group leader’s ineffectiveness at carrying out his/her role 
of coordinating the group might weaken the group and there is a risk that the 
leader-treasurer might abscond with the group’s money.646 
Linked to the issue of trust, an esusu group might be weakened by continual 
default by its members particularly as members cannot be forced to contribute if 
they have nothing to contribute.647 
Rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAS) like isusu split the borrowing 
and lending process into two separate transactions because they offer lenders a 
claim to the joint pot as borrowers and, separately, lending the money they have 
contributed to the ultimate borrowers.648 
High interest rates can be attached to borrowing which is sometimes usurious, 
for example Jerome reported that interest rates range between zero and fifty per 
cent.649 
Recently, Diamond Bank of Nigeria has unveiled an online version of esusu called 
‘eSUSU’.650 The service provided is designed to encourage Nigerians to save and 
has both a group and savings option. For the group lending option, Diamond bank 
provides a secure platform where up to twelve individuals can contribute to a 
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rotating savings scheme like esusu and ajo.651 It gives them the ability to plan 
collection dates and receive bulk payment. Unlike the traditional offline version of 
isusu, account holders can access their contributions at any time. The digitisation 
of esusu not only lifts the administrative burden from the group leader-treasurer652 
but also eliminates the risk that the treasurer will abscond with the group 
members’ money. Bringing isusu online therefore adds greater transparency to 
the affair in addition to greater efficiency and a reduced dependency on mutual 
trust to stabilise the group. 
There several similarities between the isusu members and P2PLs. For example, 
both institutions involve a participatory community. The lending activity in an isusu 
is only possible because a group of people have come together to raise a fund 
which is then lent out. Similarly, a P2P loan is only possible because funds have 
been raised by a crowd. A more obvious similarity is that both institutions involve 
members who use their personal money to lend to others within the participatory 
community. They can be said to prosume at least in regards to their lending 
activity. 
However, the digitisation of isusu highlights a major difference between P2PL 
and isusu. Firstly, isusu, particularly in its traditional offline versions are true forms 
of lending between individuals as there are no intermediaries between the 
members. The members come together of their own accord and require no 
intermediary to connect them. Even the online version seems to necessitate that 
a group has already formed offline before they decide to use the bank’s platform 
to administer the isusu activities. In contrast, P2PLs and borrowers are unknown 
to each other and the P2PL platform is what brings them together as well as 
facilitates the lending and borrowing activities. Diamond Bank’s platform is simply 
designed to make isusu easier and more efficient for the users, it does not play 
an intermediary role between the isusu members. Even though an isusu group 
relies on the president-treasurer to store and pay the collective’s funds, as 
described by Oluwole, the president-treasurer is not only a participant in the 
saving/lending and borrowing activities thereby contributing to the mutual funds 
periodically and receiving a share, but they are generally also appointed by the 
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group themselves. This is generally the case, although there are some varieties 
where the group’s organiser may either be required to contribute in a different 
form to others, e.g. in the form of feasts for some Chinese associations; or, they 
do not contribute at all, as with the Nupe of Nigeria.653 Regardless, P2PL platforms 
engage in intermediary activities which are more engaged, involve more control 
on their part and more dependency on them on the part of the P2PBs and lenders, 
without also participating in the lending and borrowing behaviour. Put simply, they 
are intermediaries. Therefore, unlike with P2PL, the participants of isusu do not 
experience a consumer-business relationship at any point during the collective’s 
existence. This means that the participants are not consumers. 
Linked to this, another immediate difference between isusu members and P2PLs 
is their capacity as borrowers and lenders. Unlike P2PLs, isusu members 
participate as both borrowers and lenders. In an isusu, the individual who 
receives an early draw is actually being advanced a credit by a saver who will 
later have his or her own turn to receive such an advance.654 This is because in 
any given isusu period, they each contribute to a pool of funds which they will 
receive funds or borrow from by the end of the agreement. In contrast, in each 
P2P transaction the lenders operate solely as lenders and do not benefit from the 
fund they contribute to, which is gathered from multiple other lenders to form the 
loan by the platform. Consequently, the capacity of the borrowers and lenders 
within P2PL are asynchronous. 
This can be illustrated by the following scenario. Twenty people meet each month 
and contribute £10 each to the fund, once all the contributions have been 
collected that first month, £200 is handed to the first member to receive the 
contributions. The following month, another member receives the next batch of 
£200 that has been collected and so forth until all twenty members have received 
£200. By the end of the twentieth month, £4,000 has been raised and shared out. 
However, as soon as the first member of the collective receives his/her £200, 
he/she becomes a debtor to the rest of the members, similarly, the last member 
to receive the fund remains a creditor to each of the members until he/she 
                                                          
653 Ardener (n 620) 211. 
654 Purcell (n 624) 147. 
191 
 
receives his/her share.655 This is the case with each member of the collective, 
each one shifting from creditor to debtor. 
P2PL participants are therefore different because within their respective 
transaction they play only one role throughout the transaction, i.e. they are either 
a lender or a borrower. Although both institutions involve their members 
transitioning in some way, with P2PLs it is different because they remain lenders 
throughout the transaction but within that role, their capacity transitions from 
prosumer to consumer. In contrast, an isusu member remains a prosumer 
throughout the isusu period, so their capacity does not change, only their 
relationship with each other. 
Isusu participants and by extension members of other types of rotary credit 
association can therefore be distinguished from P2PLs because although they 
can be classified as prosumers, they are not transitional prosumers. 
By analysing the similarities and differences between esusu/isusu and P2PL, this 
section has demonstrated how a prosumption-based form of lending works. For 
example, it highlights the fact that offline and online forms of esusu/isusu operate 
on a prosumer-to-prosumer basis. On this basis, it can be distinguished from 
P2PL which although it is also based on a prosumption model, only one party to 
the P2PL transaction can be adequately described as a prosumer, i.e. the 
lenders. Whether the borrowers can be described as such is debatable because 
arguably, there is little difference between them and individuals who apply for and 
manage their loans online using a bank’s website. In addition, P2PL differs 
because it is not purely prosumer-to-prosumer or prosumer-to-consumer 
because it operates through the platform intermediary. 
The section also highlights the possibility for individuals’ roles and relationships 
to transition during a single transaction which it shows both isusu members and 
P2PLs do. However, it has also demonstrated that P2PLs experience this 
transition in a different way to esusu/isusu members. Consequently, through the 
mechanism of contrast, this analysis illuminates the details underlying the 
concept of P2PL which need to be considered for regulation to accurately reflect 
the industry. 
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3.9 Consumer-to-consumer sales: eBay  
 
Like P2PL, eBay is another online platform which springs to mind when 
discussing the notion of consumer-to-consumer transactions. However, it 
enables both consumer-to-consumer and business-to-consumer item sales. 
Although the transactions on eBay involve the sale of goods rather than services, 
eBay and online P2PL are both online marketplaces that enable individuals to 
interact with others, facilitated by an independent platform. However, despite the 
similarity between the two business models, this section argues that they are 
conceptually different.  
eBay is a system of electronic commerce (e-commerce) which acts as a facilitator 
of transactions between individuals or in some cases, small enterprises.656 eBay 
operates under an internet auction website business model, which empowers its 
users and provides a place where internet users can exchange goods and 
services directly with each other.657  
Although, as mentioned, eBay caters to business-to-consumer sales, as this 
thesis focuses on peer-to-peer transactions, this section will also focus on that 
phenomenon within the eBay business model. 
eBay functions as a virtual marketplace where its users can buy or sell items from 
anywhere in the world that has access to eBay. It is currently one of the largest 
marketplaces in the world with 162 million active buyers, access to over 200,000 
small businesses in the UK alone and 800 million listings worldwide; and the 
mobile application allowing people to use the platform on their phones has been 
downloaded over 314 million times.658 The website does not take on the role of 
auctioneer in any of the transactions happening within its website, rather, it 
intermediates such transactions.659 There are two ways members can use eBay, 
either as a buyer or a seller. 
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To use eBay, buyers go to the website, search for an item or browse the product 
categories and view a listing. They can choose to purchase items either at a fixed 
price or through auction-style bidding. eBay encourages buyers to first find out 
more about the product by reading the description carefully and if necessary, 
asking the seller questions about the product using the ‘Ask a question’ link in the 
item listing webpage. Buyers can also review the reputation of the seller by 
looking at comments left by previous buyers and the seller’s current feedback 
score.660 This places on buyers the responsibility of being shrewd about their 
purchases and the sellers they buy from. The buyer who has won at auction or 
bought the item immediately must send payment to the seller within three days 
using the payment method specified by the seller. A bid or purchase on eBay 
qualifies as a contract which obligates the buyer to purchase the item. 
From the perspective of the seller, a seller can set up their account in advance or 
when they are ready to list their first item.661 eBay encourages sellers to research 
similar products to get an idea of the starting price and listing format of other 
products within their category by viewing active or completed listings on eBay. 
They are also responsible for making themselves aware of eBay’s policies on 
prohibited and restricted items. E.g. prohibited item listings include raffles and 
weapons, whereas restricted items include food and healthcare products. 
To sell, a seller needs to click the ‘sell’ link at the top of most eBay pages and 
they choose whether to create an auction-style or fixed price listing. The seller 
manages their listing by setting up their preferences in terms of communication. 
They can change anything in their listing later. The seller is also responsible for 
ensuring that they have received payment before posting the item to the buyer. 
The seller can also leave feedback on the buyer.662 
Due to the high number of transactions on eBay, both parties face difficulties 
using the marketplace effectively. A significant problem faced by both parties is 
fraudulent transactions.663 For example, a seller can set up multiple buyer 
accounts to drive up the price of an auction listing that they are holding, so that 
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when an authentic purchaser bids for an item, the seller can log in with his buyer 
accounts and bid on the item as well to drive up the price.664 On the other hand, 
sellers also face the risk of exposure to fraudulent buyers.665 Anecdotal evidence 
includes buyers purchasing a product and then claiming that it was lost in the post 
or damaged. In some cases, sellers have found empty return packages or 
products with different serial numbers returned to them.666 However, eBay has a 
reputation of siding with the buyers which makes this fraudulent activity easier.667 
This reflects the preoccupation most organisations and institutions have with 
protecting the platform participant that is usually associated with the ‘consumer’ 
classification. Therefore, it is important that there is a balance of protection for 
both parties in P2P models.  
The ability for buyers and sellers to leave feedback about other users gives eBay 
users the added role of monitors of the marketplace community. When things do 
go wrong, eBay gives its members recourse to a built-in alternative dispute 
resolution scheme. Neither of these community resolution tools are found on 
P2PL platforms, so P2PLs and borrowers rely heavily on the platform to 
administer the loan and resolve problems that arise between them, e.g. non-
repayment of the loan. 
As with P2PL, there are different participants within an online auction marketplace 
like eBay. Whereas on a P2PL platform, the three participants are the lender, 
platform and borrower, on eBay, the three entities are the buyer, the seller and 
eBay the platform intermediary. However, unlike on P2PL platforms, during a 
given transaction, the relationship between the buyers and the sellers on eBay is 
more direct. eBay is not involved in either the selling or buying transaction and 
does not form part of the contractual relationship between the buyer and the 
seller. eBay’s role purely consists of providing a platform for buyers and sellers 
to meet and contract with each other. eBay does not play the role of an introducer 
because the buyers and sellers are capable of finding themselves within the 
online marketplace. For buyers, eBay provides a service which consists mainly 
of making information uploaded by the sellers accessible and giving then the 
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means to purchase items or place bids on them.668 Likewise, for sellers, eBay only 
provides them with the tools they need to upload a description of the item for sale, 
determine the sale method and the tools they need to administer the bidding 
process and close the auction or immediate sale.669 eBay and other online auction 
sites like it, therefore do not participate in the transactions that occur in their 
marketplaces. Most of the control lies with the buyers and sellers.  
The eBay participant that is closest in comparison to the P2P lender would be the 
seller, in cases where the seller is an individual and not a business. However, 
their roles are quite different. Although the eBay seller may be an individual and 
may be categorised as a prosumer or just a pure producer, they cannot be 
categorised as a transitional prosumer, because within a given transaction, their 
role and capacity stays the same, i.e. they always play the role of a seller and 
their position or capacity within a given contract of sale never depends on eBay’s 
intermediation. The seller on eBay is either a producer (if a business) or a 
prosumer (if an individual). The same goes for the buyer within the eBay 
marketplace because in each transaction, their role always remains that of a 
buyer. For both, their relationship with eBay, can be considered to be that of a 
consumer-to-business relationship, for example, this relationship exists when a 
buyer or a seller complains to eBay for help resolving a dispute using the inbuilt 
ADR scheme, or when they seek eBay’s help or services in relation to searching 
for or listing a particular product for sale. However, this aspect of their 
membership is separate from the transaction. This is not the case with online 
P2PL transactions. Consequently, like the isusu/rotary club member that has a 
direct peer-to-peer transactional relationship, eBay members cannot be 
considered as transitional prosumers. 
This section has provided an example of a type of electronic commerce which 
operates under a prosumption model and compared it with P2PL which also 
operates under a prosumption model. The comparison demonstrates that despite 
these similarities, there are differences which distinguish P2PL even from models 
that are conceptually similar. Consequently, P2PL needs to be regulated 
differently. Although the internet offers many different types of online 
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marketplaces whose users interact in similar ways, the nature of the P2PL model 
endows its users with a unique characteristic, i.e. the ability to transition from one 
classification to another within a single transaction.  
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3.10 Conclusion 
 
The aim of this chapter has been to determine the similarities and differences 
between online P2PL with similar forms of financial intermediation both on- and 
off-line. It demonstrates that despite some prima facie similarities, the underlying 
model of online P2PL is fundamentally different and suggests that regulation 
should not simply cut and paste methods used for other forms of regulation and 
apply them to P2PL. Rather, careful consideration is required to ensure that 
regulation is suitable to the prosumer-based underlying model.  
The chapter started by placing online P2PL within financial intermediation. This 
is important for an industry that has often painted platforms as mere facilitators 
of P2PL contracts between borrowers and lenders, or the industry as a new form 
of disintermediation. This sets the scene for regulation of platforms in the context 
of their intermediary capacity, such as in Chapter Five which discusses the notion 
of gatekeeper liability. It also enables P2PL to be properly categorised and ensure 
suitable comparisons with other similar methods of finance. P2PL has been 
compared with a range of financial intermediation models reflecting traditional 
and online forms of lending and commerce. These comparisons demonstrate that 
P2PL is fundamentally different although it fits within the categorisation of 
financial intermediation. For example, the comparison between traditional 
banking lending with P2PLs in section 3.4 highlights that although P2PLs face 
similar lending risks, they are ultimately different because despite the prosuming 
activity of the lenders, they still retain consumer features at different stages of the 
lending process. Significantly, the comparison highlights the transitional nature of 
the P2PLs’ role, which is also a key difference between P2PL and the prima facie 
similar business model of crowdfunding it is often been conflated with. In 
analysing the similarities and differences between P2PL, CUs and payday 
lending, it has been shown that P2PL differs from pre-existing consumptive forms 
of financial intermediation due to its prosumption model of business activity. P2PL 
platforms do not provide a direct peer-to-peer experience, because the platform’s 
intermediation is much more involved in lending transactions as Chapter Five 
discusses in more detail. 
Overall, the chapter develops further the argument in Chapter Two that P2PL 
does not fit within existing conceptions of ‘consumer’. In addition to not fitting 
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within existing definitions or notions of consumer per se, the underlying model of 
P2PL is not in either the consumption or prosumption model of financial 
interaction. 
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4. Regulation of P2PL in the UK 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter Three shows  that the P2PL model differs fundamentally from existing 
forms of financial intermediation. The significance is that regulation should reflect 
the fact that P2PL is a unique way of engaging in financial transactions and 
regulate in a way appropriate to its form and users’ -characteristics. The purpose 
of this chapter is to determine the assumptions of financial services regulation, 
particularly in relation to online P2PL, by analysing relevant UK rules and the 
extent they distinguish P2PL from other forms of financial intermediation. 
The chapter provides an overview of the literature on P2PL regulation and the  
UK government’s regulatory approach. Section 4.2 analyses the consumer 
protection measures provided by the UK P2PL regime and Government’s policy, 
highlighting the distinction between pre- and post-contractual consumer 
protection measures. Sections 4.3 and 4.4 respectively explans and critically 
analyses P2PL applicable regulation. 
Existing academic discussions of the law and regulation relating to online P2PL 
has largely been based on the American situation. Andrew Verstein argues that 
the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have mis-regulated P2PL 
platforms by applying securities law to P2PL.670 The application of securities law 
to P2PL regulation makes it less safe, costlier for borrowers and lenders and 
therefore threatens its existence. Verstein argues this point looking at key cases 
in U.S. securities case law. He accuses the SEC of suffering from agency 
insensitivity, which means it is likely the SEC intervened in the regulation of P2PL 
to prevent potential risks that P2PL might one day pose, whilst ignoring the risks 
of its regulation which was not required since, Verstein argues, P2P loans 
arguably do not constitute securities. This type of insensitivity has led to the 
problem of SEC regulation trying to “fit new pegs into old holes” as it 
misunderstands the financial innovation of P2PL to apply old regulatory 
frameworks. The SEC securities regime is based on formalistic disclosure rather 
than addressing lender needs, and it focuses on investors at the expense of 
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borrowers. It also creates what he terms a ‘cliff effect’ where some regulated 
P2PL platforms are treated similarly to traditional public company issuers of 
securities facing high compliance burdens because they are issuers, when in 
reality they bear different risks to traditional public companies and have different 
needs, whereas relatively similar P2PL platforms can avoid all SEC regulation. 
So Verstein points out, securities regulation treats unlike things alike, and like 
things differently. Rather than the SEC, Verstein argues that the new Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) would be better suited to police the P2PL 
environment, whilst allowing the industry to evolve and grow. This argument 
reflects the need for regulation to be proportionate, appropriately designed to suit 
the firm or industry it intends to regulate and does not create unnecessary barriers 
to business operation. 
Brill provides a brief overview of how modern P2PL works, summarises the 
regulatory and legislative issues in the United States, including an overview of 
the securities regulation of P2PL and the potential impact of Dodd-Frank, and 
discusses the relationship between regulation and innovation with regards to 
P2PL.671 As with most other treatments on the regulation of P2PL, Brill 
acknowledges the need for regulation but points out that the uniqueness and 
mutable nature of P2PL necessitates that regulation should not create barriers 
too high for innovators to enter the P2PL market thus stifling its development, e.g. 
the withdrawal of Zopa from the American market due to concerns of over 
stringent regulations. This suggests that traditional command-and-control 
regulation would not be an effective form of regulation of P2PL due to its 
supposed inflexibility and bureaucracy. Brill emphasises the need for regulation 
to minimise barriers imposed by the current American SEC regulation and to seek 
more efficient ways to ensure clear and adequate disclosure and transparency 
for investors. This reflects the idea that regulation should place a responsibility 
on the consumer for the protection of their own well-being. This view of regulation 
does not consider the consumer or investor protection goals of regulation. It 
places a higher priority on economic growth. 
Chaffee and Rapp analyse the regulation of online P2PL.672 Their paper provides 
a comprehensive outline of the structure of two US based online P2PL platforms 
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and the historical and contemporary context of this new form of social lending. 
They state that the only thing new about P2PL is its online nature as non-
institutional lending has long been a part of economic activity around the world.673 
Like Magee and Verstein, Chaffee and Rapp analyse the regulatory regime for 
P2PL in the USA.674 They look at both US federal and state law and undergo a 
doctrinal study of case law to determine whether P2PL fits within the definition of 
a security as defined by the law, and should therefore be regulated as a security, 
an idea they agree with.  
Unlike Verstein, Chaffee and Rapp argue that regulation of this emerging industry 
is necessary, as under-regulated financial services industries tend to grow rapidly 
until they suffer a dramatic crash. Ultimately Chaffee and Rapp argue that for 
regulation not to stifle the growth of P2PL as it continues to grow and change, 
regulation should be organic and it should make use of multiple regulators who 
will use their individual expertise from regulating traditional lending and securities 
investments, to regulate P2PL in a way that can evolve along with it.  
Chaffee and Rapp’s analysis of the regulation of P2PL is largely doctrinal in 
nature. It looks at what the law of securities is and tries to fit P2PL within its 
existing boundaries. Although they do not engage in a discussion about enforced 
self-regulation, their suggestion of an organic regulatory system, is akin to the 
one adopted by responsive regulatory theories, such as Ayres and Braithwaite’s 
enforcement pyramids. Their analysis does not deeply engage in a comparison 
between P2PL and similar institutions which existed before it and how this may 
impact the regulation of P2PL and what form the regulation of P2PL should take. 
Doing so might provide insight into the most appropriate form and content of 
P2PL regulation, based on the type of individuals using and developing the 
market itself. In their analysis, they did not consider in detail the underlying 
person-to-person model on which P2PL is based and what effect this may have 
on the operation, risks or benefits of P2PL and therefore its regulation. This is 
important to consider so that regulation fits appropriately to online P2PL lending. 
Jack Magee analyses the future of P2PL under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act. He finds similarities between P2PL and 
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microfinance.675 He states that for the new industry of P2PL lending to grow and 
survive in the US market, the existing regulatory scheme needs to be significantly 
changed, suggesting that the expensive registration requirements imposed on 
P2PLs should be reduced so that costs may be reduced to reasonable levels. He 
also argues that whilst regulation is necessary, it should be no more than is 
necessary to maintain consumer confidence in the P2PL industry. Magee’s 
examination of the P2PL environment focuses wholly on the domestic regulatory 
situation in the US. It therefore does not consider the possibility of international 
regulation of P2PL 
Therefore, this thesis has taken these matters into consideration to analyse 
whether existing regulation is adequate from the perspective of P2PL users and 
the online operation of P2PL models. 
However, the UK government has adopted a different approach. Unlike in the 
United States, the UK government has treated P2P loans as a form of consumer 
credit. Consumer credit regulation was transferred from the Office of Fair Trading 
to the Financial Conduct Authority in April 2014.676 In the design of the new 
regulatory regime, the UK government strove to strike a balance between 
providing robust consumer protection and ensuring the regulations were 
proportionate to the types of firms regulated and the risks they posed.677 These 
two goals are made clear in the joint HM Treasury and Department for Business 
Innovation and Skills consultation paper on the future of consumer credit 
regulation. In the paper, the consumer protection goal is set out in terms of the 
Government’s vision of a “well-functioning” consumer credit market which is one 
where firms meet the standards expected of them, lend responsibly and offer 
competitively designed and priced products that meet consumers’ needs.678 The 
second goal of proportionality underlies the second part of the Government’s 
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vision which is ensuring that regulation supports and does not stifle a market’s 
ability to grow and innovate.679  
The third part of the Government’s vision hints at the way it aimed to balance 
these two goals. The consultation paper states that the Government envisions 
consumers being able to “borrow sensibly, able to exercise choice and having 
confidence in the system…” By referring to the idea of sensible borrowing, the 
Government indicates that part of its policy is to make consumers more 
responsible for their own affairs and actions. This is linked to their ability to 
exercise choice, which in consumer protection regulation tends to rely on the 
provision of information to the consumer, this aspect will be discussed in more 
detail later in this chapter. The aim of having confidence in the system reflects 
the Government’s focus on prudential requirements to ensure the stability of the 
market, such as a firm’s ability to meet its liabilities as they fall due, to avoid failure 
of the firm or industry. These three aspects suggest that the Government aims to 
balance the two seemingly opposed goals of consumer protection and 
proportionality by creating a situation where the basic standard of a regulated 
industry is where the status quo is an industry which is stable and well-
functioning, and where the average consumer can act responsibly within that 
environment, therefore rendering the consumer capable of making good 
decisions for themselves. As shall be seen later in the chapter, these methods 
are seen in the P2PL regulatory environment in the Government’s focus on 
platform stability, the absence of last-resort compensation for consumers e.g. 
recourse to the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) and the 
emphasis on the provision of clear information for the consumer. 
In a different Consultation Paper, on the future regulation of P2PL, it was 
confirmed that many of the current requirements under the Consumer Credit Act 
1974 (CCA), do not apply to credit agreements made via P2P platforms if they 
are not made by the lender in the course of a business - such loans are 
considered 'non-commercial' for the purposes of the CCA.680 S.189 of the CCA 
defines a ‘non-commercial agreement’ as a consumer agreement which the 
creditor or owner does not make in the course of a business carried out by the 
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creditor.681 This applies to P2PL agreements because the lenders are individuals 
who lend for personal gain rather than on behalf of a business or trade.  
The meaning of ‘in the course of a business’ was considered in the case of 
Bassano where Popplewell J said that a transaction can be said to be carried out 
in the course of a business if it occurs with some degree of regularity such that it 
forms part of the normal practice of the business.682 Similarly, in the case of Davis, 
Lord Keith stated that in the context of an Act that is primarily concerned with 
consumer protection, the expression ‘in the course of a trade or business’ 
“conveys the concept of some degree of regularity”.683 What is meant by 
‘regularity’ was expanded on in  Hare, in which case the Court held that if the 
transaction between the parties was a “one off” or “of a type only occasionally 
entered into by the applicant in the course of…business” it is not a transaction 
made in the course of business.684 In addition, in Tamimi the Court of Appeal set 
out a list of characteristics indicative of there being a business and a list which 
was indicative that there was no business. For example, indications of a business 
are the frequency, period, size and profit involved in the loans. In most of these 
cases mentioned, ‘frequency’ was interpreted as meaning the amount of loans 
lent out (to the debtor). For example, in Re Payne, it was established that the 
claimant, a property developer, owed several loans to the debtors who he knew 
personally. On the other hand, indications that a transaction was not carried out 
in the course of a business included that (1) they were made to only one person, 
(2) they were ad hoc, (3) they were to foster goodwill, (4) they would not have 
been made to anybody with whom the creditor was acquainted, (5) they were not 
recorded in writing, (6) they had no security, and that (7) the creditor had no 
business premises.685  
The type of agreements formed between P2PLs and borrowers fits several the 
indications that a transaction was not carried out in the course of a business. 
Namely, (1), (4), (6) and (7). Although P2PLs lend to multiple borrowers because 
their funds are spread across multiple borrowers in small units, they have a single 
credit agreement with each borrower that their unit of funds was lent to. In relation 
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to (4) this indication is met by the fact that in online P2PL, loan agreements are 
made between strangers rather than friends or family. (6) and (7) are also 
indications met by P2PLs because they loans are unsecured and the fact that 
P2PL is conducted purely online, means that the lenders do not operate the 
lending transactions from a physical building used for business premises. 
Therefore, prior to the introduction of regulation specific to P2PL, the lending 
transactions would have been non-commercial loans. 
The overall effect of this is that the borrowers would not be afforded certain 
protections under the CCA when they borrow through P2PL platforms.686 E.g. part 
five of the CCA provides rights to the borrower such as the right to withdraw from 
the agreement without giving any reason and without incurring additional charges 
or being held liable to compensate the lender for the withdrawal;687 the right 
implied under s.77 which imposes a duty on the creditor to give information to the 
debtor under a fixed-sum agreement, i.e. a copy of the executed agreement and 
a statement showing how much has been paid and how much remains to be 
paid;688 and, the requirement of the creditor to give notice to the debtor before 
varying the terms of the agreement.689 However under s.74(1)(a), the provisions 
in Part Five do not apply to non-commercial agreements, and under s.82(7) the 
provisions in s.82 which include the requirement for notice before varying the 
terms is also excluded for non-commercial agreements. This means that prior to 
the introduction of the new regulation of P2PL in April 2014, P2PBs did not benefit 
from these rights. 
Additionally, if the credit is provided to a business borrower which is a company, 
it also falls outside the scope of the CCA.690 The Consultation Paper stated that a 
new regulated activity would be created which covers what P2PL platforms do 
when they arrange credit agreements between borrowers and lenders and which 
aims to provide protection for both lenders and borrowers taking into 
consideration the actual benefit to consumers of such protections.691 
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Benston reviews regulations imposed to protect consumers of banking, securities 
and insurance considering the UK Financial Services Authority regulatory goals. 
He identifies six regulatory goals within these markets: the maintenance of 
consumer confidence in the financial system; to ensure that a supplier that 
consumers rely on does not fail; to assure consumers receive sufficient 
information to make good decisions and are dealt with fairly; to assure fair pricing; 
protect consumers from fraud and misrepresentation and to prevent undesirable 
discrimination against individuals.692  
He finds that capital regulation is a useful regulatory technique to achieve the 
second goal of preventing the failure of a supplier, but with regards to the other 
goals, regulations specific to financial services are not necessary or desirable.693 
For example, he argues that financial services providers have strong incentives 
to provide their customers with useful information, and there is no reason to think 
that government agencies can provide better information than they can.694 
Similarly, he argues that protecting consumers from fraud and misrepresentation 
is a valid regulatory goal, but because financial institutions and instruments are 
less subject to these concerns than other types of firms and products, there is no 
justification for specifically regulating financial services providers.695 
Micklitz documents the change caused by EU law in Germany, from the 
consumer protection law paradigm to the consumer law paradigm. He argues that 
when the European Union took over consumer legislation it gradually changed 
the approach from consumer protection law to consumer law. So the emphasis 
is no longer on protection of the weakest consumer, but the average consumer, 
which increasingly resembles a private small business rather than “the small 
man” on the street’.696 However, he points out that the shift in paradigm does not 
negate the need for legal rules which protect the weakest in society.697 
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Enchelmaier considers consumer protection from the perspective of article 59 of 
the EC Treaty, freedom to provide services.698 Article 59 precludes the application 
of any national legislation which without objective justification impedes a provider 
of services from exercising that freedom. Enchelmaier notes that this broad 
meaning does not affect the question of the relationship between freedom to 
provide services and restrictions imposed on this freedom in the name of 
consumer protection.699  
Roman Inderst focuses on the disclosure of conflicts of interest, particularly of 
commissions and ‘kickbacks’ that financial intermediaries or advisers receive 
which is a requirement of MiFID.700 MiFID is The Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive 2004 which provides harmonised regulation for investment services 
amongst EU member states and provided various investor protection 
measures.701 Inderst argues that competition is the best way to protect 
consumers, calling it an “ally” of consumers.702 In answer to the theory of banking 
which argues that more competition leads to increased risk-taking and higher 
default risk ultimately leading to situations like the 2008 financial crisis, Inderst 
argues that recent research demonstrates that this is not always the case either 
theoretically or empirically.703 Inderst also lays the blame on policy and 
supervision stating that regulation and government intervention either created 
situations which could be exploited or supervision did not react flexibly.704 Inderst 
also argues that competition is a key to generating innovations and financial 
innovation will arguably address agency concerns, information asymmetries, 
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reduce transaction costs, respond to new risk factors or technological 
developments and complete the market.705 Inderst concludes that consumer 
protection policy must be based on sound economic policy with competition seen 
as a key feature of consumer protection and this would entail rules limiting the 
opportunistic behaviour of firms whether through policy intervention or industry 
self-regulation.706 
 
4.2 Consumer Protection Regulation 
 
Quite commendably the FCA’s regulatory approach to the regulation of P2PL 
does incorporate a number of consumer protections. This demonstrates the 
FCA’s recognition of the fact that P2PL users are individuals transacting outside 
the course of business and who are in need of protection. On the pre-contractual 
side of the transactions, the protections are largely disclosure-based, whilst post-
contractual protections include prudential requirements, client money rules and 
recourse to the Financial Ombudsman Service. Respectively, these protections 
involve provisions that are designed to ensure the stability of the P2PL platform 
e.g. by ensuring that the platform sets aside sufficient funds to run efficiently; to 
protect the lenders’ money in cases of platform failure and prevent fraudulent 
activity by ensuring that the platform keeps its own funds separate from the funds 
provided by the lenders. In addition, recourse to the Financial Ombudsman 
Service reflects the desire to hold give the borrowers and lenders the ability to 
hold platforms accountable for their actions towards them. 
 
The consumer protection elements of the regulatory regime adopted by the FCA 
is chiefly based on disclosure as a means of ensuring that the lenders have the 
information they need to make informed investment decisions and that this 
information is fair, clear and not misleading.707 However, the use of disclosure as 
a regulatory tool has been the subject of much debate. On one hand, if lenders 
cannot be sure that the information regarding their investments are true, they will 
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not have faith in the market, and if that is the case, they may decide that lending 
on P2PL platforms is not worth the risk. This may be bad for the economy 
because the P2PL industry is contributes to its growth and efficiency since it 
enables the transfer of resources from those with excess resources, the lenders-
savers, to those who have less resources yet are better able to put those 
resources to good use. The underlying rationale of disclosure-based rules is that 
investors can be considered to be fully protected so long as all the relevant 
aspects of the market they operate in are fully and fairly disclosed to them.708 This 
is because they would then be able to evaluate the merits of the investment and 
protect themselves against poor ones.709 
 
Proponents of mandatory disclosure point to its many benefits. A few examples 
consist of the ability of disclosure to prevent information underproduction by the 
market which would exacerbate information asymmetries because information 
would not be optimally verified and not enough effort would be made to search 
for material information by the investor.710 In addition, wide availability of 
information is thought to result in more efficient pricing of investments because 
with information, investors can judge the value of the investment more accurately. 
As such, the underproduction of information leads to a less efficient market and 
mispricing of financial assets, and a corresponding misallocation of resources. 
Thirdly, mandatory disclosure will standardise the information disclosed in the 
financial market, which would aid comparability of the information that investors 
need to read to make their investment decisions. This relates to its function as a 
method of balancing information asymmetries between the borrower/platform and 
the lender. However, although these arguments point to the worth of information 
disclosure, they do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that information 
disclosure is sufficient regulation by itself. This point has been supported 
academics like Schwarcz who has argued that in a world of complexity, disclosure 
alone is insufficient to tackle the information asymmetries that they are designed 
to mitigate.711 
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In addition to the regulatory regime being largely based on disclosure, the FCA 
adopts a principles-based approach to regulation which has meant that it does 
not prescribe specific disclosures nor their form and content. Rather it is left to 
the platforms themselves to identify any investment risks which arise as a result 
of their own business models.712 For example, the credit risks faced by lenders 
using Zopa and Bondora by iseParkur, P2PL platforms which offer lenders the 
opportunity to fund borrowers on an unsecured basis, are slightly different from 
the risks faced by lenders who use the P2PL platform Unbolted where the 
borrowers borrow against collateral because collateral provides the latter with 
extra security and protection against loss.  
 
The regulation also leaves it to the platforms to figure out what information is 
needed by their customers to make informed decisions713 about their lending or 
borrowing choices, for example which lending or borrowing options they are going 
to choose, how much to lend and borrow based on the information provided and 
from the perspective of the lenders what class of borrower to lend to, based on 
the credit valuation provided by the platform. This approach is self-regulatory 
because it allows the platforms to determine what amounts to a risk and to take 
steps to mitigate the risk through their own efforts. It is indicative of the idea that 
the regulated party is better aware or has more knowledge about its business 
operations than a regulator does.  
 
On one hand, it is good that platforms are made responsible for identifying the 
risks inherent in their business model as it reduces regulatory costs, ensures that 
the platforms are engaged in the regulatory process and if done correctly, may 
ensure that protections are tailored to the operations of a particular platform. 
However, there is a risk that this method of enforced self-regulation, i.e. regulation 
which gives corporate officials partial responsibility for setting their own standards 
and establishing internal units to monitor compliance with those standards and 
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holding the monitors of these standards liable for their failure,714 can lead to a lack 
of uniform information amongst platforms, which can affect lenders’ ability to 
compare the risks of various platforms when choosing which platform to invest 
on. This in turn would compound the problems faced by lenders in terms of 
information asymmetries and may lead to confusion. In addition, although it is a 
flexible approach that takes into consideration the fact that different platforms 
might vary in the risks that they pose to lenders and borrowers, it leaves open the 
possibility that a platform might not take into account all the risks faced by the 
lenders and borrowers either intentionally or not.  
 
The FCA stated that this approach is meant to reflect the fact that mandatory 
specific disclosures are not appropriate in situations where business models 
within an industry vary.715 This approach is logical because it reflects the need for 
regulation to suit the firm or industry it intends to regulate. Where firms within an 
industry vary, a one-size-fits-all approach may cause firms confusion about how 
they should it. It might also raise unnecessary barriers to business operations for 
some firms within an industry because the regulatory requirements might be too 
restrictive or unsuited to how their business works, whilst at the same time it might 
be suitable for other firms within the same industry, therefore creating an unfair 
business advantage. Verstein made a similar point in his argument that the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had mis-regulated P2PL platforms 
by applying securities law to P2PL. He argued that P2P loans could not be 
classified as securities, so by regulating them as such, the SEC was trying to “fit 
new pegs into old holes” as it misunderstood the financial innovation of P2PL in 
order to apply old regulatory frameworks to new phenomenon. The effect of which 
is to make P2PL costlier for borrowers and lenders and threaten the viability of 
the industry because of the unnecessary barriers to operation created.716 The 
same can be said in terms of regulation which suits some firms within an industry 
but not others because it forces the unsuited firms into a wrongly shaped box.  
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Having identified the risks found within their platform and the information the 
platform organisers consider to be relevant to their users, the platforms must then 
disclose appropriate and accurate information to them.717 The rationale behind 
this is that in the P2PL industry business models vary718 and the underlying 
assumption is that each platform will be in a better position than the regulator to 
know the risks involved in their operations and the needs of their customers. So 
in the interest of balancing regulatory costs and benefits the FCA has essentially 
left the platforms to self-regulate their disclosures.719 
 
The approach exhibited here and in the P2PL regulatory regime in general is 
based on the ‘Better Regulation’ policy of the UK government. This is an initiative 
of the government to ensure the improvement of regulation through the reduction 
of the regulatory burden on businesses. The way this is being done is by ensuring 
that regulation is simplified, effective, and absolutely necessary through a number 
of principles which aim to guide regulators in the design of law and regulation by 
telling them ‘how’ the regulation should regulate.720 The five principles of good 
regulation are ‘proportionality’, which is the idea that regulators should only 
intervene when necessary and remedies should be appropriate to the risk posed; 
‘accountability’, which is that regulators should be able to justify their decisions 
and be made subject to public inquiry; ‘consistency’ which is the idea that rules 
and standards must be connected, taking into account existing or proposed 
regulation and also be implemented fairly. The fourth principle is ‘transparency’ 
which requires regulators to be open and simply regulations for ease of use. The 
final principle is ‘targeting’ which is that regulation should be focused on the 
problem and minimise side effects through the adoption of a goals-based 
approach where possible.721  
 
The overall aim of the policy approach is to ensure the existence of a regulatory 
framework that is conducive to the success of businesses. The better regulation 
agenda concerns balancing the need to regulate businesses with the need to 
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reduce the costs of legislation. Underscoring the policy is the idea that it is 
essential that there is regulation which protects consumers, but it needs to be 
balanced with the desire or need to avoid hindering business growth or economic 
prosperity. This is because regulation creates costs for businesses, particularly 
small businesses. One implication of this policy is the need for regulation to strike 
a balance between the right conditions for businesses to start up, invest and grow 
and the rights of consumers. A second implication is that the better regulation 
agenda attempts to understand and take account of the impact of businesses in 
order to create an improved business environment. However, this might mean 
that a greater focus is placed in favour of businesses. A lot of consideration is 
placed on the opinions of businesses e.g. what they feel would improve 
regulation. This might dampen the effect of regulation if it is intended to protect 
consumers. An example of this is the already mentioned FCA’s self-regulatory 
approach to allowing P2PL platforms to determine what counts as a risk for the 
individuals using their platforms and choosing what information is required to 
counteract any negative effects of the risk. 
 
It is possible that the reason why the FCA considers the variations between firms 
to be significant enough to justify excluding the possibility of specific disclosure 
rules, is because it has conflated P2PL with crowdfunding. Therefore, creating 
the perception that P2PL firms are more varied than they really are. As the earlier 
case studies on P2PL firms in the UK demonstrates, most platforms work in the 
same way with a few different qualities designed to increase their 
competitiveness. To take from the earlier example, lenders and borrowers on 
Zopa, Bondora by iseParkur and Unbolted, carry out the same functions, 
behaviours and exhibit similar levels of reliance on the platforms for the 
administration of their loans. However, Unbolted has provided the added 
advantage of collateral-backed loans. This advantage is provided to distinguish 
itself from other platforms and attract lenders to its services. Although it provides 
its lenders with increased protection in the case of borrower default, the lenders 
still face the risk that the platform has control over the valuation of the collateral 
and may either not value the collateral correctly or may not select an appropriate 
valuation agency. 
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However, the competitive differences promoted by different platforms do not 
change the fact that P2PL platforms are conceptually the same, i.e. they operate 
on a prosumption model of lendsumer-to-consumer transactions. Therefore, 
focusing on face-value differences results in an inaccurate conceptualisation of 
P2PL which is broader than necessary due to its inclusion of crowdfunding 
platforms. This in turn leads to regulatory choices which might not benefit P2P 
users in the long-run such as the FCA’s decision to let platform’s self-regulate 
their information disclosure. In doing so, the FCA has affected little change from 
the pre-regulation period of P2PL where platforms already provided their users 
with information.  
 
Regulators in general seem to select disclosure as their default method for 
tackling consumer protection concerns.722 The basis for this centres on the idea 
that one of the main causes of market failure is when significant differences in 
information endowments exist between market participants and accurate 
disclosures can resolve this market inefficiency by restoring the information 
balance, thus enabling consumers make better informed choices.723 However, in 
practice disclosure alone cannot provide adequate consumer protections 
because whilst it might lead to an improvement in the quality and extent of 
information consumers can rely on, it has little bearing on the ability of consumers 
to comprehend the information provided.724 It would not be fair to consumers to 
impose the responsibility of making sound choices based on the information 
provided without incorporating an element of financial education to improve their 
comprehension of the information provided. To do otherwise might limit access 
to the P2PL market to members who already have a high degree of financial 
acumen as is currently the case in the peer-to-business (P2B) lending market in 
Funding Circle. Therefore, disclosure regulation may need to be coupled with 
financial education by ensuring that platforms play a part in the education of their 
customers about financial risks and what this means for them and their 
investments and not just disclosing information to them. 
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However, disclosure and financial education alone is not sufficient to protect the 
P2P lender from the potential problems that can occur during the lifespan of a 
P2P loan. No matter how much information is provided to a lender there will 
always be elements that cannot be foretold at the time the loan contract is entered 
into, such as the risk of a borrower’s default, inflation risk and the possibility of 
the platform itself failing.725 One could argue that as the amounts lent by one P2P 
lender to one P2P borrower only constitutes a small fraction of the principal loan 
borrowed as it is made up of funds sourced from numerous lenders, the risk and 
loss borne by that lender in the event that the borrower defaults or fails to pay is 
not significant enough to warrant more interventionist post-contractual 
protections.  
 
However, this does not preclude the fact that P2PLs and borrowers are part of a 
wider society and can be affected by what happens in the external financial 
economy. For example, the subprime mortgage crisis of 2007-10 was caused by 
the expansion of mortgage credit to include borrowers with average credit 
histories who would normally have found it difficult to obtain a mortgage. 
However, in the mid-2000s mortgage lenders started to make such high-risk 
mortgages available by repackaging high-risk mortgages into pools which were 
sold to investors to fund the mortgages. This led to an increase in demand for 
housing and an increase in property prices. For a while, these increases were 
sufficient buffer to cover the costs of loan defaults by the high-risk borrowers, 
because if a borrower was not able to make their loan repayments, they were 
able to either refinance the mortgage or sell the property at a gain and use the 
proceeds to repay their mortgages. However, when house prices peaked and 
started to fall, these options were no longer available to them and it led to rising 
mortgage loss rates for the mortgage lenders and the investors who bought their 
risky, repackaged mortgage loans (private label mortgage-backed securities 
(PMBS). Several PMBS were downgraded to low credit ratings and many 
mortgage lenders closed leading to the collapse of the sub-prime mortgage 
market.726 This in turn led to loss of investor confidence in the subprime mortgage 
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sector and caused a liquidity crisis. By September 2008, the crisis had impacted 
stock markets around the world which crashed.     
 
The financial crisis of 2007/8 demonstrates that the financial problems of 
individuals are interlinked with crisis in the entire financial sector and financial 
stability. The crisis impacted ordinary people which permeated their lives; some 
people lost their jobs, businesses and homes and found it difficult to pay 
household bills and existing debts. It is therefore not hard to conclude that should 
the P2PL market continue to grow into a major source of finance for individuals 
and businesses, it too can become exposed to such crises through its connection 
with individuals living and experiencing real world issues within the wider financial 
sector and which can affect the ability of large amounts of borrowers to be able 
to repay their P2P loans.  
 
The FCA regulations do go some way to protecting lenders from adverse 
situations following the formation of the P2P loan contract. For example, loan-
based P2PL platforms will be expected to take reasonable steps to have 
arrangements in place to ensure the continued management and administration 
of P2P loan agreements in the event that the platform fails or ceases to carry on 
the regulated activity.727 This rule removes uncertainty on the part of lenders and 
removes the cost burden on them of having to recuperate loan payments from 
unidentifiable borrowers. However, the FCA will not prescribe what form of 
arrangements platforms must introduce, instead it is left up to the different 
platforms to design processes which are suitable to their business model.728 The 
lack of uniform standards is done in the interests of balancing regulatory costs 
and benefits.729 However, it leaves it open to debate what is meant by an 
appropriate arrangement and gives rise to questions concerning how regulators 
will decide whether an arrangement was appropriate. Whilst it does allow for a 
more tailored procedure by leaving it to the subjective decisions of each platform 
according to their business models, it could lead to more work for regulators in 
the long term, because should the third party loan administrator also fail the issue 
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of whether the procedure was appropriate would arise and it would have to be 
dealt with by regulators on a firm-by-firm basis. However, by this time, it might be 
too late for the P2PLs because they would have already lost their capital, unless 
platform is bailed out to prevent its failure. This happened to Funding Knight who 
went into administration amidst fears that about 900 lenders using its platform 
would not be able to get back their invested funds. But the platform was rescued 
by an investment firm called GLI Finance.730 
 
Additionally, the FCA has not specified what should happen if the arrangements 
fail to work, culpability for the failure of the arrangements and more importantly 
what recourse lenders can rely on if it does not. Rather, platforms are to rely on 
disclosure methods to clearly warn lenders of the risks involved and that even 
these safeguarding measures may not work as expected,731 because P2PL 
increasingly attracts more retail investors who are less knowledgeable and less 
experienced than sophisticated investors732 and therefore may not be able to use 
the information effectively. So potential lenders are expected to take these factors 
into consideration or at least be aware of them when deciding to lend on a 
particular platform. The implication is that the lenders themselves will bear the 
ultimate risk of failure. 
 
This situation is compounded by the fact that under the new rules, lenders in loan-
based P2PL will still have no recourse to the FSCS for the monies already lent to 
borrowers should the platform fail733 or borrowers default on their payments. This 
will not include un-lent funds which the platforms hold in a bank account as these 
would be within the remit of the FSCS due to the use of a bank account. As of 1 
January 2016, the FSCS guarantees savings of up to a total of £75,000 and 
consumers who deposit their savings with a bank would usually qualify for FSCS 
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protection against default734. In coming to this decision, the FCA has stated that it 
took into account the amount of loss lenders might suffer if a platform fails and 
the amount that would be covered by the FSCS should they be brought into FSCS 
remit.735  In doing so, the FCA has applied the principle of proportionality by 
weighing up the benefits of cover against the regulatory costs that would be 
imposed on platforms should they be brought within the FSCS’ remit. However, 
this again reflects the FCA’s preference of focusing on encouraging the growth 
and innovation of an industry above interventionist approaches to consumer 
protection such as regulation that foresees potential problems rather than just on 
the basis of current risks levels. 
 
Some platforms may choose to provide a similar safety net. For example, Zopa 
introduced a ‘safeguard fund’ in April 2013 which is held in trust by P2PS Limited 
and would intervene to repay a loan plus interest in the event that a borrower 
misses four loan payments and defaults. However, not all platforms have this type 
of fund and even if they did, there is no guarantee that such funds would not run 
out. Therefore, to ensure a consistent approach and to encourage lender 
investment within the market, the FSCS may need to be applied to P2PL. 
 
 
4.2.1 Government policy  
 
Government policy towards both the earlier discussed CUs and P2PL has 
focused on the benefits or contributions each industry may make to the reduction 
of social and financial exclusion. However, the extent of this focus is not as strong 
with regards to P2PL in light of the fact that it is a fledgling industry.  
A review of government reports relating to CUs over the last twenty years shows 
that successive governments have focused on the social potential of CUs.  
Government policy thus far has been to view CUs as the answer to financial and 
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social exclusion on a local level,736 community regeneration, small firm and self-
employment support and as a way to undo the high cost of the credit sector.737 
This can be seen from reports by the HM Treasury Credit Union Task Force in 
1999 and coalition government initiatives such as the credit union expansion 
project. 
HM Treasury Credit Union Taskforce 
 
Although the Credit Union Taskforce was set up to look at ways of developing the 
credit union movement, the report explicitly tied the development of CUs with its 
potential use to reduce or eliminate financial exclusion. The aims laid out in the 
report were “to explore ways in which banks and building societies can work more 
closely with credit unions (CUs) to increase their effectiveness; look at ways to 
widen the range of services that are provided to CU customers; and encourage 
the continued expansion of the movement.”738  
On the face of it, these aims were not overtly connected with the theme of 
financial exclusion and by themselves could engender the government’s desire 
to simply support the growth of a financial industry. However, the first aim begs 
the question: effectiveness in or doing what? Whereas the latter two aims beg 
the question of why? Why should the range of services provided to credit union 
customers be increased and why should the government take a positive interest 
in developing the industry? Highlighting these underlying questions result in little 
surprise that the report ties these aims with the end of reducing financial 
exclusion, a key concern for the government even now. For example, after 
considering the development of CUs in the UK and the objects of these 
institutions as set out in the Credit Union Act 1979, the report goes on to highlight 
three reasons why CUs help fight financial exclusion: 
 They are open to people who fall into low income brackets; 
 They encourage their members to be self-reliant and inculcate an 
understanding of the virtues of thrift; 
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 They provide low cost credit.739 
At the time the report was published in November 1999, about 2.5 to 3.5 million 
adults, or 10 percent of households, did not have a bank account.740 These 
included young people yet to obtain a job, adult unemployment, the elderly, sick 
and disabled and unemployed or part-time working single parent women, whose 
reasons for not having a bank account varied from preferring to use cash to not 
applying for an account for fear of being turned down.741 The report also identified 
that two key aspects of financial exclusion were access to a bank account and 
access to credit. It recognised that banks could help alleviate the problem of 
access to bank accounts by providing basic accounts. However, they would not 
be able to resolve the issue of access to credit because they would not be able 
to help those who would not be deemed credit-worthy by any financial institution 
or those who were able to repay loans but for whom banks would find it difficult 
to confirm their credit-worthiness.742   
The report suggested that CUs could help the latter group because since the 
individuals are members of a common bond, a credit union would be able to lend 
to them with greater confidence – CUs would therefore be able to make a 
difference because they could give access to affordable credit to people who did 
not want bank accounts and those who could not access credit from mainstream 
financial institutions because of their low income or poor credit history.743  
Consequently, the suggested improvements to CUs and credit union regulation 
made throughout the report all align with the policy of reducing financial exclusion. 
The overarching suggested improvement was to ensure a significant growth of 
membership744 so that CUs could reach a larger proportion of the people within 
its common bond and thus the target group, i.e. those who could not access credit 
from mainstream financial institutions. The underlying reasoning behind the focus 
of credit union expansion was to ensure a greater balance between people who 
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work and who can therefore contribute to the pool of funding used by CUs to 
provide affordable loans, and the less well-off who find it hard to access finance.745  
The other suggestions made in the report support this overall goal of enabling the 
growth of CUs. E.g. the purpose of the credit union movement taking a new 
direction according to the report was to make a significant impact in the provision 
of affordable services for those who lack access to them, as opposed to the public 
at large.  
Similarly, the key elements in the report’s growth strategy were to encourage 
larger individual CU; professional management; the capacity to offer a wider 
range of services; enhanced regulation; a viable share protection scheme; 
customer/member care and a better matching of CUs to areas of need.746  The 
rationale of the first strategy was that being too small affects credit unions’ ability 
to grow and their ability to afford paid staff which leaves them dependent on 
volunteers, which in turn limits growth. In addition, if these small CUs have a large 
common bond, their existence restricts other CUs operating within that common 
bond and prevents otherwise eligible people from access to a credit union.747  
The report also highlighted that a larger sized credit union would have a more 
attractive and professional appearance because of its ability to afford better office 
facilities and paid staff748 and the provision of a wider range of services through 
partnerships with other financial service providers like banks and insurance 
companies.749 The key concern with these strategies was therefore providing CUs 
with a broader reach to members of society – the reasoning being that if CUs 
were larger and more professionally managed would attract the better off who 
would deposit their savings with CUs, which would be less likely if CUs remained 
small and therefore continued to be perceived as the poor man’s bank. 
Another similar example of the close links between the report’s suggestions and 
the policy of the reduction of financial exclusion is its suggestion that there should 
be greater regulation so as to provide a formally constituted share protection 
scheme because depositor confidence in CUs is necessary to the success of the 
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movement.750 This again recognises that without a sufficient base of depositors, 
CUss will not have sufficient funds to recycle into the loans and other services 
used to lend to less well-off member-borrowers.  
To counteract any negative effects of greater regulation on smaller CUs, the 
report emphasises the need to abide by the principle of proportionality. This is so 
that regulation accommodates weaker CUs and gives them space to grow rather 
than regulating them out of existence.751 To this end, the report also suggests a 
two-tier system based on s.11C of the Credit Unions Act 1979 which stipulates 
that CUs that the Registrar considers to be adequately managed can lend greater 
amounts for longer periods. So, those CUs which are unable to achieve the higher 
standards of regulation may be able to continue as a form of local savings club, 
with possible migratory provisions which enable them to become CUs once they 
meet the standard requirements.752 
However, it is clear from the suggestions made in the report that the aim of the 
government policy and suggested changes was the reduction of financial 
exclusion.753 
 
Labour and Coalition Government initiatives 
 
The initiatives of successive governments have also sought to use CUs as a 
vehicle for combatting financial exclusion. Labour Government initiatives included 
the Financial Inclusion Fund, which was administered by the Department of Work 
and Pensions. Under the umbrella of this fund, grants were made to third sector 
lenders such as CUs so that they could lend to people who were financially 
excluded.754  Mitton explains that the main concern of policy was to improve 
access to not-for-profit or third sector lenders like CUs and to improve responsible 
lending by mainstream services by meeting the needs of people on low 
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incomes.755 These needs included access to small loans for short periods; swift 
access to credit without long or intrusive application procedures; affordable 
weekly payments; access to mainstream credit despite past poor credit history 
and denial of credit due to age.756  
In the report, Mitton identified that the advantage of expanding third sector 
lenders was that they could lend at lower interest rates than other non-
mainstream lenders and in light of the needs of those on lower incomes, 
affordable credit could be provided by expanding not-for-profit CUs.757 However, 
the report does express an understanding that CUs are not a cure-all solution 
because they require members to save with them before taking out loans, thus 
inhibiting their ability to provide widespread access to credit and they are also not 
available or accessible everywhere.758 Consequently, rather than being the 
resolution to the problem of financial exclusion, CUs are simply a part of it.  
The coalition’s Credit Union Expansion Project (CUEP) was based on similar 
goals. This is demonstrated in the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) 
Credit Union Expansion Project Feasibility Report, which identifies that the 
problem they were responding to, is the “poverty premium.”759 This problem is 
created because lending to consumers on lower incomes is expensive and risky 
due to the higher rate of default and debt write-off within this social grouping.760 
To serve them would require high interest rates to ensure adequate returns on 
capital, but this could risk the lending institutions’ reputation.761 Consequently 
banks tend not to serve this sector, leaving a gap in the credit market for people 
with low incomes, which had previously been filled by organisations which would 
charge these people high interest rates or premium prices such as mail order 
catalogues and rent to buy companies.762  The report stated that CUs already 
played a part in dealing with the main gap in the credit market – lack of access to 
affordable credit; however, because of their high operating costs and dependency 
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on grant income from the DWP, they were not financially stable enough to serve 
more lower-income consumers.763 
The CUEP was rolled out over a period of three years by the Department of Work 
and Pensions to enable CUs to expand and modernise through £38 million of 
funding over a period of three years.764  
 
4.2.2. Government policy towards P2PL 
 
Similar to the credit union experience, P2PL forms part of the government’s policy 
of increasing access to finance. For example, in October 2014, the Chancellor 
announced plans to allow P2P loans to be eligible to be held in investment ISAs. 
This was to further the government’s aim to “diversify the different sources of 
finance that are available to borrowers by encouraging the growth of the P2PL 
sector.”765 This is seen as necessary due to the loss of consumers’ trust and 
confidence in the financial services in recent years because of the banking sector, 
causing the government to see it as necessary to create a financial system which 
enables people to “access and manage” their finances confidently and easily.766  
This indicates that as with the credit union industry, the government’s method of 
using P2PL as a means to reduce financial exclusion is to encourage the 
expansion and growth of the industry. However, the difference is that whereas 
CUs are viewed as a viable method because of their nature and the ideology 
behind them, the P2PL industry is seen as such because they are an alternative 
finance option for borrowers and savers/investors. This idea is supported the 
government’s wider goal of creating a competitive market which enables people 
to take responsibility for their own finances.767 For example, in the Public Accounts 
Committee thirty-eight report, “Improving access to finance for small and medium-
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sized enterprises,” P2PL and crowdfunding are referred to as “challenger forms 
of finance” and John Kingman makes it clear that the interest of the government 
in this sector is quite simply the need for more competition in the financial sector, 
rather than because of any altruistic motives.768 
As highlighted above, the government’s policy objective towards P2PL is seen 
clearly in its move to include P2PL within the eligibility criteria of ISA investments. 
An ISA is a tax-advantaged savings account where any interest, dividends or 
capital gains that arise in it are tax-free.769 There are two policies behind this 
move. Firstly, the government’s aim is to improve competition within the banking 
sector by increasing the available sources of finance and secondly, to increase 
the choice of investments available to ISA investors.770 By making P2P loans ISA 
qualifying investments, P2P loans can be made by investors using ISA 
subscriptions and the interest payable on the loans to the investor will be free of 
income tax.771  
By enabling P2PL loans to qualify as ISA investments, the government will be 
creating greater incentives for consumers to invest their savings on P2PL 
platforms because it will be cheaper and easier to do so. In so doing, the P2PL 
sector, and to some extent the financial sector in general, will be easier to access 
from the investors’ perspective making it more likely for the industry to continue 
to grow. Not only will this increase the choices available to consumers of financial 
products, but it will further create a more substantial competitor for the banking 
industry and therefore a more competitive financial market. Consequently, P2PL 
enables the government to achieve its policy on both angles. 
Another difference between the policy focus on CUs and P2PL are the subjects 
which are considered ‘financially excluded’. Whereas, with CUs these were 
people on the lower income bracket, with P2PL the financially excluded which the 
industry is seen to potentially help are small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs). For example, on 18 July 2012, when debating whether the P2PL industry 
should be regulated, Lord Sharkey highlighted that the reason it would be 
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undesirable for the industry to fail due to rogue players entering the, at the time 
unregulated market, was because there was a “desperate need for new and 
innovative financial services to provide real competition for existing banks and to 
fund those areas of commercial life, particularly SMEs and start-ups, that the 
banks are so obviously failing to fund”.772 Again this is tied to the ability of P2PL 
to provide competition to the banking sector. 
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4.3 FCA Crowdfunding Regulation 
 
4.3.1. The Crowdfunding and Promotion of Non-readily Realisable 
Securities Instrument 2014 regime  
 
The Crowdfunding and Promotion of Non-readily Realisable Securities 
Instrument 2014 (CPNRS 2014) introduced regulation for crowdfunding in the UK 
by amending existing financial regulations within the FCA’s Handbook of rules 
and guidance (the Handbook). It regulates P2P platforms which facilitate lending 
to consumers, sole traders, and small partnerships in relation to capital 
requirements, safeguarding client money, disclosure and promotions and the 
loan administration in the event of a platform’s failure. 
 
4.3.2. Annexe A: amendment to the Glossary of definitions 
 
A key aspect of the regulation is the amendment of the glossary module of the 
Handbook so that it accommodates the P2PL industry. It does this by introducing 
three new terms, ‘loaned funds’, ‘operating an electronic system in relation to 
lending” and ‘P2P agreement’. It defines a P2P agreement in accordance with 
article 36H of the Regulated Activities Order as:  
“an agreement between one person (‘the lender’) by which the lender provides 
the borrower with credit…and in relation to which either the lender is an individual, 
or if the lender is not an individual, the borrower is an individual and either: 
 The lender provides credit…of less than or equal to £25,000; or  
 The agreement is not entered into by the borrower wholly or predominantly 
for the purposes of a business carried on, or intended to be carried on, by 
the borrower.” 
The effect of this definition is that for an agreement to be classified as a P2P 
agreement, it does not need to be undertaken by two individuals. Rather, so long 
as one of the parties to the agreement is an individual, the agreement can still be 
treated as P2P. This is emphasised by the use of the word ‘person’ rather than 
‘individual’ because ‘person’ is legally usually interpreted as including 
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corporations as well as individuals. This route is also taken within this regulation 
because within the Handbook, a person includes a body of persons corporate or 
incorporate, so that it does not have to be a natural person. 
As a result of this definition, the potential participants of P2PL is broad and it is 
possible for a traditional business-to-consumer lending agreement to occur under 
the guise of P2PL. Where the lender is not an individual but the borrower is, the 
lender is required to provide credit of no more than £25,000. It is possible that 
this restriction is designed to ensure that if a business does lend within a P2P 
platform, it does not disadvantage the individual lenders using the platform 
because of its large financial resources.  
However, it could be argued that the definition is an attempt to both accommodate 
a broad variety of crowdfunding activity and the potential for change within the 
industry and how it works, and the desire to reflect the fact that P2PL in its 
traditional sense at least, should involve an agreement between two peers. 
Consequently, this definition attempts to retain the air of P2P activity by levelling 
the playing field between a business lender and an individual lender through 
restrictions that try to ensure that whatever the case may be, the participants are 
acting like consumers. For example, the restriction on the amount lent by a 
corporate lender seems to aim to make the business lender as similar to an 
ordinary consumer as possible through the assumption that an ordinary 
consumer will not have the resources to lend more than £25,000 on a platform.  
However, where the institutional lender does lend more than £25,000, the 
definition ensures that at least one party remains a consumer, by requiring that 
the borrower’s purpose is not wholly or largely for business purposes. Because if 
the latter were the case, the lending agreement would be a business-to-business 
transaction and it would be difficult to classify the agreement as P2P. 
On the one hand, the FCA can be commended for trying to ensure that by using 
a broad definition of P2P agreement they do not restrain the growth or 
development of the P2PL industry in the UK. After all, the US industry has 
developed differently from the UK such that the vast majority of platform lending 
involves institutional lenders and some P2B platforms already allow for 
institutional lenders. It is therefore possible to envision this type of lending 
becoming more commonplace in the future of the UK industry as well. 
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Consequently, by providing for this phenomenon now, the regulators would not 
need to keep reviewing the regulation each time the industry’s user base evolves. 
On the other hand, it is much more likely that the broad definition is designed to 
accommodate two different types of lending. By including the possibility of 
institutional lenders within the definition of P2P agreement, the FCA conflates 
pure person-to-person lending agreements with other forms of crowdfunding. 
This is potentially limiting because it means that not only does the regulation treat 
both P2P and P2B lending as exactly the same, it also means that it does not 
focus specifically on the nature and requirements of each type, thereby reducing 
its ability to create certainty.   
Another key aspect of the amended glossary is the addition of the regulatory 
activity of ‘operating an electronic system in relation to lending” in accordance 
with art. 36(H) of the Regulated Activities Order (Specified Activities). Including 
this as a regulated activity provides recognition of the P2PL industry in a way that 
was not, prior to the introduction of the regulation. By creating a new regulated 
activity tailored towards P2PL the regime avoids trying to fit P2PL within existing 
regulation designed for different forms of financial activities such as existing 
banking regulation which is suited to institutional lenders. 
According to art 36(H), operating an electronic system in relation to lending 
consists of enabling two separate persons in becoming the lender and borrower 
under an article 36H agreement. This is based on the condition in subsection two 
that the operator’s system is capable of determining which agreements should be 
made available to the lender and borrower, whether or not this is in accordance 
with general instructions given to the operator by the lender or borrower. For 
example, this could refer to the role performed by platforms in connecting lenders 
and borrowers based on their chosen lending requirements.  
The purpose of article 36(H) is to specify the particular activities which are 
regulated and therefore would bring a platform under the remit of the FCA. It 
specifies these activities in subsection three, which includes such activities as, 
presenting/offering P2P agreements to persons with a view to them becoming 
either a borrower or lender under a P2P agreement;773 providing lenders with 
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financial information about the borrowers’ creditworthiness;774 pursuing debt owed 
to the lenders775 and enforcing the rights of a lender in performance of the 
operator’s duties etc.776 The specified activities listed in subsection three reflects 
the specific roles carried out by a platform at all stages of a P2PL cycle. This 
highlights the earlier point made that the new regime is tailored specifically to 
P2PL. In addition the definition shows that the FCA’s focus is on regulating the 
platform intermediaries. To an extent this is a good thing because it hints at a 
recognition that regulating the platform is a way of protecting the platform’s users 
which hints at support for the concept of gatekeeper liability. 
 
4.3.3. Annexe B: amendment to the Senior Management Arrangements, 
Systems and Controls 
 
Annex B amends the Senior Management Arrangements, Systems and Controls 
Sourcebook (the SYSC). The SYSC focuses on ensuring that authorised firms 
have appropriate systems of control, supervision and accountability in place,777 
thus providing for operational risk.  
It requires that an operator of electronic systems relating to lending must take 
reasonable steps to ensure that there are arrangements in place ensuring that 
P2P agreements facilitated by it continue to be managed and administered 
according to the terms of the contract, in cases where the operator ceases to 
carry out the regulated activity.778 The aim of this amendment is to provide better 
protection for the P2P lender by preventing P2P loan agreements from failing 
simply because a platform has ceased to exist. Although prior to the April 2014 
regulations some P2PL platforms already had such arrangements in place, the 
fact that it was not required in order for them to run a platform meant that not all 
platforms needed to have one. This in turn meant that lenders faced varying 
levels of risk depending on the platform they used, e.g. the risk of lending was 
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reduced if the platform they chose had an insolvency arrangement in place, but 
if it did not their lending risk was increased.  
However, this higher level of risk may not have been reflected in the pricing 
structure of the platform with no insolvency arrangements, because the only risk 
taken into account on most platforms are the risks associated with the borrowers’ 
creditworthiness. Consequently, the lending process would incur additional costs 
for the lender, both in the form of information asymmetries as well as in terms of 
the time, resources and skills required of a lender to determine the true benefits 
of lending on one platform over another. This of course assumes that a lender 
prior to the April 2014 regulation would undertake such a rational approach to 
every decision in the lending decision and would not be motivated to lend on a 
particular platform based on emotional or circumstantial reasons. 
The problem with this regulatory measure is two-fold. In an attempt to remain 
flexible and proportionate, the FCA does not require a particular type of 
insolvency arrangement. Secondly, the measure is not accompanied by a set of 
standard which the platform must adhere to. This leaves it open for platforms to 
decide what level of protection they provide to their users in the case of their 
insolvency. Whilst this gives platforms an opportunity to compete for customers 
on the basis of their arrangements, the change it creates from the pre-regulatory 
situation is just slight. This is because it does little to prevent unscrupulous 
platforms from providing a poor standard of arrangements on behalf of their 
lenders, merely paying lip service to the regulation. As a result of the lack of 
standards, and the self-regulatory nature of this provision, it is also difficult to 
envision how the FCA will be able to ensure that the platform has adequate 
measures in place. As a result of the nature of the very circumstance that this 
provision is designed to protect against, i.e. the potential failure of a platform 
which is a future event which cannot be foreseen when a platform first applies to 
be licensed, it could be argued that by the time the FCA is notified of the poor 
standard of arrangements it will be too little too late because the platform would 
already be in the process of winding up. 
 
232 
 
4.3.4. Annexe C: amendment to the Interim Prudential Sourcebook for 
Investment Businesses 
 
As with the Annexe B’s requirement of appropriate insolvency arrangements, the 
prudential requirements provided by Annexe C are also focused on the protection 
of the P2P users in the event of platform failure.  
This amendment introduces chapter twelve to the Interim Prudential Sourcebook 
for Investment Businesses (IPRU).  It is a new chapter called “Financial resources 
requirements for operators of electronic systems in relation to lending”. It requires 
platforms to follow strict accounting procedures in the measurement of their 
assets and liabilities when preparing their annual financial statements and 
according to s.12.2 a platform is required to at all times be able to meet its 
liabilities as they fall due, ensuring that its financial resources are never less than 
its financial resources requirement. The chapter is very detailed and thorough in 
the way it demonstrates how to calculate total value of loaned funds, financial 
resources and subordinate debt in order to do this. It also takes into consideration 
the possibility that a platform might carry out more than one regulated activity. 
The effect of this amendment is to ensure that a platform acts prudently and 
continuously monitors its financial resources. The intended aim is that by having 
adequate financial resources the firm will be resilient to financial crises and go 
some way to preventing instances of the platform’s failure. Unlike the insolvency 
arrangements provided by Annexe B, this provision provides greater certainty to 
the platforms because it sets out how they should work out their capital 
requirements rather than leaving it to the platforms to create an arrangement 
based on their perceptions of what is appropriate. The provision therefore tries to 
ensure that there is cover for operational and compliance failures, redress 
payments and reduces the possibility of a shortfall in the platforms funds.779 
In general, the aim of the FCA P2P regulator regime is to protect consumers 
through the creation of a stable platform and industry, rather than giving them any 
particular rights of action against the platform or other users. This is nowhere 
more clear than in s.12.1.6.R of the IPRU specifically states that the fact of a 
platform contravening chapter twelve, does not give rise to right of action by a 
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private person under section 138D of the Act. Consequently, although the 
purpose of such prudential provisions is to inspire greater confidence amongst 
potential and existing P2P users, by giving them an indication of the platform’s 
creditworthiness and level of commitment to its owners,780 it does not provide P2P 
users with an enforceable right against the platform. This limits level of 
accountability a platform has towards its users. 
 
4.3.5. Annexe D: amendments to the Conduct of Business sourcebook 
(COBS) 
 
Annexe D brings the activity of operating an electronic system in relation to 
lending under the conduct of business rules. However, the remit of this provision 
is restricted to the platform’s role in helping a person become a lender under a 
P2P agreement. It gives platforms examples of the type of information they 
should provide to lenders to explain the specific nature and risks of P2P 
agreements. For example, the expected and actual default rates in line with the 
requirements of COBS 4.6 on past and future performances;781 a description of 
how loan risk is assessed, including a description of the criteria that must be met 
by the borrower before the firm considers the borrower to be eligible for a P2P 
agreement;782 a description of a lender’s likely actual return, taking into account 
fees, default rates and taxation783 and an explanation of what would happen if the 
platform fails.784 This emphasises the regime’s pre-occupation with protecting 
lenders through the provision of better information. 
 
4.3.6. Other aspects of the P2PL regulation regime 
 
The regulatory regime also provides for other ways of regulating P2PL. As with 
the various provisions set out in the CPNRS 2014 annexes, these regulatory 
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781 Conduct of Business sourcebook (COBS) s 13.3.7A(1). 
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requirements focus regulation on the platforms without recognising the specific 
roles played by P2PLs and borrowers. 
For example, the lenders’ cancellation rights is derived from the Distance 
Marketing Directive (DMD), which requires financial services contracts made 
without the simultaneous physical presence of the supplier, intermediary or 
customer, to give the customers the right to cancellation within a certain period 
without penalty. As pointed out by some respondents to the regulatory 
consultation process, it is not clear which type of contract within P2PL will qualify 
as a distance contract because the DMD provides that the right of cancellation is 
lost where the performance of the contract has begun with the consumer’s 
agreement. This would seemingly not apply to both the service contract between 
the lenders and the platform, as well as the P2P agreement between the 
borrowers and lenders because in both cases the agreements begin with the 
lenders’ agreement. The FCA’s response to this dilemma has been to suggest 
that the right of cancellation should apply to the initial agreement between the 
platform and its users and not to each loan contract. Ultimately, it leaves this 
decision at the discretion of the platforms, however this stance reflects the FCA’s 
general regulatory approach which is based on regulation solely of the platform 
without regard to the C2C nature of the transactions. It is assumed that this 
rationale is based on the FCA’s pragmatic approach to achieving a simple and 
easy to understand regime. 
Another example of this is in the dispute resolution provisions and the access 
given to lenders to recourse to the Financial Ombudsman Service should they 
have a complaint about the service they have received from the platform. The 
FCA proposed that lenders who are unhappy with the service they have received 
from a platform should have the right to complain. They must first take their 
complaint up with the firm directly and failing a resolution between themselves, 
they can refer their complaint to the Financial Ombudsman Service. The dispute 
resolution rules do not require platforms to follow a specific complaints procedure, 
it leaves it for them to develop suitable processes for their business model.  
According to the Handbook, “complaint” is defined broadly as: 
“any oral or written expression of dissatisfaction, whether justified or not, from, or 
on behalf of, a person about the provision of, or failure to provide, a financial 
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service or a redress determination, which alleges that the complainant has 
suffered (or may suffer) financial loss, material distress or material 
inconvenience”. 
This gives lenders and borrowers a broad remit to complain to the platform for 
the way it carries out its role and services in regards to them. Although the 
regulation in general does not give them any actionable rights in court, recourse 
to the Financial Ombudsman Service means that platforms can be held 
accountable for any reasonable complaint that a lender or borrower may bring 
against it. It is also a more flexible approach than the court system, because the 
Financial Ombudsman Service determines an outcome based on the concept of 
fairness, rather than a right or duty. 
However, although the dispute resolution rules give lenders and borrowers the 
right to complain about a platform’s services it does not give them the right to 
complain about each other, such as the dispute resolution offered on eBay. This 
is discussed in more detail in chapter six. This hints at the fact that the regulatory 
regime does not treat P2PL as a consumer-to-consumer market where 
individuals contract with each other through the mediation of the platform. Rather 
it bypasses this notion by regulating the platforms only. It is possible to argue, 
that to recognise the essential C2C model of P2PL, regulation should also create 
a remit for alternative dispute resolution between consumers such as eBay has 
on its website between buyers and sellers, with eBay as the mediator. This 
approach would reduce expensive court costs which might not be worth it for the 
relatively small amounts that are lent on each loan agreement. This possibility is 
not prevented by the anonymity of P2PL users, because again, as on eBay, the 
dispute resolution could be started against an anonymous person with a 
username and the platform knows the identity of both the lender and the borrower 
putting it in the best position to mediate between the two. 
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4.4. Critique of the FCA regulatory regime 
 
4.4.1. The pre-contractual nature of the FCA regime 
Consumer protection regulation is traditionally regarded as a body of laws 
designed to prevent individuals from taking on excessive risks785 and to protect 
consumers’ interests at the individual transaction levels.786 Relevant “harm” is 
considered a failure in individual transactions and usually occurs at the origination 
stage or in the substance of a transaction.787 This explains why most consumer 
protection measures such as information disclosure focus on the pre-contractual 
stage of transactions and aim to prevent failures that inhibit consumers’ ability to 
enhance their welfare.788 For example, bargaining power and knowledge is often 
highlighted in the EU consumer policy and suggests an approach that leans 
heavily towards the pre-contractual stage of transactions. Although EU consumer 
law has introduced post-contractual withdrawal and cancellation rights in favour 
of consumers, it is only applicable in limited cases such as distance and doorstep 
selling to enable consumers to reverse irrational decisions.789 As confirmed in the 
new Consumer Rights Directive,790 withdrawal/cancellation rights in such 
contracts protect consumers who are vulnerable because of the lack of 
opportunity to inspect goods and to meet, discuss and agree on contractual 
terms.791 
Limiting consumer protection to pre-contractual scenarios only seems too 
restrictive and inadequate for P2PLs because of its peculiar nature. Although 
P2PLs, for example, face information asymmetries before agreeing to lend, the 
                                                          
785 Erik F Gerding, ‘The Subprime Crisis and the Link between Consumer Financial Protection 
and Systemic Risk’ (2009) 5 Florida Inter Florida Intl U L Rev 93, 94; Oren Bar-Gill and 
Elizabeth Warren, ‘Making Credit Safer’ (2008) 157 U Pa L Rev 1. 
786 Huffman (n 90). 
787 ibid 9. 
788 ibid. 
789 Christian Twigg-Flesner and Reiner Schulze, ‘Protecting Rational Choice: Information and 
the Right of Withdrawal’ in Geraint Howells and others (eds), Handbook of Research on 
International Consumer Law (Edward Elgar Publishing Inc 2010) 130. 
790 Council Directive 2011/82/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 
2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and 
Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council Text with EEA relevance [2011] 
OJ L304/64-88 implemented in the UK by the Consumer Rights Act. 
791 Joasia A Luzak, ‘To Withdraw Or Not To Withdraw? Evaluation of the Mandatory Right of 
Withdrawal in Consumer Distance Selling Contracts Taking Into Account Its Behavioural Effects 
on Consumers’ (2013) 37 Journal of Consumer Policy 91, 94. 
237 
 
main concern is the execution and performance of loan contracts, including 
prompt loan repayments and debt collection. Unlike banks, P2PLs are largely 
incapable of establishing and operating their own debt recovery arrangements. 
The provision of appropriate amount of pre-contractual information may be 
necessary but it is an insufficient protection for such lenders. This suggests the 
need for a more interventionist approach to the post-contractual side of P2PL 
transactions rather than the traditional focus on pre-contract protection. 
The new FCA regulations therefore seem right in attempting to protect lenders 
from adverse situations following the formation of P2P loan contracts. For 
example, a loan-based P2PL platform is required to take reasonable steps to 
have arrangements in place to ensure the continued management and 
administration of P2P loan agreements if it fails or ceases to carry on the 
business.792 This provision protects lenders from the uncertainty and costs of 
recuperating loan payments from unidentifiable and anonymous borrowers, but it 
has a limited scope. There is no prescribed form of arrangements and platforms 
are free to design and introduce processes that suit their business model.793 
Although this lack of uniform standards is understandably in the interests of 
balancing regulatory costs and benefits,794 it still leaves the meaning of an 
appropriate arrangement open to debate between platforms and regulators. 
Whilst this allows a more tailored procedure, it could lead to more work for 
regulators in the long term. Should an arranged third party loan administrator fail, 
the appropriateness of the procedure would arise and be dealt with by regulators 
on a firm-by-firm basis.  The FCA has not specified the consequences of the 
failure of arrangements, culpability for failures and, most importantly, lenders’ 
alternative recourse. Platforms are only required to warn lenders of the risks 
involved and that safeguarding measures may not work as expected.795 Potential 
lenders are expected to take these factors into consideration or at least be aware 
of them when deciding to lend on particular platforms and will ultimately bear the 
risk of failure. This approach therefore follows the rational choice model of 
consumer protection that emphasises limited pre-contractual disclosure and 
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leaves little room for the outcomes of consumer decisions such as repayment 
default and inability to recuperate debt as well as post-contractual remedies such 
as reimbursement of money paid and provision of new services.  
 
4.4.2. Conflated Concept of Consumer 
 
The Financial Services Bill defines consumers broadly enough to include a range 
that covers retail customers and wholesale and professional investors.796 It adopts 
a differential approach to defining consumers which means that the Financial 
Conduct Authority, in treating participants as consumers would need to take into 
consideration the varying degrees of risk involved in different investment or 
transactions they are involved in; and the differing degrees of experience and 
expertise that different consumers might have.797 The effect of this is that different 
types of consumer will be provided with different levels of consumer protection 
and different regulated activities will be subject to varying degrees of intervention, 
depending on what category the consumer of that service falls into. This might 
create problems for P2PL regulation as although there are two types of 
consumers involved with similar levels of experience, because they are 
participating in different ways (one as lender, one as borrower), they may find 
themselves subject to different levels of protection. 
Under the FCA regime, P2PLs fall into the ‘retail investor’ category rather than 
the ‘retail’ consumer category. ‘Retail consumers’ are defined as buying financial 
products or services for their own use or benefit either directly or through a 
regulated firm e.g. travel insurance. Meanwhile, ‘retail investors’ are persons that 
purchase financial instruments such as shares, bonds and exchange traded 
funds.798 The consumer protection measures that they receive are largely 
informational, e.g. firms providing appropriate information to consumers, at the 
right time. 
The problem with this is that the regulation of the ‘retail investor’ tends to imbibe 
the characteristics of neo-classical philosophy and aims to ‘responsibilise’ the 
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consumer through information disclosure and consumer education. Although 
there are increasingly signs in the EU consumerisation of retail investors, as 
discussed in Chapter Two the ‘consumerised’ regulatory measures do not apply 
to P2PL because they largely concern the distribution of retail services and 
information or advice provided for them. Therefore, neither the responsibilisation 
approach adopted by P2PL regulation nor the consumerisation approach 
adopted in the general regulation of retail financial services outside of P2PL, are 
suitable for lenders of P2P loans. This is because as explained above, these 
lenders are individuals who would normally just deposit their money in a bank, 
and thus may not have high levels of investment know-how. Additionally, the 
increase of information does not solve all the problems they face during the 
lifecycle of a P2PL transaction. Behavioural theory shows that for such people, 
too much information may not be a good thing. Information as a regulatory tool 
essentially offers P2P users only two main courses of action: because of the 
information, the P2P user may decide that they do not want to risk their funds and 
not to use the P2PL mode of saving/investing or borrowing; or they may decide 
that they are prepared to risk their money and lend or borrow on the chosen 
platform despite the risks. This would be the case regardless of the type and 
amount of information given to them or how clear it is. It does not help resolve 
other conflicts the users may face using the platform post-contract. Therefore, 
information-based regulation alone is insufficient. 
The only effect of this provision is that by broadening the definition of consumers, 
P2PLs will be covered by some sort of protection. However, P2PL platforms 
already provide similar protections as those suggested by the draft bill for retail 
investors. So, the provisions, if applied to P2PL, would not change the situation 
of P2PLs as retail investors are usually provided with less protection than 
borrowers, yet face a greater risk, i.e. loss of money through default and inability 
to reclaim this money.  
One of the operational objectives of the FCA is to strike a balance between the 
principles of consumer protection and consumer responsibility by adopting a 
differentiated approach to regulating consumer protection, which considers what 
is ‘appropriate’ consumer protection in each situation.799 The aim of this approach 
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is to ensure that different consumers are dealt with in different ways, for example, 
it recognises that the needs of a consumer purchasing a pension policy are 
different from the consumer buying a car insurance policy.800 Consequently, the 
regulator is expected to consider in each scenario, what level of consumer 
knowledge it is reasonable to expect from a consumer, how complex a product 
is, the differing degrees of risk involved in different types of investment and 
transactions and the varying degrees of experience and expertise that different 
consumers have.801 However, the Joint Commission highlighted that taking these 
factors into consideration is not sufficient if it is not complemented by a 
corresponding responsibility on firms to act honestly, fairly and professionally in 
the best interests of their customers, e.g. by providing addressing the needs of 
consumers for advice and information that is timely, accurate, intelligible and 
appropriately presented.802 The rationale behind this addition was that information 
alone will not be enough to improve consumers’ ability to make well-informed 
decisions; rather information needs to be easily understandable and 
accessible.803 
These approaches do not suit P2PL where the risk to the lender – loss of money 
through default – cannot be solved through more and more information, or more 
appropriately presented information. It also does not suit the structure of P2PL 
because the risk is not one between the firm and the consumer, but between two 
different consumers who under some models may not know each other. The 
platforms cannot provide further information to the lenders about each transaction 
because they are not party to individual transactions. The platforms can and often 
do provide general information about how to lend, and advice about how to 
choose which borrowers to lend to. However, with regards to individual 
transactions, essentially all they do is present information to the lenders which 
the borrowers have provided. In this case the approach may be relevant to the 
platforms’ duty to ensure their credit ratings are accurate and presented to 
lenders in a way that they can understand and use in their transactions. But this 
does little to balance the risk to the lenders. 
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Consumer protection as the provision of information is limited to pre-contractual 
scenarios. This is insufficient for P2PL because although the participants face 
information asymmetries before agreeing to lend, the large part of their problems 
are faced in the execution of the loan contract. For example, ensuring loan 
repayments are made by the borrower and debt collection and recovery. One 
might say that because lenders hold the capital, they are in a better bargaining 
position than the borrowers so do not need the same level of protection. However, 
unlike traditional lending institutions such as banks, they are not capable or in a 
position to carry out their own debt recovery arrangements, for this they depend 
on the lending platforms. For lenders therefore, discussing the appropriate 
amounts of pre-contractual information needed is inappropriate. Consumer 
protection regulations for lenders should be largely interventionist and focus on 
the post-contractual side of the transaction. 
Lenders on P2PL platforms are often described as investors rather than 
consumers because they lend money directly to borrowers. This is exemplified 
by the FCA which appears to recognise P2PLs as consumers following the 
amended provisions of the Financial Services Act 2012 which define consumers 
broadly enough to include a range of retail customers and wholesale and 
professional investors.804 Under the Act, consumers are, “persons who use, have 
used or may use regulated financial services…have relevant rights or interests in 
relation to any of those services, have invested, or may invest, in financial 
instruments, or have relevant rights or interests in relation to financial 
instruments.”805 The FCA, however, essentially treats P2PLs as “retail investors” 
rather than “retail consumers”. Retail consumers are defined as buyers of 
financial products or services for their own use or benefit either directly or through 
regulated firms, while retail investors are persons that purchase financial 
instruments such as shares, bonds and exchange-traded funds.806  
Classification as investor rather than consumer is significant because investor 
protection is completely different from consumer protection. Investor protection 
rules often assume a degree of expertise and are therefore less likely to be 
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interventionist than ordinary consumer protection regulations. This type of 
regulation has been adopted by the FCA P2PL regulatory regime which despite 
at times calling P2PLs consumers, still only provides them with the usual investor 
protection measures. Typical investor protection rules including the segregation 
of client and financial intermediary’s accounts807 may be irrelevant in consumer 
protection. A non-interventionist approach may seem appropriate and 
proportionate to the circumstances of the traditional lending and investment 
framework where the investors are investing in the true sense of the expression. 
Peer-to-business lenders may even be so regarded as investors going by the 
available research evidence808 suggesting a degree of financial awareness 
among such lenders. P2PL is, however, different because its lenders may well 
be ordinary people like its borrowers and share similar levels of 
investment/lending experience and knowledge, and, in fact, may face a greater 
risk of loss of money through borrowers’ default. P2PLs and borrowers are 
unlikely to be significantly different in demonstrating “lack of experience, 
unfamiliarity with the subject matter of the contract, [and] weak bargaining 
position”809 in their relationship and dealings with platforms. 
Nonetheless, the consumer protection measures of the recent FCA regime for 
retail investors are largely informational and restricted to appropriate 
information.810 This may seem right since the Financial Services Act 2012 adopts 
a differential approach to defining consumers and requires the FCA to take into 
consideration the varying degrees of risk involved in different investments or 
transactions consumers are involved in and their differing degrees of experience 
and expertise.811 Different types of consumer are provided with different levels of 
consumer protection and different regulated activities are subject to varying levels 
of intervention depending on what category a consumer of that service falls into. 
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This differential approach is, however, problematic for P2PL which involves two 
consumers with similar levels of knowledge and experience who may find 
themselves subject to different levels of protection simply because of their 
participation as lender and borrower. It is noteworthy that experience is a critical 
factor in whether consumer protection measures apply to particular individuals.812 
The designation of P2PLs merely as retail investors tends to imbibe the neo-
classical/rational choice philosophy that aims to “responsibilise”813 and 
empower814 consumers through information disclosure and education. This may 
not be suitable for P2PLs who lack sufficient high levels of investment know-how 
and are not very different from individual customers/depositors in traditional 
banking, particularly in pure, person-to-person P2PL models. Such lenders are 
unlikely to have independent access to information about borrowers, including 
potential use of multiple platforms, and are faced with the problems of information 
asymmetry and behavioural bias in addition to directly bearing the risk of 
borrowers’ default.  Compared to platforms, which may have independent 
verification and monitoring mechanisms, an individual P2P lender who has lent a 
fraction of a loan may not know the real financial situation of a borrower. The 
lender depends solely on what the borrower discloses and may not know whether 
the borrower has mounting financial difficulties from several sources.815 
It is instructive that similar issues of information asymmetry and behavioural bias 
trigger regulation in traditional bank lending. Banks are subject to regulation on 
deposit handling and how payments are made because they handle customers’ 
deposits, which are repayable on demand, and primarily bear the risk of 
borrowers’ default. Technically, banks simultaneously act as intermediaries 
between their customers and borrowers since loans are derived from customers’ 
deposits and borrowers are unknown to the customers. Borrowers do not know 
which proportion of borrowings comes from any particular customer and 
customers likewise are unaware of the destination of their money as loans. P2PL 
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platforms similarly act as intermediaries between lenders and borrowers, 
although the degree of their involvement in the lending processes appears to be 
played down. 
The second difficulty is that the philosophy of responsibilisation and 
empowerment is not well suited to P2PL lenders. Indeed, such a philosophy 
assumes the ability to exercise power. P2PL lenders are however in fact 
powerless. This is in the sense of behavioural research which regards 
powerlessness as the inability to achieve desired outcomes.816 For instance, 
transactional parties respond to stressful situations in different ways and can 
cope by applying primary and secondary controls. Primary control uses active 
behaviours to change a situation to a preferred one while secondary control 
involves active and passive behaviours designed to alter oneself rather than a 
stressful situation.817  Powerlessness, which occurs when a party is unable to 
exercise primary control, is more likely to be case with online P2PL participants, 
particularly the lenders. Lenders rely on the platforms to deliver key aspects of 
the P2PL transaction, e.g. loan repayments, credit risk assessments and pursuit 
of defaulting borrowers; and can at best apply secondary control and may not be 
able to exercise primary control at all.  
Rather than control, trust seems a key factor for lenders’ participation in P2PL.818 
Trust makes a person vulnerable to another party even when that person is 
unable to monitor or control the other party.819 Trustworthiness can arise out of 
the personality of the one who trusts, the competence and reputation of the one 
who inspires trust, or governance provided by a third party that enforces trust.820821 
Legal and economic theories emphasise the third party element of this tripartite 
typology which builds trust through the regulation of participants’ exchange and 
                                                          
816 Matthew Bunker and A Dwayne Ball, ‘Consequences of Customer Powerlessness: 
Secondary Control’ (2009) 8 J Consum Behav 268, 269. 
817 ibid 270. 
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819 Roger C Mayer, James H Davis and F David Schoorman, ‘An Integrative Model of 
Organizational Trust’ (1995) 20 The Academy of Mgmt Rev 709. 
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821 Arvind Ashta and Djamchid Assadi, ‘An Analysis of European Online micro-lending Websites’ 
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ensuring that participants keep their promises.822 Research demonstrates that 
individuals’ reluctance to engage in internet-based transactions is overcome if 
they trust business counterparties in terms of security, privacy and reliability. 
Similarly, online P2PL transactions require strangers to trust and cooperate with 
each other via platforms that have an exclusive access to participants’ personal 
recognisability factors. By analogy to a physical shop, a platform is arguably part 
of a consumer’s transactional decision. The concept of transactional decision 
includes the decision to enter a shop and any other decision related to “any 
decision taken by a consumer concerning whether, how and on what terms to 
purchase.”823 One can argue, for example, that P2PL platforms are the online 
equivalents of prominent shopping brands/shop owners that allow multiple 
retailers and service providers to use their shop spaces, subject to a certain level 
of control from the owners.  
The fact that the regulatory regime has largely focused on the conduct of the 
business, follows a general trend in UK financial regulation following the financial 
crisis. Following the crisis, the priority of regulators was in the stabilisation of 
financial systems, which has led to a regulatory approach focused on the conduct 
of business.824 This results in looking at the way businesses operate and how the 
way they do so affects consumers.825 This approach is evident in the P2P 
regulatory regime as explained above. It is also made clear by the government’s 
policy towards the P2PL industry, a thread which runs through all aspects of the 
regulation. For example, this approach was highlighted by Christopher Woollard, 
the FCA Director of Strategy and Competition during a speech given at the FCA’s 
event on UK FinTech. He stated that the concern about fostering innovation is 
linked to the FCA’s duty to promote competition in the interests of consumers and 
a good way of doing this was to facilitate disruptive innovation.826  
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4.4.3. P2P Borrower-specific Protections 
 
The thesis has so far focused on P2PLs who, as demonstrated in Chapter 2, are 
a unique type of participant in the financial market, and thus elucidates on their 
classification and implications for regulation. The discussions in Chapter 2 about 
consumers and prosumers, however, show clear that P2PBs are no different in 
their nature, role and level of participation in P2PL transactions from ordinary 
consumers in traditional consumer credit markets who borrow money from 
institutions like banks. 
The analysis of the P2PL regulatory regime above reveals some borrower 
protections. For example, all users of P2PL have recourse to the Financial 
Ombudsman Service should they have any complaints about the platform827 
perhaps because the FCA perceives both lenders and borrowers as consumers. 
The prudential requirements which ensure the stability of the platform can also 
be viewed as a method of protecting borrowers in the long run for the same 
reason that it can be seen to protect lenders – a stable platform ensures 
consumer confidence in the market and thus a safe and viable environment to 
transact. The client money rules also protect borrowers by ensuring that lenders 
receive the borrowers’ repayments. A more specific protection is the fact that the 
pursuit of debt owed to lenders and the enforcement of the lenders’ rights under 
the obligations of the platforms are classified as regulated activities in the 
Regulate Activities Order (Specified Activities).828 This means that there is an 
expectation that the pursuit of funds on behalf of lenders will be carried out 
ethically. The regulation of P2PL debt recovery is dealt with in the Consumer 
Credit Sourcebook in the FCA Handbook CONC 7 which relates to situations 
where borrowers are in arrears or default and the firm must recover repayments. 
CONC 7.17 – 18 deal specifically with the P2PL industry. CONC 7.17 provides 
that where the P2P agreement is a fixed-sum credit, platforms are expected to 
give borrowers fourteen days’ notice of arrears and provide borrowers with further 
notices at intervals not exceeding six months. It also provides details of how 
platforms should go about providing arrears notices and the information 
                                                          
827 Financial Ombudsman Service Limited (n 610) 3. 
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contained in them. CONC 7.18 has similar provisions in relation to P2P 
agreements for running account credit and 7.19 deals with notices of default sums 
under P2P agreements. The provisions indicate that P2PL firms are subject to 
the same rules that conventional lenders are in situations of debt recovery. For 
example, CONC 7.3 makes it clear that lenders are expected to treat borrowers 
with forbearance and due consideration and where appropriate to inform them 
that free and impartial advice is available from not-for-profit advice bodies. 
S.7.3.14 also requires that no disproportionate action is taken against borrowers 
in arrears or default, e.g. before court action is taken, all other proportionate 
measures should be fully explored. These regulations ensure that like their 
counterparts in traditional forms of lending, P2PBs are protected from the risk of 
illegal payment collection methods and abusive behaviour in the collection 
process. 
As highlighted in Chapter Two, responsible lending requirements were first 
introduced in the UK to implement the Consumer Credit Directive and are part of 
the FCA legal regime..829 For example, the rules in the Consumer Credit Source 
in the FCA Handbook, CONC 5.2.1 R s.1 sets out the requirement for firms to 
carry out creditworthiness assessments of customers prior to agreement, which 
must be based on information obtained from customers and, where necessary, 
credit reference agencies. In 5.2.1 R s.2 a firm is expected to consider the 
potential for the commitments under the credit agreement to adversely impact the 
borrower’s financial situation and the ability of the borrower to make repayments 
as they fall due. Although the provision does not apply to non-commercial loans, 
CONC 5.5.2 G s.2 states that P2P agreements may also be considered a credit 
agreement or regulated credit agreement, which would make the provisions of 
the CCA or CONC applicable. CONC 5.5 deals specifically with creditworthiness 
assessments in P2P agreements bringing the industry in line with the rules in 
CONC 5.2.3 (which set out the creditworthiness assessment requirements of 
lenders generally), as they would otherwise not apply to non-commercial 
agreements such as P2P loans.  
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The responsible lending provisions contained in the Consumer Credit 
Sourcebook therefore protect P2PBs from lending practices that pay little or no 
regard to the borrower’s ability to meet repayment obligations. With regards to 
where the burden of the responsibilities falls, i.e. the actual lenders or the 
platforms, the provisions demonstrate that the FCA regulatory regime has chosen 
the platforms even though they are not party to the P2P loan contract.830 This 
indicates that the regulators are willing to accept platforms, in their role as 
facilitators, are the best possible means of ensuring safe and ethical lending 
practices in the P2PL industry.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
From the start, the FCA’s aim has been to balance the aim of securing an 
appropriate degree of protection for consumers and promoting effective 
competition in the interests of consumers. This is a difficult feat to achieve. The 
regime largely amalgamates regulation for crowdfunding investment under a 
single regulator thereby going some way towards eliminating confusion for 
customers, which in turn gives the P2PL concept greater credibility and reduces 
regulatory costs for them and the platforms. However, in doing so, the FCA has 
adopted a largely information and disclosure-based regime with regards to the 
P2P participants. The regulation provides a basic level of consumer protection, 
but it still imbibes a largely caveat emptor approach to P2PL, which means that 
once a lender or borrower has been given clear, fair and not misleading 
information, it is up to them to decide whether and how they invest and the 
consequences are left to them to bear. This is emphasised by the fact that aside 
from the alternative dispute resolution provisions provided to lenders and 
potentially the borrowers also, the regulation does not assign any rights of action 
against the platform, or against other users. In this way, it limits the users’ ability 
to enforce any of the regulation designed to protect them. This means that 
changes to the regime or the practices of a firm can only be triggered by relatively 
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largescale issues that may arise, e.g. platform-wide or industry-wide malpractice, 
as opposed to malpractice faced by a lender or borrower. 
By focusing its attentions on the regulation of the P2P platform, the regulatory 
regime accounts for the role played by P2PL platforms during both the lending 
and management stages of the loan cycle. As seen above, it caters to the role of 
the platforms in ensuring the creditworthiness of borrowers, the pursuit of unpaid 
debts to the lenders, and deals with the risks faced by lenders of platform abuse 
of their funds. In so doing the regulation does not imbibe the idea that platforms 
are mere conduits just because they are not party to the lending agreement, but 
recognises their true role as an active intermediary. However, because the 
regime aims to also encourage the growth of the P2PL industry, it does not go far 
enough in its use of the platform to regulate P2PL transactions. Consequently, 
the platforms are not regulated as gatekeepers. 
A key part of this thesis has focused on the conceptualisation of P2P users, 
viewing lenders as transitional prosumers, i.e. ‘lendsumers’ and borrowers as 
consumers. However, the UK P2PL regime maintains a conceptualisation of both 
parties as consumers. In itself, this is a positive step towards recognising the 
basic conceptual framework of P2PL as consumer-to-consumer, particularly 
because it ensures that the P2PLs are treated with the same level of protection 
that the borrowers, who are traditionally associated with the consumer role, are. 
However, because the regime treats them as consumers, the protection it affords 
them is limited to their relationship with the platform. Consequently, the consumer 
protection measures provided by the FCA regime are effectively based on the 
business-to-consumer paradigm of levelling the playing field between a business 
which has the upper hand and an individual that does not. This is why it focuses 
so much on information disclosure and other pre-contractual remedies designed 
for situations where there is an uneven playing field between the business and 
consumer. 
While such an approach is useful for protecting a lendsumer during the stage of 
the lending process when they behave like consumers, i.e. when they are reliant 
on the platforms for the administration and enforcement of the loan, it does not 
fully provide for the roles and characteristics at the stage of the loan where they 
behave like prosumers. It also does not consider the relationship between the 
lendsumer and the borrower. As they are already on a similar level playing field, 
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the usual consumer protection rules that are meant to even a playing field, do not 
have much relevance in monitoring their relationship. However, just because a 
consumer protection regime does not fit the relationship between a P2P lender 
and borrower, does not mean that the rights and responsibilities towards each 
should be ignored. Assumedly, the FCA regime tries to replace the need to focus 
on the lenders and borrowers’ relationship between each other, by placing all 
regulatory focus on the platforms. However, because the regulation does not treat 
all aspects and phases of the P2PL transaction, nor adopt a gatekeeper liability 
approach which holds the platforms responsible for the actions of its users, it fails 
to consider the need for some form of regulation of the actions between the 
lenders and the borrowers. 
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5. Towards Clarity and a Regulatory Paradigm for P2PL 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter Four critically analysed the UK regulatory regime for P2PL and 
concluded that because it does not adequately conceptualise P2PL, its 
regulations are largely focused on the pre-contractual side of P2PL transactions 
and the platform alone. Rather than recognising the underlying prosumption 
model of P2PL, the FCA regime treats P2PL as another form of business-to-
consumer financial business.  The purpose of this chapter is to suggest a P2PL 
regulation model. Section 5.2 sets the scene by analysing the meaning, goals 
and typical forms of regulation. Section 5.3 confirms the central arguments that 
P2PL is a new and different way of doing business by placing it in the wider 
financial regulation framework.  A key point in section 5.4 is that clarity in law and 
regulation requires regulatory measures to adapt to new concepts and new ways 
of doing business. Sections 5.5 to 5.7, set out the use of gatekeeper liability to 
regulate platforms in such a way that considers P2P structure and the concept of 
“lendsumer” as an analytical tool to help regulators better understand the roles 
and characteristics of individuals that are protected.  
Before the advent of P2PL platforms, two main financial institutions have acted 
with a comparable intermediary capacity. These are banks and investment 
companies. These operate in the mainstream financial sector and demonstrate 
the reasons why it is important to regulate intermediaries. 
Having already mentioned the way that banks act as intermediaries between their 
depositors and borrowers in an earlier section, it serves only to summarise at this 
point that they act as intermediaries by pooling and transforming depositors’ 
money into long-term loans and by taking on the credit risk involved in lending.831 
This means that regardless of whether the borrower repays the full amount of the 
loan or defaults and never repays, the depositor can obtain the full amount that 
they deposited on demand and do not have to bear the loss of the default or late 
payment. 
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This is not the same with investments made through an investment company. An 
investment company issues stocks or other securities to investors and use the 
proceeds to buy diversified portfolios of securities which they contract out to 
investment advisors to manage in line with shareholder approved investment 
goals.832 Investors may or may not be able to redeem their shares on demand 
depending on the type of fund.833 They are also not provided with any guarantee 
that the value of their shares will remain the same.834 Consequently, the risk that 
the share value may decrease during the term of investment lies with the investor 
and not with the institution. 
Another type of financial institution that has an intermediary role are brokers. 
These are agents who negotiate trade agreements or bargains and buy and sell 
shares on behalf of an investor for a fee. For an additional fee, they can offer 
other services such as financial advice. However, they do not own the title to the 
property being traded. In their analysis of not-for-profit P2P organisations, Davis 
and Gelpern argued that brokers cannot be compared to P2P organisations 
because they do not pool customer funds, rather they simply facilitate direct 
investment.835 The basis of their distinction was that unlike brokers, P2P 
intermediaries do not help individual investors to lend directly to the ultimate 
recipient of his/her funds, so they do not have direct claims836 against an individual 
borrower who benefits from their investment. 
On the one hand, it is understandable why Davis and Gelpern have made this 
distinction. Their research is in the context of charitable P2P intermediaries, and 
their comparison between P2P intermediaries and mainstream financial 
institutions focuses on the similar benefits they provide to the investors. Namely, 
the pooling of funds from many investors which enables the diversification of 
investments; and, providing an information service which reduces the 
transactional transparency barriers that individual investors may normally face 
without an intermediary e.g. the skills necessary to evaluate the risks associated 
with lending to particular borrowers.837 
                                                          
832 ibid. 
833 ibid. 
834 ibid 1221. 
835 ibid. 
836 ibid. 
837 ibid. 
253 
 
On the other hand, by focusing on the comparable benefits, this analysis does 
not consider the similar characteristics that brokers have with P2P intermediaries. 
For example, P2PL websites are for-profit organisations which earn a fee for their 
intermediation services. As with brokers they are not party to the actual 
transaction they facilitate; whereas for brokers this is the purchase or sale of 
shares or insurance products, for P2P platforms this is the lending contract 
between a borrower and lender and the subsequent repayment of the debt and 
the associated interest payments. The fact that despite brokers not being party 
to a contract does not stop them from being held liable when things go wrong in 
certain circumstances, implies that the same thing can be done for P2P platforms. 
On the other hand, whereas with brokers it is clear they are the agent of the 
investor, it is not clear who the P2PL platforms are agents of, if any. In this sense 
one can say that they are truly impartial intermediaries who facilitate a 
transaction. This will need to be considered when investigating their liabilities to 
both parties to the transaction they facilitate. 
Regulating P2P platforms involves the same regulatory concerns that surrounds 
the regulation of other financial forms and institutions, i.e. the promotion of 
innovation whilst still ensuring the safety and soundness of the platform, 
consumer protection goals, the promotion of financial inclusion and the 
prevention of systemic risk.838 These concerns are further complicated by the fact 
that regulators need to take into account the fact that whilst the P2PL market is 
currently relatively small, it is a growing and changing method of finance which at 
some point in the future, may render any early imposed regulations obsolete or 
ineffective.839  
P2P platform intermediation is a socially valuable activity because it can 
contribute to more efficient reallocation of resources within and between the 
savings and lending markets. However, it does also bear hidden risks. For 
example, from the lenders perspective, there may be concerns that the platform 
may misuse the lent funds or fail in the performance of its duties. Meanwhile, from 
the borrower’s perspective there’s a possibility that the intermediary might make 
off with the money leaving them with the repayment obligation.840 An example of 
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this can be seen in the recent suspension of the Swedish platform TrustBuddy by 
the Swedish FSA, following alleged misconduct within the company’s 
management. In this case, the breaches identified included the company using 
lender’s capital in violation with their instructions or without their permission, 
resulting in a discrepancy between the amount owed to the lenders and the 
available balance of the client bank accounts. There are some indications that 
these practices have occurred since the TrustBuddy platform began. 
From the lenders’ perspective, one regulatory issue is to ensure that they 
understand the risks and terms of the financial transaction to protect their varying 
expectations of the transaction. Key questions include which party the lender has 
a direct claim against, the borrower or the platform; and what the legal and 
financial relationships between the parties are, particularly where the 
creditworthiness of either the platform or the borrower is called into question841 As 
argued by David and Gelpern, because not all lenders are sophisticated 
investors, regulators should not assume that they will all be efficient at managing 
the risk of the transactions by themselves or that the platforms will necessarily 
volunteer substantial, correct, accurate and understandable information on which 
they can rely in the absence of regulation.842 
David and Gelpern have argued that the risks associated with financial 
intermediaries are affected by the degree of discretion they have over the lenders’ 
funds. So the more discretion the intermediary has concerning how the funds are 
used, the more justified it is to have intrusive regulation to ensure that the 
management of the intermediary is sound.843 They have given the example that 
for ‘true’ intermediaries like deposit-taking banks, intrusive regulation is justified 
because they have a greater degree of control over the use of funds as opposed 
to mere ‘middlemen’ such as wire transfer services which have little to no 
authority over their clients funds.844 They’ve stated that the risks associated with 
broad discretion can be found in principal-agent relationships where there’s a risk 
that the intermediary, employees or key agents may be incompetent, have 
conflicting interests with the lenders, and mis-use funds etc.845 
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Arguably, no principal-agent relationship exists within the P2PL structure since 
the platforms are not party to the lending contract and  contracted to act on behalf 
of either the lenders or borrowers and have no actual or apparent authority to do 
so. Even if such a relationship exists,  the structure of P2PL is unclear whether 
the principal-agent relationship would be between either the lender and the 
platform or the borrower and the platform; or if these two principal-agent 
relationships exist simultaneously. However, as highlighted above, P2P platforms 
can have characteristics similar to both traditional deposit-taking intermediaries 
and brokers alike. Consequently, whilst David and Gelpern’s regulatory rule of 
thumb also applies to P2PL platforms, it is not just in relation to the degree of 
discretion platforms have over the monies lent. Rather, this rule of thumb of how 
much risk the lenders are exposed to by the platforms, should be extended to 
include the degree of control a platform has not just over the funds, but also the 
formation of the transaction, its implementation and management and up to the 
point that the monies are repaid. As this more accurately reflects the life-cycle of 
a P2PL transaction and the fact that the platform’s role and influence does not 
just end once the introductions have been made and the contractual 
arrangements concluded. 
Another regulatory challenge posed by P2P platform operations is caused by the 
fragmented way that finance is raised for borrowers. This is a beneficial method 
of capital raising, as one borrower’s funds may be raised from a large number 
and variety of lenders from different areas of the country, thereby speeding up 
and spreading the risk involved in financial lending. However, this method creates 
problems of collective action for the lenders because it would be difficult to jointly 
monitor the platforms or to make joint-decisions when the necessity arises.846 
From the borrowers’ perspective, platforms should also be regulated to minimise 
the risks that they face. As with lenders, they also experience agency and 
asymmetric information problems, among other things, because until they receive 
the funds, they have to depend on the platforms carrying out their functions and 
duties towards them.847 Similarly, questions are raised when considering the 
conditions and obligations that the borrowers owe the platform and the lenders 
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e.g. whether these obligations are fair and whether they are enforced in a fair and 
reasonable manner.848 
It is also necessary to regulate P2P platforms from a public policy perspective. 
Although the money that is being lent and borrowed on the P2P platform consists 
of private money belonging to individuals, arguably wider society has an interest 
in how this money is spent and to whom it is going. For example, the interest lies 
in preventing money laundering, or the funding of shield activities, i.e. activities 
named on the application form as the purpose for the loan when the loan is really 
to fund illegal activities. Society also has an interest in ensuring that the money 
lent will be used in ways which promotes its values and aids its interests.849 It may 
be impractical or insufficient to regulate every single lender or borrower using a 
platform, so it would be better to hold the platform intermediary accountable for 
the type of lenders, borrowers and activities they allow to operate on their 
platforms.  
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5.2 Regulation and Financial Regulation 
 
5.2.1. Defining regulation 
 
‘Regulation’ as a concept or activity is not so easily defined. This is particularly 
the case because it comes in a multiplicity of formations, e.g. command-and-
control regulation, responsive regulation, reflexive law etc. Given the wide variety 
of regulatory types, it is almost inevitable that it will be just as easy to point out 
the many differences between them as it is to point out their similarities – and as 
such, very difficult to define regulation.  
Jordana and Levi-Faur state that there are multiple and often confusing meanings 
of regulation and the different definitions reflect the particular disciplinary 
concerns advanced at a particular time.850 They chart the application of three 
definitions of regulation identified by Baldwin, Scott and Hood851 over time, and 
conclude that it is not important to agree on a conclusive definition of what 
regulation is, rather it is better to look for a specific context and goal that shapes 
the particular meaning of the idea of regulation.852 This perspective is adopted in 
this thesis as the key concern is to promote regulation which enforces and 
protects the interests of all three participants of P2PL. 
The three main meanings of regulation identified by Baldwin Scott and Hood are: 
1. Targeted rules 
2. All forms of state intervention in the economy 
3. All mechanisms of social control. 
These definitions increase in broadness of scope; definition one being the 
narrowest because it applies only to a specific type of rule and definition three 
being the broadest because it includes all forms of social control which might 
include regulation by bodies which are not necessarily the state.  
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The first definition is regulation in its narrowest form.853 Under this notion, it is the 
creation of an authoritative set of rules accompanied by a mechanism of 
monitoring or securing their compliance; the latter mechanism is usually a public 
agency.854 An example might include the creation by law of an institutional agency 
designed to regulate or ‘target’ a particular sector of the economy or a particular 
problem. One might include in this definition an example of targeted rules, the 
creation of the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) in the United Kingdom. The 
second definition includes all state efforts to direct the economy.855 In addition to 
rule-making, this definition includes measures such as redistribution and taxation.  
Lastly, the third definition of regulation stretches to include all methods of social 
control. It is broader than the first two definitions because it is not limited to state 
action and legal norms, but can also include non-institutional arrangements and 
non-state mechanisms.856 Consequently, anything that influences behaviour can 
be considered to be regulation.857 It is particularly apt to describe the growth of 
‘semi-consensual’ international regimes for the control of global problems like 
climate change. Such regulatory regimes can be established through voluntary 
agreements and may lack strong monitoring and enforcement mechanisms.858 
This meaning is increasingly becoming popular within the socio-legal and 
constructivist literature in light of the interests in international regulatory regimes 
and the problems of enforcement that this definition entails. 
Jordana and Levi-Faur argue that to an extent, these three definitions reflect 
changes in the economic and social context of regulation and they also reflect 
different research and disciplinary interests.859 For example, up to the end of the 
1980s, scholars outside of the U.S. used the word ‘regulation’ to refer to the 
general instruments of government used to control the economy and society. In 
line with the second definition, the word ‘regulation’ was used interchangeably 
with ‘intervention.’860 Economists used to refer to ‘regulation’ in the broader sense 
of the word possibly because it was useful for conveying a widespread aversion 
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to over-regulation,861 however, given the establishment of independent regulatory 
institutions in various sectors of the economy, e.g. the FCA and the Prudential 
Regulatory Authority (PRA) which were established by the Financial Services Act 
2012; the rise of institutional economics; and law and economics scholarship, the 
conception of regulation as ‘targeted rules’ is growing popular.862 
In line with the first definition of regulation posited by Baldwin et al, Adler 
considers regulation as, “nontax, noncriminal, public law” i.e. legal directives or 
utterances such as licences: 
1. That are issued and enforced by governmental bodies, rather than by 
private litigants. 
2. That are principally enforced through sanctions or incentives other than 
criminal litigants 
3. That are not taxes (more specifically, not taxes principally designed to 
raise revenue, such as the income tax).”863  
This conception of regulation therefore excludes court action where private 
parties seek relief from the courts, which is the case with tort or property law.864 It 
also excludes self-regulation because of the necessity of a governmental body to 
implement and enforce regulation. By implication this means that activities which 
are self-regulated are not actually regulated despite the name and even though 
industries may have appointed bodies to implement and enforce good behaviour 
within their markets. So, although some P2PL platforms were part of the P2P 
Association which regulated its members through a code of conduct, prior to the 
April 2014 P2PL was an unregulated activity by this definition.  
Adler notes that regulation does not only amount to duty-imposing norms, but can 
also include liberties and powers. As such regulation can also take the shape of 
pre-event controls of behaviour as well as ex post compensation or damages for 
bad behaviours.865 
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Considering these definitions, prior to the introduction of the April 2014 regulatory 
regime, the form of P2PL regulation fell under the third, broad definition of social 
control. This type of regulation affects the behaviour of those P2PL platforms, but 
its breadth of control is limited only to those who have voluntarily consented to be 
regulated by these codes. Take for example the case of Quakle, explained earlier 
in the thesis. Before the failure of that platform, Quakle was not part of the P2P 
Association as it had not volunteered, consequently, it was not governed by the 
rules they had instituted relating to capital requirements. Whereas Quakle has 
failed due to poor financial management, the other platforms members like Zopa 
have continued to grow. This shows that the voluntary nature of self-regulation 
means that by itself, it will not always achieve the aim of regulating an industry 
as there are some firms that may decide not to adhere to the non-binding rules. 
However, the current regulation of P2PL in the UK now falls within the first 
definition of regulation, targeted rules because it is monitored and enforced 
through a public agency and is governed by a set of authoritative rules. The 
creation of regulation designed to regulate online P2PL can be considered an 
example of targeted rules since in the United Kingdom, the government has 
decided to regulate it through a public agency – the FCA. On the other hand, this 
might be a stretch since the FCA was not designed specifically for the regulation 
of P2PL, rather its regulation is being fitted within the remit of a new but existing 
regulatory agency. Consequently, the second meaning might also be apt to 
describe the regulation of P2PL since, at least in the UK its regulation will be a 
form of state intervention. For the sake of analysis, this paper adopts the first 
definition of Baldwin et al, i.e. targeted rules 
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5.2.2. Goals of regulation 
 
To create particular goals for regulation or to question what the aim of a particular 
piece of regulation is implies that regulations must be held accountable to their 
effects or consequences. This suggests that their moral value is consequentialist 
in nature and the best method of evaluating regulation is to weigh up their 
outcomes. In other words, regulation must serve a particular purpose and 
produce a desired end result to be considered effective. 
 
This is the perspective adopted by most normative scholarship, which has been 
consequentialist in nature.866 Consequentialism is a theory of morality that 
evaluates an action or rule etc., through the comparison of alternative outcomes 
in terms of their consequences and stipulates that the best action or rule is the 
one that yields the maximum amount of some good.867 Welfarism is a form of 
consequentialism that views well-being as the only morally relevant characteristic 
of an outcome.868 From the perspective of P2PL regulation, this implies that the 
best regulation to adopt would be one that produces some sort of social welfare.  
 
There are three main positions on the nature of well-being: the preference-
satisfaction view, mental-state view and objective-good view.869 The preference-
satisfaction view suggests that outcome a is better for an individual only if the 
individual has the right sort of preference for a over b.870 The mental-state view 
follows the same logic but posits that a is only ever better than b if the individual’s 
mental state is better in a than it is in b. Lastly, the objective-goods approach 
states that a is better than b if the individual can obtain a better bundle of objective 
goods in a.871872 
According to economists’ ‘Pareto indifference’ principle, if the well-being 
produced by outcome a, is the same as the well-being produced by outcome b, 
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both outcomes would be considered to be morally good.873 Economists also argue 
in favour of the ‘Pareto-superiority’ principle which stipulates that if each individual 
is at least as well off in outcome a as they are in outcome b, and at least one 
individual is better off in outcome a, then a is the better outcome than b.874 
Therefore, unless there is a difference between the well-being produced by 
different regulations, this view supposes that there is no difference in their 
value.875 However, contrary to this view, welfare production is not the only aim of 
regulation. It might be asked what the role of regulation is, e.g. whether it is to put 
people in a better place than they would normally be in or whether regulation 
exists simply to ensure people follow the same rules, have an equal footing in the 
market and can conduct their affairs with peace of mind etc. 
Based on this welfarist approach, most normative scholarship on regulation 
argues that regulation is only justified in certain cases of failure of the free 
market.876 Market failures that financial regulation aims to correct include 
imperfect information which can lead to the inaccurate or incorrect pricing of 
financial products. For example, inaccurate information about P2PBs could lead 
to the prices of the loans not reflecting the full risk involved in the transaction, 
consequently, the lender could be underestimating the risk involved in the 
lending. Regulation can try to protect this by controlling the type and quality of 
information that is made available to the market.877 Other examples of market 
failures include natural monopolies which regulators could resolve by subsidising 
new entrants in the market.878   
 
However, within the sphere of financial regulation, the goal of correcting market 
failures is not the only goal. For example, the goal of prudential regulation can be 
said to be to manage and minimise the risk of failure by institutions that are seen 
to be critical to maintaining stability within the financial market.879 The goal of 
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managing and minimising risk is often coupled with the management of market 
failures. This can be seen with the current UK financial regulatory system in which 
the FCA deals with market failure and the PRA deals with the management of 
risk through prudential requirements. On a micro-level, prudential regulation 
supervises individual financial institutions. This is usually achieved with 
mechanisms such as minimum capital requirements and liquidity requirements, 
mechanisms to require early intervention by regulators, safety nets like deposit 
insurance and insolvency and resolution mechanisms.880 
 
Prior to the financial crisis of 2008, various arguments were raised to argue for 
the limitation of prudential regulation, these seem to have been linked to the 
general movement towards a more decentralised form of regulation, a concept 
which views regulation as not necessarily tied to or predominated by the state for 
example, self-regulation.881 One such argument was that only certain types of 
institutions posed a systemic risk to the wider financial market.882 Although P2PL 
platforms do not take deposits, they do involve the circulation and reallocation of 
money. This is because they take money from lenders – money that could be 
derived from individuals’ savings – and lend it to borrowers. According to a Nesta 
survey conducted between March and September 2014, 25% of borrowers raised 
finance on P2PL platforms for debt consolidation and 2% to raise money for their 
own business.883 Research commissioned by the insurance group RSA showed 
that over half of new small businesses in the UK fail to survive longer than five 
years.884 If the economy struggles and the individuals or sole traders start to be 
affected by it, there could be a rise of bad debts and the loss of the lenders’ 
money due to failure to repay. Considering this, the public policy argument does 
not take into account the wide variety of interrelating factors that affect the users 
of P2PL platforms, and their finances. For example, borrowers, being ordinary 
people are vulnerable to external factors like rent or mortgage payments, sudden 
financial shocks which might reduce or eliminate their cash flow to the extent of 
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being unable to meet debts or other obligations, e.g. accidents and job losses; 
likewise, there are many number of reasons a business might fail including too 
much competition, business rates and the cost of running a business. 
Additionally, they are both vulnerable to the wider state of the economy so if there 
is a financial crisis the borrowers could be impacted. Consequently, although the 
P2PL itself might not be very risky, the fact that it involves individuals and sole 
traders/small businesses subject to such risks externally, it cannot claim not to 
be subject to systemic risks in the wider financial market. Through its participants, 
it is also vulnerable to systemic risk. 
 
Another argument that had been made in favour of limiting prudential regulations 
was that applying regulation to a wider range of nonbanks and financial 
instruments was too costly and would reduce innovation.885 Whilst this is a 
pertinent argument, it is based on a very narrow conception of what regulation is 
and what it is meant to achieve. The underlying assumption of this argument is 
that the market operates efficiently for all the industry participants, so that it does 
not cause harm to society. This in turn assumes that regulation should adopt a 
neutral and non-judgemental approach to the regulated subject, that is, whether 
the direction or subject being regulated is a good or bad one or could be operated 
better to the advantage of the society at large. Therefore, it does not allow for the 
notion that regulation might play a role in expressing or putting into place new 
values that might be beneficial for society, so the basis of this argument is also 
that regulators have no role in steering an industry in a particular direction. 
Rather, so long as the industry poses no harm to society it should be left to the 
industry to decide what direction it takes.  
 
However, this is not adopted in practice as demonstrated by the existence of 
social regulation which tries to achieve goals that private persons on their own 
will may not pursue, e.g. distributional justice and access to judicial remedies.886 
An example is the policy adopted by the government in relation to access to 
finance, as has been seen in the discussion of the policy behind the regulation of 
CUs in the UK, the underpinnings of said regulation has been to steer the credit 
union industry through the pursuit of making it a way to access finance for people 
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who do not typically have access to it. This in itself is a value-based goal imposed 
on the industry by the external regulators. The fact this happens suggests that it 
is possible for other goals or uses to be imposed on an industry.  
In contrast to these pre-financial crisis arguments against stringent prudential 
regulations, the crisis showed that the failure of some non-bank entities had 
systemic repercussions by disrupting the financial markets and contributing to a 
widespread loss of confidence, e.g. the failure of the Lehman Brothers early in 
the crisis.887 The largely light-touch regulation adopted by the UK financial 
regulator pre-crisis failed to take into account the systemic risks that can arise 
from the interaction between regulated and unregulated institutions because 
bank regulation did not reflect the risks of loan originators which had poor 
underwriting standards.888 This example demonstrates that financial markets are 
not mutually exclusive, if they are exposed to each other in one way or the other, 
they might be rendered vulnerable in an indirect way to the risk posed by the 
other market. e.g. a borrower who uses a P2PL platform is not necessarily 
precluded from other forms of borrowing – in fact many platforms themselves 
have used the fact that the borrowers they authorise can obtain loans from other 
sources like banks as an advertising tool. It is not uncommon for individuals or 
businesses to have multiple co-existing debts e.g. credit cards, multiple loans etc. 
Failure to pay multiple of these debts might lead to the borrower’s financial ruin 
and this could impact their ability to repay a loan. Such personal financial crises 
are exacerbated during societal financial crises which impact most members of 
society. Consequently, through their users, P2PL platforms are exposed to such 
systemic crises as well. 
A final goal of financial regulation is consumer protection. This can be both a type 
of financial law as well as a goal in the broader sense. Consumer protection aims 
to protect the weaker or more vulnerable party to financial transactions and 
prevent them from being victim to unscrupulous practices such as mis-selling of 
unsuitable products like payment protection insurance and packaged bank 
accounts; or services like irresponsible lending. There are a wide variety of 
mechanisms through which consumer protection regulation achieves these 
goals, including redress to put consumers in the position they would have been 
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in if the wrong had not been done to them; consumer protection intervention tends 
to be implemented through access to accurate information, as demonstrated by 
the FCA’s recent intervention in the P2PL markets in February 2016 because of 
misleading information having been to users about. Enforcement mechanisms 
are also used, such as the requirement that all financial firms notify their 
customers that they have access to the complaints resolution service provided by 
the Financial Ombudsman Service. However, the focus of consumer protection 
and the mechanisms provided to achieve its goals focus on the weak party in a 
B2C model of business. Consequently, the current framework of consumer 
protection does not fit all the situations that are faced by P2PLs it only provides 
for the B2C relationships between the lenders and platform and borrowers and 
the platform respectively.  
In addition to the regulatory mechanisms already mentioned, these regulatory 
goals can be achieved through several mechanisms which include rulemaking, 
supervision and certification or licensing.889 The rulemaking mechanism is the 
ability to set rules or standards to govern the acts of private persons. The rules 
act as the norm which mandates or guides conduct in each situation, and for this 
reason they need to be articulated precisely to adequately define the conduct 
which the regulator wants the target to achieve.890 The importance of this is to 
ensure that there is no regulatory confusion brought about by imprecise wording 
or lack of clarity about what is expected of the regulation’s target. The P2PL 
regulatory regime uses the rulemaking mechanism in relation to its prudential 
aims, for example, the minimum capital requirements are specific in their 
mandate for how much the platforms need to set aside in proportion to their loan 
books and the rule dictating that platforms must have a plan in place to ensure 
continued administration of loans in case of failure. The latter rule is intended to 
mandate a platform’s action but it does not provide guidance of what type of 
action should be taken which is left to the platform to decide for the sake of 
flexibility. 
The supervisory mechanism is carried out by the regulators monitoring, 
assessment and guidance of an entity’s efforts to meet the obligations set out by 
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the rules or principles established by the regulatory regime. Under their 
supervisory powers the regulator focuses on how to apply the rules.  
In addition, regulators also use certification or licensing as a mechanism to 
prevent the spread of poor quality or undesirable products and services. It has 
uses for both prudential and consumer protection purposes. From the prudential 
perspective, it can be used to minimise risks to the financial system posed by 
substandard products or firms. Indeed, many financial institutions need to be 
licensed, for example banks and now also P2PL platforms need to be licenced to 
carry out an electronic business in relation to lending, i.e. to operating a P2PL 
platform. From a consumer protection perspective, this mechanism can be used 
to ensure that only sound products and services which are beneficial to 
consumers and society members are allowed into the market. 
 
5.2.3. Types of regulation 
 
Command and Control 
 
Systems of regulatory control generally adopt the following steps: firstly, the 
regulation lays down a broad set of desirable outcomes or policy goals, e.g. 
consumer protection or responsibilisation of the consumer. Secondly, it sets 
suitable targets for achieving those goals. Lastly, it takes specific actions which 
will achieve the targets.891 Consequently, within a regulatory system, the following 
functions are required: rulemaking, communication of the rules to the regulatees, 
monitoring, enforcement, adjudication, sanctions and evaluation of the regulatory 
system.892 Command-and-control regulation typically refers to the third stage i.e. 
measures which directly affect the firm or regulated entity, and in classic 
command-and-control systems, government has a high degree of involvement in 
all of the functions of the regulatory system. 
Traditional regulation is often termed ‘command-and-control’ because it consists 
of legal standards (commands) which are reinforced by legal sanctions (controls) 
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and it is therefore a prescriptive form of regulation.893 Steele and Jewell have 
defined command-and-control regulation as the prohibition of defined behaviour 
and the enforcement of said prohibition through criminal law.894 Meanwhile Hutter 
has defined it as the command of law supported by the state’s authority.895 It 
features measures such as standard setting followed by permitting or licensing, 
monitoring and inspecting and if necessary enforcing and sanctioning. These 
definitions indicate that command-and-control regulation is centralised requiring 
state intervention to enact laws and enforce them. 
Command and control regulation has been criticised as too restricted because it 
suggests that regulatory rules are only meant to constrain, rather than aid or 
encourage activities or changes of behaviour by the regulated firm or individual. 
It has also been criticised as being costly and inefficient, causing enforcement 
difficulties and stifling innovation,896 in comparison with self-regulation. 
However, Sinclair notes that when one examines the proliferation of different 
forms of regulation which are apparently described as either command-and-
control or self-regulation, it is not easy to compartmentalise them in such a rigid 
manner, rather the range of policies fall between the two theoretically polar 
opposite forms of regulation.897 For example, enforced self-regulation/responsive 
regulation, cooperative agreements, negotiated compliance and corporate 
reporting etc.898 These policies tend to incorporate elements of both. Similarly, 
although the FCA generally adopts a principles-based approach to regulation as 
exemplified by the Better Regulation principles and its Principles of good 
regulation,899 the mechanisms used by the FCA to regulate P2PL are known to 
command-and-control regulation such as rules which are backed by sanctions 
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enforced by the regulator. Additionally, Cole and Grossman have argued that at 
least within the environmental regulation discourse, command-and-control 
regulations can and have produced social benefits which exceed their costs and 
can be more efficient than alternative economic regulatory measures.900  
Since, at least in the UK, the P2PL industry have actively sought government 
regulation, this suggests that there are benefits to command-and-control 
regulation, for example, the enforcement aspect of this regulatory form or at the 
very least, the show of doing something to regulate the industry. 
 
Self-regulation 
 
Self-regulation refers to the delegation of regulatory responsibility from the 
government to an industry or group over its own activities or behaviour.901 This 
includes voluntary codes of conduct which are voluntarily established by contract 
and usually involve very little public input in the formation.902 For example, the 
pre-April 2014 UK P2PL industry was one that had developed voluntary codes of 
conduct903 without any direct government supervision or consumer input. It was 
used to ensure certain standards within the industry were maintained. Another 
example of self-regulation is statutory self-regulation where the government 
legislates a self-regulatory structure and power is delegated to the industry or firm 
to implement it.904  
 
Self-regulation is a form of regulation that has a lot of potential to ensure the 
compliance of the regulated firm, industry or person, however as stated by Priest, 
it is more likely to work under certain conditions. For example, the existence of 
relatively few industry players; high exit costs; a history of cooperation by the 
regulatee; expertise and resources for regulation are available in the industry; 
noncompliant behaviour can be punished; consumers value compliance; fair 
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dispute settlement mechanisms exist and public participation and oversight has 
a part to play in the industry.905 This makes sense as these are factors which 
make securing compliance either easier or more efficient. For example, where 
there are fewer industry players, it would be easier for compromises to be made, 
agreements reached and to monitor each participant for compliance to the rules. 
In addition, unless the industry has the ability or authority to exercise punishment 
for non-compliance amongst each other, then the self-regulatory rules are likely 
to be toothless. So, in the absence of these factors, self-regulatory systems are 
likely to be less effective at securing compliance. Self-regulation may therefore 
require at least minimal government action to encourage the regulatory 
structure,906 for example to give it a semblance of legitimacy or the support of 
accountability. 
 
Self-regulation has many advantages over traditional forms of regulation. A 
practical advantage is that it can allow regulation that would not be feasible due 
to cost restraints, lack of skill or expertise and/or personnel, if implemented by 
the government.907 It enables the government to ensure critics that an industry is 
being regulated and the public is being protected, without having to take direct 
responsibility for implementing or enforcing the regime.908 It is also said to be a 
very flexible regime with rules that can quickly adjust to changes within the 
industry as compared to the much slower command-and-control route,909 enabling 
firms within the industry to remain competitive. 
 
However, there are several disadvantages of self-regulation. Where regulation is 
meant to protect the public interest for example, through consumer/investor 
protection or limiting irresponsible lending practices, there is a concern that self-
regulation may be used as a façade to hide the pursuit of the industry/firm’s own 
interests.910 Or they may seek self-regulation to prevent stricter and more direct 
forms of regulation.911  
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In addition, the advantage of flexibility may be limited by the possibility of 
favouritism within self-regulatory structures.912 The self-regulatory body is likely to 
be dominated by the bigger or longer established firms and may be designed to 
pursue their interests through maintenance of the status quo, at the expense of 
smaller firms and the public interest.913 This indicates a potential conflict of 
interests inherent in the self-regulatory structure which is whether the industry 
should regulate for the public interest or the industry interest. For the P2PL model, 
there might need to be a combination of both since self-regulation is often more 
effective when it works in the ‘shadow’ of government regulation.914 Regulation 
would need to be loyal to the public interest because unless its consumers, both 
lenders and borrowers, have confidence in the P2PL market, very few would use 
the service thus rendering the market irrelevant. On the other hand, in light of 
relatively recent introduction of the P2PL market, regulation would also need to 
pursue the market’s interests in flexibility, innovation and competitiveness. 
However, the issue of how regulation should balance the interests within the 
P2PL market is one that the literature does not consider. 
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Responsive regulation 
 
Securing compliance is a critical theme of regulatory enforcement which gave 
rise to the ‘deterrence vs. compliance’ debate. Supporters of deterrence 
strategies argued that only punitive sanctions would compel corporate 
compliance with the law, whilst supporters of compliance argued that this could 
only be achieved through persuasive methods.915 The debate was one-
dimensional as it focused on which regimes compelled corporate compliance. 
Ayres and Braithwaite’s two regulatory enforcement pyramids arose from the 
need to transcend this debate.916 Through the framework of these pyramids, they 
argued that regulatory agencies act more efficiently when deterrent strategies are 
balanced by persuasive tactics,917 that is, when regulation is more responsive. 
Responsive regulation is the idea that regulatory processes and decisions should 
take into account industry structures, since different structures will be amenable 
to different degrees and tools of regulation.918 In this way, the firm or industry’s 
behaviour should direct the severity of regulatory sanctions or extent of 
intervention.919 Deterrence by itself, i.e. command-and-control regulation, often 
fails to secure compliance commitment because it does not take into account 
businesses’ perceptions of the morality of the regulated activity, rather it puts a 
price on noncompliance and depends on the operation of the imposed sanctions, 
or ‘deterrence trap’, to secure compliance.920 In contrast, responsive regulation 
seeks to build moral commitment to compliance with the law.921 This idea is 
enacted by escalation and de-escalation along the pyramids’ hierarchy of levels, 
and is instigated by non-cooperation by firms/industries.922 
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By combining the two strategies, Ayres and Braithwaite highlighted that using one 
particular method is problematic because a regime that is purely punitive or 
persuasive fails to account for the varying values of corporate actors,923 leading 
to regulatory responses which lack understanding of the causes of a particular 
case of non-compliance and missing their targets by using inappropriate 
regulatory tools.924 Therefore, Ayres and Braithwaite argued that regulators need 
to be responsive to different corporate conduct and based on this, decide when 
to punish or persuade to effectively secure compliance.925 The regulatory 
pyramids seek to provide the framework for this and their ultimate aim is to 
change the behaviour/attitude of firms so they become more compliant with 
regulation and embrace socially responsible motivations as better than purely 
economic values in the long run.926 
The pyramid of regulatory enforcement (PRE) is designed to regulate individual 
firms and escalates with severity of sanction.927 Regulatory action begins at the 
base of the pyramid, where regulators push for compliance through persuasion. 
Escalation occurs upon failure of the regulated firm to cooperate with regulators, 
moving up from warning letter, to civil penalties, criminal penalty, licence 
suspension and finally licence revocation.928 However, it is not the content of the 
PRE that counts but the logic of its structure, i.e. the pyramidal shape and the 
use of escalating TFT responses.929 So, different regulators can choose which 
type of sanctions to place at each level of the pyramid depending on what is 
appropriate in their regulatory arena.  
The pyramid of regulatory strategies (PRS) works with the same logic as the PRE, 
the difference is the PRS targets industries not individual firms and increases 
state intervention.930  If regulators can convince industry associations that 
compliance with a particular law or regulation is beneficial to them, then the 
association can persuade individual firms to comply.931 At the base of the PRS 
lies self-regulation, because when it works it is cheaper for society and the 
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regulated industry. This is followed by enforced self-regulation, command 
regulation with discretionary punishment and finally command regulation with 
non-discretionary punishment.932 As with the PRE, the content of the PRS 
depends on what suits the enforcing state. One benefit of the PRS is it appears 
to treat self-regulation of companies as a privilege which can be removed or 
impinged whenever firms/industries misbehave. This slightly mitigates the 
dangers of permanent self-regulation e.g. exploitation of the privilege, and the 
performance of environmental or social responsibilities reduced to the bare 
minimum of standards. 
The hierarchy of sanctions/interventions reflect Ayres and Braithwaite’s argument 
that punishment as a first response is counterproductive.933 From the point of view 
of the state, the pyramidal strategy is economically advantageous, because it 
gives the cheaper options of persuasion and self-regulation the opportunity to 
work first and only when they fail does it utilise more expensive punitive 
strategies.934 This implies that whenever persuasion proves successful, the state 
saves resources which would have been wasted had they immediately used 
penal sanctions e.g. court proceedings.935 The EPs therefore make regulation 
cheaper, because by starting with persuasion or intervention, they inform 
companies that unless they effectively self-regulate, e.g. punish themselves 
according to agreed company policies, the regulators will punish them instead 
and they are prepared to go as far as required to do so.936 
The strategy of their enforcement pyramids has a convincing theoretical basis 
which has influenced policy documents and regulatory strategies worldwide. 937 
For example, it was applied by the Australian Tax Office’s (ATO) Compliance 
Model, helping it to manage firms’ perceptions of the morality of their conduct by 
not focusing solely on deterrent strategies.938 This enabled the ATO to settle the 
                                                          
932 ibid 38. 
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TNT freight case using reputation and publicity as an incentive for the firm to 
settle.939 
However, the logic of the enforcement pyramids, based on responsiveness and 
tit-for-tat strategy, is too focused on transcending the deterrence/compliance 
debate and thus fails to overcome weaknesses and ethical and practical 
problems inherent in the strategy. For example, whether a company cooperates 
with the regulator is the main factor for responsiveness, hence escalation occurs 
upon non-cooperation. This two-dimensional portrayal of corporate decisions and 
conduct affects the ability of regulators to take truly responsive actions and 
judgements, and potentially leads to inappropriate enforcement action. 
Additionally, the enforcement pyramids’ validity is undermined by weaknesses 
inherent in the TFT strategy such as the assumption that in every regulatory 
encounter, actors will be able to reach each other’s conduct, when in reality, 
regulators are not always certain about the details of firms’ conduct, on which 
their response depends.940 They are also undermined by the responsive method 
of regulation on which they are based, such as the conceptual problem of how to 
‘start’ using the pyramids. 
Responsive regulation is a method of regulation that may be applicable in a wide 
variety of contexts. The literature has applied it to the food industry,941 the 
environment,942 fisheries controls,943 and tax enforcement regulation944 etc. Given 
the relatively recent origin of P2PL, the literature does not consider the application 
of responsive regulation to this industry.  
Responsive regulation is not a form of regulation, but a method of implementing 
existing regulation, as such it is provides a useful framework, at least in theory, 
for analysing the potential practical implications or usefulness of P2PL regulation. 
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One concern however, is that the literature focuses on the regulation of firms and 
industries, for example, the enforcement pyramids are applied to firms. However, 
it is not clear how this can be easily translated to P2PL which necessitates the 
regulation not just of the platforms which act as intermediaries, but also of the 
borrowing and lending consumers that use the service. Responsive regulation, 
which involves the initial use of self-regulation may only be applicable to the 
regulation of the platforms as it is difficult to envision the self-regulation of 
individuals within the industry, short of stating that there is to be no regulation of 
them at all. Consequently, like the current P2PL regulatory regime, it also does 
not consider the regulation necessitated by a P2P business model. 
 
Responsibilisation 
 
However, this is something that in part seems to be encouraged by policies such 
as the responsibilisation of consumers of financial services and products. The 
responsibilisation of these individuals might be considered self-regulation at the 
individual level. To responsibilise an individual is to enhance his awareness of his 
own responsibility for the decisions he makes and for finding solutions to his 
investment or financial problems.945  
The responsibilisation of consumers is often thought to be achieved through 
financial literacy and education.946 Williams notes that the economic model of 
financial education often couches it in terms of the ‘empowerment’ of financial 
consumers because it is supposed that education reduces barriers to 
participation in markets and improves the accessibility of key information.947 This 
is because the confusion caused by the increasing supply and variety of financial 
products, coupled with information asymmetries, i.e. the risk of the market 
circulating poor-quality or unusable information and the complexity of the 
available information, means that consumers’ interests are threatened, 
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particularly their interests in financial products supplied under long-term 
contracts.948 
In this way, education acts together with consumer protection regulation to 
improve decision-making skills and help individuals to benefit from remedies such 
as disclosure.949 However, others view financial education as a shift of 
responsibility for personal economic security from the state to the individual and 
as an expression of the interests of states and firms in expanding consumer 
financial markets.950 Policy discourse often conceives of financial illiteracy as a 
problem of national interest, linking it to the performance of domestic financial 
markets and the overall health of national economies.951 For example, an OECD 
report asserted that higher levels of financial literacy would help all economies 
and potentially moderate the volatility of financial markets in ‘emerging 
economies’.952  
However, whilst responsibilising the consumer might be empowering them to 
seek private means of protecting their interests, it also encourages individualistic 
tendencies and contributes to the erosion of solidarity as the key principle of 
social policy.953 It fails to address issues of public and collective goods for 
example, collective information and action.954 Additionally, the limits of the 
effectiveness of information provision have already been discussed in the review 
of the literature on paternalism above. The weaknesses inherent in the provision 
of information necessitate that any regulation with the goal of responsibilising the 
consumer, should be accompanied by other regulations to ensure that the market 
runs efficiently from the perspective of both the recipients and the industry. 
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Within the context of P2PL, responsibilising regulations, may take the form of 
ensuring the “lendsumers”955 access accurate information about current market 
prices i.e. loan prices, or from the borrowers’ perspective, educating them about 
the risks of taking on new borrowing. This could help ensure the efficient running 
of the market by preventing market failures caused by mis-pricing of or 
overestimation of how much an investment might be worth and by contributing to 
the reduction of borrowers who borrow more than they know they can repay. 
Educating the consumer does not need to be reserved to preventing potential 
problems, but could also consist of directing consumer lenders or borrowers to 
various solutions to their problems – however, this would mean that the consumer 
would have to take personal steps to resolve their own problems. However, within 
P2PL they might not be able to do so, for example, privately recuperating unpaid 
debts from a borrower, might be impossible because lenders may not have 
access to this information for data protection purposes.  
 
5.2.4. Dual Regulation and Civil Liability Approach 
 
Regulation and civil liability relationship 
As discussed in Chapter Four, P2PLs are provided with some protections within 
the UK regulation. However, whilst they can seek ordinary contract and tort laws’ 
remedies for certain wrongdoings, lenders cannot privately enforce the 
protections enacted for their benefit in the regulatory instruments. This relates to 
the principles surrounding statutory liability. The basic rule is that a breach of 
statutory duty is not a private law cause of action for damages. The presumption, 
as originally stated by Lord Tenterden CJ Doe d. Murray is that “where an Act 
creates an obligation, and enforces the performance in a specified manner…that 
performance cannot be enforced in any other manner”.956 In Lonrho Ltd v Shell 
Petroleum Co Ltd (No),957 Lord Diplock confirmed that a statutory duty can only 
be enforced in the manner prescribed by statute.958He, however, identified two 
exceptions to thee presumption: firstly, on a true construction of the relevant 
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statute, it is clear that the obligation or prohibition was imposed for the benefit or 
protection of a particular class of individuals; and secondly, the statute creates a 
public right and a member of the public suffers what Brett J in Benjamin v Storr 
described as “particular, direct and substantial” damage “other and different from 
that which was common to the rest of the public.”959 Consequently, one of the 
main factors which determines whether there is a statutory right of action is 
whether the scope and wording of a statute demonstrates that Parliament 
intended to make the prescribed duty one owed to private members of the public 
or a public duty only. 
The English courts have found no relevant intention of Parliament in some cases. 
For example, in Harris v Evans960 it was held that taking into account the intention 
of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974,to protect the public, the Health and 
Safety Executive did not owe a duty of care to a business owner regarding 
information provided by one of its inspectors about the safety requirements for 
that business. The reasoning that a duty of care would likely cause untoward 
cautiousness that would be detrimental to the proper discharge of the Executive’s 
enforcement responsibilities. Likewise, in Badham v Lambs Ltd,961 the court had 
to consider whether s.1 of the Road Traffic Act 1934 which deemed it unlawful to 
sell a motor vehicle in a condition that would render its use on a road illegal, gave 
the purchaser a right of action against the seller. The defendant in the case had 
sold the claimant a second-hand car that was unlawful to drive because it had 
defective brakes. Consequently, the claimant brought an action for damages for 
breach of statutory duty. It was held that the main objective of the legislation was 
to punish offenders and not to protect purchasers of motor vehicles or provide a 
right of action and nothing in it showed relevant parliamentary intention. Duparc 
LJ insisted that the legislation “does not say so”, apart from providing financial 
penalties for guilty sellers. 
The second exception is that if on construction of the statute, it appears it was 
passed for the benefit of a particular section of the community, and the claimant 
belongs to this community, there is a strong ground for concluding that an action 
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will arise.962  However, if the statutory duty appears to be for the protection of 
society as a whole, rather than a limited class, there is no private right of action 
as decided in DC Accountancy Services Ltd v Education Development 
International Plc.963 A quasi-regulator imposed a sanction on the provider of 
education services for alleged poor service. The provider’s claim in tort for 
negligent assessment failed because the regulator owed a duty of care to the 
general public and not to the provider specifically. 
The general rule also applies even in cases where Parliament had the intention 
to protect, but does not provide a remedy for breach of the regulatory measure 
imposed. In R v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison Ex p. Hague the House of 
Lords held that because the fact that a particular regulatory provision was 
intended to protect certain individuals is insufficient to confer private law rights of 
action.964 The case concerned prisoner segregation in good faith in breach of 
procedures prescribed by the Prison Rules 1964 under the Prison Act 1952. The 
prisoner’s claim for damages for false imprisonment failed. 
Although there is no rule against recovering economic loss in an action for breach 
of statutory duty if the claimant can prove that the purpose of the statute was to 
protect his/her financial interests, the courts may be slow to infer such an 
intention. Stuart Smith LJ in Richardson v Pitt-Stanley opined that the court would 
be less likely to construe a civil cause of action arising out of statute for mere 
economic loss, than in cases relating to the safety and health of a particular class 
of persons.965 For P2P users then, it is necessary for the statute or regulation to 
specifically provide for a right of action since they are more likely to claim for 
economic loss rather than physical injury. 
 
P2PL regulation and civil liability relationship  
As mentioned in the previous section, it is generally the case that a statutory duty 
does not automatically provide individuals with a private right of action against 
offending parties, which in the context of P2PL regulation, would be the platforms. 
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The regulatory instruments made under the FSMA 2012 in relation to P2PL 
specifically state that they do not give rise to any rights of action for P2PLs and 
borrowers. Consequently, P2PL users only have the usual private actions 
provided by ordinary rules of contract. Since P2PL platforms are not party to the 
lending transaction, users do not have direct means of pursuing justice or 
enforcement of rights against the platforms or at the very least a causal link would 
be difficult prove. Therefore, in the UK P2PL regulatory system, the relationship 
between civil liability and regulatory liability is tenuous at best and non-existent 
at worst. 
 
Regulation and civil liability in P2PL regulatory regime 
Civil liability is an older form of regulation and enforcement than administrative 
regulation.966 Whereas regulation is an ex ante approach to providing victims with 
a remedy, civil liability consists of an ex post approach.967 Typically, regulation 
requires that the regulated party should pay a fine if there has been a violation of 
regulatory standards, the criteria of which the concerned parties are already 
aware of.968 This is the case even where no harm has occurred from violations of 
regulations.969 However, one problem with regulatory measures is that an offender 
will only pay the fine if the regulatory authorities are aware of the wrongdoing.970 
The effect is that the protections provided by public regulatory measures are 
effective only in so much as the regulatory agencies enforcing them are. 
Nonetheless, this can equally apply to private regulation which depends on the 
will of private actors to pursue rights of action in court. Other remedies of 
administrative regulation include disqualification, revocation of a licence and in 
some cases imprisonment.971 Overall, regulation provides potential offenders with 
the incentive not to engage in misconduct. Regulatory authorities also have 
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access to public funds to assist in enforcement of regulation, the authority to 
collect fines and when formulating regulatory standards, they can do so following 
thorough information gathering about the regulated industry and users.972 
In contrast to regulation, civil liability is a court-based form of regulation in which 
courts set the due level of care based on the nature and facts of particular 
cases.973 This means that standards are not completely clear to parties before 
cases arrive in court.974 As mentioned above, this system of regulation only 
provides protection through payment of damages if victims exercise their right of 
action in court. Used alone, this form of regulatory protection is vulnerable to the 
apathy of potential claimants. For example, even if the total damage caused by 
perpetrators is very high, the individual damage might not be. Consequently, 
rational self-interested victims might not wish to expend the time, effort and legal 
expenses associated with the court system of redress.975 This is known as rational 
apathy.976 Additionally, the burden of proof lies on claimants to prove that the 
perpetrator has acted negligently or that they have suffered loss or harm because 
of the perpetrator’s misconduct.977 It is therefore substantially linked to the idea of 
blame and the need for a causal link between the misconduct and the harm 
experienced by the victim.978 Furthermore, private remedies are also usually only 
effective as long as the wrongdoer is solvent because the typical civil remedies 
are damages award, although avoidance of financial transactions is also 
possible.979 These factors mean that private enforcement often leads to less 
enforcement than administrative regulation.980 
However, these weaknesses do not necessarily mean that one form of regulation 
is better than the other and that administrative regulation should be chosen over 
and above civil regulation. Historically, the relationship between civil liability and 
administrative regulation has been one of “relative functional complementarity”.981 
This is where one form of regulation compensates for the weaknesses of the 
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other.982 For example, Cafaggi gives the example of how as civil liability did not 
ensure sufficient protection to workers and victims of road traffic accidents, 
regulators intervened to provide regulatory schemes primarily aimed at 
compensation.983 Similarly, as de-regulation decreased the level of protection, this 
forced civil liability to expand its remit to protect old and new victims.984  
Regulation often intervenes when civil liability is unable to provide victims with 
adequate compensation due to difficulty of proving a causal link or limited range 
of remedies.985 Likewise, public regulatory agencies act under an administrative 
framework and therefore take only expressly prescribed actions into 
consideration.986 This often makes them to respond only to intentional wrongs and 
leave aside negligent breaches, making public regulation to be less flexible than 
private enforcement.987 As regulators are subject to budgetary constraints, the 
range of supervisory actions available to them is limited which results in an 
inability to police every aspect of the financial market.988 In contrast, because 
private parties usually the first person to become aware of the perpetrator’s 
breach of duty, they may be the first person to respond against it.989 Therefore, 
the roles performed by civil liability and administrative regulation complement 
each other, but they do not do the exact same thing. Their respective strengths 
and abilities should be better harnessed in P2PL regulation by combining them 
for a more effective protective regulatory regime. Sections 5.5 and 5.6 
demonstrate that gatekeeper liability is a step in this direction. The doctrine not 
only considers the high degree of control exercised by platforms in P2PL 
transactions and thus reflects the need for corresponding responsibility, but it also 
helps to reduce the difficulties associated with seeking justice through civil rights 
of action such as proving a causal link to the financial intermediary.  
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5.3 P2PL in the Wider Financial Regulation Framework 
 
As highlighted in chapter four, one problem with the P2PL regulatory regime is 
that although it calls lenders consumers, the regulatory approach that the FCA 
has adopted is still based on the business-to-consumer paradigm of regulation, 
rendering its treatment of P2PL as P2P nominal only. Consequently, it does not 
reflect the new concept underlying the P2PL business model, i.e. one of 
intermediated consumer-to-consumer or prosumer-to-consumer structure. 
Arguably, old concepts should give way to new concepts and regulators should 
not, as the FCA has done, try to adapt old concepts to new ones because they 
cannot fit. The P2PL industry has demonstrated that a new method of doing 
business has emerged and is still evolving, so law and regulation should also 
adapt to the new concepts and regulate on its basis. This is essential to produce 
clarity in the law. 
Despite the widespread knowledge, use and popularity of businesses like eBay, 
Uber, micro-lending and more directly relevant to this thesis, P2PL, which are 
based on the underlying concept of a C2C business model, the C2C concept is 
still largely unseen in law and regulation of financial services. This is particularly 
the case because regulatory measures tend to only understand the business-to-
consumer relationship, which is why regulation adopts and reflects this approach. 
The fact that the P2P regulatory regime is limited to the regulation of the P2P 
platforms only, demonstrates the importance of clarity of language and an 
understanding of the theoretical concepts underpinning the practical side of 
business operation. Although insight of the practicalities is important, this should 
not be at the expense of theory. 
Although the P2PL regulatory regime has been lauded by the P2PL and 
crowdfunding industries as flexible and proportionate, this is not unexpected, 
because the main concern of the industry practitioners, i.e. the platform 
operators, is the growth and development of their business. For example, the 
FCA recently warned P2P platforms about their promotions because it had found 
that some services had been comparing loans to savings accounts without 
explaining how the returns would be taxed or showing the APRs clearly. In 
response Christine Farnish, the chair of the Peer-to-Peer Finance Association, 
stated that “The report is correct to highlight incidences of where companies have 
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misled customers and the FCA is right to take a tough line as this could bring the 
whole sector into disrepute.”990 This demonstrates that their concern for consumer 
safety and the need for regulation is tied to this because from their perspective, 
regulation and consumer protective measures are good for business, i.e. they 
inspire confidence in and encourage use of their platforms by potential lenders 
and borrowers.  
Consequently, whilst approval of current regulation by industry practitioners is a 
good sign that a regulatory regime may work, it should not wholly be relied on as 
it risks regulatory capture and the potential to overlook the perspectives of all the 
relevant parties within the transaction. Secondly, approval of the current 
regulation is not a sign that it will be approved of in the future, as no one can 
predict future events which may render the regulation ineffective. Rather, a better 
sign that regulation of the P2PL business model will be effective is that it first 
recognises the concept of the P2P within its framework because in doing so, it 
will not overlook and/or compromise the very structure of the P2PL market, i.e. 
its ability to operate on a P2P level. 
 
5.4 Importance of Clarity in Regulation 
 
Following on from this, the importance of the clarity of language for regulation 
cannot be understated. One reason for this can be expressed in the words of 
John L Austin who said that, “to say something is to do something; or in which by 
saying something we are doing something.”991 This questions the assumption that 
to say or write an idea merely states the case or describes it.992 This is not the 
case, because how an idea is conceived can influence how it is put into effect. 
This is demonstrated in the theory of grammar by the concept of a ‘performative 
statement’. For example, whilst on the face of it, such statements appear to be 
merely statements, in fact, by saying them a person is doing something, i.e. they 
cause something to happen. Austin gives the example of the statement given 
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when a person makes their marriage vows, “I do” (take this woman/man to be my 
lawful wedded wife/husband).993 Under the right circumstances, by stating these 
words the person is actually doing them, i.e. marrying the person, not just 
describing or reporting that they are doing or going to do so.994 
Linked to this, another reason why it is important to express a concept correctly 
is because of the productive power of language. This idea that language has the 
power to influence and create is not new and can be found in the linguistics 
literature and age-old religions. For example, within the Judeo-Christian tradition, 
the world began through the divine, creative power imbibed in a phrase, “‘let there 
be light’, and there was light.” In a similar vein, Sutton argues that language is 
not just a medium for communicating stereotypes and prejudices, rather, it is a 
causal force in its own right because it also has the power to create, augment 
and transform them.995 This means language can affect as well as reflect how 
people think and react to certain concepts. An example is the metaphor of 
language as a lens which focuses and directs cognition, i.e. has power over it. 
Like a lens, language has the power to direct the focus of the sender’s and 
recipients’ attention, thought and memory. Consequently, Ng found that the use 
in English language of the masculine terms like ‘man’ and ‘his’ to express 
genderless concepts like ‘humanity’, ‘mankind’ and ‘people’, is not perceived by 
some people as referring to both men and women. Rather it influences their 
thoughts to such an extent that in a memory test it was found that they had 
encoded the masculine generic to refer to men only.996 The implication of this is 
that male individuals will be viewed as the ones who are responsible for the feats 
of ‘mankind’, not women.997 Consequently, language or concepts expressed 
incorrectly can intentionally or otherwise focus attention and understanding in the 
wrong direction. As stated by Phillips and Hardy, “social reality is produced and 
made real through discourses, and social interactions cannot be fully understood 
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without reference to the discourses that give them meaning.”998 Similarly, Watson 
argues that language is not separate from action and reality and that 
“language…is itself action, and plays a part in the construction of realities.”999 
Similar arguments have been made within the context of regulation. For example, 
Osuji argues that language effects how regulators, stakeholders and businesses 
respond to particular issues.1000 And that a regulatory strategy that amalgamates 
different concepts together can have significant consequences.1001 For example, 
a particular regulatory issue may derive from an ethical basis and not from one 
based on the economic benefits for the business, as a result, the business or 
industry at large may view it as non-essential for regulatory purposes despite its 
relevance to society.1002 This is particularly so in regulatory environments like the 
FCA regime where government policy leans towards encouraging growth of the 
sector that is being regulated. 
On this basis, the idea also extends to regulation because how a concept is 
conceived influences how law or regulation relating to it is written, which in turn 
influences how it is first interpreted and then how it is applied. If the regulation 
misunderstands or uses a limited conception of the subject it is regulating, this 
effects the conduct of those who are going to comply with it and this may shape 
business proceedings or consumer rights either negatively or positively 
depending on the concept adopted. Therefore, it is important for there to be clarity 
of language within regulation. 
A legal example of this problem is demonstrated by the way the SGA 1979 
defines the concept of ‘goods’, how this relates to digital content and the effect it 
has on the consumers. In recent times, the internet has changed the way 
commerce works and how people transact with one another. Items that were once 
sold in physical formats such as books, music and computer software can now 
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be sold as downloadable digital content like eBooks, mp3 music and computer 
programs. One would think that so long as the item is the same, the purchaser of 
will be provided with the same legal protections regardless of whether they 
purchased it on the internet or physically. However, this depends on whether the 
item qualifies as a good under the SGA 1979. 
Whether computer software can be classified as a good has been the subject of 
much debate. The SGA 1979 defines the term in s. 61(1) as including “all 
personal chattels other than things in action and money.” This definition was 
created by the original SGA 1893 in s.62(1) when there was no such thing as the 
internet or digital technology. Even when the 1979 Act was enacted, the internet 
and digital technology were in their nascent phase. However, since the 
establishment of the SGA, the commercial world, has developed at a fast pace 
producing new ways of carrying out sales of goods transactions.1003 Yet, the 
definition of goods was based on a conceptualisation of the word that is tied to 
the traditional idea of physical, store-bought goods, e.g. software bought in the 
form of a CD. The lawmakers did not envision the possibility of sale of goods 
transactions occurring on the internet, where a software could be downloaded 
directly to the buyer’s computer.  
Central to the problem is the fact that the concept of goods is tied to the issue of 
tangibility, such that intangible things cannot be classified as goods. From a legal 
perspective, the classification of digital content is ambiguous because there is no 
consistency in how it is classified at common law. The legal consequence of the 
SGA 1979 is that digital content such as eBooks and computer software that is 
downloaded directly from the internet to the buyer’s computer would not be 
classified as a good because they are intangible, e.g. computer software 
comprises of a set of computer instructions like a manual, which is strictly 
intangible. However, if the exact same eBook or software was supplied on a CD 
they would fall within the definition of goods under the SGA 1979.1004 
Consequently, how an item is classified depends on how it is purchased and the 
relevant law applicable to a transaction will depend on whether the digital content 
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has been delivered through a physical medium or downloaded from the internet, 
regardless of whether the purpose of such transactions might be the same in the 
mind of the consumer. 
Whether digital content should be treated as “goods” in the ordinary sense as 
defined by the SGA 1979 is a much-debated issue, as is whether they are 
“services” under the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982. Indeed, Bray and 
Kerry argue that digital content cannot be treated as goods because the SGA 
does not cover intangible items and ownership in goods tends to be transferred 
to the buyer whereas digital content is simply licensed and so cannot technically 
be considered a sale.1005  
As a result of the digital and therefore, intangible nature of computer software, 
their sale over the internet has been classified as a sale of services rather than 
as a sale of goods. Therefore, it has been regulated under the Supply of Goods 
and Services Act 1982. Bradgate discusses these differences in considerable 
detail in his influential report, for example, he states that only contracts for sale 
of “goods” benefit from the protections afforded by the implied terms in sections 
12-15 of the SGA 1979.1006 The 1982 Act provides consumers with a lower level 
of protection for the product transferred during the sale than is provided by the 
SGA 1979.1007 For example, in the Supply of Goods Act the supplier must ensure 
that they provide a service with reasonable skill and care whereas under the SGA 
1979, the seller must ensure that the good is of satisfactory quality and s.13 
stipulates that if the sale of goods takes place by description, as often happens 
online, there is an implied term that the goods should correspond with the 
description by which they were sold. This produces an unfair situation for 
consumers who purchase the digital content not suspecting that their chosen 
medium of purchase, whether they purchase the content in CD format online or 
instore, or whether they purchase a digital version of the same product online, 
can produce significant differences in the legal protection they are afforded under 
the two separate acts. The lack of clarity in the law in this area has been caused 
                                                          
1005 Oliver Bray and Ben Kerry, ‘Digital Content under the Consumer Rights Act 2015’ (2015) 26 
Entertainment Law Review 271, 271. 
1006 Robert Bradgate and Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, ‘Consumer Rights in 
Digital Products’ (Institute for Commercial Law Studies, University of Sheffield 2010) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31837/10-1125-
consumer-rights-in-digital-products.pdf> accessed 3 January 2017. 
1007 ibid. 
290 
 
by an arbitrary conceptualisation of the term ‘goods’ in relation to software, largely 
because of the courts and lawmakers reluctance to soften or completely remove 
the concept’s ties with the notion of tangibility, at least so far as the internet is 
concerned. However, under the Consumer Rights Act 2015, consumer contracts 
for the provision of digital content, defined as “data which are produced and 
supplied in digital form,”1008 are required to be of satisfactory quality,1009 fit for 
purpose1010 and as described.1011 This provides consumers of digital content with 
similar protections as consumers of traditional “goods” under the SGA. Thus the 
Act brings the law closer to the digital and internet age. 
The digital content example demonstrates how a concept is initially conceived 
can have considerable consequences for its practical application. This issue is 
exacerbated in cases involving rapidly developing areas or industries such as e-
commerce and the internet. Whereas in the defining of the concept of ‘goods’ for 
the SGA, the internet was so embryonic that it is possible to suggest that 
lawmakers did not conceive the role it would later play in commercial 
transactions, the same cannot be said for the regulation of P2PL. In this context, 
regulators already have an idea of not just the fact that the industry evolves 
rapidly and so may play a much greater role in online financial transactions in the 
future – something they are hoping for and aim to facilitate through their 
regulation – but they also already have examples of the basic concept underlying 
the P2PL industry. For example, the online C2C model has been operating online 
and successfully for years in the form of online marketplaces like eBay and 
Alibaba. So, failing to take this concept into account in the first P2PL regulation 
was a missed opportunity and one which could also affect the rights and 
responsibilities of individuals using the P2P platforms. 
However, there are examples of the law adapting to changing concepts to make 
the regulated industry or subject area workable, e.g. the adaptation of the law to 
include digital goods and emails. The implication is that the same can be done 
for the regulation of lendsumers specifically and the C2C financial model of 
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transactions in general. An example of this is how contract law has adapted the 
need for writing to accommodate electronic contracts in e-commerce.  
The different form of transaction online meant that the requirements of writing 
were no longer always suitable as few businesses are likely to retain old ways of 
doing business.1012 As a result of the internet businesses can create and perform 
contracts using electronic mediums without the need to meet either face-to-face 
by using websites, emails and chat services.1013 Emails are comparable with 
letters sent through the postal system because they are typically written and 
distributed by a person for another person or group; the contents of the mail are 
personal and includes only the sender and recipient and emails can be digitally 
signed.1014 It can be used in commerce to communicate information pertaining to 
the contract negotiations, offer and acceptance or a draft copy of the contract.1015 
And if the contract relates to electronic goods, the email can itself be the object 
of the transaction1016 or used as a method of delivery of the items, in this way 
applying it to performance of the contract. 
In contract law, some types of agreement are subject to formalities requiring them 
to be made or evidenced in writing, failing which, the contract would not be 
enforced. Reasons behind this include the need for evidence of the agreement, 
to put the parties on notice, or to mark the transition between the stages of 
negotiation and contract.1017 In addition, the aim of using signatures in commerce 
is to provide the parties to a contract with certainty about the identity of the 
signatory and his or her personal involvement in the act of signing and the 
authenticity of the transaction documents.1018 The vast amount of online 
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transactions is ever increasing and the same need for certainty is needed online 
as much as it was offline.  
Whilst the concepts of a contract in writing and a signature make sense in a 
physical world where contracts are made of paper and signatures are signed 
manually, this is not so much the case in the paperless online environment. 
However, the case of J Pereira1019 demonstrates the court’s willingness and ability 
to adapt the concept of writing to suit an electronic means of communication, i.e. 
email.  
In that case, the defendant was a director of a company which failed to pay for 
goods supplied to it by the claimant so the claimant petitioned for the company to 
be wound up. The defendant asked one of his staff members to send an email to 
the claimant’s solicitors requesting that the hearing of the winding up petition be 
adjourned subject to him giving a personal guarantee for the amount owed by the 
company. His name did not appear in the body of the email but this was 
automatically supplied by the ISP. The claimant’s solicitors orally accepted the 
proposal and agreements were sent to the defendant. However, the defendant 
did not return them, neither did he pay the amounts owed. The District Judge held 
that for the purposes of section four of the Statute of Frauds 1677 – which, before 
it was repealed, required written evidence and a signature for an agreement to 
be enforceable – the email constituted a guarantee and the presence of his email 
address was constituted a signature. 
On appeal, Judge Pelling held that the email could be deemed to be sufficient 
writing for the purposes of the 1677 Act. Although, he held that the automatic 
inclusion of the defendant’s email address was not sufficient to constitute a 
signature and on this basis, the guarantee was not enforceable. In this case the 
judge treated an email in a similar way one would treat a physical document as 
the focus in his consideration was on its contents rather than the medium itself.1020 
Similarly, the concept of signatures has been adapted to e-commerce through 
the article 9(1) of the EC Directive on Electronic Commerce (2000/31 OJ L178/1), 
which requires EU member states to ensure that their respective legal systems 
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enables the possibility for contracts to be concluded by electronic means without 
the creation of obstacles which could divest them of their legal effectiveness. 
So far it has been demonstrated that there is a need for law and regulation to 
properly conceive of new concepts and demonstrate an understanding of the 
concept in regulation designed for it. It has also been shown that failure to do so 
can have adverse effects on those subject to the regulation. By analogy the same 
issue applies to P2PL regulation and the need to understand the underlying 
concept of a peer-to-peer operational framework. 
P2PL is a new type of financial intermediation and it is not just a conceptual issue 
as it has financial consequences for the economy if it continues to grow. Current 
projections are that the industry will continue to do so. The implication is that it 
needs regulation which sees and treats it for what it is conceptually.  
In an interview with the BBC on 10th February 2016, Lord Adair Turner, the 
former chair of the defunct Financial Services Authority (FSA) issued a grave 
warning about the potential for the P2PL industry to be the cause of losses that 
would, “make the worst bankers look like absolute lending geniuses”. This 
statement of course refers to the bankers’ now infamous role in the financial crisis 
of 2008. The relevance of this statement is clear against the backdrop of some 
industry practitioners like Funding Circle which launched its investment trust in 
November 2015 raising £150 million; as P2P loans have started to be securitised 
in the US; and as more platforms are beginning to work with institutional 
partners.1021 The industry has largely reacted with harsh disagreement with the 
Lord Turner’s warning, resorting at times to personal references to his own 
handling of the former FSA. However, what must be emphasised is the inability 
to predict the future and the possibility that something that appears to be safe 
and useful in now may in the future prove otherwise should the economic 
environment change. So, it is necessary to maintain a neutral stance to an 
industry if it is the subject of regulation and not allow oneself to be blinded by the 
desire for and potential of an innovative, ‘upstart’ industry to produce positive 
societal goals. 
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Lord Turner was concerned about the simple and light way that the platforms 
themselves perform credit checks.1022 However, it is also in reality indicative of the 
great potential of the industry to become increasingly mainstream as is desired 
by the government and regulators for the benefit of the economy and by industry 
practitioners for the benefit of their business. If it does, then it could affect the rest 
of the economy and financial services eventually reaching ordinary members of 
society who would not normally invest in the stock markets or in property etc. 
Such individuals may start borrowing money to lend on P2P platforms – 
something that already occurs in other forms of investment like property 
investment. There, it is not unheard of for investors to take out credit cards, 
bridging loans etc., to leverage their spending power within the investment. This 
illustrates how if the enthusiasm for the P2PL industry follows suit, the potential 
for the industry to affect the wider financial economy through the 
interconnectedness of the consumers’ investments with external sources of 
borrowing. 
For this reason, it is a mistake for regulation to conflate the two different business 
models of ‘crowdfunding’ and ‘peer-to-peer lending’. The FCA regulation uses the 
term ‘crowdfunding’ as an umbrella term to denote multiple different forms of 
marketplace lending because it is convenient to do so. The FCA regulation is 
capable of distinguishing between the different types of P2PL operation, e.g. it 
distinguishes between loan-based lending, investment-based lending, donation 
and rewards-based lending. However, the use of the term crowdfunding, has 
influenced the regulation in such a way that it no longer conceives of P2PL as 
peer-to-peer. This is reflected in how the regulation includes P2B and even B2B 
scenarios (since small businesses can be seen as consumers) as well under the 
regulation. The result of which is a regulation that should be regulating a person-
to-person industry, but instead regulates it in the same way that it would normally 
regulate a business-to-consumer industry – by focusing only on the business 
participant in the tripartite participant relationship. As a consequence, it misses 
the opportunity to see the P2PLs for what they are, instead treating them in the 
same way as consumers who operate in a business-to-consumer environment, 
rather than as prosumers who are vulnerable to business’ practices and state of 
health, as well as the borrower’s actions, but are arguably even more vulnerable 
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than an ordinary consumer because of the additional risks and responsibilities 
they take on in combination with their dependency on the platform once the 
contract is underway. These roles and characteristics do not benefit from a 
corresponding control or power to prevent those risks from materialising or an 
ability to enforce their interests in the way institutional characters like banks can 
in a comparable position. Additionally, the P2PL industry does not provide the 
lenders with any rights against them or a malfeasant borrower should things go 
awry as part of their business structure – which can be contrasted to eBay which 
as part of its business structure provides its customers with an internal alternative 
dispute resolution mechanism to hold each other accountable.  It could be argued 
that the regulation is merely reflecting the current state of the industry. However, 
regulation that intends to protect the lender/investor/consumer as the FCA regime 
states it intends to, does also have a role to play in directing its attentions at the 
subjects and beneficiaries that matter. In a purely P2PL context, this should 
include a focus on the needs and responsibilities of lenders and borrowers and 
creating a level field on which they can operate in respect of all three P2PL 
participants, and not just the respective two-way relationship between the 
borrower and the platform or the lender and the platform. It is also not unfeasible 
for regulation to step in to create rights within an industry where none exist – after 
all, this is the basis of consumer protection law in the first place, i.e. the law 
intervening to create rights where none previously existed. 
Additionally, the P2PL regulatory regime does not consider the ways that different 
forms of crowdfunding differ conceptually. For example, this thesis has focused 
on person-to-person (P2PL) in its purest form, where individuals are on either 
side of the transaction. However, with other forms of crowdfunding, it may not be 
individuals on either side, it could be consumer-to-business and on in some cases 
institution-to-consumer. So, on a conceptual level, they differ because rather than 
two consumers meeting and transacting, you have a business and consumer 
intermediated by the platform and sometimes a mixture because of the nature of 
crowdfunding. This is significant because it changes the dynamics of the 
relationships between the participants and may even negate in some cases the 
relevance of consumer protection law – which will not be appropriate for a 
business, hedge fund or pension fund for example. Consequently, the regulation 
needs to be separate to not only provide separate rights and protections for 
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lendsumers and borrowers in the context of pure P2PL compared with the 
participants of other forms of marketplace lending. 
 
5.5 Inapplicability of Doctrine of Passivity to P2PL 
 
There is a classical division between passive and active intermediaries. When an 
intermediary actively participates in actions or conduct of the primary actor, the 
doctrine of passivity applies. Examples of passive intermediaries can include, 
search engines, social networks and online marketplaces. These types of 
intermediaries do not create content or involve themselves with the online 
activities of their users.1023 Whereas examples of active intermediaries can include 
banks, CUs and brokers.  
It might be argued that because P2P platforms are not party to the lending 
contract, they should not be held liable if the contract fails or if the participants 
engage in illegal or socially harmful activities whilst using its platform services. 
The doctrine of passivity is a potential justification for limiting the liability of P2P 
platforms for actions carried out by a borrower or lender when a lending 
agreement goes awry. However, it is argued that P2P platforms are not at all 
passive and so should not benefit from the protection of the doctrine of passivity. 
Consequently, in this context, the doctrine of passivity demonstrates why and 
how P2PL platforms can be held liable for their participants’ behaviour.  It is not 
possible for P2PL platforms to argue non-liability based on non-involvement 
because even at the most basic P2PL model, the platforms are involved at every 
stage of the transaction: formation, management and enforcement.  
There is a need for a functional approach to the regulation of P2PL platforms 
which takes into consideration the active role that platforms play in the P2PL 
lending transaction. The fundamental idea behind this is that P2PL platforms are 
not merely inactive conduits through which P2PL transactions come to exist. The 
fact that they are actively involved in the transaction justifies holding them 
responsible when things go wrong. As P2PL platforms have a lot of involvement 
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in the P2PL transaction lifecycle, it is not unreasonable to expect them to bear a 
proportionate amount of responsibility and to be held accountable for the P2PL 
participants’ actions.  
The underlying premise behind this is that if an online intermediary is passive and 
has very little involvement in the activity complained of, they should not be held 
accountable when things go wrong.  
To understand why a non-passive intermediary like P2P platforms should be held 
liable for third party actions, it is first necessary to understand the concept of a 
passive intermediary. A similar concept to this is considered in regulation 17(1) 
of The Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulation 2002 which contains what 
has been called the ‘mere conduit’ defence.1024 It states: 
“Where an information society service is provided which consists of the 
transmission in a communication network of information provided by a recipient 
of the service or the provision of access to a communication network, the service 
provider (if he otherwise would) shall not be liable for damages or for any other 
pecuniary remedy or for any criminal sanction as a result of that transmission 
where the service provider – a) did not initiate the transmission; b) did not select 
the receiver of the transmission; and c) did not select or modify the information 
contained in the transmission.” 
The subject matter of subsection a) pertains to causation, and to a positive act. It 
indicates that a service provider that did not start a transmission or cause one to 
come into being cannot be held responsible for that transmission. The wording of 
the clause also precludes any form of negligent or vicarious responsibility 
because it requires the accused service provider to have caused the 
transmission. Consequently, if a third party who the service provider supplies or 
is responsible for creates a wrongful transmission, liability for the transmission 
would remain solely with the third party and not vest in the service provider. The 
subsection also appears to require the service provider to have done more than 
just allow something to have been started. For one to ‘initiate’, one must do 
something, or take an action. Therefore, the wording of the regulation also 
requires the active participation of the service provider in whatever qualifies as 
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the ‘initiation’ of the transmission, be it the creation, sending or dissemination of 
the transmission. 
However, the defence against liability provided by regulation 17(1) is a narrow 
one. Although, causation is only part of a multi-stage test for liability under this 
provision. Based on the wording, the provision requires that all three factors be 
present for a service provider to be found not liable for a transmission. 
Consequently, it is not enough that a service provider did not cause the 
transmission; it also must not have played a part in selecting the receiver of the 
transmission or have any control over the information within the transmission 
either. It therefore follows that if a service provider played no part in the initiation 
of the transmission, but exercised control over the transmission by modifying it in 
some way and/or played a role in choosing who received the transmission, the 
service provider in question could still be found liable for the wrongful 
transmission. 
Subsections b) and c) relate to the provision of access to the transmission.1025 
They both hint at the underlying concept of control. In subsection a) the control 
lies in the service provider’s ability or action in determining who receives or 
accesses the transmission. Whereas subsection c) relates to whether the service 
provider had any role in determining the information transmitted. The implication 
on the defence of ‘mere conduit’ is that it is based on the idea that the lack of 
control over the transmission demonstrates a lack of responsibility or blame for 
its consequences which justifies precluding or limiting the service provider’s 
liability. 
The concept was discussed briefly in the case of Bunt v Tilly which was brought 
in the context of defamation law. In Bunt v Tilley1026 the common law issue before 
the Court of Appeal, was on what basis an internet service provider (ISP) could 
be held liable for material which was merely communicated using the services it 
provided. In other words, when an ISP could be found liable in circumstances 
where it did not actively participate in the wrongful conduct.  
In that case, the claimant sought remedies in libel against six defendants. The 
first three were individuals who the claimant alleged were responsible for posting 
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defamatory messages on websites hosted by third party websites. The remaining 
three defendants were the ISPs, AOL, Tiscali and BT. The claimant also sought 
remedies against them because the defamatory messages were communicated 
“via the services provided” by them. The key point is that the claimant had not 
accused the ISPs of either authorising, publishing or being vicariously 
responsible for the defamatory messages. The only role the claimant could 
attribute to the ISPs was that they provided the first three individual defendants, 
with internet connection, which ultimately enabled them to post the comments 
online. The claimant’s argument was that the ISPs acted as intermediaries by 
providing the third parties with access to the internet which enabled them to pass 
an electronic communication from one computer to another, resulting in a posting 
on a message board about the claimant’s business. 
Eady J held that to be liable for the defamatory publication, it was not enough that 
the defendant had merely played a passive instrumental role in the process. As 
a matter of law, an ISP which performed no more than a passive role in facilitating 
postings on the internet could not be deemed to be a publisher at common law.1027 
Consequently, the claims against the ISPs were struck out. Put another way, if 
the ISPs had played more than just a passive role in the third party message 
postings, they could have been held liable for the third parties’ actions. 
In the case, Eady J seemed to accept the analogy between ISPs and postal 
services and telephone carriers.1028 In that their role of carrying internet 
communications from one computer to another is like the mere conduit roles of 
postal and telephone service providers because they enable communications to 
occur without playing a part in their creation or the accrual of their content; and 
whilst having no actual knowledge of the content carried by their service. 
The concept of ‘knowledge’ and ‘awareness’ is a key factor in the doctrine of 
passivity theory of liability because without it, it would be difficult to justify 
imposing liability on a third party intermediary. As stated by Eady J in Bunt v 
Tilley, “there must be knowing involvement in the process of publication of the 
relevant words. It is not enough that the person plays a passive instrumental role 
in the process.”1029 This means that in a broader context, if the intermediary knew 
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of the wrongful action and failed to prevent it, given the opportunity and if it had 
the ability to do so, then there can be no reason why liability should not be 
imposed.1030  
This leads back to the idea of control. If an intermediary has no knowledge or 
awareness of the wrongful behaviour, it cannot exercise any control over its 
creation or continuation and it can therefore be said to be blameless. 
Consequently, for an intermediary to demonstrate that it was truly passive, it must 
demonstrate that it exercised no control over the bringing about of the wrongful 
conduct, i.e. it had no knowledge of it. 
Similarly, the case of Metropolitan International Schools Ltd demonstrates what 
counts as passive conduct. Again, in this case, defamatory comments were 
posted on a website. When an internet search was conducted under the 
claimant’s name, the comments appeared as an extract of information in the 
google search engine. It was held that the search was completed without Google 
Inc’s involvement, rather it was an automatic one and because Google Inc. had 
not authorised or caused the extract to appear on the searcher’s screen, it’s role 
was merely that of a facilitator which provided a search engine service.  
The connection between knowledge, control and passivity is highlighted in the 
more recent case of Tamiz v Google Inc. [2013].1031 In this case, the claimant 
brought a claim against Google Inc. about eight comments which he thought were 
defamatory against him.  The comments had been posted anonymously on a blog 
hosted on Blogger.com which was run by Google. Blogger.com is a platform 
which allows users to create an independent blog and provides them with the 
design tools to do so. The claimant claimed that eight comments posted on a blog 
called, ‘The London Muslim’ were defamatory against him. Google Inc. received 
the claimant’s letter of claim and forwarded it to the blogger who some days later 
removed all the comments complained about. The case was brought in relation 
to the publication of the comments before they were removed from the blog. 
In this case the court discussed the question of whether Google Inc. could be 
found to be a publisher under the common law of defamation. The court 
discussed two possible levels of liability – whether Google Inc. was a primary 
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publisher or whether it could be found to be a secondary publisher. Both liabilities 
were based on the how much Google Inc. knew and the point at which Google 
Inc. came into knowledge of the disputed conduct. 
In the case, Google was held not to be a primary publisher of the alleged 
defamatory material because even though part of its role included helping third 
parties to publish blogs and comments, it did not have prior knowledge or control 
over the blog’s contents or have an agency or employment relationship with the 
blogger. Also, for the period before Google was notified of the material, it could 
not be held to be a secondary publisher either because it did not know or ought 
to have known through reasonable care that the comments posted on the blog 
were likely to be defamatory. This particular part is relevant to P2P platforms 
because, for example, it could be argued that due to the vast number of lenders 
and borrowers using their facility and the lack of an employment or agency 
relationship between them and the platform, the platform would not have any 
control or prior knowledge of its users’ conduct or actions whilst using the 
platform.  
In fact, this issue was raised by the trial judge, Eady J in Tamiz v Google. He 
pointed out that it was impossible for Google Inc. to exercise editorial control over 
the content of the blogs it hosts because the vast number of blogs and words 
written per minute made assigning responsibility to Google Inc. unrealistic.1032 The 
key concern here is the practicalities of imposing liability. 
But the appeal case does point to the fact it is possible to assume the role of a 
secondary publisher at common law – and in so doing, assume responsibility for 
the wrongful conduct. Richards LJ held that even if Google Inc. had no prior 
knowledge of the alleged defamatory material, if after notification and a 
reasonable time had been given to remove the material, Google had not done so; 
it could be assumed that Google Inc. had associated itself with or made itself 
responsible for the continuation of the wrongful material/conduct. In this way, it 
could assume the role of a secondary publisher.1033 
This highlights two points. Firstly, once knowledge or control comes into the 
picture, it might be possible for an intermediary to be found liable for wrongful 
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conduct. Therefore, once a platform has knowledge or control over wrongful 
conduct, it is no longer a merely passive intermediary. Secondly, it indicates the 
extent to which an intermediary such as a platform, can be described as passive. 
That is, so long as the platform has no knowledge or control over the conduct and 
there are no reasonable grounds for expecting it to, and if it does not later assume 
responsibility for the conduct in question, it cannot be described as passive. 
In all the cases mentioned, the ISPs and Google provided a service which 
involved providing access to various tools, be it the internet or a service. They 
facilitated actions, but their facilitation did not require direct involvement, 
knowledge or control of the subsequent actions which their service facilitated. For 
example, although the ISPs provided access to the internet, they were not found 
responsible for wrongful conduct carried out using the internet, using the internet 
service they provided. Similarly, Google provided tools for individuals to create 
independent online blogs, but this did not make them liable for the content of 
those blogs. All intermediaries facilitate something, but these cases show that to 
be classified as a passive intermediary, the level of involvement needs to be very 
minimal. 
This idea finds support in recital 42 of the E-Commerce Directive which states 
that the exemptions from liability imposed by the Directive only relate to cases 
where the role of the information society service provider is of a “mere technical, 
automatic and passive nature”. This is because technical and automatic roles 
imply a lack of knowledge and control. The example it gives of such a role is when 
an information society operates and gives access to a communication network, 
such as a message board, it transmits or stores the information posted by third 
parties temporarily for the sole purpose of making the transmission more efficient.  
In the trial case of Tamiz v Google, Eady J provided an analogy of “a purely 
passive” platform provider. He compared Google Inc’s ownership of 
Blogging.com to the ownership of a wall, which overnight is covered with 
defamatory graffiti. The owner can clean the graffiti, but this does not mean that 
they are the publisher of the graffiti.1034 This analogy again indicates the 
requirement of knowledge of and control over the specific wrongful act.  
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However, the way the analogy conceptualises the degree of knowledge and 
control necessary to impute blame is limited and incomplete. Firstly, the analogy 
only assigns blame if there was prior knowledge of the wrongful act. Its concept 
of control is limited to whether the owner had any direct involvement in creating 
the defamatory graffiti. But it does not cover aspects of control such as due 
diligence and prevention. To take the analogy further, this could include applying 
anti-graffiti paint on the wall to prevent all forms of graffiti, or other preventative 
measures. Of course, this analogy was designed with defamation law in mind, so 
it does not adequately cover other areas of law where due diligence might be 
required. Secondly, the analogy suggests that an intermediary can only be 
classed as purely passive if it did not take any positive steps towards producing 
the defamatory material. It implies that because there was no intention on the part 
of the owner of the wall to allow the graffiti to be drawn and because the owner 
did not draw the graffiti himself, the owner can never be responsible for the graffiti 
on its wall. However, this is not the case, as the lack of positive action by the 
owner does not mean that he cannot later assume responsibility, as was 
discussed in the appeal court in the same case of Tamiz v Google. Richards LJ 
said as much in the case, when he stated that it was wrong of Eady J in the trial 
to attach significance to the absence of any positive steps by Google Inc. 
concerning the continued publication of the comments.1035 
In a similar way, there is some indication that the courts are less willing to classify 
intermediaries as passive. In Davison v Habeeb [2012], Judge Parkes QC stated 
that as Google Inc’s role within its blogging service was not merely facilitative, it 
was arguable that Google Inc. could be a publisher at common law of the 
defamatory material in question. He distinguished Google Inc’s role from the 
service provided by the ISPs in Bunt v Tilley. He argued that the ISPs in Bunt v 
Tilley were comparable to the postal service because they were conduits 
facilitating the passage of messages from one person/computer to another. 
However, Blogger.com was more like a “gigantic noticeboard” which is under 
Google Inc’s control in the sense that it provides the noticeboard for use and can 
take down notices. Judge Parkes QC said that Google Inc. should be seem as a 
publisher responding to requests, rather than as a mere facilitator playing a 
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passive instrumental role.1036 This suggests a narrow definition of the concept of 
a mere facilitator or passive intermediary and that an intermediary cannot rely on 
the defence of the doctrine of passivity just because it has no direct involvement 
or knowledge of the wrongful conduct.  
Similarly, in Tamiz v Google, Richards LJ distinguished it from Bunt v Tilley by 
saying that unlike the ISP’s in the latter case, Google Inc’s role in relation to the 
blogs on Blogger.com was not purely passive. It provided a platform for bloggers 
with design tools and unlike the search engine in Metropolitan International 
Schools Ltd [2011],1037 it made the blogger service available on its own terms and 
it could easily remove or block access to any blog which did not comply. 
Additionally, although it does not exercise prior control over the blogs’ contents, 
Google Inc. defined the limits of permitted content and had the authority to 
remove or block access to offending material drawn to its attention.1038 This marks 
a shift in the concept of passivity from the earlier case of Bunt v Tilley to a 
narrower conceptualisation of the classification.  
Therefore, P2P platforms which do not merely provide a bulletin-board style 
platform service where lenders and borrowers communicate and organise their 
own lending relationships directly with each other, cannot benefit from the liability 
limitation provided by the doctrine of passivity.  
 
5.6 Gatekeeper Liability Basis for P2PL Platforms 
 
One possible way of ensuring the efficiency of P2PL platforms, and therefore 
inspiring confidence in the online -P2PL market is through entry authorisation. A 
system of licensing of platforms could help prevent future problems in the market, 
ensure that all platforms are subject to the same conduct of business rules and 
to financial supervision.1039 This could potentially help prevent situations like 
Quakle’s collapse risking confidence in the market, due to poor business 
operations and inefficiencies. The cause of Quakle’s failure in 2011 was said to 
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be the fact that rather than using the personal and business credit information 
available for borrowers, it instead used their social media profile and ranking to 
ascertain the level of risk they posed.1040 Inevitably, many of the borrowers 
defaulted because they were not creditworthy and using social media-based 
information to determine such risks proved to be unreliable. The amount lent on 
Quakle was small in comparison to other platforms at the time, e.g. when it was 
trading the amount of loans issued on its platform amounted to 0.1% of loans in 
the P2PL market, in comparison to Zopa’s contemporary amount of 2%.1041 
However, the small amount of loans lent on the platform, did not change the fact 
that the platform’s users experienced substantial losses. For example, one 
customer reported that he stood to lose 70% of his initial £1,120 investment 
because they were yet to be repaid and Quackle had failed to recuperate these 
repayments from the borrowers before its collapse.1042 
Before the onset of the FCA regulatory regime, the Operating Principles of the 
P2P Association required each member to maintain their own funds calculated in 
accordance with Method A of the Payment Services Regulations 2009.1043 This 
was good, but the benefit of these capital requirements in ensuring the liquidity 
of the platform was limited because the P2P Association is voluntary and at the 
time, only three P2PL platforms were members who were required to obey those 
capital requirements. 
One thing that was absent in the voluntary, pre-FCA regime regulation of P2PL 
and still is absent under the FCA regime, is membership of a compensation 
scheme. The insolvency of individual borrowers and the potential insolvency of a 
platform, causes losses to P2PLs which in large amounts can cause a loss of 
confidence in the P2PL market. On the one hand, regulation could step in to 
provide these lenders with the assurance that if all were to go wrong, at least 
some of their money would be recoverable. Such regulation is pertinent for 
unsophisticated lenders who do not have the time, skills, information or tools to 
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monitor the financial health of the borrowers or the platform ahead of default or 
platform insolvency; or are financially illiterate. It would go some way to inspiring 
greater confidence in the P2PL market place because it acts as a safety net which 
users can rely on as a last resort. The existence of a mechanism which ensures 
at least some of their money is safeguarded even during times of financial 
instability, reduces the amount of risks that lenders would normally have to 
consider when deciding whether to use P2PL as a form of investment. If a 
platform were to fail but the lenders were to experience no losses despite the 
failure, it will give them the impression that the market is a stable one. This in turn 
may encourage more consumers to invest their savings through P2PL activities 
because of the confidence stability inspires, and ultimately lead to growth in the 
industry.  
On the other hand, it could be argued that those participating as lenders on P2PL 
platforms would typically have some degree of financial literacy and self-reliance, 
because studies of the P2PL and crowdfunding markets show that most 
individuals using them had pre-existing investment experience before they 
started using P2PL platforms and are the type of people that like to try new things. 
Secondly, if they did not have some form of self-reliance they would not risk their 
savings by lending to strangers. In support of this view are studies which indicate 
that most P2PL lenders are experienced investors. Additionally, it could be 
argued that over-reliance on such a regulated compensation scheme could lead 
to P2PLs heavily relying on regulators to prevent insolvency or bail them out if it 
were to happen. Although this might not be an issue where defaults are few and 
far between, where incidences of defaults are high and/or are coupled with either 
the platforms general lack of ability or competence in collecting debt; or with the 
insolvency of the P2PL platform, then the costs on the regulator or taxpayer to 
bail out the lenders will increase.  
Consequently, over-reliance on the regulator may lead to a situation where 
lenders become more careless, less prudent and become free-riders of the state 
by passing the risk to the regulators and tax-payers. Therefore, although a 
financial compensation scheme should be applied in the case of online P2PL to 
encourage consumer confidence in the market, this shows that regulation should 
also limit its use, to avoid abuse of the compensatory system and the attendant 
costs to the taxpayer. Such limits could be imposed in several ways, e.g. limiting 
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the circumstances in which the compensation scheme applies to P2PL users or 
restricting the criteria by which a lender could qualify for the compensation 
scheme. It also demonstrates that there needs to be an element of consumer 
responsibility in the form of a duty to be prudent when choosing borrowers to lend 
to. This might mean providing assurance that they have considered all the 
information that has been provided by the platform at the time of lending, that 
they have taken into consideration other factors that might affect their investment 
such as their own ability to invest and its impact on their financial circumstances, 
their current financial situation and that there is an expectation that the lender has 
considered the risks associated with their choice of borrower. As another 
example, the compensation scheme could be limited to those lenders who chose 
to lend to grades A-B rated borrowers, borrowers who were previously held to 
have a highly unlikely chance of default, so that the lender cannot be faulted for 
choosing quasi-riskless borrowers to lend to. Whereas a lender that chose to lend 
to a grade C-D borrower, would have to accept responsibility for choosing such 
a risky investment in return for high profits. In so doing, the regulator can combine 
protection of the P2PLs whilst also assuring that this does not lead to abuse of 
the system. The implication is that a compensation scheme can be adapted to 
suit the context of P2PL, rather than being dismissed as disproportionate 
because in its current form it is too costly for the platforms when weighted against 
its benefits.  
The effective operation of online P2PL transactions requires trust between the 
participants. For cooperation to exist, strangers need to be assured of each 
other’s trustworthiness.1044 Sources of trust include: the personality of the one who 
trusts, the competence and reputation of the one who inspires trust and 
governance provided by a third party that enforces trust.1045 In situations where 
the contracting parties do not know each other, they cannot rely on the first two 
factors, e.g. they cannot depend on the skills, capabilities, history of honesty or 
other characteristics that might usually inspire their trust in a friend or person they 
have met, because they simply do not know them. Legal and economic theories 
tend to emphasise the last element of this tripartite typology, in that trust can be 
built through regulation of the participants of exchange by a third party, which 
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ensures that the participants keep their promises.1046 The fact that an external 
source of trust such as a court or regulator can hold the parties to their promises 
gives them faith that the transaction will be honoured.  
The doctrine of passivity is a basic exemption method of imposing liability, but it 
is not complex enough to deal with the P2P platform. The unique nature of P2P 
platforms as an online intermediary requires a more carefully fitted development 
of rules which help determine when it is appropriate to impose liability on the 
platforms even though they are third parties to the transactions. As has been 
shown above, the doctrine of passivity provides no justification for limiting the 
liability of P2PL platforms, consequently the question at hand turns to how they 
should be regulated. 
However, the dilemma for regulators lies in striking a balance between the need 
for P2P platforms to be regulated and allowing the freedom of private parties to 
act in a way they see fit and for the industry to grow.1047 A further dilemma for 
regulators is striking a balance between the need to protect the lenders and the 
need for regulation to be helpful to economic activity by keeping the costs of 
business low.1048 Regulation which compromises the ability of the P2PL market to 
operate on a P2P level – the very structure of the business model, should be 
recognised as imposing a severe cost on them. However, arguing that imposing 
liability on the platform in some situations would do this, would be an 
exaggeration. 
This means that to provide effective lender protection, regulation would need to 
ensure that investors have appropriate remedies against market participants who 
harm their interests.1049 These remedies should be achievable, i.e. it does not 
impose hurdles too high for the lenders to jump over to get recompense. For 
example, by making them bear the burden of proof for factors that the lender 
would find very hard to verify due to informational asymmetries found within the 
industry. Similarly, regulation should not lead to situations where lenders find 
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themselves with no defendant to seek action against. For example, P2PLs may 
not have recourse against the individual borrowers they lent to because said 
borrower is likely to be bankrupt. This is the current state of affairs within the UK 
P2PL market, it is also the effect of a regulatory regime of intermediaries which 
relies on passivity to limit intermediary, and by extension, platform liability.  
On the other hand, the same regulation must also avoid creating an environment 
which is unsuitable for the industry as this could stagnate the industry’s growth 
and inhibit the overall will of the market participants. Consequently, to reduce the 
cost of capital, regulation should be clear about when an intermediary is at risk of 
liability so that it can calculate or control this, rather than incurring high costs for 
legal advice or defence to avoid liability. Regulation should also ensure that the 
intermediary is the appropriate body to impose the law on. For example, if an 
intermediary was unable to control the wrongful conduct of its participants, and 
yet was faced with strict liability for not doing so, it would incur high costs to 
mitigate these liabilities through out-of-court settlements or the purchase of 
insurance to cover the potential liability.  
This means that regulators should only impose liability on internet intermediaries 
if they are in the position to monitor and control the actions of their participants. 
 
5.6.1. Gatekeeper liability theory 
 
Gatekeeper liability is a supplementary form of liability which can be placed on 
P2P platforms to help regulate the conduct within its platform service and which 
courts can turn to as a second stage test once no liability can be found in the 
usual normative fashion. It recognises that the platforms are in a better position 
than P2PLs and borrowers to control what goes on there. Consequently, the 
rationale behind gatekeeper liability does not depend on a normative assessment 
of the degree of responsibility, participation or support a platform had in relation 
to the wrongdoing. Rather, it turns on the balance between the social costs of the 
wrongdoing and how well a platform can be relied on to stop or prevent it.1050  
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Academics have offered numerous definitions of the term ‘gatekeeper’ and there 
is little agreement about what form gatekeeper liability should take. For example, 
Kraakman, who developed the concept in the 1980s, defined gatekeepers as 
“private parties who are able to disrupt misconduct by withholding their 
cooperation from wrongdoers.”1051 He states that the key idea behind gatekeeper 
liability is the duty it imposes on intermediaries to prevent misconduct by 
withholding support, which could be a good, service or form of certification that is 
essential for the wrongdoing to succeed. It is the withholding of support that he 
believes acts as the ‘gate’ of gatekeeper liability.1052  
On the other hand, Coffee defines gatekeepers as “reputational intermediaries 
who provide verification and certification services to investors”.1053 The services 
he describes include verifying a company’s financial statements, evaluating its 
creditworthiness, appraising the fairness of a transaction and in general, 
assessing or vouching for a corporate client’s statements about itself or a specific 
transaction.1054 It is clear from this that Coffee’s gatekeeper plays a largely 
reputational role, and this might be caused by the fact that his perspective comes 
from the capital market context. His definition is also narrowly construed as it only 
applies to reputational intermediaries, not allowing room for other types of 
intermediaries to be considered. 
Meanwhile, Gerner-Buerle defines gatekeepers as, “agents that ensure 
compliance of the primary market actor with the applicable rules by reviewing its 
disclosures and withholding their participation in transactions if violations occur.” 
This definition comes from the perspective of securities law as demonstrated by 
the reference to the disclosure requirements faced by issuers. 
However, Hamdani refers to gatekeepers as, “parties who sell a product or 
provide a service that is necessary for clients wishing to enter a particular market 
or engage in certain activities”. He considers gatekeepers to be third parties like 
auditors, lawyers and underwriters.1055 His definition is broader than Coffee’s and 
is closer to Kraakman’s because it reflects the fact that not all parties subject to 
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third-party liability are intermediaries involved with reputation management. So, 
whilst true of liability for securities fraud, it might not be true of all other 
contexts.1056  
Embedded within Kraakman’s definition of a gatekeeper is the issue of ability to 
disrupt misconduct. It implies that if a private party is not “able” to exhibit this type 
of control over the primary actor’s conduct, it cannot be classified as a 
gatekeeper. This idea is also reflected in Hamdani’s conception of gatekeeper. 
Hamdani has stated that a third-party can only be a gatekeeper and thus face 
gatekeeper liability if it can detect the wrongdoing at a reasonable cost and 
prevent its clients they know to be wrongdoers from committing misconduct.1057 
Without these two elements, it would be unjust and impractical to impose liability 
on the gatekeeper. 
These definitions have a different conception of what the “gate” is, i.e. the element 
of control the gatekeeper is capable of exhibiting over the primary actors, but they 
all contain an element of withholding a service. As mentioned above, Kraakman’s 
is the withholding of support from the primary actors. Coffee’s is not clearly stated 
but seems to be the provision of verification and certification services, which it is 
assumed he intends for the intermediary to withhold when wrongdoing occurs. 
Gerner-Buerle’s is the withholding of a primary actor’s participation and 
Hamdani’s also has an element of withholding because although not clearly 
stated like Coffee’s, it involves withholding services which are necessary for the 
primary actor to even enter the market. Therefore, the key feature of a 
gatekeeper’s role is the ability to control the primary actor’s actions, through 
withholding a key element of their service. In addition, the ‘ability to control’ 
involves being able to detect and prevent the action in question. 
P2P platforms are capable of being gatekeepers because they contain these 
main elements of gatekeeper liability. They have a “gate” to control because 
without the service they provide, a lender or borrower would not be able to enter 
the P2P market or lend or borrow in that way. They also exhibit control over that 
gate through the verification processes they carry out to determine whether a 
borrower is creditworthy enough to borrow over the platform. At present, they do 
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not carry out checks on the lenders or the monies provided by lenders e.g. 
whether they are legitimate funds and not the source of criminal activity. However, 
this is probably due to the desire to encourage individuals to lend on the platform 
by making it straightforward; and therefore, lender checks are something that 
could be carried out by the platform. P2P platforms are also in the best position 
to detect wrongdoing on the platform in comparison to lenders and borrowers, not 
least because due to their role facilitating transactions, they have access to all 
the borrowers and lenders that use their platform and access to information about 
all the transactions on their platform.  
However, it is worth pointing out that the above quoted conceptions of a 
gatekeeper focus on the intermediary as something that enables access to a 
service or the provision of goods. So, if they detect wrongdoing they can withhold 
the service or the goods. This may limit their role to after-the-fact wrongdoing so 
that the intermediary only steps in once the crime or contravention of a private 
law right has already occurred. This is demonstrated by the outcome of Mann 
and Belzley’s analysis of internet intermediary liability which was to suggest three 
schemes of intermediary liability: traditional liability for damages, takedown 
schemes where the intermediary removes offensive content upon notice and ‘hot 
list’ schemes in which the intermediary avoids facilitation of transactions with 
certain parties known to be malfeasors.1058 All of which require the intermediary 
to act after the wrongdoing has occurred. 
However, it is more useful to include within the conception of a gatekeeper an 
intermediary that can also act as a gatekeeper to wrongdoing, therefore 
incorporating preventative action. This means that any intermediary with the 
ability to control an action or wrongdoing, can act as a gatekeeper for the 
purposes of regulation. 
Traditionally, the law has pursued a direct approach to liability where the primary 
malfeasor is the actor who can most efficiently prevent the internet-related 
misconduct. E.g. internet gambling would not occur if both a gambler and a 
gambling website did not exist. So, if either of these actors can be controlled 
directly, the social harm caused by internet gambling can be prevented.1059 
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Existing schemes of liability have largely resulted in broad freedom from liability 
for intermediaries because they have relied on the traditional fault-based tort 
principles to determine intermediary liability. In addition, as these principles are 
underlain by the doctrine of passivity, they have for some time absolved 
intermediaries from responsibility.1060 Even when courts have suggested the 
possibility of intermediary liability on a common law basis, they can fall back on 
exemptions provided by European legislation such as article 12 of Council 
Directive 2000/31/EC, 2000 OJ (l178) 1 which provides immunity to ISPs when 
they are acting as mere conduits for the transfer of copyrighted materials and 
article 15 of the Directive bans member states from imposing a general duty on 
ISPs to monitor. 
However, the usual normative, fault-based liability schemes are not adequate in 
an online environment. One problem is that traditional liability schemes tend to 
assume that intermediaries are inherently passive, which would make it unfair to 
impose responsibility on them for the actions of the primary actors.1061 However, 
this perspective is flawed because it paints all intermediaries the same colour and 
fails to consider other reasons for imposing liability on an intermediary, e.g. that 
it is a cost effective method of online regulation.1062 They also reflect an irrational 
fear that imposing liability on intermediaries would automatically harm the 
electronic industries they belong to. Consequently, traditional schemes of liability 
focus on targeting the primary wrongdoer who committed the actual malfeasance.  
This leads to the problem of identifying and locating the primary malfeasor to hold 
them accountable. If a lender wishes to identify a borrower to pursue a private 
law right, they are reliant on the platform to provide the necessary identification 
details. However, the platform has a duty of care over the borrower to protect his 
or her identity and provide adequate confidentiality and data protection. This can 
prevent the platform from providing useful information about the borrower’s 
identity to the lender when needed, such as their real name and contact details.  
This is compounded by the anonymity of platform users and that the information 
provided to lenders by borrowers on the platform is largely self-provided and 
therefore unverified. As stated by Lessig, “[b]oth data and people are unidentified 
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in this world, and while it is often possible to make good guesses, it is also easy 
to make good guesses impossible.”1063 In addition, so long as the wrongful action 
is not a criminal activity and remains a civil matter, the platform is unlikely to 
disclose this information to a lender without being ordered to do so by a court. 
Unless there is legislation which requires the platform to do so on receipt of notice 
from the injured party.1064 All this imposes the burden of high costs on the lender 
seeking to pursue the primary malfeasor.  
However, because of the high volume of transactions and low value of each 
transaction on a P2P platform, pursuing the primary malfeasor might create a 
situation where the costs of the pursuit of justice and recompense is 
disproportionate to its actual benefits. This in turn might force the injured 
party/lender to accept the loss and forego his private law right because of his 
incapability of enforcing it. These scenarios also create a situation where the 
wrongdoer is effectively “judgement proof”1065 because of their anonymity and 
ability to escape liability on the grounds of a purely economic cost/benefit 
analysis.  
Arguably, accepting that one party must always forego their rights because it is 
difficult to enforce law and regulation against the primary malfeasor is 
unacceptable in a society which desires to respect the rule of law. Therefore, 
regulators that wish to continue pursuing the primary malfeasor as a strategy, 
must choose between allowing certain harms to continue unimpeded due to 
impracticality or finding an alternative regulatory strategy1066 to pursue a more just 
outcome. 
Rather than focusing liability on the question of who is at fault for a specific 
offence, the most appropriate regulatory question to ask is whether the P2P 
platform is the party in the best position to stop the bad practices at issue. This 
would reflect one of the many aims of regulation and law which is the prevention 
of wrongful conduct. Making an intermediary liable for a primary actor’s wrongful 
conduct does not necessarily mean that the primary actor will escape liability. 
Rather, it means that a separate form of liability could be created to reflect the 
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1064 Reed (n 30) 52. 
1065 Mann and Belzley (n 1068) 259. 
1066 ibid. 
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role of the intermediary in allowing, enabling or failing to prevent or act against 
the wrongful conduct, which does not rely on the restrictive doctrine of passivity 
to determine the intermediary’s level of blameworthiness. 
Because of the nature of the relationships on P2PL platforms, this form of 
structural liability might be a more pragmatic and better form of finding liability 
rather than focusing on fault-based liability. In situations like fraud or where 
problems have arisen because incorrect information was supplied by the 
borrowers, it would be more practical to pursue the platform rather than the 
borrowers themselves. 
Mann and Belzley identified three changes caused by the internet which mean 
that intermediaries are more likely to be the least cost avoiders, i.e. the body who 
would spend the least on preventing the losses caused by misconduct,1067 and 
therefore the bodies which should be held liable for misconduct. These are that 
the internet brought:  
 an increase in the chance that it would be easy to identify specific 
intermediaries for large classes of transactions 
 a reduction in the information costs which make it easier for intermediaries 
to monitor the conduct of its end users; and 
 increased anonymity across the internet makes seeking remedies against 
individual users generally less effective.1068 
All three factors are relevant to the P2P industry. Out of all three P2P participants, 
the platform is the only entity associated with all the transactions which carry on 
within its service. Compared to the platform participants, the platform is the most 
readily identifiable party within a transaction. From the lenders’ and borrowers’ 
perspectives, the platform is also the most likely to be associated with a 
transaction because a single loan transaction can be funded by multiple lenders 
whilst the individual borrower might be anonymous to the lenders; and a single 
investment by the lender might be shared by numerous borrowers across the 
platform. Yet despite these numerous transactions, the platform is at the centre 
of them all and is what connects the borrowers with the lenders.  
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Additionally, the platform is the party most likely to hold most of the information 
about either party, which they may not have on each other. When a borrower 
defaults, it is very difficult for a P2P lender to pursue them directly, either because 
of the contractual terms or because of data protection reasons they do not have 
all the necessary details about the borrower. This also means that the platform 
would be the one that could most effectively prevent and control misconduct 
within its network, thus saving litigation costs.1069 
However, imposing gatekeeper liability poses the risk of increasing costs to 
platform users because a platform might decide to pass on the costs of exercising 
its controls on to its users. Gao and Yang have also suggested that liability might 
lead to a censoring of services provided by sites by giving them the power to 
decide what can and cannot be done on the internet. Censoring on a P2P 
platform could take the form of more stringent checks. In turn this might serve to 
limit entry into the market by some sectors of society, e.g. borrowers from poorer 
sectors of society who have poor credit rating. But this may already happen 
anyway through platforms’ existing credit checks for borrowers. 
In addition, MacCarthy has challenged the argument that intermediaries should 
be held liable because they are the least cost avoider. Based on his analysis of 
the enforcement of US anti-gambling laws through payment intermediaries, he 
points out that there are numerous costs which supporters of the least cost 
avoider rationale do not consider. For example, the cost of maintaining and 
enforcing an internet gambling coding and blocking scheme that is completely 
manual and cannot be automated; the cost of over-blocking legal transactions; 
the cost to screen and check the business activity of merchants participating in 
the payment systems; the cost to monitor the use of payment systems for specific 
illegal activity, here the payment systems are in no better position than anyone 
else to conduct this monitoring activity; the cost to defend against legal 
challenges; etc. 
Arguably, this argument only relates to payment intermediaries and other 
intermediaries which are external to the actual transaction or industry in question. 
Although they are third parties, unlike P2PL platforms their relationship to the 
market activity is not as close or linked. While their role within the online gambling 
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market is necessary because without it money would not be exchanged, their 
level of control and power over gambling participants is not as high as that 
exhibited by platforms within their own service. In essence, their degree of 
separation from the misconduct is further away than a P2PL platform’s, so their 
level of control and involvement is not as extensive as a P2PL platform’s would 
be. The unacknowledged costs raised by MacCarthy may cause concern in 
relation to payment intermediary liability, but the examples provided are things 
that platforms already or should already be doing to provide a quality and safe 
borrowing and lending experience.  
MacCarthy also presents the US litigation between Tiffany and eBay as an 
example of why intermediaries are not always the least cost avoider. He states 
that the fact that Tiffany and eBay were unable to agree on compensation for the 
infringement of Tiffany’s trademarks despite years of negotiations and 
discussions, suggests that the full costs of the enforcement efforts exceeded what 
Tiffany was willing to pay. Moreover, if Tiffany was a rational actor that was willing 
to pay up to the amount that it would cost to take its own enforcement actions, 
the failure to reach an agreement suggests that eBay was not the least cost 
enforcer in that case.1070 
However, whilst this argument applies within a business-to-business context 
where the businesses are expected to be on a similar level playing field, within a 
P2P platform service, the platform will always be the least cost avoider because 
the participants involved are not other businesses, but individuals, and not all of 
them, if many, will be high net worth individuals capable of funding enforcement. 
Neither would they have the ability to enforce it themselves. 
But gatekeeper liability ultimately provides more benefits than it does risks. It 
provides P2PLs with an additional defendant who will, in most cases, be more 
solvent than the borrower; it will enable the injured party and, if a matter arises in 
court, the court to discuss not just the issue of causality, but also a more accurate 
allocation of responsibility which takes into account all the parties involved and 
the quality of the platform’s services and its standard of care in providing them. 
Consequently, it will prevent platforms from shifting liability away from 
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themselves, creating a vacuum of justice and judgement-proofing unidentifiable 
primary actors. It will also enable them to adopt a more reflexive approach to 
regulating conduct on their platforms by encouraging them to consider the 
correlation between their own actions or standard of care and the existence or 
likelihood of misconduct by their users. 
Consequently, gatekeeper liability through regulation of the platform intermediary 
offers regulators an easy way to provide a more suitable scheme of liability 
adapted to the structure of P2PL activity. Unfortunately, the legal community in 
the UK and large parts of Europe typically ignore the insights of gatekeeper 
liability theory when drafting and interpreting financial market regulation.1071 
 
5.7 Concept of Lendsumer 
 
The emergence of online P2PL necessitates a reconsideration of what it means 
to be a consumer of financial services. This is because P2PL alters the 
characteristics of the key participants of lending. This creates the regulatory 
problem of what is the appropriate degree of protection that should be afforded 
to the P2PLs. 
The concept of the lendsumer identifies the fact that P2PLs are more than just 
consumers. They have an increased role and responsibility because of their 
increased participation. Arguably, this is a good thing because customer 
involvement leads to greater customer empowerment. Although one might argue 
that greater customer involvement should go hand in hand with greater 
responsibility being placed on the customer for their actions, this is not the logical 
next step. Customer empowerment is not completed by simply enabling the 
customer to make bigger decisions and take part in the production of their goods 
or services, rather, it must also be accompanied with the means to support and 
enforce this added participation and the responsibility that follows from it. If not, 
it leaves the lendsumer in a similar position as the ordinary consumer – 
dependent on the producer and facing information asymmetries etc. – whilst also 
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engaging in more risky activities and taking on the role and position of traditional 
lending institutions.  
The implication for regulation, is it needs to suit the role and position of the 
lendsumer, a concept which by considering the status of the P2P lender 
throughout the lifetime of the P2PL cycle, requires regulation to also provide for 
the full lifetime of the loan. Simply providing for the lendsumer’s informational 
needs only supports them in the pre-contractual stage to make better decisions. 
It does not consider their roles, activities and general dependency on the 
platforms following this. 
Therefore, well-rounded P2PL regulation should also provide for the full 
experience of the P2P lender. This includes effectiveness in enforcing their rights 
against platforms and borrowers as well as the stability of the platform and the 
legitimacy and transparency of the platform.  
The analysis within the chapters on the roles and characteristics of P2PL 
platforms and lenders give rise to numerous questions which can be directed at 
P2PL regulation. Particularly in regards to the extent to which the regulation deals 
with the specific roles of the participants. In respect of the platforms, one question 
that is asked is whether the regulation deals with all the roles that the platform 
undertakes. For example, ensuring the creditworthiness of the borrowers; the 
facilitation of the transfer of funds from the lenders to the borrowers and vice 
versa; and the pursuit of unpaid loans for the lenders. Another question that could 
be asked is the extent to which the regulation reflects the fact that the platforms’ 
roles extend through both the pre-contractual and administrative stages of the 
lending agreement in a substantial way. Does the regulation therefore cover both 
the pre-contractual and management stage of the lending cycle also? 
Secondly, does the regulation clearly identify or consider the relationships within 
the transactions? For example, which party the lender has a direct claim against, 
be it the borrower or the platform and what the legal and financial relationships 
between the parties are, e.g. where the creditworthiness of either the platform or 
the borrower is called into question. Such regulatory considerations would go 
some way to providing certainty for the lenders. 
Thirdly, does the regulation imbibe the idea that platforms are mere conduits 
simply because they are not party to the lending agreement, or does it recognise 
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that they are active intermediaries because they have much more involvement in 
each transaction and should be regulated as such? The regulatory regime should 
not treat P2PL platforms as passive intermediaries, because whereas the latter 
do not create content or involve themselves with the online activities of their 
users, P2PL platforms should be liable for their participants’ behaviour when 
things go wrong because even at the most basic level P2PL model, platforms are 
involved at every stage of the transaction: formation, management and 
enforcement. The examination of the doctrine of liability showed that P2P 
platforms which do not merely provide a bulletin-board style of platform service 
where lenders and borrowers communicate and organise their own lending 
relationships directly with each other, cannot benefit from the liability limitation 
provided by the doctrine. In contrast, the unique nature of P2P platforms as online 
intermediaries requires a more carefully fitted development of rules which help 
determine when it is appropriate to impose liability on the platforms even though 
they are third parties to the transactions. 
Finally, there is the issue of whether the regulation provides appropriate redress 
for the platforms participants. To ensure effective lender protection, regulation 
would need to ensure that investors have appropriate redress against market 
participants who harm their interests. These remedies should be achievable, e.g. 
by not creating a situation where the lender/borrower does not have any 
defendant to seek action against. 
The section on the P2P participants focused on the P2PLs. It highlighted that 
their roles and behaviour is like consumers’ in terms of their relationship of 
dependency on the platform and to an extent they can be described as prosumers 
in terms of their lending activity to the borrowers. This was conceptualised by the 
classification, ‘lendsumer’. Consequently, a key question for existing regulation 
from the perspective of the P2PLs is whether it recognises the fact that in each 
lending transaction and its administration, from the start to completion, the 
lenders’ capacity transitions from prosumer to consumer.  
Prior to April 2014, the regulatory landscape of P2PL was not completely bare, 
however it was quite problematic for platforms to operate in because of the 
uncertainty created by the need to consult a broad spectrum of statutes and 
regulation to determine their liabilities or whether they are in breach of them. The 
former Office of Fair Trading regulated consumer credit arranged through P2PL 
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platforms that adopted the loan-based model.1072 Additionally, crowdfunding, in 
the general sense, fell within the scope of FCA regulation if it involved a person 
carrying on a regulated activity in the UK, for example, the communication of a 
financial promotion.1073  
In addition, prior to April 2014, it was possible that some forms of marketplace 
lending could be regulated as a collective investment scheme (CIS) because the 
definition of a CIS was very wide. The fact that “any arrangements with respect 
to property of any description” could be classified as a CIS meant that it covered 
all types of investment funds. Similarly, some forms of investment-based 
platforms could fall within this definition because funds are pooled by a platform 
and distributed to investors. However, this classification may not have included 
all forms of loan-based P2PL. Where a platform’s operations did fall within the 
definition of a CIS, it needed to be approved by the FCA. However, this was done 
on a case-by-case basis. The case-by-case nature of FCA approval prior to the 
April 2014 regulation created an environment of regulatory uncertainty, because 
start-up platforms could not be sure how their business model would be regulated 
without having to consult multitudes of different regulations. The case-by-case 
nature of authorisation also added to their overhead costs which in turn means 
that P2PL could only be limited to high net worth investors.1074 Consequently, 
although P2PL was not completely devoid of any regulation, prior to the April 
2014, there was no regulation tailored specifically to suit P2PL creating regulatory 
confusion. The FCA’s answer to this situation was to create an umbrella 
regulation designed to cover what it calls ‘crowdfunding’, an umbrella term for 
both loan-based and investment-based P2PL. 
The UK regulation of P2PL came into force on 1 April 2014. Most platforms are 
still going through the transition period and at the time of writing, none has yet 
been fully licensed by the FCA. Despite the establishment of a body of regulation 
that is specific to P2PL, the regulation of this market is still a debatable issue, 
particularly because of increasing regularity in which new risks and issues either 
arise within the market or are pointed out by senior regulators. For example, 
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Andrew Tyrie, the current Treasury committee chairman has recently written to 
the FCA and PRA with warnings about the risks of P2PL and questioning whether 
current regulation of the market is apt.1075 Key to the points he made were the 
questions he asked about how the platforms judged creditworthiness, how the 
P2P users could be certain that they were getting accurate information and how 
they could assess the risks of lending; and the fact that the wider prudential risk 
of unsecured lending on the rest of the financial sector is unclear.1076 This 
emphasises the limits on a purely disclosure-based regulatory regime. This 
follows on from the statement made by the former head of the FSA, Adair Turner, 
who in February 2016 warned that the P2P sector could cause bigger losses than 
the bankers did during the financial crisis. 
This shows that far from settling the matter of how P2PL should be regulated, the 
UK regulation has provided a temporary solution to the question of how the 
industry should be regulated. This has been implied by the FCA itself which in 
their Policy statement PS14/14, repeatedly states that many aspects of the 
regulation will be reviewed, and the FCA’s assurance that in the policy statement 
that they will review the situation in 2016. This makes the subject of its regulation 
a pertinent issue. 
 
5.8. Regulatory Implications of ‘Lendsumer’ 
 
 
This thesis proposes an original concept of a “transitional consumer” or 
“lendsumer” and adaptation of the existing concept of gatekeeper liability to online 
P2PL. Both concepts have different but related implications for P2PL regulation. 
Whilst “lendsumer” has implications for regulatory perception and protection of 
P2P lenders under the UK P2PL regulatory regime, gatekeeper liability details 
how to go about it using a form of civil liability. “Lendsumer” is a new paradigm of 
consumer which has implications for protection of certain consumers of financial 
services. Although new, lendsumer is built on existing concepts previously 
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discussed in Chapters Two and Three. The effect is not to create a new method 
of regulation but to add more precision to the way regulators perceive and carry 
out the protection of lendsumers or similar transitional consumers. 
Paternalism can be a responsive action to a recognised need (Chapter 2 above). 
One of the implications of behavioural research is the role of third parties in 
assisting people to deal with  cognitive and emotional biases, prejudices and 
faults. Although individuals have an interest in exercising their freedom of choice 
and liberty, they also have an interest in avoiding bad situations and 
consequences, even the results of their freely chosen actions. This requires that 
the action taken is appropriate and the need is properly identified.  As explained 
in Chapter Two, ‘soft’ paternalism involves policies that are limited to targeting 
agents who do not act knowledgeably. It is different from ‘hard’ paternalism 
because the latter involves policies and regulations which target knowledgeable 
and competent agents. Even this definition implies the use or need for information 
to improve knowledge.  
The concept of lendsumer reflects ‘soft’ paternalism by targeting agents who may 
be vulnerable due to their lack of knowledge, information asymmetries during 
lending transactions and the intermediation of  platforms, whilst ultimately 
respecting their decision to engage in P2PL. Furthermore, it acknowledges that 
P2PLs and transitional consumers operating in similar environments can be 
vulnerable due to their inability to exert control over their affairs and reliance on 
a third party for the execution and management of r transactions. For P2PLs, this 
lack of control occurs post-transaction as discussed earlier in this chapter. 
Therefore, the lendsumer concept demonstrates that lenders behave and act 
very much like the classical consumer paradigm at the post- transaction stage, 
hence the ‘-sumer’ aspect of the moniker. 
The implication for regulators is that once the P2P lender has transformed from 
a prosumer back to an ordinary consumer, the type of protections necessary for 
their protection and facilitation need to be highly interventionist and information 
provision will be inadequate. The EU retail credit regulation has shown an 
increasing interventionist pattern of protection for retail investors, e.g. product 
prohibition and regulation of independent financial advisors and product/service 
sale. Such protections have limited effect on P2PL transactions post-contract due 
to their conception of the retail investor as a consumer and being designed with 
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a different type of financial model that is largely B2C and where retail investors 
or borrowers purchase a service or borrow money. In contrast, P2PL is an 
intermediated C2C transaction and where one of the consumers involved acts 
both prosumptively and consumptively in any given transaction. Therefore, retail 
credit regulations are not broad enough to deal with both consumer risks and 
lending risks faced by P2PLs. Instead, regulation should focus on holding the 
party with the most control, i.e. the platforms, more accountable for aspects of 
the transaction which they have knowledge and control over.  
This can be achieved through a policy designed around user accountability and 
greater communication in addition to the competition and industry stability 
policies demonstrated by existing regulations. In essence, “lendsumer” requires 
that P2PL is not treated like an ordinary investment where, for example, the value 
of stocks is expected to fluctuate due to uncontrollable market forces, rather than 
what it is: enforceable lending rights. One would not tell banks or CUs that if a 
borrower does not repay lent funds, they must accept this fate as a learning point. 
This is what P2PLs are being told by treating lending transactions as a pure 
investment with all the attendant warnings that their capital is at risk. 
Suggestions in this thesis from a communications perspective include a database 
shared by P2P platforms to enable them to determine how many P2P loans 
borrower have taken and the way they have managed their repayments across 
platforms to provide a more accurate picture of borrowers’ borrowing and financial 
habits. A dispute resolution body for complaints by individuals using C2C 
platforms can be set up. This could be run similarly to the Financial Ombudsman 
Service but for individuals rather than disputes between businesses and 
consumers. The  problematic  issues of authority and redress which are, firstly, a 
body may have little enforcement power over individuals unless it is government 
authorised and, secondly, individuals might not have sufficient resources to 
compensate others adequately. This suggests the need for some form of FSCS 
backing for lenders’ deposits. 
Such a bold intervention is not impossible for P2PL. For example, a UK tribunal 
‘reached behind the veil’ of the C2C disintermediated business model by ruling 
that Uber drivers should not be treated as self-employed and deserve employee 
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rights such as minimum wage.1077 This is on the basis that Uber exercises a 
greater degree of control over the driver’s role than would normally be expected 
where someone is operating on a self-employed basis. Furthermore, the FCA 
recently announced proposals for new rules for credit card companies designed 
to help customers get out of persistent debt. The rules will require firms to take 
steps to help customers in persistent debt, e.g. prompting e faster repayments if 
a customer has been in persistent debt for eighteen months.1078 This is an 
interventionist form of consumer protection which, like the Uber tribunal ruling, 
prioritises individuals in need of protection rather than the continuation or stability 
of the intermediating platform. Similarly, regulators can adopt the same level of 
protection for P2PLs and  a more interventionist policy towards the platforms. 
Lendsumer also draws on the theoretical conceptualisations of the classical 
consumer and prosumer. As discussed in Chapter Two, the classical definition of 
consumer is a natural person acting outside of his/her trade, business or 
profession with certain exceptions. Such legal definitions are based on the idea 
that the consumers are the weaker party as natural persons rather than on the 
fact of how they act and behave in certain circumstances. Consequently, Schüller 
argued that it is the act of buying consumer goods that should define the 
consumer and not their nature.1079 
The consumer aspect of ‘lendsumer’ is not based on the economic construction 
in the EU and similar definitions of consumer based on the nature of the 
individual, nor those which assume contracts of sale of goods. Rather, it focuses 
on the acts and behaviours of  individuals during the transaction at hand, i.e. a 
situational conception of consumers that recognises that an important factor of 
consumer behaviour is the situation e.g. type of goods, environment and 
experience. 
                                                          
1077 Costas Pitas, ‘UK Tribunal Rules Uber Drivers Deserve Workers’ Rights’ (Reuters, 28 
October 2016) <https://uk.news.yahoo.com/uk-tribunal-rules-uber-drivers-deserve-workers-
rights-132223513--sector.html> accessed 17 April 2017; Hilary Osborne, ‘Uber Faces Court 
Battle with Drivers over Employment Status’ The Guardian (19 July 2016) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jul/19/uber-drivers-court-tribunal-self-employed-
uk-employment-law> accessed 17 April 2017. 
1078 ‘FCA Proposes New Rules for Credit Card Firms to Help Millions of Customers Get out of 
Persistent Debt’ (FCA, 31 March 2017) <https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/fca-
proposes-new-rules-help-customers-persistent-debt-credit-cards> accessed 17 April 2017. 
1079 Schuller (n 279) 123. 
326 
 
Similarly, lendsumer is based on the theoretical concept of ‘prosumer’. ‘Prosumer’ 
is an amalgamation of the concepts of producer and consumer. and defines an 
individual who is involved in the design or production process of goods which the 
individual will eventually or potentially purchase. The prosumer engages in 
activities which are traditionally considered separate – production and 
consumption. Unlike consumers, prosumers work for the things they consume – 
they are active participants. A prosuming transaction is one which requires or 
encourages the actor to produce or consume. However, although prosumer blurs 
the lines between producer and consumer, firms, which do most of the work, still 
control the major resources required to fully carry out transactions. 
Lendsumer draws on the concept of prosumer by describing an individual who 
during a given transaction transitions from a prosumer ( lending activity) to a 
consumer (reflecting passivity and dependence on P2P platforms). Lendsumers 
are, however, different from prosumers for not consuming the product they 
produce. Unlike prosumers, lendsumers are not simultaneously producers and 
consumers of a single product or service, rather they produce a loan that another 
individual will eventually consume while they consume the ultimate benefit of this 
which is the interest payments made in addition to repayments of loan premiums. 
P2PLs therefore combine the producer and consumer capacities differently from 
prosumers. ‘Lendsumer’ reflects the fact that P2PLs that take over the production 
role of traditional lenders are also consumers during the second stage of 
transactions. 
The concept shows that P2PL is a long-term activity involving different stages, 
during which the users’ roles and capacities experience changes. The implication 
for regulators is the need to design protections appropriate for each stage of the 
P2PLs’ activities – protections suitable for them in their capacity as lenders, and 
protections suitable for them in their capacity as consumers of the platform’s 
services. Regulation therefore needs to govern both relationships occurring in the 
tripartite activity that is P2PL, the relationship between lenders and borrowers, 
lenders and the platform and borrowers and the platform and not just the 
lenders/borrowers and platform relationship. 
One consequence of the conceptualisation of P2P lenders as lendsumers and 
P2P borrowers as consumers in the classical sense, is the fact that current 
consumer protections do not currently regulate the relationship between them 
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directly. The UK P2PL regulatory regime focuses attention on the platforms. To 
an extent, the encouragement of responsible borrowing for borrowers, and 
responsible lending for lenders, is arguably as far as the current regime is willing 
to go in regulation of these two individuals’ relationship. Regulators need to 
determine the efficacy of further and more direct regulation, however, 
proportionality and pragmatism suggest a continuation of the focus on platforms 
with greater intervention via gatekeeper liability to give platforms more 
responsibility for the actions and behaviours of the intermediated parties towards 
each other, in correlation with the degree of control and knowledge that the 
platforms have over transactions. Gatekeeper responsibility recognises the 
underlying model of online P2PL as one of intermediated C2C transactions 
requiring regulation of the behaviours of individuals towards others to avoid moral 
hazard by targeting the participant with the most authority and control. 
The third component of the ‘lendsumer’ paradigm is the notion of intermediated 
finance. In pure C2C transactions, individuals that provide products and services 
to recipients cannot be transitional consumers/prosumers because, firstly, they 
maintain the same role/capacity throughout single transactions and, secondly, 
there are either no intermediaries involved such as in esusu or the intermediary 
is purely a facilitator of the transaction as in eBay. The completion or success of 
sales does not require or involve eBay’s direct involvement i.e. sales can be 
executed without eBay ever needing to get involved.  P2PL transactions are 
different because for loan transactions to be executed and managed, the 
platform’s involvement is required throughout the loan’s lifecycle. In particular,, 
loans have a longer life-cycle than simple sale of goods transactions which end 
as soon as the buyer receives the goods. Consequently, lendsumers prosume 
through lending activities in which their active participation in the bringing about 
the transaction is heightened in comparison to the classical consumer, and are, 
however, consumers in their relationship with the platforms during the execution 
and management of loan transactions. The implication is that P2PL platforms 
should be regulated as financial intermediaries and the degree of paternalistic 
intervention for the protection of the lendsumers should reflect the degree of 
control platforms exercise over transactions and parties in their system. P2PL 
cannot be treated as purely C2C due to an involved intermediary that has control 
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over what goes on within its platform and should therefore be held accountable 
where necessary to protect lendsumers and consumers. 
Following Chapter Four’s analysis of existing regulations of online P2PL, the 
lendsumer theoretical paradigm highlights the need for a more bespoke 
regulation, particularly in consumer protection. Protections to are needed to 
reflect the underlying intermediated person-to-person aspect of P2PL. 
Regulations need to reflect an understanding that P2PL transactions have a 
longer life-cycle than sale of goods and services transactions that are of the 
classical consumer and prosumer. P2PLs should be treated as lenders and not 
consumers and retail investors, thereby taking into account the roles, 
responsibilities and risks in the lending activity, which are different from those 
experienced by retail investors and consumers.  
Furthermore, lendsumer entails the need for designing regulations capable of 
protecting individuals at both the prosumer and consumer stages of transaction. 
This requires regulation that reflects the overlapping or simultaneous 
relationships occurring in P2PL transactions. f Example are: the prosuming 
relationship between lenders and borrowers; the prosuming relationship between 
lenders and platforms where lenders rely on platforms to execute loans as 
designed by lenders; the consumer relationship between lenders and platforms 
for post-contractual services platforms provide once loan contracts are underway 
e.g. when platforms assume the traditional lender role by paying the loan to the 
borrowers and  the responsibilities of managing loan repayments on behalf of 
lenders by ensuring timely collection and pursuit of  debtors; the pre-contract 
consumer relationship between lenders and platforms e.g. ensuring that  
prospective borrowers are credible and providing well-run and stable platforms to 
lend on; and the corresponding relationships between consumers, platforms and 
lenders. 
Rather than viewing the prosuming action of P2PLs as an indication of 
heightened self-reliance, individualism, responsibility and capability, regulators 
should realise that the additional ‘work’ by individuals who prosume exposes 
them to risks either greater in degree or extent than what ordinary, passive 
consumers would face. Indeed, Comor argues that in the absence of a radically 
changed political, cultural and economic structure, the prosumer’s engagement 
mostly serves status quo interests and the prosumer is likely to become, at the 
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very least, the subject of ongoing exploitation.1080 Regulators should therefore not 
perceive these broad prosumer characteristics as a reason to minimise the need 
for greater consumer protections for lendsumers. 
Further to the theoretical analysis, the implications of the proposed model for the 
UK regulatory system are as follows. Firstly, as online P2PL is a form of financial 
intermediation and involves an underlying C2C business model, regulation by the 
FCA is appropriate. The discussions on intermediated finance in Chapter Three, 
along with t comparisons of online P2PL with other forms of intermediated finance 
such as traditional lending, esusu and eBay demonstrate that P2PL is not 
disintermediated finance, but a new form of intermediated finance that uses 
consumers to carry out lending activities. Furthermore, the inapplicability of the 
doctrine of passivity to P2PL demonstrates that platforms exercise more control 
over the affairs and management of lending transactions than the individual 
participants. Whilst online P2PL is based on a C2C model it is not a pure form of 
it. 
A more accurate description is consumer-platform-consumer (CPC) transactions. 
Therefore, because the FCA is the most appropriate body to regulate platform 
services since online P2PL concerns the interaction of consumers through a 
business. The current UK FCA-based regulatory approach already does this. The 
FCA was created to regulate the conduct of financial services firms and markets 
whilst the other financial regulatory body, the PRA,1081 was created as part of the 
Bank of England for prudential regulation and supervision of banks, building 
societies, CU, insurers and investment firms. Having shown that online P2PL is 
fundamentally different from traditional lending provided by banks and CUs and 
that exclusive focus on the stability of the industry and platforms will not provide 
sufficient protections for P2PLs and borrowers, the industry is rightly regulated by 
the FCA that is more consumer focused than the PRA.  
However, as demonstrated in Chapter Four, the way the FCA currently regulates 
online P2PL falls short of what is needed. Although the FCA correctly separated 
P2PL regulation from bank lending and provided specific rules for the 
                                                          
1080 Edward Comor, ‘Contextualizing and Critiquing the Fantastic Prosumer: Power, Alienation 
and Hegemony’ (2011) 37 Critical Sociology 309, 322. 
1081 ‘Prudential Regulation Authority’ 
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Pages/default.aspx#> accessed 26 April 2017. 
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crowdfunding industry in general, the amalgamation of all forms of crowdfunding 
under one body of regulation distinguishable only as ‘investment-based 
crowdfunding’ or ‘loan-based crowdfunding’ is unhelpful.1082 Existing regulation 
has focused on the protection of consumers in the classical sense. This has 
resulted in largely pre-contractual, information-based consumer protections 
which are designed to protect consumers who are vulnerable for being unable to 
inspect goods and services or properly assess the claims or advice of 
businesses, as opposed to consumers who lack the post-contract power to 
protect their interests once the lending cycle is underway.1083 Consequently, whilst 
P2PBs can be appropriately protected under the current regime, the protection of 
P2PLs has shortcomings. Therefore, P2PL-specific regulation is necessary to 
ensure adequate protection for lendsumers. 
Suggestions about the proposed regulatory approach include, firstly, the 
empowerment of P2PLs through the ability to hold third party platforms 
accountable rather than empowerment through information provision and 
delivery. This would recognise that P2PLs, despite their prosumption activities 
are powerless for being unable to exercise primary post-contract control.1084 
Indeed, prosumption without the control of the post-contract stage of lending 
activity, or direct enforcement of lending rights,  partly accounts for P2PLs’ 
vulnerability in the first place. It is therefore suggested that interventionist 
protection applies gatekeeper liability as shown in Chapter Five. Regulation 
cannot responsibilise and empower participants lacking sufficient degree of 
primary control over their affairs. 
Regulation should be more specific about what it requires of P2P platforms for 
lender protections and provide lenders with enforceable rights against the 
platforms for not carrying out their regulatory responsibilities in a satisfactory 
manner.1085 At present, some key protections for lenders such as the requirement 
for platforms to have measures in case of the platform’s liquidation or cessation 
of business lack a minimum standard or set of criteria. This results in a largely 
self-regulatory environment which is unenforceable by lenders should things go 
                                                          
1082 Financial Conduct Authority, (Policy Statement, PS14/4), 6-7. 
1083 See section 4.4.1 of this thesis. 
1084 See section 4.4.2. 
1085 See section 5.2.4 on the need for both regulation and civil liability in the regulation of P2PL 
where this is discussed. 
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wrong. Specific criteria would protect P2PLs by enabling them to judge the 
efficacy and reliability of prospective platforms.  
Regulatory standards are arguably inflexible and inefficient forms of regulation. 
However, this applies only regulatory standards are imposed on activities that are 
constantly changing and not in P2PL because even if the P2PL industry changes, 
so long as it is based on the current lendsumer-platform-consumer model, the 
need for measures to assure the continuance of lending activities will not change. 
Consequently, specific measures will protect lenders and even provide regulatory 
certainty for platforms.  
Additionally, rights of action would greatly encourage P2PL activities by letting 
lenders know that if things go wrong they have recourse to justice. Rights of 
action should also exist against platforms for the actions or conduct of its users 
through gatekeeper liability where appropriate. For example, widespread 
misconduct exemplified by P2PLs on the Chinese platform Jiedaibao ( 
section.2.3.1 above), could be regulated by holding platforms as opposed to 
individual lenders responsible. Platforms are in a better position than P2PLs and 
borrowers to control what goes on and exercise preventative action to 
wrongdoing or risky conduct on the platform.  
Finally, access to FSCS protection of lenders’ money should be provided. P2PL 
is not a pure investment. Although it is not traditional bank lending form due to its 
individual lenders, P2PL is a form of financial intermediation different from 
investment of stocks and bonds. Once P2PLs decide to lend money, how and to 
whom, the platform carries this activity out. Bank lending consumers have access 
to FSCS protection for not being party to banks’ lending decisions, i.e. banks 
decide without consumers’ express permission to use their money to make 
money for itself. Consequently, consumers who do not directly lend need access 
to FSCS protection in case the banks lose the money and are unable to repay on 
demand. However, the lack of explicit permission to lend using the deposits 
cannot be the sole justification for the provision of FSCS protections to bank 
customers, because credit union members also have access to FSCS protection 
even though they are already aware that the loans from their credit union are 
largely derived from the deposits of  members. This suggests at least implicit 
consent to using their savings to fund the credit union’s lending. Similarly, 
institutional lending does not confer peculiar benefits to bank customers, because 
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P2PLs equally receive returns on their investment in the form of interest 
repayments on loans, whilst bank customers receive interest on their savings and 
deposits. The fact that these amounts can be minimal is irrelevant as they depend 
on the bank and the state of the market. 
The fact that P2PLs expressly decide to lend funds to borrowers through 
platforms does not necessary lead to the conclusion that their funds do not merit 
regulatory protection. Firstly, P2PLs are not only using their savings just like 
indirect lenders of banks and CU, they are also contributing to the health of the 
economy by widening access to finance to individuals. Arguably, this should be 
encouraged and confidence in the market can be boosted by knowledge of the 
relative safety of the lenders’ money. This does not need to be a guarantee of all 
the money initially lent, but could be about 25% of the loan principal. Alternatively, 
the proportion of lending funds guaranteed by the compensation scheme could 
be determined by a scale of risk lenders voluntarily took, e.g. as discussed in 
Section3.5.6 lenders who chose to lend to highest risk borrowers can receive the 
least amount from the compensation scheme.  
Ultimately, regulators need to determine appropriate amounts to encourage 
confidence in the market. Overall, this should reflect the transitional nature of 
P2PLs as both prosumers who take on lending responsibility upon themselves 
and therefore rightly held responsible for this decision, and consumers of the 
platform’s services, depending on its ability to manage loans, honesty, and ability 
to handle the lenders’ money until loan are repaid in full, and also dependent on 
borrowers who may or may not be sufficiently responsible throughout the loan 
cycle to manage their finances well enough to afford repayments.  
This thesis has therefore proposed a dual regulatory framework comprised of 
regulation and civil liability. It is the concept of “lendsumer” which enables civil 
liability to be used as a regulatory tool of the P2PL industry. It also facilitates an 
understanding of the need for this dual regulatory approach. The concept was 
introduced to show firstly, that based on the role and nature of lendsumers, there 
is a need for regulation to protect the lendsumer and secondly, for lendsumers to 
have the right to take action against P2PL platforms – a right that is extendable 
to P2PBs. Civil liability, based on gatekeeper liability, concerns the issues of who 
has a right of action, against whom and for what reason. It therefore provides 
platforms with a level of accountability through rights of action that lendsumers 
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can enforce, thus protecting them at the post-contractual stage of their 
transaction – something that regulation alone has insufficiently provided them 
with. Meanwhile, the regulation aspect of the dual regulatory framework is meant 
to adequately protect lendsumers at all stages of the P2PL transaction cycle. 
These suggestions will strengthen the current P2PL regulatory regime and 
provide adequate protection to P2PL participants in recognition of its underlying 
lendsumer-platform-consumer model, and vulnerabilities of lenders who are not 
mere consumers or prosumers, but an amalgamation of both in the form of a 
transitional consumer. 
 
5.9. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued that the FCA regulatory regime of P2PL assumes that 
either the P2PL business model is based on a B2C structure or that the only 
important aspect of the industry’s operations necessitating regulation is its B2C 
aspect. This assumption occurs even though the language used by the regulators 
to refer to the industry refers to the person-to-person form, i.e. they regulate P2PL 
on a B2C level, but refer to it as P2PL. The effect of this assumption is a lack of 
clarity of language which reflects on the practical aspect of the regulation by the 
fact that it does not consider the risks, needs or conduct of P2PLs and borrowers 
in relation to each other. This is a cause for concern because P2PL does not exist 
in a vacuum, but within the wider context of other C2C, disintermediated services 
such as Uber, eBay, and micro-lending, for which the regulation is also largely 
business-to-consumer based because it focuses on the regulation of the 
intermediaries’ conduct. 
The chapter also argues that clarity of regulatory language is important because 
how an idea is conceived impacts how it is put into effect. Consequently, because 
of a lack of understanding of the underlying conceptual framework of P2PL, i.e. 
its C2C nature, the UK regulatory regime has focussed its regulation on the 
traditional B2C aspects of the industry’s practice. Yet, P2PL is part of the wider 
movement towards disintermediation which involves a change in concepts, from 
consumer to prosumer and from B2C to C2C, or to take it further ‘prosumer-to-
prosumer’. However, the chapter demonstrates that it is not impossible for the 
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law to adapt to changing concepts, rather it is important it does so to remain 
appropriate and relevant. This is particularly the case considering how new 
technologies often change the way businesses operate, just as the internet did to 
the way businesses communicate and the contracts are signed due to the onset 
of electronic means of carrying out such actions. 
 
In light of the UK regulatory regime’s focus on the B2C relationship between the 
users and the platforms, Chapter Five analyses the role of P2P platforms in their 
capacity as intermediaries between the lenders and borrowers. This is a focus 
that the regulatory regime does not thoroughly engage with. The chapter argues 
that P2PL platforms are not passive intermediaries, therefore they should not 
benefit from the limited liability provided by the doctrine of passivity. As they are 
not merely passive, it is possible to hold them to account for the malfeasant or 
detrimental actions of the borrowers and lenders towards each other. 
Chapter Five suggests gatekeeper liability as a way of doing this, but to maintain 
an appropriate balance between the business interests of the platforms and the 
interests of the P2P users, liability should only be imposed in situations where 
the platforms are in a position of control over the P2PL users’ actions. This also 
reflects the need for regulation to be proportionate to the actions and conduct of 
the participants whilst also providing user protection and the means to enforce 
their rights. Although, P2PL platforms are typically in a position of control as 
argued in this chapter, this requirement adds a degree of flexibility to consider 
the possibility of P2PL business models where platforms are genuinely passive 
entities. 
Finally, to aid the conceptual understanding of P2PL, Chapter five argues in 
favour of the need for a reconsideration of the concept of ‘consumer’ in relation 
to P2PL. Linking back to the analysis of the notions of ‘consumer’ and 
‘prosumption’ in chapter three, and the fact that P2PLs are more than just 
‘consumers’, it puts forward the concept of ‘lendsumer’ as a more accurate 
reflection of the roles, conduct and nature of P2PLs and as an analytical tool by 
which the suitability of regulation can be questioned  from the perspective of the 
users of P2PL.
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6. Conclusion 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
This thesis has discussed the regulation of P2PL in the United Kingdom as it 
pertains to the consumer-to-consumer basis of P2PL operations and from the 
perspective of its participants. P2PL is a relatively new tool which enables 
individuals to save or invest money (the lenders) or raise funds (borrowers) 
through the assistance of other individuals. As P2PL platforms connect 
individuals with each other, it forms part of the wider ‘sharing economy which 
itself is part of the continual quest of innovators to simplify processes and goods 
through disintermediation.  
This thesis has argued that because of the tripartite relationship between the 
individuals and the P2PL platforms, P2PL represents a new form of 
intermediation which does not fit within the current conceptions of consumer law 
and protection. The implication is that if the law wishes to provide adequate 
protection for the P2PL users, it needs to reflect a better understanding of them 
conceptually, which will lead to regulation which is more tailored to the industry 
and which takes into consideration the risks, actions and characteristics of P2PL 
users. 
The general literature on the P2PL tends to focus on the more practical issues of 
credit risk and trust and the implications these factors have for the way platforms 
are run, or how to improve the lending and borrowing experience for the users. 
Analysis of the legal and regulatory rules surrounding P2PL has concentrated on 
the north American experience, particularly in relation to the way the SEC had 
classified P2PL as a form of securities investment. The difficulties that such 
legislation in America had on the P2PL industry there, led some academics like 
Verstein to argue in favour of no regulation or laws at all for P2PL because of the 
restrictive impact it had on the development of P2PL there. This highlighted the 
need to explore the theoretical justifications of P2PL regulation and to justify the 
interventionist stance that most regulation adopts in relation to private 
agreements between individuals as a starting point when analysing the legal 
rules. In contrast with the US situation, the literature focusing on the legal 
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regulation of P2PL in the UK was sparse and where it does exist, generally 
consists of a review or analysis of the existing P2PL regulatory regime. By not 
exploring the theoretical justifications of regulation first, the underlying 
assumption of such work is that existing conceptions of regulation and its purpose 
fit the P2PL model of finance. This thesis argues that it does not and highlights 
that the current crop of rules and regulations e.g. consumer protection law, were 
developed in light of B2C business structures and therefore are more suited to 
regulating scenarios within that framework of interaction. However, the thesis has 
argued that such concepts are not easily translated to the C2C context in which 
P2PL largely exists and this is an important consideration because of the 
necessity of rules/regulations to have clarity of language, and for regulation to 
fully take into consideration all risks and experiences faced by P2PLs and 
borrowers.  
This thesis sought to answer two questions arising from this gap in the literature: 
a. What are the theoretical and practical justifications for P2PL regulation? 
b. Are current regulatory instruments fit to resolve the regulatory difficulties 
posed by P2PL? 
 
 
6.2. Summary of Findings 
 
6.2.1. The theoretical and practical justifications for P2PL regulation 
 
To answer the first research question, the thesis analysed three theoretical 
justifications for more or less interventionist regulation, which are RCT, 
behavioural economics theory and paternalism. The aim was to show that 
paternalism and by extension, consumer protection law which is a type of paternal 
regulation, provided a basic justification for P2PL regulation which is protection 
of the weaker party in a contractual relationship.  
The analysis highlighted that the basic assumption of the RCT perspective of 
regulation which is that people are rational beings who will always choose the 
outcome that will best maximise their welfare, is unrealistic because it is based 
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on what might happen in a perfect market. However, perfect markets do not exist 
because there are market failures which in reality make transacting in a rational 
way very difficult. For example, information asymmetries are a form of market 
failure caused by the fact that one party may have more information than another 
and not have any incentive to share this information with other market participants 
if left to their own devices. Consequently, the party in the weaker or more 
vulnerable position, i.e. the one lacking the information may be susceptible to 
actions by the stronger party to mislead them and to the fact that the market might 
not truly reflect the risks involved. The discussion of paternalism in chapter two 
sought to answer the problems raised by liberalists who, although they may 
consider regulation necessary object to regulation which comprises of (too much) 
state intervention. This problem is also expressed by the regulatory aim to 
balance proportional regulation with the need to encourage growth and 
innovation within a given industry.  
The thesis used the findings of behavioural economics theory to demonstrate that 
state intervention through regulation was justified. The behavioural economics 
theory paradigm argues that people are subject to emotional and psychological 
biases which can impede their ability to act and think rationally when making 
private transactions. For these reasons, the thesis considers P2PL interventionist 
regulation justified because of the failure of the markets to adequately resolve the 
problems that arise from the individuals’ inherent biases without the assistance 
of regulation. 
 
P2PL and existing conceptions of consumer and consumer protection 
 
The consideration then turned to the problem of whether this justification was 
appropriate in relation to P2PL since the two transacting parties could both be 
viewed as ‘consumers’, and therefore one may not necessarily be weaker than 
the other in terms of their level of experience or expertise in using P2PL as a form 
of finance.  To answer this research question, the thesis critically examined the 
meaning and conceptualisation of the term ‘consumer’. The analysis was based 
on the EU definition of consumer because of its widespread influence in 
European countries, of which the UK is one.  
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The analysis of the EU definition of consumer demonstrates that P2PL does not 
fit within the existing conceptions of consumer and consumer protection, because 
existing conceptions are based on an economic construction of the consumer 
which views them as rational beings. It posits that to truly understand what a 
consumer is, one must understand that they are not always predictable and do 
not always act rationally. Therefore, to understand what a consumer is, one must 
examine what they do and how they behave rather than impose a one-size-fits-
all approach to defining them. The concept of ‘prosumer’ is used as an analytical 
tool to compare P2PL users with consumers to highlight the ways in which they 
differ, because rather than focusing on the nature of consumers, it takes into 
consideration what they do. Using the ‘prosumer’ concept the thesis highlights 
the limited nature of the ‘consumer’ concept in describing the P2PL participants’ 
activities and the reasons why P2PL users cannot accurately be described as 
consumers.  
Through an analysis of the different conceptualisations of ‘consumers’, i.e. the 
average’ and ‘vulnerable’ consumers, the chapter argues that previous 
conceptions of the consumer did not fit all the circumstances experienced by 
P2PLs and borrowers because they were narrowly based on the idea that firstly 
the transactional relationships governed by consumer protection law is 
automatically going to be the one based on the B2C model of business and that 
the role of consumers is to consume or receive the services or products from a 
more sophisticated business. However, the discussion of the idea of the 
prosumer in combination with a review of the actions that P2PLs and borrowers 
must take to engage in P2PL demonstrated that this is not the case. 
However, the thesis also argues that P2PLs do not fit accurately within the 
prosumer concept either because they display a combination of consumer and 
prosumer traits depending on the situation they find themselves in within a single 
P2PL transaction. It is argued that in relation to the P2PLs’ actions and level of 
participation during the formation of the loan service provided to the borrowers, 
they behave like prosumers because of their high level of participation in the 
production side of the transaction. However, once the agreement has been made, 
their level of participation drops and their dependency on the platforms to 
administer the loan agreement replaces their prosumer-like tendencies such that 
they behave more like consumers. This analysis is important because it reveals 
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the different types and levels of risks faced by P2P users depending on which 
point in the transaction, or which relationship one is considering at any one time.  
A further significance that this analysis reveals, and which contributes to the 
answering of the second research question, is that the consumer protection 
regulatory regime focuses only on a limited section of the P2PL 
process/transaction. For example, the focus on information disclosure as a 
means of consumer empowerment and the focus on regulating the platform’s 
activities and conduct without the provision of rights of action to the borrowers or 
lenders, only focuses on the market failures that present itself in a typical B2C 
transaction. This neglects the risks or problems faced by P2PLs and borrowers 
in relation to each other’s actions or lack thereof. It also demonstrates that the 
regulation of P2PL is still based on an understanding of business operations as 
being B2C and the idea that consumer protection is only justified in relation to 
market failures caused by the existence of a weaker party and stronger party, as 
opposed to market failures that exist when two individuals within the same 
category interact with each other. The focus also does not reflect the wider 
disintermediated changes taking place within the sharing economy in which P2PL 
exists. These considerations therefore answer the research sub-question in the 
negative, i.e. P2PL does not fit within existing conceptions of the consumer and 
consumer protection. Consequently, it acts as the foundational argument to the 
second research question answered in chapter four because it suggests that 
because P2PL does not fit within the consumer paradigm, the regulation is not 
suitably adapted to it. 
It also points out that consumer behaviour can vary depending on the situation 
they find themselves in, for example, it might depend on the type of service they 
are contracting into or the goods they are buying. This chapter therefore creates 
awareness of the importance of considering the transitional nature of consumers 
depending on which point of the transaction process they have found themselves 
in, to provide them with adequate regulation. 
 
P2PL and other existing kinds of financial intermediation 
To answer this research sub-question, the thesis compared the similarities and 
differences between P2PL and other forms of intermediation both on and offline. 
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It compared P2PL with traditional bank lending, esusu/isusu which is a form of 
rotary savings, the C2C transactions that occur on the eBay marketplace, payday 
lending and CU. This research question was answered in chapter four. The aim 
was to further demonstrate the uniqueness of P2PL by distinguishing it from 
existing forms of lending and direct consumer-to-consumer transactions. Through 
the comparisons between P2PL and other forms of lending and C2C transactions, 
the chapter contributed to the overarching research question by showing that 
P2PL does not fit within existing forms of intermediation because it reflects a 
prosumption rather than consumption-based model.  The key factor behind this 
difference is the transitional nature of P2PLs and the way they are no longer just 
merely consumers. This finding emphasises the need for regulation of P2PL to 
be more tailored to the way it works, rather than simply trying to apply existing 
forms of regulation catering to B2C-type intermediaries to it. 
 
 
6.2.2. Current regulatory instruments and the regulatory difficulties posed 
by P2PL 
 
This question was treated in chapters four and five. Chapter four critically 
analysed the current P2PL regulatory regime and policy in the UK. It argues that 
although the current regulatory regime provides consumer protections for the 
lenders and borrowers, from the perspective of the lenders, these protections are 
limited to the potential market failures that can be faced between a business and 
a consumer, in this context, the P2PL platform and the lenders. This is 
demonstrated by the fact that the protections afforded by the regime are largely 
information-based protections designed to responsibilise the consumer. 
However, apart from a right to complain about the platform’s services to the 
Financial Ombudsman Service, the regulation does not provide the lenders or 
borrowers with any enforceable rights against each other in relation to their 
lending or against the platform itself. This leaves the lenders dependent on the 
platforms for the administration and execution of the loan. It demonstrates that 
the success of the regulatory regime’s consumer protection successes, is 
hindered due the underlying assumption of the current regime, that consumer 
protection consists of protecting the weaker party which leads the regime to 
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provide a substantial amount of pre-contractual, information-based protections 
but very few post-contractual ones that deal with the key concerns of P2PLs 
which is the continued repayment of their loans. Consequently, it demonstrates 
that the current regulatory regime is only partially fit to resolve the regulatory 
difficulties posed by P2PL because it only largely focuses on the pre-contractual 
market failures and the risk posed by the platform itself.  
Within the traditional bank lending framework, the participants are banks, 
customers and borrowers. The bank operates as the lender; however, the money 
lent to borrowers is derived from their customers’ deposits, so technically they 
simultaneously act as intermediaries between their customers and borrowers. In 
this scenario, the borrowers are unknown to the customers. The borrowers do not 
know which proportion of their borrowing comes from any particular customer and 
the customer likewise does not know exactly where his or her money is going. 
Because the bank handles the customers’ deposits, which they have a duty to 
repay on demand, they are subject to regulation on deposit handling and how 
payments are made. They also bear the risk of default.  
Within the P2PL framework, the traditional customers of the bank now operate 
as lenders on the platforms, particularly in its pure, person-to-person business 
model. This means that they are faced with similar problems of information 
asymmetries and behavioural biases as borrowers, with the addition that they 
now bear the risk of the borrowers’ default by themselves. Therefore, as 
individuals, they cannot be subject to similar regulation and liabilities as bank 
lenders. Rather, they will need the benefit of consumer protection regulation. 
However, because the lenders on P2PL platforms lend their money directly, they 
are often called investors rather than consumers. For regulatory purposes this 
classification as an investor rather than consumer is significant because the 
protections available to investors often assumes a degree of expertise and are 
therefore more non-interventionist than the protections available to ordinary 
consumers. In the traditional lending and investment framework this approach 
makes sense as it means that regulation is proportionate to the circumstances. 
However, in the P2PL framework, where lenders/investors may hold the same 
level of investment/lending experience or knowledge as the borrowers, this 
classification and the different protections which come with them, are not 
proportionate. 
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This chapter reviews the regulation of P2PL in the United Kingdom from a 
lendsumer perspective. It analyses the extent to which the regulation creates a 
suitable environment for lendsumer’s to use P2PL and the extent to which it 
reflects the degree of involvement of the P2P platforms. It demonstrates that 
although the regulation recognises that the term ‘crowdfunding’ is an umbrella 
term under which there exists many business models, it does not reflect the 
underlying concept of consumer-to-consumer transactions that underlies P2PL in 
particular, the prosumers that use it nor the transitional nature of P2PLs. 
Having demonstrated the limits of the current UK regulatory regime, chapter six 
makes a theoretical argument in favour of the importance of the clarity of 
language. This supports the discussion about the concept of the lendsumer made 
earlier because it emphasises the theoretical need to first understand a concept 
thoroughly before regulating it.  
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6.3. Theoretical implications: the consequences of adopting a lendsumer 
conceptualisation of P2PL 
 
The main contribution of this thesis is the concept of the ‘lendsumer’. It 
contributes to the academic debates and discussions about the prosumer by 
expanding the meaning and application of the terms ‘consumer’ and ‘prosumer’. 
It does this by demonstrating that the concept of ‘consumer’ is not just a fluid one 
in the sense that it is changing into or being replaced by the concept of ‘prosumer’, 
rather, it demonstrates that a single individual can embody both concepts during 
a single transaction. 
One implication of this is that this idea of a capacity that transforms is not limited 
to just the P2PL context. P2PL just provides an interesting and unique way of 
exemplifying it and has been used to show that consumer interaction has 
changed. However, the concept of ‘lendsumer’ can also be applied to other forms 
of consumer-to-consumer or prosumer-to-prosumer interactions such as on 
eBay’s buyers and sellers and Uber’s passengers and drivers. Of course, the 
name can be changed but the underlying idea of an individual’s transitional 
capacity remains the same. 
The concept can be used as an analytical tool. In the context of P2PL the concept 
has been used to demonstrate a more detailed, full and insightful understanding 
of the P2P users. Insightful because of its emphasis on looking at the actions and 
roles of the customer and what they do, not just the nature of the person and the 
purpose of the transaction, as the concept of the consumer demands due to its 
definition. Whereas the concept of consumer comes with the underlying 
assumption that the consumer is automatically going to be the weaker party, the 
lendsumer encourages a look at everything the individual does, their capacity 
within the industry they are operating in and the issues or problems they face 
during the transaction from the beginning to the end. This is done without any 
automatic assumptions of weakness. The implication for consumer protection law 
and regulation is that they have a positive or active role and not just a negative 
one, i.e. they need not only look for market failures caused by consumers’ 
inherent weakness in relation to the business party to a transaction, but can also 
help resolve or protect consumers from problems faced in a transaction e.g. the 
inability to hold another party to account for misconduct.  
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A related implication of the use of the concept of lendsumer is that by not focusing 
on relationships of weak party versus strong party, it goes some way towards 
moving away from the idea that consumer protection rules should only apply to 
relationships between individuals and businesses, but also encompasses the 
transactional relationships between individuals who interact more directly. For 
example, the lend in lendsumer draws attention to the productive actions that the 
individual undertakes in the transaction, thereby focusing on the relationship with 
the P2PBs, whereas the ‘-sumer’ draws attention to the consumption activity of 
the lendsumers in their relationship with the platforms. These ideas can be 
substituted for other types of interactions within the disintermediated sharing 
economy. 
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Appendix: The role and conduct of P2P lenders and borrowers on P2PL 
platforms 
 
The following section provides a case study of what P2P lenders and borrowers 
do on the platforms they have chosen to use and explains their main 
characteristics. The information is gathered from the platforms respective 
websites and a table summarising the main characteristics of the platforms 
features on the p2pmoney website.1086 The case studies look at various factors 
that make up the P2P users’ overall conduct on the platforms, e.g. their roles, 
capacities, and responsibilities etc. The aim is to provide a general insight into 
the behaviours and activities of P2PL users which in turn will highlight whether 
they fall into the category of consumer or prosumer. 
 
Zopa 
 
P2P lenders’ role 
P2P lenders on Zopa make fixed rate loans of between one to five years to 
multiple people under individual loan contracts. The money is lent in small 
amounts to different borrowers. If the lender wishes to retrieve his funds, he or 
she has the ability to transfer the loan to another lender using the ‘Rapid Return 
Facility’ on the website. In order to use the platform’s services, the lender has to 
set up a lending account, transfer money to the Zopa account from his/her 
personal bank account and select a lending option. This also involves choosing 
how much to lend and when and how to access their money. The money is lent 
automatically by Zopa once the lender’s conditions for lending have been met. 
Once the loan is formed, the lender must monitor the loans to keep updated about 
what is going on. 
Capacity of P2P lender 
In Zopa the lenders are individuals who lend on a personal basis. Although it is 
possible for institutions to lend on the platform, but only in a professional capacity. 
                                                          
1086 ‘Peer-to-Peer Companies’ (p2p Money) <http://www.p2pmoney.co.uk/companies.htm> 
accessed 16 April 2016. 
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This means that a proportion of any one loan could be partly funded by a business 
and therefore partly business-to-consumer (B2C) funding. However, because 
loans are created from multiple lenders’ investments, the B2C contribution to the 
loan might be relatively small. 
P2P lenders using Zopa tend to be a mixture of retail, high net worth and 
sophisticated lenders. Businesses lending on the platform need to have a 
consumer credit license. 
Dependency on the platform 
P2P lenders rely on Zopa to carry out a number of pre-contractual activities vital 
to the formation of the loan. For example, the platform carries out the necessary 
identity, fraud and credit checks prior to the formation of the contract. It also 
assesses the affordability of the loan to the borrower.  
They also rely on Zopa to administer the loan according to Zopa’s principles once 
the loan has been formed. If a borrower misses a repayment, this is chased by 
collections agency appointed by the platform unless or until a default occurs. 
Zopa maintains the ‘Zopa Safeguard Trust’ which is held by P2PS Limited in trust 
for lenders and covers the risk of a borrower not repaying the loan. However the 
trust is not guaranteed and whether it pays out depends on how much money is 
held in the fund. If a borrower has defaulted after four months in arrears, the loan 
contract is assigned to P2PS Limited and the platform makes a claim on the 
lender’s behalf to the Safeguard Trust to reimburse the loan principal and interest 
that is due. 
In situations where the lender wishes to pull out of a loan agreement and retrieve 
his/her money, there is no guarantee that they’ll be able to access the money 
they have already lent using the Rapid Return facility if there are no other lenders 
to assign the loan contract to.  
Another way in which they rely on the platform is to diversify their investment. The 
money transferred to the platform is automatically split into numerous microloans 
that are lent to multiple borrowers at a fixed rate. Therefore, they rely on the 
platform to do the actual lending by transferring the funds to the ultimate 
borrower. 
P2P lender’s self-reliance/liabilities 
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The P2P lender places his/her capital at risk with no compensation scheme to act 
as a financial safety net in case things go wrong. 
P2P borrower’s role 
To use the platform’s facilities, the P2P borrower must sign up to Zopa as a 
borrower. In order to borrow, they check Zopa’s loan rates using the Zopa loan 
calculator. Following this, they choose the amount they want to borrow and for 
how long. Zopa provides them with a quote, which if they are happy with it, they 
accept and apply for a loan. 
Their role during the loan agreement is to repay the loan and interest on a monthly 
basis. 
Capacity of P2P borrowers 
On Zopa, borrowers act, i.e. borrow money, in a personal capacity. 
P2P borrowers’ reliance on the platform 
The borrowers rely on Zopa to authorise the loan and transfer the money to them 
upon approval. 
P2P borrowers’ responsibilities 
In addition to paying the monthly loan repayment, Zopa expects its borrowers to 
pay a loan servicing fee when they join which includes an amount to cover the 
risk of non-repayment. They are also expected to have an income, to ensure that 
they are able to afford the repayments. 
 
Bondora 
 
P2P lenders’ role 
On Bondora lenders fill in an identification form and transfer their funds to 
Bondora’s account.  
There are two types of lenders that use Bondora, passive and active. Passive 
lenders with little time on their hands can automate their investments with 
Bondora’s Portfolio Manager. Lenders who chose to lend this way select the 
portfolio manager settings and add the necessary funds to the account. 
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Active lenders use an interface called API, to access the Bondora system 
programmatically. They have to take steps to learn more about API and contact 
Bondora to do so. They are advised to gain more experience using Bondora and 
only become an active lender if they are lending larger sums of money. 
Both types of lenders must set up a Portfolio Manager by selecting their desired 
target risk-return and agreeing to the terms and conditions. Lenders can choose 
to spread their investment between several borrowers or set a limit on 
investments to a single borrower. 
Lending takes place by the lender transferring their funds to the platform. Once 
this has happened, the money is lent to numerous borrowers. The initial capital 
and interest is also automatically lent out. 
Capacity of P2P lender 
On Bondora, individuals lend on a personal basis. Businesses and charities can 
also open lending accounts but for a business related purpose.  
Lenders using the platform can be retail, high net worth and sophisticated 
investors. 
Dependency on the platform 
Bondora lenders rely on the platform to risk-assess the borrowers using 
sophisticated underwriting models. The platform assigns borrowers into credit 
groups with an interest rate that reflects the relevant risks. 
Bondora is responsible for payment collection and for chasing payment where 
there has been non-payment or default. In addition, lenders are reliant on 
Bondora to safeguard the money lent by keeping it in a separate client account. 
As passive investors use an automated lending system, the platform does the 
lending once the settings have been chosen, including reinvesting the 
repayments from the lenders’ investments. The Portfolio Manager continues to 
invest according to the lender’s chosen risk-return setting, monitors it and 
continuously corrects future investments to match the level selected. For 
example, by targeting lower risk loans when the portfolio risk level is higher than 
the selected risk-return setting. Lenders are also dependent on the platform’s 
automatic diversification. 
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P2P lender’s self-reliance/liabilities 
The P2P lender places his/her capital at risk with no compensation scheme to act 
as a financial safety net in case things go wrong. The burden of operational risk 
is also bourn by the lender, for example, the risk of the lender going bankrupt. 
The lender also bears the burden of currency risk as all loans are denominated 
in euro. The lender must take currency risk into account if they have converted 
their local currency to euro and back when investing on Bondora, as currency 
fluctuations can have a strong impact on net returns. 
P2P borrower’s role 
P2P borrowers on Bondora must provide the platform with information requested 
by the platform which it needs to perform the necessary identity, fraud and 
affordability checks. The borrowers then receive several credit offers based on 
their rating and must choose one. Once the offer has been chosen it enters the 
marketplace and triggers all portfolio managers matching the criteria of the loan.  
The borrower must determine the purpose of the loan, the maximum loan and 
interest amounts and the loan duration. They also have to select their preferred 
currency of the loan. 
Capacity of P2P borrowers 
On Bondora, borrowers act, i.e. borrow money, in a personal capacity. 
P2P borrowers’ reliance on the platform 
The borrowers rely on Bondora to authorise the loan and transfer the money to 
them upon approval. 
P2P borrowers’ responsibilities 
In addition to paying the monthly loan repayment, Bondora expects the borrowers 
to provide information which is true and accurate. 
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Unbolted 
 
P2P lenders’ role 
P2P lenders must register on the platform as an investor. Once they are 
registered they transfer their funds to the platform. Their role involves selecting 
their lending criteria e.g. how the funds are deployed and the maximum amount 
per loan. Lenders also decide whether to use AutoLend, which enables automatic 
bidding on all loans that suit the lender’s pre-defined lending criteria. 
During or following the lending process, lenders decide whether to change or 
cancel AutoLend instructions. They can also decide whether to actively manage 
their investments, rather than using AutoLend. In such cases, the lenders bid on 
specific loan offerings by themselves and choose a particular loan they want to 
invest in. Such active lenders diversify their loan portfolio by choosing particular 
asset classes. The platform does also enable AutoLend lenders to self-select 
individual loans. 
Capacity of P2P lender 
On Unbolted, lenders invest in personal capacity. 
Dependency on the platform 
Unbolted, is a P2PL platform in which borrowers borrow against collateral of 
value. The platform, rather than the lenders, determine the value of the asset lent 
against by partnering with selected firms who are internationally recognised for 
creating or managing auctions for a particular category of assets. The platform 
uses their mid-range estimate to determine the value of the asset. So lenders are 
dependent on the platform and its associates to accurately value the asset which 
borrowers lend against. 
The asset is under the control of Unbolted during the term of the loan and lenders 
do not have private access to it. 
If the borrower defaults, the platform puts the asset up for auction. The funds 
received, less the charges for selling it through a third party auctioneer, are used 
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to pay off the outstanding loan principal and interest. The lender is therefore 
dependent on the platform’s ability to sell the asset at the best value for money 
on their behalf. 
The platform has a ‘Provision Trust’ which protects the principal of the loan. It is 
funded by 1% of the principal of every loan made out of the platform’s own fees. 
If there is a shortfall in the recovery of the loan principal, the platform puts in a 
claim against the Provision Trust on behalf of the lenders to cover the shortfall. 
Lenders of Gold Loans, i.e. loans backed by gold assets, are protected by the 
Gold Trust for their entire dues, including interest. 
P2P lender’s self-reliance/liabilities 
The P2P lender places his/her capital at risk with no compensation scheme to act 
as a financial safety net in case things go wrong. 
Borrowers are not credit checked because the lending system on Unbolted is 
based on one that is backed by assets with a resale value. 
P2P borrower’s role 
To engage in the borrowing process, borrowers upload photographs of their 
asset, describe it and apply for a loan. They send the asset(s) to the platform by 
next day courier which is free and fully insured. They must then accept the loan 
and receive the funds. 
Once the loan has been made they must make the loan repayments monthly. 
Capacity of P2P borrowers 
Individuals borrow in a personal capacity. However, small businesses can also 
borrow on the platform. 
P2P borrowers’ reliance on the platform 
The borrowers’ assets are held by the platform during the loan term, so they are 
dependent on the platform to keep it safe until it is returned to them. 
The asset is valued by the platform, so they are also dependent on the platform 
to obtain an accurate valuation of their asset, which will impact the extent of their 
borrowing, e.g. amount. 
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P2P borrowers’ responsibilities 
This is not mentioned on the platform’s website. 
 
eMoney Union 
 
P2P lenders’ role 
On eMoney, P2P lenders must first register on the platform and then deposit 
money into the eMoneyUnion account, so that it can be lent out by the platform. 
Following this, they decide and choose their personal appetite for risk. They 
select the amount they wish to lend, the amount per borrower and over what term. 
Lenders must also decide whether to lend automatically using eBidPal, to 
borrowers suiting the risk rating the lender choses. They can also decide to 
purchase pieces of loans in the platform’s secondary market which are called 
eMicroLoans. Lenders can also decide to bid on loans which were not fully funded 
at the loan approval stage in the eMarketPlace. 
They must monitor the loans to keep updated on the loans they have and the 
repayments using the lender dashboard. 
Capacity of P2P lender 
P2P lenders lend in a personal capacity and can be retail, high net worth or 
sophisticated investors. 
Dependency on the platform 
Lenders are dependent on the platform in a number of ways. The borrower’s 
repayments are secured on property or by the eProvision fund. The platform 
automatically matches lenders with borrowers who have been approved and 
received a risk grade from the platform’s underwriters.  
They are reliant on the platform to chase late payments and in cases of non-
payment, the platform puts in a claim to the eProvisionFund on their behalf to 
ensure they do not suffer a loan repayment default. However, there is no 
guarantee that the claim will succeed as it is subject to their being sufficient funds 
available within the fund. 
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As with all platforms, the lenders are dependent on the platform to keep their 
money safe in the case that it ceases to trade.  
Their lending decisions are based on the platform’s credit and borrower checks 
and they are dependent on the platform to for the administration of the loan. 
Lastly, the borrowers’ details are anonymous as they use a membership number 
to identify them on the platform. 
P2P lender’s self-reliance/liabilities 
The lender places their capital at risk when lending on the platform. 
P2P borrower’s role 
The borrower’s role consists of providing the information necessary for the 
platform to carry out credit checks and to pay a set-up fee of between £40 and 
£325, a proportion of which goes to the provision fund. They must also make their 
monthly loan repayments. 
Capacity of P2P borrowers 
The platform does not state this. 
P2P borrowers’ reliance on the platform 
The platform determines the borrower’s risk rating on which basis their borrowing 
depends. 
P2P borrowers’ responsibilities 
The platform does not state this. 
 
Folk 2 Folk 
P2P lenders’ role 
P2P lenders on Folk 2 Folk must apply to lend. They can choose ‘Greenlight 
Lending’ which leaves the platform to automatically commit their funds to the first 
available lending, or choose from a list of available lending opportunities on the 
platform website.  
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The lenders choose to lend to one borrower or to a number of different borrowers. 
So they bear some active responsibility for the diversification of their investment, 
unlike on other platforms where this is embedded within the model by 
automatically dividing the lenders’ money between multiple loans. 
The P2P lenders also have to monitor the loans to know what is going on with 
the loans and repayments using the lender dashboard. 
Capacity of P2P lender 
Folk 2 Folk targets both individual and business lenders. Individuals lend on a 
personal basis and can be retail, high net worth or sophisticated investors. They 
can also be a self-invested personal pension (SIPP). 
The platform describes lenders as essentially high net worth individuals with 
liquidity but wanting to earn income from it. 
Dependency on the platform 
P2P lenders rely on the platform to secure the funds with a mortgage over the 
property. They also rely on the platform to perform credit and security checks. 
P2P lender’s self-reliance/liabilities 
The P2P lender places his/her capital at risk with no compensation scheme to act 
as a financial safety net in case things go wrong. 
*P2P borrower’s role 
To use the platform, borrowers must complete an application form. They secure 
the loan on property and must make their monthly repayments. 
Capacity of P2P borrowers 
Borrowers tend to borrow in a personal capacity e.g. to purchase a second 
property, refurbish a house or purchase an investment property. 
The platform describes borrowers as essentially high net worth individuals in 
need of liquidity. 
P2P borrowers’ reliance on the platform 
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Although lenders are discouraged from serving notice on a loan, they have the 
right to give three months’ notice. During which time the platform will try to find a 
replacement lender. Borrowers are reliant on the platform’s ability to do this. 
P2P borrowers’ self-reliance/liabilities 
The loan is secured on a mortgage over a property. If the lender withdraws from 
the loan agreement and the platform cannot find a replacement, the borrower is 
responsible for repaying the loan/lender. 
The platforms do not provide a brokerage service where they introduce the 
lenders and borrowers to each other, helps them negotiate terms and then step 
out of the picture altogether. Rather, they maintain a vital role and presence after 
the loan has been agreed and started. 
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